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WHAT REALLY HAPPENED 
AT PARIS 



WHAT REALLY HAPPENED 
AT PARIS 

THE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE, 1918-1919 

BY AMERICAN DELEGATES 



EDITED BY 



EDWARD MANDELL HOUSE 

UNITED STATES COMMISSIONER PLENIPOTENTIARY 

AND 

CHARLES SEYMOUR, Litt.D. 

PROFESSOR or HISTORY IN YALE UNIVERSITY 



WITH MAPS 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1921 



n^^" 
^\\1 



Copyright, 1921, by 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



Published May, 1921 



SCRIBNER PRESS 



acU6i7031 



IN EXPLANATION 

When the Academy of Music in Philadelphia was taken 
under lease, in the autumn of 1920, for a term of years 
by a group of public-spirited citizens, it was for the pur- 
pose of acquiring the building so as to dedicate it to the 
public good. Its sixty-three years of service had given 
the Academy a wonderful history in which every Presi- 
dent of the United States since Frankhn Pierce had 
figured: practically every great orator, artist, and dis- 
tinguished publicist in the United States and every 
illustrious visitor from foreign lands had appeared on 
its stage. 

It was determined to recreate the Foyer in the build- 
ing into a beautiful auditorium of intimate size which 
would serve as a Public Forum. In discussing this proj- 
ect with Colonel Edward M. House, he expressed his 
conviction that the time had come to tell the American 
public, for the first^time, the inside story of the Peace 
Conference at Paris. It was decided that instead of 
following the customary method of publishing the ma- 
terial, it should be first spoken in a series of talks to be 
given in the Academy Foyer and thus the idea of dedi- 
cating the room as a public forum would be launched. 
Fifteen of the most salient subjects of the Conference 
were selected, and fifteen of the most authoritative 
speakers chosen, and a series of fifteen weekly talks 
explaining "What Really Happened at Paris" was 
announced. Tickets were sold only for the entire series, 
and when the first talk was delivered every seat in the 
auditorium was sold to the most intellectually distin- 
guished audience ever brought together in Philadelphia. 

The series was given under the auspices of The Phila- 
delphia Public Ledger, and it was arranged that each 
talk should be sent out in advance of delivery to the 



vi IN EXPLANATION 

subscribing newspapers of the United States and Europe 
of its syndicate for simultaneous publication the morning 
after its delivery in the Academy Foyer. By this method, 
the word spoken in Philadelphia reached, the following 
morning, a world audience. 

On Friday evening, December lo, 1920, the first talk 
was delivered and the series was continued for fifteen 
consecutive weeks. Each talk was limited to one hour; 
and was followed by a half-hour questionnaire, giving 
those in the audience who desired the opportunity to ask 
any relevant question not covered in the speaker's talk. 
Each talk began promptly at half -after eight o'clock, 
when the doors were closed and no late-comers were 
admitted, insuring uninterrupted attention for the 
speakers. By this method the sessions never exceeded, 
in time, an hour and a half. 

The talks were successful from the first. No series of 
such length on one subject extending for fifteen weeks 
had ever been attempted in Philadelphia, and some mis- 
givings were felt as to the sustaining public interest; the 
result proved that never in the history of Philadelphia 
had a series been given in which not only had the interest 
been sustained, but had constantly deepened. 

Edward W. Bok 

President 
The Academy of Music Corporation. 

Philadelphia, March, 192 1. 



FOREWORD 

The voice of the United States during the memorable 
Conference at Paris in 1918-19 finds its first compre- 
hensive and authoritative expression within these pages. 
Here is told, by those who sat in conference day by day 
with the heads of states, the story of the negotiations 
which brought about the Peace with the Central Empires. 
Here are the facts and not the rumors and gossip picked 
up like crumbs from a bountiful table, and which many 
put into books in order to meet the hunger for informa- 
tion concerning one of the momentous events in history. 

The final decisions rested with others, but these de- 
cisions were largely based upon facts and opinions fur- 
nished by those who tell the story of "What Really 
Happened at Paris." The narrators do not always agree 
as to the value of the results, nor in their estimates of 
the men who brought them about, but this lends an 
interest to the account which it could not otherwise 
have. 

There were great and complex characters at this 
gathering of the world's foremost men, and there is a 
wide difference of opinion as to their purposes and their 
mental and temperamental equipments. Statesmen, sol- 
diers, men of the sea, artists, financiers, and writers of 
all kinds and sorts touched elbows with one another. 
The settlements to be made were interwoven with every 



viii FOREWORD 

human interest, and brought the best from every land 
to participate in or advise as to the final adjustment. 

There were some who towered above their fellows, and 
these became centres of groups from which policies and 
opinions radiated. Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, 
Orlando, Paderewski, Venizelos, Smuts, Makino, and 
Wellington Koo were among the statesmen having dis- 
tinct and enthusiastic followers. Clemenceau stands 
out the clearest-cut figure of them all. No doubt or 
mystery surrounds him. He fought in peace as he fought 
in war, openly, intelligently, and courageously for his 
beloved France. No one in that notable gathering had 
so well within grasp the gift of accomphshment. He 
inspired the affection of many — the admiration of all. 

Paderewski and Wilson had about them something of 
romance and spirituahty lacking in others. The one had 
gathered together the fragments of a broken kingdom and 
had moulded it into a virile and hberty-Ioving repubhc. 
He came as the spokesman of an ancient people whose 
wrongs and sorrows had stirred the sympathies of an 
entire world. This artist, patriot, and statesman awak- 
ened the Congress to do justice to his native land, and 
sought its help to make a great dream true. His fervored 
eloquence brought about the renascence of Poland, and 
added new lustre to a famous name. 
"""Wilson, on the other hand, had aroused the conscience 
and aspirations of mankind, and when he stood at the 
peak of his influence and power, there was never a more 
commanding figure, for he was then the spokesman 



FOREWORD ix 

of the moral and spiritual forces of the world. His work 
at Paris was tireless and unselfish, and it was not until 
he returned to America to render an account of his 
stewardship that disaster overtook him, and wrecked the 
structure built in co-operation with our alhes with such 
painstaking care. 

Until Wilson went to Europe he did not know how deep 
and terrible were her wounds, or how close they came to 
us. Until he could see for himself he could not realize 
how a torn and distracted Continent was seeking help 
from the only source from which help could come. If 
there was ever need for a "Good Samaritan" surely 
the time was then. He voiced the unselfish and coura- 
geous spirit of America, and our hearts quickened as the 
pent-up emotions of many peoples broke forth to do 
him and our country homage. 

But that day is gone, gone in that hour when we left 
our task unfinished. It was a volte face for which we 
have dearly paid in the world's esteem. If our gallant 
dead who lie beside their comrades in the fields of France 
had done hkewise at Chateau-Thierry and the Argonne, 
we could not have reached our high estate. Never 
before has a nation tossed aside so great a heritage so 
lightly. 

But even now there springs to hfe the faith that we 
may yet recover something of what we have lost, and if 
this book can add to this purpose it will meet the hopes 
and expectations of its authors. 

Edward M. House. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

In Explanation by Edward W. Bok .... v 

Foreword by Edward Mandell House ... vii 

I. Preparations for Peace i 

SIDNEY EDWARD MEZES 
^ (College of the City of New York) Chief of Territorial Sec- 

tion, American Peace Commission. 

II. The Atmosphere and Organization of the Peace 

Conference 15 

clive day 

(Yale University) Chief of the Balkan Division, American •' 

Peace Commission. 

III. The New Boundaries of Germany .... 37 

CHARLES HOMER HASKINS 

(Harvard University) Chief of Division of Western Europe, 

American Peace Commission. 

IV. Poland 67 

ROBERT HOWARD LORD 

(Harvard University) Chief of Polish Division, American 

Peace Commission. 

V. The End of an Empire: Remnants of Austria- 
Hungary 87 

charles seymour 

(Yale University) Chief of Austro-Hungarian Division, 

American Peace Commission. 

VI. FlUME AND THE ADRIATIC PrOBLEM 112 

DOUGLAS WILSON JOHNSON 

(Columbia University) Chief of Division on Boundaries, 

American Peace Commission. 

VII. Constantinople and the Balkans 140 

ISAIAH BOWMAN 

(American Geographical Society) Chief Territorial Adviser, 
American Peace Commission. 
xi 



xii CONTENTS 

PAGr 

VIII. The Armenian Problem and the Disruption of 

Turkey 176 

WILLIAM linn WESTERMANN 

(Cornell University) Chief of Near Eastern Division, Ameri- 
can Peace Commission. 

IX. The Protection of Minorities and Natives in 

Transferred Territories 204 

MANLEY OTTMER HUDSON 

(Harvard University) Legal i\dviser, American Peace Com- 
mission. 

X. The Trial of the Kaiser 231 

JAMES BROWN SCOTT 

Legal Adviser, American Peace Commission. 

XI. Reparations 259 

THOMAS WILLIAM LAMONT 

Economic Adviser, American Peace Commission. 

XII. The Economic Settlement 291 

ALLYN ABBOTT YOUNG 

(Harvard University) Economic Adviser, American Peace 

Commission. 

XIII. The Labor Clauses of the Treaty . . . . 319 

SAMUEL GOMPERS 

Chairman Commission of International Labor Legislation, 

Paris Peace Conference. 

- XIV. The Economic Administration During the Armi- 
stice 336 

herbert hoover 
Director-General of Relief. 

XV. The Atlantic Fleet in the Great War . . 348 

HENRY THOMAS MAYO 
Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. 

XVI. The Problem of Disarmament .... 370 

TASKER HOWARD BLISS 

Military Representative of the United States on the Supreme 
War Council and Commissioner Plenipotentiary at the Paris 
Peace Conference. 



CONTENTS xll'i 



PAGE 



XVII. The Making of the League of Nations . . . 398 

DAVID hunter miller 

Legal Adviser, American Peace Commission. 

XVIII. The Versailles Peace in Retrospect .... 425 

EDWARD MANDELL HOUSE 

Representative of the United States on the Armistice Com- 
mission. Commissioner Plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace 
Conference. 

APPENDIX 

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF QUESTIONS ASKED AND ANSWERS 
GIVEN AFTER THE LECTURES IN PHILADELPHIA 

III. THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 447 

IV. POLAND 449 

V. THE END OF AN EMPIRE: REMNANTS OF AUSTRIA-HUN- 
GARY 452 

VI. FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 457 

VII. CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 461 

VIII. THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM AND THE DISRUPTION OF 

TURKEY 465 

ix. the protection of minorities and natives in 

transferred territories [69 

x. the trial of the kaiser 475 

xi. reparations 481 

xiii. the labor clauses of the treaty 485 

xv. the atlantic fleet in the great war .... 49o 

xvi. the problem of disarmament 495 

xvii. the making of the league of nations . . . 504 

Index 509 



LIST OF MAPS 

PACK 

Germany — Showing the New Boundaries and the Dispositions 

of Territory Made by the Peace Conference . . 50 and 5 1 

Poland — Showing Arrangements and Dispositions of Territory 

Made by the Peace Conference 76 

Map Showing the Dispositions of the Territories of the Former 

Austrian Empire by the Peace Conference . . . . 104 

The Balkan Countries, Showing the Changes Determined by 

the Peace Conference 167 

Map Showing the Dispositions Made by the Peace Conference 

of the Territories of the Former Turkish Empire . , . 199 



Vgf. 



I 

PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 
by sidney edward mezes 

The Inquiry 

In September, 1917, five months after the United 
States entered the war, Colonel House, at the request of 
President Wilson, began to gather a body of experts to 
collect and collate data that might be needed eventually 
at the Peace Conference. The President felt that the 
United States was especially in need of such specialists 
at the Conference because of its traditional policy of 
isolation and the consequent lack, in its governmen- 
tal departments, of a personnel thoroughly conversant, 
through intimate contact, with the inter-relations and 
internal composition of the European and Ac'dtic powers 
and their various dependencies. It was the desire of the 
President that this work of preparation should be carried 
forward with as little pubhcity as possible (hence the un- 
informing name), in order that premature expectations of 
peace should not be excited and thus, to however slight 
a degree, slow down the war-making activities of the 
nation. 

Mr. David Hunter Miller, of the New York bar, was 
made treasurer of The Inquiry, and early in 191 8 Mr. 
Walter Lippmann, previously of the editorial staff of 
the New Republic^ was named secretary. Headquarters 
were set up in the home of the American Geographical 
Society, in New York, by courtesy of its board of trustees. 



2 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Throughout the existence of The Inquiry it was under 
the supervision of Colonel House, and was in close touc^ s 
with the Department of State and the President. 

The first practical contribution of The Inquiry to the 
problems of peace was made early in 191 8, when the 
President, through Colonel House, asked for a report on 
the main outlines of an equitable settlement. This 
report, prepared by the director, treasurer, and secre- 
tary, was the basis from which the President started in 
formulating his Fourteen Points, which were later incor- 
porated in the armistice conditions imposed on Ger- 
many. This step on the part of the President fore- 
shadowed his practice at the Peace Conference in Paris, 
where the staff of The Inquiry, there known as the ter- 
ritorial and economic section of the American Commis- 
sion to Negotiate Peace, was called on for similar and 
also for more detailed and responsible assistance through- 
out the sessions of the Conference. 

Two main tasks confronted The Inquiry, the delimita- 
tion of its field of work and the selection and training of 
its personnel. The United States had had no part in a 
general peace conference, and both tasks were new to us. 
Moreover, while it was clear that the Conference would 
have to deal with settlements involving a large part of 
the world, what issues would be dealt with in various 
regions, and what regions would be excluded from con- 
sideration was far from clear. And the isolation of the 
United States and its lack of intimate interest in and 
touch with other countries, especially in the eastern 
hemisphere, left our government without any accumula- 
tion of information and with too small and scattered a 
trained personnel to deal with such information as might 
be gathered. Great Britain, France, Germany, and, to a 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 3 

lesser extent, Italy had maintained close relations, as 
their interests required, with other European countries, 
with the Turkish Empire, with colonial Africa, with the 
Far East, and with the Pacific Islands. Their foreign 
and colonial services were made up of permanent em- 
ployees who had lived in these regions, come in contact 
with their officials and leading men, and in many cases 
made reports on these lands and the peoples inhabiting 
them. Moreover, travellers, traders, and scientists were 
also available, and were intimately acquainted with those 
lands and their peoples from personal observation and 
investigation, and could correct the second-hand evi- 
dence of books and published reports by first-hand 
knowledge of eye-witnesses. No such resources were at 
our command in this country. It was only recently that 
our diplomatic and consular services had been organized 
on a permanent basis with secure tenure, and the incum- 
bents in these services had dealt chiefly with govern- 
ments and with business agencies, and had little training 
or interest in questions of geography, history, ethnology, 
economics, strategy, etc., that would be the chief con- 
siderations at the Peace Conference. And few of these 
regions had been visited more than casually, or studied 
with any thoroughness by American travellers, traders, 
or scientists. 

It was natural, under these circumstances, and in 
view of the uncertainties regarding the questions that 
would be decided at the Peace Conference, that some 
groping in the dark and some unnecessary work should 
have been undertaken. It may be interesting and eluci- 
dating to give a few instances in point. 

Would South American questions be dealt with by the 
Conference? It seemed improbable, but was not impos- 



4 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

sible, and if they should be included in the settlement 
the United States would be expected to take a leading 
part in their consideration. A careful study was there- 
fore made of all South American boundary disputes, of 
South American history, and of the land, the people, 
and the economic resources and organization of South 
America. None of this material was used at the Peace 
Conference, though it has been and will be of value to 
the Department of State. 

Would Russian questions be dealt with by the Con- 
ference? It was impossible to tell, but it seemed not 
improbable during the first half of 191 8. A systematic 
study of Russia, especially along its western borders, was 
therefore made — a study of agriculture, industry, rail- 
ways, political habits and customs, racial affiliations, and 
the like. Aside from the training the staff received from 
such work, the material collected and the conclusions 
drawn from it were of little use at the Conference, for 
Russia was not then and is not yet ripe for settlement. 

Would Africa and the islands of the Pacific come up 
for consideration? There we seemed to be on safe 
ground. Undoubtedly they would, and much data were 
collected for these regions — their geography, the simple 
tribal organizations of their backward peoples, their 
products and the value of these products to the great 
powers, the customs of the natives, the history of the 
dealings of European nations with them, and much else 
that, it was thought, might be helpful. As it turned 
out, these regions were considered by the Conference, but 
the consideration was along such general lines of political 
expediency and practicahty that the detailed data col- 
lected had little bearing on the decisions reached. 

As a final illustration, mention may be made of maps. 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 5 

Base maps were constructed for the whole of Europe and 
the Near East, and for various sections of the continent 
that would surely be involved in the settlements of the 
Conference. In volume this was one of the largest under- 
takings of The Inquiry, and it had educative value for 
its staff, aiding, as it did, toward an understanding of the 
most contentious regions the Conference had to consider. 
But at the Conference these maps were hardly used at 
all. Some of the cases containing them were not opened. 
The world series of milhonth maps proved to be sufficient 
for all needs. They constituted a sort of international 
currency, readily accessible, familiar to all participants, 
and inexpensive. 

But the bulk of the work of The Inquiry dealt with 
Mittel Europa, indeed, with the distracted areas of Cen- 
tral Europe and the Near East on either side of the 
much-heralded Hamburg-Bagdad Railway, stretching 
from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Persian Gulf 
and the Indian Ocean, and the data gathered proved to 
be indispensable when the Conference met. And as the 
spring and summer of 191 8 advanced, the exact nature 
of the data required grew clear. It became evident, 
namely, that many kinds of information bearing on the 
drawing of boundary-lines would be needed, and that no 
information that did not bear on such settlements, ex- 
cepting general economic information that would be 
needed in drafting the economic clauses of the treaty, 
would be of any value. In August, therefore, the staff 
of The Inquiry was asked to confine its consideration to 
such data, and soon thereafter the work clarified and 
definite objectives were estabfished. Only the regions 
along or adjacent to probable boundary-lines were now 
studied. Others could be dismissed from consideration. 



6 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

By the middle of October tentative boundaries for the 
whole of Mittel Europa had been worked out, and in 
November these were sent to Colonel House, who was 
then in Paris, representing our government in the armi- 
stice negotiations and the arrangements for the Peace 
Conference that followed. In January, 19 19, a "Black 
Book," illustrated by maps, was prepared for our pleni- j 
potentiaries, laying down and discussing revised boun- 
daries; and in February, after conferences with our col- 
leagues of other delegations, a "Red Book," with further 
revision, was made ready for them. With this report 
The Inquiry, renamed the Territorial Section of the 
Peace Conference, practically dissolved as an organiza- 
tion, although most of its members continued to render 
service as individuals for some months longer. 

As to personnel, the problem proved to be less diffi- 
cult than at first it threatened to be. Pohcies would, of 
course, be determined, and the culminating negotiations 
.conducted by our plenipotentiaries. The Inquiry staff" 
•would thus be limited to the role of gathering and evalu- 
ating facts, and of digesting them for prompt and handy 
use. Work of such detail could not be expected of 
statesmen and diplomats, nor would they have been 
competent for it. The need was for men expert in 
research. Consequently the staff" was in the main re- 
cruited from strong universities and colleges but also 
from among former officials, lawyers, and business men. 
The studies that were made during the winter, spring, 
nnd autumn of 191 8 in the geography, history, eco- 
nomic resources, poHtical organization and affifiations, 
ad ethnic and cultural characteristics of the peoples and 
t'^rritories in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the islands of the 
Pacific, served as tests for the selection and ehmination 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 7 

of workers ; the men making these studies and reporting 
thereon were under constant observation, and as a result 
the best fitted among them emerged and were put in 
charge of various subdivisions of the work and assigned 
groups of assistants. As a consequence, by the fall of 
19 1 8 The Inquiry was thus organized: 

Director, Dr. S. E. Mezes; College of the City of New York. 
Chief Territorial Specialist, Dr. Isaiah Bowman; American Geo- 
graphical Society.^ 
Regional Specialists: 

For the northwestern frontiers — Dr. Charles H. Haskins; Har- 
vard University. 
For Poland and Russia — Dr. R. H. Lord; Harvard University. 
For Austria-Hungary — Dr. Charles Seymour; Yale University. 
For Italian boundaries — Dr. W. E. Lunt; Haverford College. 
For the Balkans — Dr. Clive Dly; Yale University. 
For Western Asia — Dr. W. L. Westermann ; University of Wis- 
consin. 
For the Far East — Capt. S. K. Hornbeck, U. S. A. 
For Colonial Problems — Mr. George L. Beer, formerly of Colum- 
bia University. 
Economic Specialist, Dr. A. A. Young; Cornell University. 
Librarian and Specialist in History, Dr. James T. Shotwell; Co- 
lumbia University. 
Specialist in Boundary Geography, Maj. Douglas Johnson; Colum- 
bia University. 
' Chief Cartographer, Prof. Mark Jefferson; State Normal College, 
Ypsilanti, Michigan. 

Besides The Inquiry proper, and affiliated with al- 
though distinct from it, were the experts in international 
law, Mr. David Hunter Miller and Major James Brown 
Scott. 

This body of men proceeded to Paris at the opening 
of December, 191 8, except Mr. Miller, who had gone in 

1 Dr. Bowman was named executive officer in the summer of 1918, after Mr. 
Walter Lippmann resigned as secretary to undertake intelligence work for the 
army in France. 



8 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

October. In Paris they assisted the commissioners pleni- 
potentiary with data and recommendations, and them- 
selves served on commissions deahng with three types of 
problems: First, territorial; second, economic questions 
and reparation; third, international law and the League 
of Nations, as is told* more fully in later chapters. 

As it turned out, the staff of The Inquiry were con- 
cerned in Paris, as members of commissions, with deli- 
cate questions of pohcy, and it may be noted that the 
decisions which they had a part in negotiating were only 
in the rarest instances modified by the supreme council. 

Armistice Negotiations * 

When, early in October, 191 8, Bulgaria's armies crum- 
bled and she sued for peace, competent observers knew 
that the greatest of wars was ending, and the longed-for 
peace was at last in sight. Austria-Hungary, opened to 
attack from south and east, distracted by dissension, 
torn apart by revolt, could not long stand. Germany, 
too, must fall. The time and manner of her overthrow 
she might, within limits, elect. She might hold out to 
the last, and fight until spring — at the cost of frightful 
casualties and sacrifices for herself and for her enemies. 
But fall she must. The gamble for world dominion was 
lost. 

President Wilson acted at once, and within a week 
Colonel House was on his way to France to represent our 
government in the culminating armistice negotiations. 

He reached Paris barely in time to take part in settling 
the conditions to be imposed upon Austria-Hungary, 

1 Among other data, the writer has examined evidence made available by 
Colonel House, who vouches for the facts stated, but is not responsible for the 
views expressed. 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 9 

which in the meantime had applied to the Italian com- 
mander, General Diaz, for an armistice. These condi- 
tions were very severe. As in the case of Bulgaria, 
which had also applied through mihtary channels, they 
amounted to unconditional surrender, even to the point 
of allowing Allied troops to occupy the country and use 
it for military operations. Germany could be attacked 
from the south. 

In this instance Colonel House did not ask that the 
President's Fourteen Points or other policies be accepted 
in the armistice, largely because that point which affected 
Austria-Hungary, number ten, no longer apphed; it was 
not autonomy, but independence of Austria and Hungary, 
that the north and south Slavs, Rumanians, and Italians 
demanded, indeed were already asserting. The American 
representative did insist, however, in harmony with our 
government's policy, upon engagements to furnish food 
and other succor designed to alleviate the misery of the 
misguided peoples within the falling monarchy. 

But a greater decision was pending. On October 5, 
the new Chancellor of Germany, Prince Maximihan of 
Baden, speaking for the German Government, requested 
President Wilson to "take in hand the restoration of 
peace" and accepted as a basis the "program set forth 
in the President's message of January 8, 191 8, and in his 
later pronouncements." But the President would not 
undertake the task until he was assured that the German 
Government accepted the very terms laid down in his 
message and addresses, leaving for discussion only practi- 
cal details of their application, and that it was ready to 
evacuate occupied territories, and to abstain during the 
process from "acts of inhumanity, spohation, and desola- 
tion" on sea and on land. He warned Germany that 



10 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the armistice terms must give "absolutely satisfactory 
safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the 
present military supremacy ... in the field" of our armies 
and those of our associates, and further, failing to re- 
ceive satisfactory proofs of the democracy and the per- 
manence of the German Government, he wrote: "If it 
[the government of the United States] must deal with the 
mihtary masters and the monarchical autocrats of Ger- 
many now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later 
in regard to the international obligations of the German 
Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but 
surrender." 

With the situation thus clarified. President Wilson 
communicated the correspondence to the Allies, and re- 
ferred the German Government to Marshal Foch. 

It is in this setting that the Versailles Conference, 
intrusted with the heavy responsibility of exacting from 
Germany the amplest hostages for good behavior, or 
continuing the war, must be pictured. The personnel 
is interesting — Clemenceau already acclaimed Pere de la 
Victoire, the grim Tiger, sparing of words, ominous in 
his deep silences, hard and cynical save only in his devo- 
tion to France; Lloyd George, most sensitively repre- 
.'.entative and nimble-minded of the world's greater states- 
uien, who had organized disjointed Britain, and firmly 
taught her the hardest lesson for British heads, how, in 
place of muddling through, to employ foresight and pre- 
arrangement; Orlando, learned, eloquent and warm- 
hearted, who had led Italy to triumph after and in spite 
of Caporetto; and House, skilled negotiator, experienced 
and sagacious, speaking for the strongest and most 
idealistic nation, the well-trusted representative of its 
powerful President, who stood forth the first man in the 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE ii 

long annals of history to be spontaneously accepted as 
their leader by men of all nations. 

These men had met in conference before; notably, a 
year earher, when the AUies were facing their darkest 
hour, these same conferees had effected a co-ordination 
of the four nations' war-making activities, without which 
a stern armistice could not have been imposed upon 
Germany in 191 8. The four usually met in the morning 
at American headquarters, 78 rue de I'Universite, Paris, 
while in the afternoon formal conferences were held at 
Versailles, in the quarters of the Supreme War Council, 
where other notables met with them, Balfour, Milner, 
Sonnino, Venizelos, among others, and, at times, the 
military and naval chiefs as advisers. 

In asking an armistice of President Wilson and the 
Allies, and in accepting his conditions, Germany admitted 
that she had lost the war. But, as secure safeguards 
against a recurrence of indescribable horrors and world- 
wide disorganization, and as a decent approach to repair 
of countless damages wantonly inflicted — how much could 
be exacted from Germany in these respects? Victory 
for her had been all but in sight in May and June. Then 
her fall from this place of high hope had been swift and 
stunning. Her people and her leaders were in an ugly 
mood. Would they pursue Realpolitik, accepting the 
inevitable now and saving what they could from the 
wreck; or, desperate, ruthless to the last, would they, 
if they thought the terms impossibly humiliating and 
severe, elect to endure a time longer, on a desperate 
gambler's chance, and with this certainty, at least, that 
their enemies too must continue to pay in efl'ort, suffering, 
and sacrifice of lives, or else soften their conditions. 

It is easy to answer such questions now, but it was hard 



12 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

to answer them then. I can do no better than to quote 
Colonel House's description of the situation. 

"There came into our counsels at different times the mihtary and 
naval chiefs who had directed the Allied forces to victory. Foch, 
Petain, Haig, Pershing, Bliss, Benson, Wemyss, and their hke, and 
we made careful assessments of their views and advice. We were 
confronted by a situation full of possibihties for harm, full of poten- 
tiahty for good. It was our task to weigh carefully these military 
and naval opinions and accept the responsibihty for decisions. 

"The outstanding problem was to have the terms cover what must 
be practically unconditional surrender without imperihng peace 
itself. The mihtary spirit in the United States was at its height dur- 
ing this period, and this feehng could not be ignored. With the 
Entente, the situation was quite different. They were war-worn 
and war-weary. They had been bled white. Germany was retreat- 
ing in an orderly fashion and no one could say with certainty that 
she would not be able to shorten her hne and hold it for months. If 
she had done this and we had failed to make peace when she had 
accepted the President's terms there would have been a pohtical 
revolution in every AHied country save the United States. The 
people would almost of certainty have overthrown the existing gov- 
ernments and would have placed in power ministers instructed to 
reopen peace negotiations with Germany upon the basis of the Presi- 
dent's fourteen points, and with the offer of more moderate armistice 
conditions. 

"This was all known to us in Paris, and it was as delicate and dan- 
gerous a situation as was ever given to a group of diplomats to solve. 
As it was, tlie European military and naval advisers were satisfied, 
and the outcome was the ending of the world war." ^ 

Captain Paul Mantoux, then, and later at the Peace 
Conference, official interpreter, a man with a memory of 
extraordinary fidelity, throws important light on the 
views of Marshal Foch, in a letter of July 6, 1920, to 
Colonel House, from which I quote in part: 

"You asked him this question, 'Will you tell us. Marshal, solely 
from a military point of view and apart from any other consideration, 

^ The Public Ledger, November ii, 1920. 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 13 

whether you would prefer the Germans to reject or sign the armistice 
as outlined here?' 

"Marshal Foch's answer was: 'Fighting means struggHng for 
certain results (on ne fait la guerre que pour ses resultats): if the 
Germans now sign an armistice under the general conditions we have 
just determined, those results are in our possession. This being 
achieved, no man has the right to cause another drop of blood to 
be shed.' . . . 

"One of the prime ministers, I think it was Mr. Lloyd George, 
asked him what would happen if the Germans refused to sign and 
how long it would take to drive them back across the Rhine. He 
answered, opening both arms, a familiar gesture with him, 'Maybe 
four or five months — who knows?' 

"He never alluded to a final blow in the next few days when he 
brought from Versailles his draft of the mihtary terms of the armistice 
convention. He simply said this: 'The terms your mihtary advisers 
are agreed upon are those we should be in a position to enforce after 
the success of our next operation.' . . . 

"Neither the soldiers nor statesmen knew then all we have learned 
since about the condition of Germany and of the Germa^i army. 
Our losses, which were so great at the end of four years -of hbstihties, 
had become particularly heavy during the weeks of intense and con- 
tinuous fighting and marked the last stage of the war. Apart from 
purely military considerations, there was in the minds of the states- 
men a strong feehng that the populations, after showing themselves 
ready to accept every sacrifice for a just cause, would never forgive 
their leaders if they thought the fighting had been prolonged beyond 
the hmits of necessity." 

In conclusion, a word on the political clauses of the 
armistice. That the Entente finally accepted President 
Wilson's Fourteen Points with one addition and one sub- 
traction, both by the British, is known: how they were 
induced to accept and incorporate them in the armistice 
must be told elsewhere. The addition was a requirement 
that Germany make reparation for damage done to the 
civilian population of the Allies and their property by 
the aggression of Germany at sea and from the air, and 
not on land only; and this Germany was notified that 



14 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

President Wilson accepted. The subtraction reserved 
decision on point two, dealing with the freedom of the 
seas, on the ground that the phrase "the freedom of the 
seas" is open to various interpretations, some of which 
could not be accepted. 

In sum, the armistice agreement, concluding the World 
War, that took effect on the stroke of the eleventh hour 
of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of nineteen 
hundred and eighteen, constituted a substantial basis 
for a peace of justice and of healing. 



II 

THE ATMOSPHERE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE 
PEACE CONFERENCE 

BY CLIVE DAY 

As soon as the armistice had put an end to open war 
and brought peace in sight, people naturally began to 
speculate on the manner in which the terms of peace would 
be drawn. The average citizen assumed an august as- 
sembly, a sort of Parhament of the World, which would 
announce the bases of a Just and lasting settlement: 
amended territorial frontiers, reparation of damages, 
and a revised code of international law. The Allies were 
united in purpose, and were now at last in a position to 
translate into fact the ideals which would make the world 
safe for democracy. 

Over against this vague forecast of the man in the 
street it is interesting to set the picture of the Conference 
which has been drawn after the event by some of its 
critics. They picture a melodrama. Here in the gloom 
meet the three leading actors who determine the whole 
action of the play. Other figures make their entrances 
and exits, but serve merely as foils to set off the three 
great characters. These are heroic figures, great in their 
abilities and ambitions, but great also in their human 
weaknesses. The audience cannot hear their voices, 
which are so low that they do not carry across the foot- 
lights, but it follows the course of the plot by their ac- 
tions. In the last scene the critic conceives force and 
guile prevailing over the weaknesses of the character who 

15 



i6 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

should have been the hero of the play — evil triumphing 
over ineffective virtue. The spectator has been assisting 
at a tragedy. 

Between the two accounts of the Conference sketched 
above, the reader must make his choice according to his 
taste in fiction. They are both products of the imagina- 
tion, and are equally valueless for an understanding of 
what actually happened at Paris. The form of the Con- 
ference was greatly affected, without question, by the 
demand of the public for the spectacular. Each little 
country that had associated itself with the AHies against 
the Central Powers, demanded a place for its representa- 
tives in a scene adequate in dignity and impressiveness 
to the World War. Persons skilled in such matters 
arranged halls at palaces on the Quai d'Orsay and else- 
where with trappings that satisfied the senses; pictures 
were painted; the cinematograph was allowed to ap- 
proach the fringe of the assemblies. All this part of the 
Conference, designed for show, formed a protective shell, 
within which the vital parts of the organization could 
function with no regard to appearance, and with no dis- 
traction from serious business. 

The responsible directors of the Powers at war with 
Germany had realized from the beginning that a study of 
the terms of peace could not profitably be made in a de- 
bating society. Some of the Powers, for example those 
of Central America, had made contributions so shght 
and had interests so little affected, that they would cer- 
tainly not be asked to share in the preliminary dehbera- 
tions. Some of the great Powers as certainly must be 
included. At what point was the line to be drawn? It 
could readily be seen that France, England, Italy, and 
the United States would recognize no superior. Was 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 17 

Belgium or Serbia or Japan to be grouped with them 
above the others? The decision finally announced by the 
four major Powers, that they would choose but one addi- 
tional associate, Japan, inevitably gave rise to heart- 
burnings, and had a material effect on the terms of settle- 
ment. It recognized the practical political influence of 
Japan and neglected such ideal measures as are expressed 
in national spirit and sacrifice. At least it allowed the 
Conference to proceed. Two months had passed since 
the armistice was signed, and the American delegation 
had already been waiting a month for the beginning of 
organized business. 

The organ of the Conference thus established by in- 
formal negotiation of the great Powers /Was termed the 
Council, and followed the model of the Supreme Inter- 
allied War Council that had been acting on matters of 
mihtary policy at Versailles during the last part of the 
war. Two representatives of each of the five great Pow- 
ers, normally the premier and the foreign minister, com- 
posed the body and hence it came to be known as the 
Council of Ten. For more than two months (January 
13 to March 25), the Council was recognized as the official 
source of authority of the Conference. It called the 
Plenary Assembly into being, regulated the activities, 
and when it saw fit reviewed the action of that body. It 
created commissions to study special subjects in detail 
and prepare them for the consideration of the Conference. 
It had to face the questions of fact and pohcy that rose 
constantly in central and eastern Europe. 

As was to be anticipated, the Council was a somewhat 
formal body. It conducted itself with the ceremony and - 
solemnity which the world would expect of such a gather- 
ing. It had a meeting-place worthy of its dignity, in 



1 8 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the study of the French foreign minister in the palace on 
the Quai d'Orsay. Double doors on the side of entrance 
prevented the escape of any sound; high windows on the 
opposite side looked out on a formal lawn, often drenched 
with rain or covered with snow. Within, all was luxurious 
comfort. At one end of the room, with his back to an 
open fire of great logs, sat the presiding officer, Clemen- 
ceau, and near him his colleague Pichon; ranged at httle 
tables on their right and facing them were the other 
delegates; on their left were secretaries and a place where 
might be stationed officials or representatives who had to 
address the Council. A second row of chairs about the 
room gave a place in the background for special secre- 
taries of the different Powers, and for experts who might 
thus be readily consulted by their principals. Altogether 
there might be thirty individuals, more or less, in the 
room. 

Much of the business which occupied the attention of 
the Council was formal in character. The smaller states, 
excluded from its deliberations, demanded at least the 
opportunity to present to it their claims, and many hear- 
ings were granted to their representatives. Every one 
knew that the arguments and facts which they stated 
would soon be printed, and would be turned over for 
study to speciahsts, who would sift them critically and 
so prepare them for the consideration of the principal 
representatives. Every one recognized the extravagance 
and unreahty of many of the nationahst demands. To 
illustrate the artificiahty of these proceedings may be cited 
the occasion on which the claims of Albania to national 
independence were put before the Council. The Al- 
banians are a people apart, who for centuries have lived 
a free fife in their wild country, and to the present day 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 19 

have preserved the virtues and defects of a primitive 
population. Their spokesman before the Council was a 
broken-down old Turk who had no interest in Albania, 
who enjoyed no respect or following there, who got his 
place at Paris because he was wilhng to sacrifice the 
aspirations of the Albanians to the ambitions of Italy 
to extend her power across the Adriatic. He read 
from a manuscript which had doubtless been prepared 
for him, and with the contents of which he was certainly 
not famihar, for he stopped long at every page until he 
could find the continuation of his sentence on the next. 
The reading was hfeless, it seemed interminable. "How 
much longer is this going on?" asked one of the American 
plenipotentiaries, very audibly, of the interpreter. And 
all this took place while almost hourly reports were com- 
ing in of war, famine, and pestilence in stricken Europe, 
and while the people of northern Albania itself were 
fighting a desperate struggle against the harsh Serbs. 
Surely no greater contrast is conceivable than that be- 
tween the idle words which filled M. Pichon's luxurious 
study in the palace on the Quai d'Orsay and the grim 
reahty of fife in the mountains of High Albania, where 
people were being massacred by thousands. 

Such scenes as this appeared, to those who were on the 
spot as well as to those who viewed them from a distance, 
unprofitable, but they appeared inevitable. The truth 
is that people demanded of the Conference something of 
a show. Even though the meetings of the Council were 
supposed to be secret sessions, and though the subjects 
considered and action taken were announced to the pubhc, 
if at all, only by brief and formal statements, still it was 
some satisfaction to an aspirant people to know that its 
representatives had appeared before the Council, to be 



20 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

able later to read the arguments and claims that had been 
advanced, and to hear something of the manner of their 
reception. 

For spectacles, such as those indicated, the Council 
was very well fitted. The spectacular, however, is al- 
ways superficial, and when the Council was called upon 
for more substantial action, for definite policies, and for 
vigorous decisions, its weakness became apparent. A 
survey of the more serious kinds of work which the Con- 
ference was called upon to do will make more clear the 
reasons for a change in its organization. 

Some of the questions which came before it for decision 
did not admit delay. When the term of the armistice 
expired, the Council must fix the conditions on which it 
was to be renewed. Marshal Foch was summoned to 
describe the mihtary situation, and to propose arrange- 
ments which would safeguard the interests of the Allies. 
Throughout central and eastern Europe armies were 
still in the field, engaged in formal war; the Council 
must define its attitude toward the interests which they 
represented, must seek to curb the fighting and to sta- 
bihze the pohtical situation. The revolution in Russia 
presented a whole complex of problems. The Powers 
found themselves in a labyrinth, in which, turn and 
twist as they might, they found ahvays the path to the 
outlet blocked before them. Revolution in Hungary 
added to their difficulties. Constantly, moreover, they 
must seek to further the work of salvaging what could 
be saved from the wreck of Europe. Mr. Hoover 
would appear before the Council with proposals for 
relief which involved intricate questions of shipping and 
finance and raised often also questions of a mihtary 
and pohtical kind. 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 21 

; The work of the Council cannot be appreciated justly 
without recognizing the burden of the administrative 
duties which were imposed upon it. Assembled to draw 
up terms of peace, it found itself still in the midst of war, 
and faced by conditions which demanded active treatment 
if society were to be saved from dissolution. Whether 
it would or not it had for a time to attempt to govern a 
large part of Europe, managing affairs which in a modern 
state are handled by organized departments of foreign 
affairs, of war, of commerce, of finance. According to 
general opinion the Council managed this administrative 
business rather badly. Indeed, there would be occasion 
for surprise if it had succeeded; even the Council of Four 
later did not achieve a notable success in this part of 
its work. Whatever be the critic's Judgment on the Con- 
ference as an executive he will be unjust if he estimates 
the merit of its more permanent contributions without 
taking into account the strain upon its attention of this 
current business, which constantly distracted it from 
constructive work. 

Besides the questions coming before the Council de- 
manding administrative action, it had, if it were to reach a 
settlement, to determine problems of two kinds, namely, 
problems of fact and problems of policy. The principles 
of settlement had been enunciated by the President, and, 
with certain modifications, had been accepted both by 
the Allied Powers and by the Central Powers. Most 
of these principles, however, were expressed in general 
terms. Agreement upon them enabled the Powers to 
stop fighting, but did not enable them to draw up definite 
terms of peace. What did the President mean, for exam- 
ple, when he said that "a readjustment of the frontiers 
of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable 



22 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

lines of nationality? What were these lines, which for an 
indefinite future were to fix the boundaries of Italy and of 
neighboring states? The President himself would cer- 
tainly have refused to define them, if he had been asked 
to draw them on a map. He would have done as he did 
later when the question of the Armenian frontiers was 
referred to him for settlement. He would have assem- 
bled experts, whose competence and impartiality he 
trusted, would have told them to study the region and to 
draw the best fine they could, and when he had satisfied 
himself by discussion and reflection that this line was the 
best, he would have proposed it for acceptance. 

Even this process would have involved not only a de- 
termination of the facts in the region in question, but 
also a decision on questions of policy. Rarely does a 
single line present all the advantages of a perfect frontier. 
Even if nationahty be made the only criterion, rarely 
are the lines of nationality so "clearly recognizable" that 
they may be said to draw themselves, and still more rarely 
will such fines, if drawn, satisfy the other desiderata 
expressed or imphed in the President's addresses of a 
just and lasting peace. A decision on the merits of al- 
ternative frontiers involves not merely a knowledge of 
details, but also a judgment on the relative importance 
of different human interests, and a prophetic insight into 
the future of man's development. 

If it be difficult for a single individual, supplied with 
all available knowledge and power, to reach a decision 
in a matter of this kind, imagine how much the difficulty 
is intensified when several individuals must agree upon 
the decision, when each has his individual standard of 
judgment, when some have views which to the others 
seem clouded or distorted by individual interests. If 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 23 

agreement is to be reached in these circumstances, it 
will almost certainly be by a process of compromise, in 
which A yields his position at one part of the frontier, 
to get the adherence of B to his line at another part, or 
A yields his Hne entire in one part of the world, to get B 
to accept his line in a distant region. This process of 
barter is, of course, offensive to the idealist. When the 
result is analyzed in detail many perversions of justice 
will appear. The result must be judged as a whole, if 
it is to be judged fairly. And the critic must also con- 
sider not whether the actual decision is as good as one 
which he might propose, but whether it is better than no 
decision at all. 

For the determination of matters of fact the Council 
of Ten was manifestly ill adapted. It lacked the techni- 
cal preparation and intimate acquaintance with detail 
which were needed for the effective investigation of facts 
in the many parts of its great field. The Council of Ten 
proved also unfitted to settle the serious questions of 
poHcy, which involved both its administrative and its 
legislative functions. It could not follow a definite 
plan in dealing with Russian problems, and it could not 
clear the way for a settlement of the fundamental terri- 
torial and economic problems, until the great Powers had 
arrived at a common understanding on the issues in which 
there was a grave divergence of view. M. Pichon's 
study offered a noble setting for a spectacle, but con- 
sidered as an office for the conduct of practical business 
it was a failure. 

There were too many people in the room. Secretaries 
and speciaHsts served a useful purpose in the eyes of their 
principals, but to the eyes of the principals of other coun- 
tries they appeared as a crowd of hangers-on, unknown 



24 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

to them personally, possibly dishonest or indiscreet, 
before whom the principals were not inclined to discuss 
delicate questions with the entire candor that the situa- 
tion demanded. 

There were too many states represented in the Council. 
The Japanese delegates were diligent in attendance, and 
(unlike some others) kept their eyes open, however tedi- 
ous were the proceedings. When a territorial question 
was under discussion they peered at their maps with in- 
scrutable gravity. One never knew, however, whether 
their maps were right side up, and one felt pretty 
certain, anyway, that it made no difference whether 
they were or not. The Japanese were not interested in 
the European questions that composed most of the busi- 
ness. Nor were the Italians equally concerned in all 
parts of the field. Keenly, sometimes passionately, in- 
terested in questions that touched Italy directly, they 
were complaisant and sometimes almost indifferent when 
the topic was remote. 

There were too many delegates apportioned to each 
state. The panel system allowed substitutions and a 
shifting membership, by which individuals were granted 
the compliment of a seat at the Council, but by which the 
compactness and the continuity of the Council itself were 
impaired. Normally the chief of each state was accom- 
panied to the Council meetings by his foreign minister. 
The arrangement assumed an equality of the two officials 
which did not in fact exist. The comparison involves no 
question of the actual merit and abihty of the foreign 
ministers. Sonnino was probably a stronger man than 
his principal, Orlando, more determined than he to press 
Itahan demands, and certainly better equipped for the 
business in that he could urge his claims in French or 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 25 

English with equal facility. "Which language shall I 
speak?'* he inquired on one occasion; "it is all the same 
to me." Balfour appeared, unfortunately, to think that 
he shared this advantage, but even when he talked French, 
he presented ideas that were always interesting, if they 
sometimes inchned to the abstract and doctrinaire. It 
was a pleasure to hear him analyze and criticise the no- 
tion of "autonomy,'* when that vague concept had crept 
into the discussion. No one could surpass Lansing in the 
logic and force with which he could present a legal argu- 
ment. But abihty, even first-rate abihty, did not count 
when it was in the second place in the delegation. Lan- 
sing might convince every one else in the room, but if he 
did not convince Wilson, who had given him his place 
and who himself was (in the words to the treaty) "acting 
in his own name and by his own proper authority," his 
argument profited nothing; it hindered, rather than 
helped, the progress of deliberation. An observer got 
the impression that in fact the principal representatives 
of the American and British delegations were less open 
to suggestions from their foreign ministers than to those 
that came from any other source; they appeared openly 
to resist any appearance of dependence on their colleagues. 
As to Clemenceau, he did not allow the existence of 
Pichon to inconvenience him in the shghtest degree; 
he used him and abused him without any recognition of 
the distinction. 

The Council of Ten recognized early that it was not 
quahfied to investigate the intricate facts which underlay 
most of its problems. Within a fortnight after its open- 
ing session it began therefore to estabhsh special com- 
missions, to which it referred questions as they arose, 
for preliminary study and report. For example, after 



26 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

hearing the claims advanced by the Rumanian representa- 
tive the Council voted: "The questions raised by the 
declarations of M. Bratianu on the territorial interests of 
the Rumanians in the Peace Settlement shall be referred 
for examination, in the first instance, to a committee of 
speciahsts composed of two delegates for each of the 
following Powers: the United States of America, the 
British Empire, France, and Italy. The duty of this 
committee will be to study the questions to be settled, 
to condense them in as narrow hmits as possible and to 
propose a solution for an equitable settlement. This 
committee may hear representatives of the peoples con- 
cerned." 

The advantage of this process, by which the supreme 
organ of the Conference was reheved of the prehminary 
processes of investigation and discussion, and could 
devote itself to the decision of the larger questions, 
was obvious. Commissions grew rapidly in number. 
According to the calculation of Andre Tardieu, fifty-two 
of them were at work before the treaty with Germany was 
signed, and these fifty-two commissions held, altogether, 
one thousand six hundred and forty-six sessions. Dis- 
persed and secluded, these commissions attracted in 
general little attention. They had no proper authority 
except that of recommendation. They had, in fact, im- 
mense influence on the outcome of the Conference. 
Without them the terms of peace would certainly have 
been very different, if indeed they could have been 
written at all. 

Some of these commissions were intrusted with ques- 
tions so important that their contributions to the settle- 
ment appear positively greater than those of the Council 
of Ten itself. At the head of the list comes, of course, 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 27 

the commission on the League of Nations. The body 
which formulated the Covenant of the League had a mem- 
bership which (unlike that of the Council) was not fixed 
by any official convention, but was determined by a more 
personal standard. Under the presidency of Wilson it 
reached out to include great men of the small Powers, 
such as Venizelos of Greece and Dmowski of Poland, and 

"men who are recognized as intellectual and moral leaders 
in the greatest empires, hke Lord Robert Cecil, General 
Smuts, and Leon Bourgeois. If the opinions of those who 
beheve in the future of the League of Nations are to be 
trusted, the work done by this commission in its sessions 

. at the Hotel Crillon, is destined to be more fruitful, if at 
the time it seems less decisive, than that accomplished 
by any other organ of the Conference. Another com- 
mission, whose work was essentially constructive, was 
that on International Legislation on Labor, including such 
representative spokesmen on the broad and difficult 
problems that it covered as Gompers of the United 
States, Barnes of England, and Vandervelde of Belgium. 
Other commissions studied the reform of international 
commercial relations, in the case of customs tariffs, 
shipping regulations, waterways, and railroads. Every 
student of the history of commerce knows how seriously 
the world has suffered from the perversions of policy 
in these matters, and will recognize in the hsts of members 
of the commissions some of the names of those most 
competent to initiate reform. 

Two commissions, those on reparations and on finan- 
cial questions, occupy a place apart by reason of the 
pecuhar gravity of the questions intrusted to them. 
Some of the ablest men in banking and in business, some 
leaders from the academic and some from the official 



28 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

world, were associated in these commissions in the en- 
deavor to determine the damages inflicted on the people 
of the Allied countries in the war, to decide upon the 
measure and means of reparation, and to manage the 
financial questions that were incidental to the restora- 
tion of peace. Finally, a whole group of commissions 
was estabhshed to study the territorial questions involved 
in the peace settlement, with a central committee above 
them to correlate their work. To these territorial com- 
missions the European states contributed mainly men 
trained in their foreign offices and in their diplomatic 
corps; the British Government compfimented some of 
its colonial premiers with seats, and the United States 
was ordinarily represented by college professors, and the 
fike, who, as members of the The Inquiry, had been 
studying the special questions with a view to the even- 
tual discussion of terms of peace. 

The commissions varied greatly in size. The four great 
Western Powers had always one or two representatives 
apiece; Japan had a seat on those commissions in the 
work of which it felt a particular interest, and other 
Powers had seats on the larger commissions. Procedure 
resembled that of the Council. Members sat about a 
table in designated places, and spoke on any topic in an 
order fixed by the alphabetical arrangement of countries; 
all the important commissions had the usual apparatus 
of secretaries, interpreter, and stenographer, and printed 
in their minutes the substance of the discussion. Some 
of the sessions were formal; one of the Powers would 
introduce an expert to present a studied argument, 
or representatives of outside interests would be heard. 
Most of the sessions were distinctly practical and busi- 
nesslike. The field of interest was specific and limited, 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 29 

and each state had picked for its members those who were 
thought to be most competent to represent it in that 
field. Views of the facts and of the proper settlement 
usually varied greatly when they were first presented. 
Discussion and criticism often cleared away mistakes and 
misunderstandings, and led to an agreement based on 
genuine conviction. Sometimes they did no more than 
to define more sharply the differences, but also served to 
suggest some compromise on which both parties could 
agree if neither could have his own way. Sometimes, 
particularly when facts were obscure and interests sharply 
divergent, agreement proved to be impossible, and the 
commission would have to submit a divided report. 

The commissions had necessarily not merely to de- 
termine facts, but also to decide questions of policy in 
working out their problems. Representatives of some 
of the European Powers, notably Italy, were bound by 
strict instructions, which required them to work for a 
particular solution; their policy was determined by 
powers above. Delegates of the United States were 
notably free from such influence; they could share with 
their plenipotentiaries the responsibihty for choosing a 
certain course, but were encouraged in general to make 
their own decisions, with a view to the facts in their own 
field, and with Kttle regard to outside influences. As 
time passed and the need of reaching some definite con- 
clusion grew more urgent, the process of compromise 
became prominent as a means of adjusting differences of 
opinion which would not yield to argument. 

The final stage in the work of a commission was occu- 
pied with the preparation of its report. This gave in 
condensed form the salient facts, the principles followed, 
and the conclusions reached. Its most important con- 



30 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

tent was a series of draft articles, embodying the results 
of the deliberations, and proposed for inclusion in the 
treaty of peace. The commission drew up these arti- 
cles with the greatest care, and with the assistance of 
specialists skilled in drafting. The leader of these special- 
ists, M. Fromageot, declared modestly that he was a 
mere ** machine a ecrire," to be employed by the com- 
mission in recording its resuhs, but he early gave evidence 
of a feature not common in typewriters; the machine 
locked if one attempted to write with it anything that 
was not perfectly clear and specific. These draft articles 
supplied the materials with which the treaties were built 
up. Only in rare cases were amendments or additions 
made by some superior organ of the Conference. 

The estabhshment of the commissions relieved the 
Council of Ten of a considerable part of the business 
which it would otherwise have had to conduct, but did 
not improve its capacity to deal with the problems that 
remained within its province. The weakness of the 
Council became actually more apparent as it ceased to be 
occupied with minor matters and ceremonial audiences, 
and faced at closer range the great questions that were 
beginning to take shape. Only one of the questions, 
that relating to the eastern frontier of Germany and the 
Polish outlet by way of Danzig, actually came before the 
Council for settlement. In the background, however, 
were other questions even more serious: the amount and 
form of the reparation payments, the position of France 
on the Rhine frontier, the claims of Italy in the Adriatic 
region and of Japan in the Far East. Some of the ques- 
tions were being debated in commissions, some were dis- 
cussed only in private conferences. They affected such 
grave interests, and they were so entangled with each 
other and with the position to be accorded the League of 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 31 

Nations, that they must be settled before the Conference 
could proceed to frame terms of peace; but they were 
questions too difFicuIt and too delicate to be intrusted 
to the Council of Ten. The Council, estabhshed as the 
supreme power of the Conference, appeared now as an 
obstacle blocking the way. It was set aside in the sum- 
mary and informal manner which characterized all the 
vital acts of the Conference. Wilson, Lloyd George, 
Clemenceau, and Orlando ceased to attend the sessions 
of the Council of Ten and met as a group by themselves. 
The Council of Four took control of the Conference. 

Events had in fact long been tending toward this con- 
summation. During the second month of the Conference, 
the heads of the three most important Powers had been 
absent from the Council. Lloyd George was occupied in 
England by questions of domestic politics; Wilson was 
absent from February 14 on his trip to America; and 
Clemenceau was shot on February 19. The Council of 
Ten had an opportunity to realize how helpless it was to 
reach decisions without the individuals in whom authority 
and power centred. The Council continued its sessions 
with representatives replacing the absent members, but 
did httle more than mark time. The serious business of 
this period was conducted either in the commissions or 
over the telegraph wires and in private conversations at 
Paris. When the representation of the heads of states 
was completed again by the return of Wilson on March 
14, the practice of private conference persisted. The 
three weeks following were a critical period, culminating 
in the announcement from Wilson on April 7 that prepara- 
tions had been made for him to leave France. Following 
on the arrangement of the differences between Wilson, 
Clemenceau, and Lloyd George, which permitted the 
settlement of terms of the German treaty, came the Adri- 



32 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

atic crisis and the departure of the Italians for Rome on 
April 24. To submit to the old Council of Ten the points 
which divided the great Powers in this period would have 
been an idle form. Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and 
Orlando were bound by considerations of home politics 
to fight for certain terms of settlement which they had 
given their peoples reason to expect. Wilson was bound 
to fight for terms conforming to the principles which he 
had published. Agreement was possible only by way of 
compromise. Compromise was possible only as each 
individual became convinced that he was getting the 
most he could, and that what he got was better than the 
nothing which would ensue if he declined altogether to 
agree. He might hope for guidance in this matter by 
soHtary reflection or by intimate discussion with personal 
advisers, but he could hope for no help from the formal 
arguments, the platitudes, the sedulous shrinking from 
the facts, which would have characterized a discussion 
of the subject in the old Council of Ten. No one in that 
body at this stage of action would have dared to tell the 
truth. His fragment of truth would have been quoted, 
and would have appeared to half the world as a monstrous 
perversion. An attempt to realize at this time the ideal 
of "open covenants openly arrived at" might readily 
have started another war, and would certainly have de- 
layed interminably the agreement on terms of peace. 

Lacking the chiefs of state, the old Council lost its 
former prestige and authority. It continued to sit now 
as a Council of Five and did useful work as a sort of 
superior commission, considering the reports of the com- 
missions which it had created and transmitting them with 
its findings to the Four. It bore itself with dignity in a 
situation which was not agreeable. If the Five did noth- 
ing definitive, at least they did it very well. Of the 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 33 

sessions, however, which I was privileged to attend, there 
was but one in which I noted on the part of the Five a 
real relish for the work in hand. The Four, busied with 
matters of greater moment, had directed the Five to send 
a telegram ordering two of the AIHes to remove their 
troops from a district in central Europe where they were 
in conflict. The action proposed appeared ill-advised. 
Further, was it a duty of the Five to send telegrams for 
their superiors? ** We are not messenger-boys," remarked 
one of the plenipotentiaries. At last a subject had arisen 
on which the Council of Five could express itself with 
some decision; and it considered the manner in which 
the Four had best be corrected with a zest that at other 
times was lacking. 

An indication of the relative activity of the different 
councils is afforded by the statistics compiled by Tardieu. 
The Council of Ten held seventy-two sessions, the Coun- 
cil of Ministers of Foreign Affairs ("the Five") held 
thirty-nine sessions, the Council of Four held one hundred 
and forty-five sessions. In comparison with this last 
and smallest council the others fade into insignificance. 
The Ten fell into the background, the Five never emerged 
from obscurity, the Four ruled the Conference in the 
culminating period when its decisions took shape. 

The Council of Four had begun in purely personal and 
informal conversations, and preserved its privacy in 
many of its later sessions. It needed at most the service 
of an interpreter, and of a secretary who could be called 
to make in due form a minute of some decision. To 
assume on this account, however, as some have done, that 
the treaties were drawn by the four heads of states and 
that the terms were fixed by these four individuals, is 
an extraordinary perversion of the facts. 

Most of the articles in the treaties were taken bodily 



34 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

without change from the reports of commissions. Some 
> serious problems, it is true, notably those relating to the 
y Itahan frontier, had not been referred to any commis- 
sion; decision on these problems was reached in the pri- 
vate sessions of the Four. Further, there were questions 
of policy in the field of the commissions which were too 
grave to be definitely settled by them, and which were 
still in flux when the Four were ready to hear and act 
upon their reports. Doubtless the Four discussed these 
matters in their secret sessions, and they sometimes de- 
cided them there. On the other hand, they followed 
often the practice of bidding their special advisers to 
attend the session, as the Council of Ten had done, in- 
viting suggestions from their advisers as the question was 
discussed, and frankly relying upon their guidance in the 
effort to arrange the best settlement. At these later 
meetings in the beautiful salon of the President's resi- 
dence, the attending delegates from the commissions were 
indeed given a position of far greater prominence than 
was ever conceded them at the sessions of the Council of 
Ten. They were called from the back row of chairs to 
seats immediately by their principals, and conferred 
openly with them. 

It is impossible to apportion exactly the influence on 
the final settlement of the many individuals and groups 
who contributed to it. The critic of the proceedings was 
incHned at the time, and is still inclined, to take for 
granted the terms which were fixed by the commissions, 
and to direct his attention to those questions which had 
not been studied, or at least had not been settled, in the 
commissions, or the settlement of which was revised in 
the Council of Four. Judging the matter from this stand- 
point, he exalts the power of the Four, and ascribes to 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 35 

them all the credit or blame for the treaties. In truth 
the Four did take to themselves the responsibility of 
decision. They had the courage to determine one ques- 
tion in comparison with which any other question seems 
a matter of detail: they decided that there should be a 
treaty ready for the signature of the Germans at a date 
pretty definitely fixed. Their power to determine just 
what the terms of that treaty should be is commonly 
much exaggerated. 

Even those parts of the final settlement which had not 
been fixed in finished form by the commissions had been 
studied and discussed for months by experts officially 
designated to investigate them. No question was abso- 
lutely decided by this process. No question could be 
subjected to this process, however, without a narrowing 
of the field of choice in which the final decision was likely 
to He. The representative of a great Power had every 
reason to follow the guidance of his expert advisers, 
and would depart from it only in the rare cases in which 
considerations of higher policy, concealed fiom his sub- 
ordinates, made a sacrifice in one part of the field appear 
to him the inevitable means of gaining a greater benefit 
in another part. Cases of this kind were, at least as 
regards the American representative, extraordinarily few. 

It is interesting to speculate on the concealed activities 
of the Council of Four, and particularly on the interplay 
of the personaHties of its members. If one can judge 
from the impressions obtained in council meetings which 
were open to observation, Orlando must have played a 
relatively subordinate part in the general settlement. 
It seems equally clear that no one of the remaining three 
dominated the group. If one could have dominated by 
a dauntless will, it would certainly have been Clemenceau. 



36 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

If shrewd management and ingenuity in devising prac- 
ticable plans had been enough to assure control, the 
leadership would have gone to Lloyd George. If abihty 
to define and defend the aim to be kept in view had been 
the essential quahty, no one in that respect matched the 
American President. No one of the three had, in fact, 
his own way. Each has been criticised because he got 
less than was expected of him. Wilson is of the three 
the one most blamed, yet time may prove, as I beheve it 
will, that his generous devotion to ideals of the future 
contributed the most positive and most permanent fea- 
tures of the settlement. Sufficient time has already 
passed to show that some features which he opposed are 
bad, and further to make clear that these features are 
the expression of deep-rooted national prejudices, against 
which even now reason cannot combat. 

Years more will pass before real peace actually prevails. 
The war released bhnd forces in all fields of human in- 
terest, and the Powers of the world were as helpless in 
1919 to compose these forces as they had been in 19 14 
and are now in 1921. No human peace conference could 
have reheved us of all these present evils. The Confer- 
ence at Paris was eminently human, and the critic can 
readily point out features of its organization and of its 
operation which in a difi'erent and a better world would 
have been better managed. This much, at least, he must 
recognize. When compared with similar bodies in the 
past, such as the Congress of Vienna or the Congress of 
Berhn, the Paris Conference faced vastly greater problems, 
studied its problems in a more scientific way, and sought 
more earnestly to harmonize its settlement with the 
principles of justice. 



Ill 

THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 

BY CHARLES HOMER HASKINS 

The new frontiers of Germany constituted one of the 
fundamental and one of the most troublesome problems 
of the peace conference of Paris. About them waged 
the conflict of ideas between a peace of Justice and a 
peace of violence, and in them are illustrated the chief 
diflficulties which arose in giving effect to the peace of 
justice which the conference sought to establish. They 
meant the release of submerged nationalities like the 
Danes of Schleswig, and the undoing of ancient wrongs 
hke the partition of Poland, or recent acts of force hke 
the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. They in- 
volved the question of the best kind of national boun- 
daries and the meaning and limits of self-determination. 
Territorial in their nature, they were also tied up with 
matters of reparation, customs zones, national defense, 
and guarantees for the future. Though the provisions 
fixing new frontiers occupy less than one-fourth of the 
Treaty of Versailles, such matters underHe the whole 
settlement, and their history would cover a large part of 
the history of the conference. 

Fortunately for our present purpose, all this can be 
shortened and simplified. Let us take a brief view of the 
general problem and then go on to a survey of Germany's 
new boundaries in the west. The eastern or Polish 
frontier is a topic by itself, and will be discussed in 
another chapter.^ 

^ See Chapter IV. 
37 



38 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

The German Empire dates only from 1871, but its 
constituent parts have a long history. Its chief mem- 
ber was the kingdom of Prussia, which contained at the 
outbreak of the war three-fifths of the empire's area and 
population. Prussia had spread in all directions, and, 
save in Alsace-Lorraine, which belonged to the whole 
empire, the frontier problems both in the east and in the 
west were all concerned with Prussia. It was Prussia 
that had partitioned Poland, that had swallowed up the 
Left Bank of the Rhine in 1815, that had seized Schles- 
wig-HoIstein in 1864. Nearly half the area of Prussia 
had been acquired since Frederick the Great. It was 
Prussia that dominated the empire, and it was the Prus- 
sian king who, as German emperor, had declared the 
war. It was not surprising that there were those who 
urged that Prussia should lose the fruits of a long career 
of mihtary aggrandizement and be reduced to the limits 
she had occupied in the eighteenth century or even 
earlier. 

Now, if the conference of Paris had been the congress 
of Vienna of a hundred years before, it would have pro- 
ceeded to carve large slices out of Prussia for the benefit 
of the victorious Allies, just as Prussia had done for her 
own benefit at the earlier congress. But the world had 
moved since 1815, most rapidly of all since 19 14, and a 
peace of the older sort no longer accorded with the com- 
mon moral sense of mankind. Moreover, the Allies had 
accepted as the basis of the peace the Fourteen Points 
and other utterances of President Wilson, and these, 
while providing specifically for the restoration of Alsace- 
Lorraine and Poland, had condemned the bartering of 
peoples from sovereignty to sovereignty without their 
consent, while at the same time they upheld the principle 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 39 

of self-determination, which Germany had so conspicu- 
ously violated in the past. The carving up of Prussia 
was impossible, not because the Prussian Government 
did not deserve it, but because her peoples would oppose 
it, and in our time it is peoples that count. The righting 
of historic wrongs may easily cause greater wrongs when 
men have become reconciled to the conditions once 
wrongly established, and the conference was cautious 
about reaching back far into the past to correct old acts 
of injustice. It reached farthest, as regards Germany, in 
the case of Poland, and here the reason was not so much 
that a wrong had been done in the eighteenth century as 
that the Poles continued to cry out against this wrong 
and resist it. In the west none of the changes made by 
the treaty reached back farther than 18 14. 

The conference even declined to compel the division of 
Prussia into several states within the German Empire. 
For such a division there was a good deal to be said. 
The German Empire pretended to be a confederation, 
yet this one state could outvote and outmanoeuvre all 
the others; there was inequality everywhere. If Hanover 
and Westphalia and the Rhineland had been set off as 
separate federal states, the empire would have been more 
truly federal, and the diverse interests of the western 
regions would have had some chance to express them- 
selves. For some weeks just after the armistice a little 
encouragement from the Allies might have accomplished 
this result at the hands of the Germans themselves; 
but the encouragement was not forthcoming, at least 
from England and the United States, and the slight local 
movements in this direction proved abortive. Anything 
of this sort was thought to involve meddling in Ger- 
many's internal affairs, and the worst feature of Prussia's 



40 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

anomalous position had been removed with the flight 
and abdication of the HohenzoIIerns. With no king and 
no emperor, Prussia seemed less dangerous, and there 
was a disposition, especially in England and the United 
States, to deal gently with a Germany which professed 
democracy and repentance. 

In western Germany the conference used the knife 
very sparingly and only after careful local diagnosis. 
Alsace-Lorraine was the only major operation, and that 
was really performed by the armistice. But the patient 
will often suffer much pain from a surface wound, and 
make more complaint over it than over a deep incision. 
Although the Germans had contemptuously refused the 
self-determination which they had promised the Danes 
in 1866, although they had ignored the unanimous pro- 
test of the deputies of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, in 19 19 
they became suddenly enamored of self-determination as 
they now interpreted it. As they explained this prin- 
ciple, none of the alien peoples could get out of the em- 
pire without a popular vote, whereas the application 01 
such a vote to its German-speaking inhabitants, outside 
of Alsace-Lorraine, was not self-determination but con- 
quest. They even retorted that the Allies ought to ap- 
ply self-determination to their own ancient conquests, 
not only in Ireland and Egypt, but in Canada and Cuba 
and the Philippines. I have a German map, issued during 
the conference, which even represented Florida and Texas 
as wild buffaloes straining to get loose from the brutal 
lasso of the United States ! 

Whatever happened at Paris the Germans were sure 
not to be pleased with it. A good deal of false sympathy 
has been wasted on the penitent German of 191 9 who had 
failed to wreak his will in annexations and indemnities 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 41 

on a defeated Europe, and who, if measured by his own 
standards, certainly got off very easily at Paris. What a 
victorious Germany would do in the east was seen, less 
than a year before the armistice, in the treaty of Brest- 
Litovsk. What she would have done in the west is, for- 
tunately, exemplified in no such document, but her am- 
bitions were stated in Pan-German and semi-official form 
throughout the war, and an official formulation of 191 7 
has recently been revealed in the ** War Memories " of 
Ludendorff,^ including a huge war indemnity from France, 
a protectorate over Belgium, "strategic and economic 
rectification" of the French frontier, which was another 
name for the seizure of the iron-mines of Briey and 
Longwy and unconquered border fortresses Hke Verdun. 
This was the least for which Germany hoped, and vic- 
tory on the Marne or the Somme or at Verdun might 
have meant far more. In the face of the German war 
aims the Allies might well be astonished at their own 
moderation. Accepting at the armistice the principles 
proposed by the American president, they exacted no 
indemnity, enforced only moderate restorations, nearly 
all of them definitely agreed to by Germany in advance, 
and preserved the unity of an empire founded by force 
and conquest. The world had certainly moved since 
Vienna — it had even moved far since Brest-Litovsk and 
the German terms of 191 7. And the most decisive ele- 
ment in that advance had been furnished by the United 
States, both through its military aid in the war and 
through its insistence on a peace of justice as the best 
preventive of future wars of revenge. 

The western frontiers of Germany include the problems 
of Schleswig, the Belgian border, Luxemburg, Alsace- 

' I, p. 320 (London, 1920). 



42 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Lorraine, the Left Bank of the Rhine, and the Saar 
valley. Let us review them briefly in this order. ^ 

SCHLESWIG 

The new boundary between Germany and Denmark 
was one of the simplest problems presented to the con- 
ference and one which most readily reached a Just solu- 
tion. Like every region on the circumference of the Ger- 
man Empire this had been an area of dispute for many 
centuries, the dispute being settled in Germany's favor 
by the war with Denmark in 1864 and the subsequent 
annexation of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to 
Prussia. A clause was inserted in the treaty of 1866 
that the "inhabitants of North Schleswig shall be again 
united with Denmark if they should express such a desire 
by a vote freely given." This promise Prussia never 
made any pretense of carrying out, and while Denmark 
had not joined in the Great War, the conference lent a 
sympathetic ear to her claims for Justice. The treaty 
provided for a popular vote by zones under an interna- 
tional commission, and the result of these votes, held in 
the spring of 1920, was to give the northern zone to Den- 
mark and the southern to Germany. It w^as originally 
proposed to have a third zone which included territory 
farther to the south, but the Danish Government was 
timid on this point, fearing lest the thrifty farmers might 
try to vote themselves out of the German Empire to 
escape the fiscal burdens left by the war, only to form a 
recalcitrant German-speaking minority as soon as they 
got into Denmark. Such fears proved groundless, for 
the voting followed linguistic rather than economic lines, 

* For a fuller discussipn of these matters, see Haskins and Lord, " Some Prob- 
lems of the Peace Conference" (Cambridge, 1920), Chaps. II-IV. 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 43 

and Danish influence in the middle zone was probably 
weakened by the elimination of the southern zone from 
the plebiscite. 

The Schleswig clauses of the treaty were elaborated by 
a commission of ten, which, starting from the principle of 
determination by popular vote, had merely to work out 
the method and extent of its apphcation. Delegations 
were heard from Denmark and from the disputed terri- 
tory. The general policy of the commission, which was 
unanimous on all its recommendations, was to make the 
popular consultation as broad and fair as possible, even 
to the extent of allowing a vote in the third zone, which 
was finally stricken from the treaty. The basis of the 
settlement has generally been regarded as just, and the 
final elimination of this question from the field of con- 
troversy may well be viewed as one of the distinct tri- 
umphs of the conference. 

Belgium 

The Belgian frontier, which raised less important is- 
sues than the Danish, was handled by the same com- 
mission. Here Prussia's annexations had been made in 
1 81 5, and she had recently used them to prepare her at- 
tack on Belgium's neutrality by building strategic rail- 
ways through a sparsely inhabited region and by con- 
structing a great miKtary camp at Elsenborn, near the 
Belgian border. Some thousands of the inhabitants 
continued to speak French, and the whole region was 
closely connected with Belgium. By the treaty the 
circles of Eupen and Malmedy, with a population of 
61,000, as well as the minute border territory of Mores- 
net, which had been ruled jointly by Belgium and Prus- 
sia, were handed over to Belgium, partly on the score of 



44 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

reparation and of security against future attack. The 
interests of the people were covered very vaguely by a 
clause which required the Belgian Government to open 
registers in which written protests might be made by 
such inhabitants as opposed the cession. This was the 
provision of the first draft, but, on the initiative of its 
two American members, the commission of June 7 unan- 
imously recommended a modification, so that the duty 
of securing a free and secret expression of the desires of 
the population should fall to delegates of the League of 
Nations rather than to the government immediately in- 
terested. Unfortunately, this change failed of embodi- 
ment in the final draft of the treaty. The result was a 
dispute in which Germany has accused the Belgians of 
keeping the registers in such a way as to avoid protests 
and intimidate protestants, and Belgium has accused the 
German Government of exerting local pressure; but the 
Council of the League of Nations, to which the Germans 
appealed, rightly decided that it had no jurisdiction to 
interfere. I have no first-hand knowledge of the merits 
of this dispute, but under the procedure recommended 
by the Paris commission the Germans would have had 
no excuse for their protest, and the Belgian title would 
have escaped any possible question in the future. 

In general, this change of frontier was of minor im- 
portance for Belgium, whose interests at the conference 
were concerned rather with reparation and with her re- 
lations to Holland. 

Luxemburg 

In the case of the grand duchy of Luxemburg the only 
problem concerned the customs frontier, not the political 
boundary. It is a quaint bit of Old World hfe, this di- 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 45 

minutive state of a thousand square miles and 260,000 
inhabitants, with its ancient castles and its modern 
blast-furnaces, with its independent grand duchess and 
its people whose national song expresses their desire to 
"remain what they are." Situated between Germany 
and France, in a position of great strategic importance, 
so small a state must inevitably gravitate in one direc- 
tion or the other, and until the armistice it gravitated 
toward Germany. Its dynasty was German, its rail- 
roads were German, it was a member of the German 
customs union. At the outbreak of the war Germany 
violated its neutrality, which she had promised by treaty 
to respect, and seized its railways for use against France 
and Belgium, though she was bound by treaty not to use 
them for military purposes. Indeed, Luxemburg was 
the vital connection between the two wings of the Ger- 
man army in their invasion of France. German princes 
and generals were well received by the reigning duchess, 
and throughout the war Luxemburg was swallowed up 
in Germany and cut off from the outside world, while 
popular leaders, hke Priim, languished in German pris- 
ons. No wonder the Germans were not allowed to keep 
,the railroads which they had turned from their proper 
purposes, no wonder the Luxemburgers denounced the 
customs union with their defeated neighbors. This the 
peace treaty confirmed, and this was all that it required. 
Some months thereafter, after a sharp campaign between 
Belgian and French interests, the people, by this time 
under a new grand duchess, voted for a customs union 
with France. 

Alsace-Lorraine 

Alsace-Lorraine took little of the time of the peace 
conference. This would have seemed strange at any time 



46 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

during the war or the generation which preceded it, for 
Alsace-Lorraine was an open wound which, in President 
WiIson*s phrase, "had unsettled the peace of the world 
for nearly fifty years." It was not a direct cause of the 
war, but it became a burning issue as soon as the war 
broke forth, and it remained one of the chief obstacles to 
any peace of compromise. But the problem of Alsace- 
Lorraine was settled by the Allied victory and evacua- 
tion required by the armistice, and these military acts 
were sealed by the enthusiastic reception of the French 
troops immediately thereafter. There was no way of 
reopening the question at the conference, for the Ger- 
mans had accepted President Wilson's eighth point re- 
quiring that the wrong done to France should be righted, 
and by their enforced evacuation they were no longer in 
a position to delay or to interfere. 

Nevertheless at Versailles Germany put up a last fight 
for the retention of these territories, tied up as they were 
with Germany's imperial tradition, with her strategic 
position, and with her supply of iron ore. She demanded 
that there should be a popular vote. For this there was 
no legal ground, the language of President Wilson speak- 
ing only of the wrong done to France, and the armistice 
having assimilated Alsace-Lorraine to other occupied ter- 
ritories. Nor could Germany point to her past record as 
justification, for she had gone directly in the face of 
popular opinion in 1871, expressed most formally in the 
protests of the representatives of these three depart- 
ments in the French Chamber at Bordeaux, and had from 
that time on refused any popular consultation on the 
question. But consistency was not an obstacle in the 
Germany of 1919, and a referendum was her last hope. 

To this the French objected on principle, declining to 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 47 

recognize the Tightness of the act of 1871 by any form of 
voting to undo it. There were also grave practical ob- 
jections of justice because of the emigration of perhaps a 
half milhon Alsatians and the incoming of nearly as 
many Germans from beyond the Rhine, quite apart from 
the effects of war in a region whose man-power had been 
ruthlessly sacrificed for German imperialism. No im- 
mediate plebiscite could be just, and any postponement 
in this particular region might work even greater wrong. 
Perhaps the French would have been wise to call a large 
representative assembly by which some formal expression 
of opinion might have been made and later objections 
thus forestalled. 

Since the signing of the treaty the secret propaganda 
of the German Heimatdienst has been active in Alsace- 
Lorraine, keeping alive German feeling where it still ex- 
ists and in particular fomenting a so-called Neutralist 
movement for the separation of this region as a neutral- 
ized state under the protection of the League of Nations. 
Propaganda of this sort has begun to appear in American 
newspapers, and should be received with the caution with 
which we learned to treat German propaganda during the 
var. It is amusing to hear from such sources of a "na- 
tional" movement in Alsace-Lorraine; for this region, 
chiefly German in speech, has no traditions of separate 
life or national independence, and was not even allowed 
by the Germans to become a federal state of their empire. 
Whatever the strength of any movement for autonomy, 
it is in no proper sense "national." 

With the major question of the return of the lost prov- 
inces to France settled in advance, the Paris conference 
had only to deal with matters of detail, such as naturally 
arise in a retrocession from one country to another. A 



48 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

draft of such clauses was submitted by the French and 
referred by the council of four to the special committee of 
three, Messrs. Tardieu, Headlam-Morley, and Haskins, 
which had already been at work on the Saar valley. 
The clauses were examined point by point by economic 
and legal experts, and various modifications were in- 
troduced in detail with reference to other portions of 
the treaty. The clauses respecting citizenship are par- 
ticularly complicated, and much depends upon the spirit 
of liberality with which these and the economic clauses 
are interpreted by the French administration. One 
of the matters which occasioned most debate was the 
relation between the port of Strasburg and that of Kehl, 
across the Rhine in Baden, for the Germans were under- 
stood to have retarded the natural development of 
Strasburg to the advantage of Kehl, and several years 
would be required to bring the facihties on the Alsatian 
side forward to a corresponding point. It was finally de- 
cided to place the two ports together for seven years, 
to be extended, if necessary, for three years longer, with a 
free zone in each port, under the international authority 
of the Central Rhine Commission, whose control over the 
Rhine was given a more international character by the 
treaty. In the discussion over the port of Kehl one of 
the American advisers remarked to a French minister: 
"The simplest solution would be for you to dig a new 
channel for the Rhine east of Kehl, which would then be 
permanently united with the Left Bank !" The minister 
took the suggestion seriously and needed to be privately 
informed of the danger of misunderstanding the American 
form of humor. 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 49 

The Left Bank 

So far the boundary changes considered have been rela- 
tively simple, the moving of a line backward or forward 
on the map, followed by all the machinery of govern- 
mental administration. When we come to the questions 
of the Left Bank and the Saar we meet with various pro- 
posals for separating the economic and military from the 
political frontier and for introducing elements of inter- 
national control over regions in some measure interna- 
tionalized. 

By the Left Bank of the Rhine is commonly meant the 
territory of the German Empire lying west of the river 
between Alsace-Lorraine and the Dutch frontier, in all 
about ten thousand square miles with five and a half 
milHon inhabitants — about the same number as the 
State of Illinois. The greater part of this territory belongs 
to Prussia, which acquired it from the French in 1814, 
while the French themselves had first taken it, with some 
minor exceptions, from its many previous lords only 
twenty years earlier. It is a great industrial region, not 
unlike Pennsylvania. It was also a military region, rich 
in munition factories and fortresses and strategic rail- 
roads planned to support German military enterprises to 
the westward. And it is a thoroughly German region in 
speech and government and economic life, closely bound 
to the lands beyond the Rhine. 

France had shown interest in the Left Bank in the 
early days of the war, and it formed the subject of a 
secret agreement with the Czar's government in February, 
191 7. Downright and immediate annexation was not 
commonly proposed, but many desired ultimate annexa- 
tion, prepared by military and economic control. Thus 




GERMANY— SHOWING THE NEW BOUNDARIES AND THE DISPOSITIONS 




OF TERRITORY MADE BY THE PEACE CONFERENCE 



52 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the agreement with Russia required the complete separa- 
tion of the Left Bank from Germany as an autonomous 
and neutral state, to be occupied by French troops until 
all the terms of the final treaty of peace had been ful- 
filled. It was expected that this occupation would be 
long, and the buffer state might remain in the French 
customs union still longer, with perhaps a favorable 
plebiscite for permanent union with France. In other 
words, the political frontier of France remaining for the 
present very much as before, its economic and mihtary 
frontiers were to be advanced to the Rhine. Part of this 
pohcy was traditional interest in the region of the Rhine, 
part of it was plain imperialism, economic or pohtical, 
but much was legitimate self-defense on the part of 
France against German invasion. Such a programme had 
much support in France during the conference, and it 
gained prestige from its strong advocacy by Marshal 
Foch, commander-in-chief of the victorious Allies. His 
plan, as sketched just after the armistice, comprised the 
moving of the German frontier back to the Rhine, an 
independent regime for the Left Bank, and the occupa- 
tion of the Rhine bridges until the full execution of the 
terms of peace. Such a plan was approved, before the 
opening of the peace conference, by the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the French Chamber. 

The idea of a separate buffer state had never been ac- 
cepted by England; indeed, English approval had been 
pubhcly withheld by Mr. Balfour in 191 7, and Mr. 
Lloyd-George had frequently repeated: "We must not 
make another Alsace-Lorraine." The creation of such a 
state was consistently opposed by the United States as 
contrary to the beist interests of the population and the 
conditions of the armistice and as a source of future 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 53 

wars. To the French, on the other hand, some special 
military guarantee on the Left Bank seemed an essen- 
tial part of the peace which had been won at such terri- 
ble cost. Twice within half a century Germany had in- 
vaded France, and it was a universal French demand 
that this should be prevented for the future. Granting 
that Germany was the larger and more populous coun- 
try, the only defense seemed to push back her favorite 
field of concentration and to meet her by an advanced 
hne before she could reach the French and Belgian 
border. More than once it was pointed out that England 
was protected by the sea, all the more since the surrender 
of the German fleet, and America by the Atlantic Ocean, 
but that France was exposed to the full first shock of 
German attack. The defense of the Rhine, it was argued, 
concerned not merely France but western civihzation. 
If the League of Nations was mentioned, the futilitj'^ of 
the Hague tribunal was called to mind, as well as the 
vain attempts at mediation in 1 914. At best, its action 
would be slow, and France might be overwhelmed in the 
interval. Inter-AIIied control of the Rhine bridges might 
be a sufficient precaution, as was urged in a brilliant 
French memoir of February 25, 19 19, but that inevitably 
carried with it a certain degree of separation of the Left 
Bank from Germany. 

This debate, one of the most fundamental of the peace 
conference, lasted ofi" and on for six months. The ne- 
gotiations have been traced from a French point of view 
by M. Tardieu,^ one of the participants who was responsi- 
ble for several able memoirs in which the French argu- 
ment was set forth. Nothing has been printed by the 
British or American negotiators, and as the matter was 

* U Illustration, February 14, 1920. 



54 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

handled by a small group of plenipotentiaries, their part 
of the story must be awaited. Both sides were firm, and 
the result was a compromise. France gave up the sepa- 
rate state of the Left Bank but secured occupation by an 
inter-AIIied force for fifteen years as a guarantee of exe- 
cution of the treaty. In return Great Britain and the 
United States offered to come to the aid of France in 
case of an unprovoked attack by Germany, an agree- 
ment, however, which was valid only if ratified by both 
countries, and the United States Senate has not yet 
ratified it. On one set of provisions there was no essen- 
tial difference of opinion, the demilitarization of the Left 
Bank. Germany agrees to maintain no fortifications 
\ est of the Rhine or in a zone of fifty kilometres to the 
east thereof, and to assemble no armed forces in this 
\vhoIe region; any violation of these provisions shall be 
regarded as a hostile act against the signatory powers and 
**as calculated to disturb the peace of the world." Ac- 
cordingly Germany's military frontier now lies fifty 
kilometres east of the Rhine; her poHtical and economic 
frontiers remain unchanged, save for the control of Rhine 
navigation by an international commission, and subject 
temporarily to the occupation of the Left Bank and the 
Rhine bridge-heads as a guarantee of executing the treaty 
she has signed. Another temporary change in the Saar 
valley will be considered later. 

The result failed to satisfy extremists of either sort. 
Marshal Foch stood out for the separation of the Left 
Bank and opposed the final settlement as inadequate in a 
plenary session of the conference. May 6, which was not 
reported in the press. This view of the necessity of geo- 
graphical and military, as opposed to poHtical and pre- 
ventive, guarantees has naturally had many advocates 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 5s 

in France with the failure of the United States to accept 
the special treaty. Opponents of M. Clemenceau have 
insisted that this tenacious negotiator yielded too much 
to England and the United States. On the other hand, 
radical critics of the peace held up their hands at what 
they called a military alliance of these countries with 
France, overlooking the very significant point that as- 
sistance was to be given only in case of an unprovoked 
attack. If France provokes the attack she goes alone. 
If Germany without provocation attacks France, she re- 
peats the aggression of 19 14 and brings on a general war. 
The mere existence of such an obligation would have 
prevented war in 19 14; if ratified, its existence ought to 
^j)revent such a war again. By this time the world ought 
to have learned that the Franco-German frontier is not 
merely a local question but an international matter, for 
peace between France and Germany is a condition of 
world peace. It is well known that there is an important 
group in Germany whose declared object is a new war of 
revenge against France. It is in the world^s interest 
that this movement should fail, and the best method to 
defeat it is, first, the avoidance of provocation on the 
part of France, and, second, a united front against un- 
provoked aggression. The fifteen years of inter-AIIied 
watch on the Rhine may be gradually reduced if Ger- 
many executes the treaty faithfully. The Anglo-American 
guarantee will prove superfluous if Germany refrains 
from unprovoked aggression. And the permanent de- 
militarization of the Left Bank remains as a warning to 
militarists of all countries that frontiers bristling with 
forts and armies are not the safest guarantees of inter- 
national peace. 



56 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

The Saar Valley 

One corner of the territory of the Left Bank formed a 
problem by itself, namely, the Saar valley in the south- 
western part of Rhenish Prussia and the Palatinate 
along the northern edge of Lorraine. A pleasant region 
of farm and forest under the old regime, its importance 
then was chiefly mihtary, through the use of its bridge- 
heads for the defense of Lorraine and for an advance 
eastward. In more recent times it has become highly 
industrialized, thanks to its important deposits of coal. 
Its furnaces and iron works support a dense population 
in its towns; its coal-mines produced before the war 
17,000,000 tons a year, 8 per cent of the enormous coal 
output of the German Empire. Its western portion, 
about Saarlouis, became French with the foundation of 
this fortress by Louis XIV; its eastern part, about Saar- 
brlicken, where the coal chiefly lay, had been in French 
hands only from 1793 to 181 5. It had all been considered 
sufficiently French to be left to France in the preliminary 
peace of 1814, but had been taken away in the following 
year and handed over to Prussia, which coveted its 
bridge-heads and its coal-mines. The frontier of 181 4 
continued to have its advocates in France until the 
Franco-Prussian War set back the French frontier still 
farther; and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine in the Great 
War once more revived French claims on the Saar. 

These claims differed in territorial extent according 
to the point of view. The historic frontier of 1814 would 
have returned to France 250 square miles, with 355,000 
inhabitants, including the area producing about two- 
thirds of the coal mined north of the new boundary of 
Lorraine. An economic frontier which included all of 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 57 

the coal deposits of the Saar and the district directly de- 
pendent upon them would have included an area more 
than twice as large, and the frontier of 1814 would have 
disrupted this economic unit. A strategic frontier, drawn 
so as to protect the mining territory and the approaches 
to Lorraine, would have extended still farther to the 
north and east. The strength of these several claims 
was also different. The frontier of 1814 had been vio- 
lated by Prussian annexation in the following year, but 
it was not an ancient boundary, had never, in fact, been 
laid out on the spot, and had been in abeyance for more 
than a hundred years. The inhabitants nearly all spoke 
German, and while it was alleged that many thousands 
of them had French sympathies, this statement was, in 
the nature of the case, incapable of verification at the 
time. The military frontier had much to commend it on 
purely strategic grounds, but no merit on the ground of 
history or the desires of the local populations whom it 
would annex, while its importance was diminished by the 
demilitarization of the Left Bank. The economic fron- 
tier, on the other hand, involved a new element, that of 
reparation, for the coal-mines of northern France had been 
wantonly and systematically destroyed by the German 
authorities as a means of wrecking French industry and 
delaying its revival; and German coal-mines were the 
most appropriate equivalent, especially those of the Saar, 
which lay within a dozen miles of the new French fron- 
tier and were almost wholly the property of the Prussian 
and Bavarian states. The economic claims were the only 
ones for which a basis could be found in the agreed basis 
of the peace as stated in President Wilson's Fourteen 
Points and other utterances. Here the justification was 
clear and unmistakable, both in the eighth point, which 



58 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

provided for restoration of the devastated territory of 
France, and in the pre-armistice agreement for full com- 
pensation of damage done to the civilian population and 
cheir property. In order, however, to square with the 
basis of the peace, such material compensation must not 
involve the political annexation of unwilling populations. 
The problem of separating the mines from the people who 
hved over them was thus created, and it was not a sim- 
ple one. 

Annexation in the Saar valley had not appeared in 
any of the published statements of the French war aims, 
but both the mining area and the mihtary frontier had 
been included in the secret agreement with Russia in 
fQiy, and the French desires, as formulated in a note of 
M. Briand, January 12, had been made known to the 
British Government in the course of the same year. 
The frontier of 1814 was urged by the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the Chamber shortly after the armis- 
tice, and it was understood that Marshal Foch desired 
a military line well beyond it. The French plenipoten- 
tiaries took their time about formulating their demands 
in this district, and it was not till March 27, 1919, that 
their plan was laid before the council of four. This in- 
cluded political annexation up to the frontier of 18 14, 
with full ownership of the mines, but only the mines, in 
the adjoining districts beyond. President Wilson ac- 
cepted the validity of French claims to coal from the 
Saar, and was early convinced that the ownership of the 
mines was the surest method of securing Just compensa- 
tion, but he did not admit the justice of political an- 
nexation. The British, while favoring the transfer of the 
mines, did not favor the frontier of 18 14, which might 
have created a new Alsace-Lorraine, with protesting dep- 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 59 

uties in the French Chamber; instead of direct annexa- 
tion they preferred a larger autonomous state under 
French protection. The difference of opinion was acute 
and constituted one of the major points of disagreement 
in the difFicuh days of early April. 

Like the Left Bank the Saar was one of those questions 
affecting closely the principal Allied powers which were 
not referred to commissions but were reserved for the 
special consideration of the council of four. Neverthe- 
less, the members of this council were, on this matter, in 
close touch with their advisers, and established a special 
committee on April 2 which worked throughout the 
month. Italy not being particularly interested, the com- 
mittee consisted of representatives of three countries 
only, Messrs. Tardieu, Headlam-Morley, and Haskins, 
M. Tardieu presiding with the resourcefulness and skill 
which he brought to all matters of the conference; and 
the final draft of the treaty articles was the unanimous 
work of the committee. It was aided by specialists, such 
as geographers, mining experts, and legal advisers. On 
the American side the work of Mr. David Hunter Miller 
was all-important at critical points in the negotiations, as 
regards not only the drafting of specific clauses but also 
in all larger questions connected with the new form of 
government. The determination of certain questions of 
boundary was facilitated by a special visit to the dis- 
trict. 

The starting-point of the committee's work was a 
statement formulated on March 29 by Messrs. Headlam- 
Morley and Haskins, with the assistance of Major 
Douglas W. Johnson, and accepted by the council of 
four. By this it was agreed in principle that full owner- 
ship of the coal-mines of the Saar basin should pass to 



6o WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

France to be credited on her claims against Germany for 
reparation, and that the fullest economic facilities should 
be accorded for their exploitation, while the political and 
administrative arrangements necessary to secure these 
results should be the subject of further inquiry. In the 
negotiations which followed, the French naturally sought 
to secure as much as possible with the mines, while the 
Americans sought to safeguard the rights and interests 
of the local population. The British in general favored 
intermediate solutions and worked steadily for a final 
compromise. President Wilson remained firm against 
any form of annexation or protectorate, yet it soon ap- 
peared that under Prussian political control the owner- 
ship of the mines might easily be rendered valueless for 
France. A French mandate which was suggested under 
the League of Nations looked uncomfortably like an- 
nexation, besides stretching the mandatory principle be- 
yond its proper purpose. A commission of arbitration to 
settle difi'erences was shown to be inadequate to prevent 
trouble so long as the region was governed from Berlin, 
but it led to the final solution, elaborated from the Amer- 
ican side, namely, a governing commission under the 
League of Nations acting as trustee for fifteen years. In 
the working out of this idea both President Wilson and 
Mr. Lloyd-George had specific suggestions to make, and 
took much interest in the clauses of the new form of gov- 
ernment when they were examined in detail, with ex- 
planations from members of the committee at meetings 
in the president's study. It is said that at the close of 
one of these meetings when the general arrangements for 
the new government had been approved, the prime 
minister turned to the president and said : "Mr. President, 
I think we have got a very good plan here." "Well," the 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 6i 

answer is said to have been, "why don't you apply it to 
Ireland?" 

The final result was a compromise which sought to 
reconcile the French right to the mines and the inhabi- 
tants' right to local self-government. France failed to 
-'^•cure the frontier of 1814 or any lesser form of annexa- 
.on or protectorate; in gaining the holding of a plebi- 
; jite at the end of fifteen years to test the strength of 
french sympathies in the basin, she gave up the subse- 
• lent ownership of the mines in any part of the territory 

hich should then become permanently German. Dur- 
ing these fifteen years the Saar is included within her 
economic frontier, where it naturally falls because of its 
close relations to the iron-fields of Lorraine. The United 
States stood throughout for a principle which also had 
much support in France, namely, the mines without the 
people. While accepting the largest possible facilities 
for repairing the wrongs which France had suffered from 
Germany, America successfully maintained the rights of 
the local population, finally placed under the protection 
of the League of Nations, which thus became a guarantor 
of peace and justice on this portion of the Franco-German 
frontier. As the latest and most authoritative history of 
the conference, the British account, edited by Mr. Tem- 
perley, remarks: "It is very difficult to see how the con- 
flicting interests involved could have been reconciled 
without some serious violation of justice, if the machin- 
ery of the League had not been available for a solution."' 

The provisions respecting the Saar were bitterly as- 
sailed in the German memoranda on the first draft of the 
treaty, but, as in other instances, the Germans were 
stronger in general denunciation than in effective criti- 

1 "A History of the Peace Conference of Paris" (London, 1920), vol. II, p. 183. 



62 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARtS 

cism. Government of the Saar population by the League 
of Nations was pronounced "odious," but the conve- 
nience and immediate certainty of this form of reparation 
could not be denied, and no secure or acceptable guar- 
antee was offered in its stead. The Allies replied that 
they had chosen a form of reparation "which, by its ex- 
ceptional nature will be, for a limited period, a definite 
and visible symbol," while at the same time "they in- 
tended, by assuring themselves of the immediate posses- 
sion of a security for reparation, to escape the risks to 
which the German memoir itself has drawn attention," 
in emphasizing Germany's inability to pay. At one point 
the Germans made a helpful suggestion, namely, with re- 
gard to the arrangements for repurchase of the mines in 
territory which might vote in the plebiscite for reunion 
with Germany, and this clause, originally designed to 
enforce prompt action on Germany's part, was modified 
so as to bring it into harmony with the general reparation 
clauses. The Germans made no constructive criticism of 
the new form of government, and it was inferred from 
this that the clauses had been drawn with sufficient care 
to safeguard the essential interests of the population. 

Like all settlements of a complex situation, the Saar 
settlement has been criticised as too complicated; and, 
like all compromises, it has been attacked from both sides. 
Those who wanted the frontier of 1814 consider it inade- 
quate; those who are soft-hearted toward Germany pro- 
nounce it too severe. And because it is complicated and 
requires for its understanding that unusual accomphsh- 
ment, the reading of a considerable section of the treaty, 
many have condemned it without taking the trouble to 
examine it. To my thinking, the Saar settlement is 
fundamentally fair in principle, and its practical justice 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 63 

becomes clearer as we see the workings of reparation 
elsewhere. Germany, with her large pre-war surplus of 
coal, pays for the mines she has destroyed by handing 
over other mines, which were, with small exception, the 
government property of Prussia and Bavaria; and any 
excess value is credited to her reparation account toward 
a total sum which she declares herself unable to pay in 
full. Those who wanted France to accept an engage- 
ment to deliver a fixed amount of coal have been refuted 
by the events since the conference, namely, the dimin- 
ished coal production in Germany and the small quan- 
tities actually furnished to France under other clauses to 
which Germany affixed her signature. As other prospects 
of reparation melt away, France holds one solid asset and 
receives therefrom something of the coal so sadly needed 
for the revival of her shattered industries. As I have 
said elsewhere, a mine in hand is worth many contracts 
to deliver. Those who pity Germany on account of the 
Fourteen Points would do well to remember that the 
Fourteen Points promised restoration to France, and that 
this is a fundamental condition of any right and just set- 
tlement. The Fourteen Points cut in both directions, 
and should be applied when they run against Germany 
as well as when they are in her favor. If in practice it 
may be necessary to forego full restoration because of 
Germany's inability to pay what she owes under the 
treaty, it is worth remembering that the Saar mines are 
something which she was able to pay, out of the public 
property of Prussia and Bavaria, and in the concrete 
form where payment was definitely due and imperatively 
needed. And the final decision respecting the govern- 
ment of each part of the territory is based upon the vote 
of its inhabitants as they may express their preference 



64 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

for France, Germany, or permanent internationalization, 
a clear application of the principle of self-determination. 

In the meantime the internationalized territory of the 
Saar basin comprises about 700 square miles, with 
650,000 inhabitants. The people retain "their religious 
liberties, their schools, and their language." During the 
fifteen years while German sovereignty is suspended 
they send no representatives to the Reichstag and the 
Landtag, but they have local assembhes of their own. 
They participate in the government to a much greater 
degree than do citizens of our District of Columbia. 
The administration is not unlike the commissions which 
have been established in many American cities, only 
this commission is appointed by the League of Nations 
and is ultimately responsible to it. At present its five 
members include a Frenchman as chairman, a native 
of the Saar basin itself, a Dane, a Belgian, and a 
Canadian, the last named, Mr. Waugh, having been 
mayor of Winnipeg and representing in a peculiar de- 
gree the general and transatlantic interest in the 
maintenance of peace between France and Germany. 
It is a long way from Winnipeg to Saarbriicken, but not 
too long for one who cares for peace and justice. 

What will happen in the popular referendum of 1935 
will depend on the conditions of the moment as well as 
upon the experience of the intervening years. The in- 
habitants of the Saar basin are exempt from compulsory 
military service and enjoy valuable economic privileges 
which are sometimes envied by their French and German 
neighbors. Last spring voters of certain neighboring 
communes and cantons in Prussia petitioned the League 
of Nations for incorporation in the new district, and there 
is evidence that opinion in the district is favorable to its 



THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 6s 

new government. In any event the vote fourteen years 
hence is restricted to those resident in the territory at the 
time of the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, so 
that all temptation to colonization is removed. It was 
conjectured by many at Paris that the results of com- 
mission government might prove so satisfactory that, 
under the alternatives offered in the plebiscite, the major- 
ity would vote to remain under the League rather than for 
union with either France or Germany. Whatever jus- 
tification of the Saar settlement this might bring, the 
American participants will be content if its ends are ac- 
complished during the fifteen years of League rule pro- 
vided in the treaty. For that much depends on the ac- 
tual workings of the League of Nations. 

The settlement of Germany's boundaries was by no 
means a simple matter, and at times it strained the con- 
ference almost to the breaking-point, but the task was 
accomplished and embodied in a unanimous agreement. 
Two considerations had to be kept constantly in mind: 
justice to the local populations, in spite of the crimes of 
the imperial government; and satisfaction to the well- 
founded demands of Germany's injured neighbors. These 
two were not always easy to reconcile, and the different 
points of view often represented very different personal 
and national backgrounds. The discussion was frank, but 
it was friendly, and we are informed by participants that 
even at its most tense moments in the council of four it 
never lacked the tone of mutual respect and good-will.^ 

1 This point deserves emphasis because the nature of the council's sessions 
has been grossly misrepresented by a popular writer, Mr. J. M. Keynes, in an 
effort to discredit the conference and its work ("The Economic Consequences of 
the Peace," pp. 30-32). It is stated by the official interpreter, Captain Mantoux, 
that Mr. Keynes never attended a regular session of the council of four; the con- 



66 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

A treaty was possible only through the fundamental 
agreement of Great Britain, France, and the United 
States, and it can be maintained only by the continued 
co-operation among these powers, which is an essential 
basis for the world's peace. 

fused and furious gathering which Keynes describes in the large drawing-room of 
the president's house would appear to have been so rendered by the presence of 
a large number of economic advisers like himself, specially called in for the oc- 
casion. The real work of the council was done quietly and efficiently in President 
Wilson's down-stairs study, and it is no serviced the cause of truth or of peace 
to assert the contrary. 



IV 
POLAND 

BY ROBERT HOWARD LORD 

Among the political problems that came before the 
Peace Conference, the problem of the reconstruction of 
Poland was one of the first to be taken up and one of the 
last to be finished. Indeed, it is not altogether finished 
even yet. It was also one of the gravest and thorniest 
questions with which the Conference had to deal. 

It was difficult because the eastern frontiers of Poland 
could not be settled without reference to the Russian 
Soviet Government, whose existence the Peace Confer- 
ence could not pretend to ignore but never felt able to 
recognize; and because the western frontiers of Poland 
could not be fixed without taking a good deal of terri- 
tory from Germany; and taking territory from Germany 
is very serious business. How serious it is may be judged 
from the fact that German statesmen, from Bismarck to 
Biilow, have been unanimous in declaring that Prussia's 
very existence depended upon maintaining her estab- 
lished Trontier in the east. Prince Lichnowsky wrote, 
not long before the armistice, that: "The Polish question 
constitutes for Germany the gravest question of the war 
and 6f the peace — far graver than the fate of Belgium. 
. . . With it stands or falls the position of Prussia as a 
great power, and therefore that of the Empire." And it 
may as well be remarked at once that no other part 
of the territorial arrangements made at Versailles has 

67 



68 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

caused so much anger in Germany as the Polish settle- 
ment, and scarcely any other part has been more fre- 
quently denounced by the critics of the peace treaties 
outside Germany. 

In the case of Poland, as of most other territorial prob- 
lems, the Peace Conference proceeded from the principle 
that in the Europe of to-day the frontiers that are most 
hkely to prove just, satisfactory, and durable are those 
that conform to ethnographic divisions; state boundaries 
ought, as far as possible, to follow the lines of cleavage 
between nationalities. Whether this is a sound"principIe 
I cannot undertake to discuss here. It may be that the 
doctrine of the rights of nationality has been enormously 
exaggerated; self-determination may be a false and mon- 
strous idea; it may be that economic needs or his- 
toric rights or long-established political connections 
ought to be the chief considerations in determining 
boundaries. But it must be recalled that nationalistic 
ideas have been the most important factor in reshaping 
the map of Europe in the last hundred years; that most 
of the wars of the past century have been due to the de- 
sire of so many peoples to gain national independence or 
national unity; and that during the World War nearly 
every one seemed to applaud such utterances of President 
Wilson's as the speech before Congress in which he said: 
"Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an im- 
perative principle which statesmen will henceforth ignore 
at their peril. . . . Every territorial settlement involved 
in this war must be made in the interest and for the bene- 
fit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any 
mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival 
states." At all events, it seems to me the most distinc- 
tive mark of the Peace Conference at Paris that, more 



POLAND 69 

systematically, more completely, and upon a far larger 
scale than at any previous peace congress, it attempted 
to remake the map of Europe upon the basis of the rights 
<jf nationality. Its territorial work must be Judged with 
reference both to the validity of that principle in itself 
and to the degree of honesty and intelligence with which 
it applied that principle. 

Already before the Conference assembled, the Allied 
and Associated Powers had in general terms defined their 
attitude toward the Polish question. In the thirteenth 
point of the famous fourteen, Mr. Wilson had declared 
that "an independent Pohsh state should be erected 
which should include the territories inhabited by indis- 
putably Polish populations, which should be assured a 
free and secure access to the sea. ..." The prime min- 
isters of Great Britain, France, and Italy, in their dec- 
laration of June 3, 1 91 8, had also affirmed that "the 
creation of a united and independent Polish state with 
free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of 
a solid and Just peace and of the rule of right in Europe." 

These declarations, however, admitted of a consider- 
able latitude of interpretation. There was much room to 
discuss what constituted an "indisputably Polish popula- 
tion"; which territories really contained such a popula- 
tion; and what was meant precisely by "free and secure 
access to the sea." When called upon to apply their 
formula in concrete cases, the principal Allied and Associ- 
ated Powers had ample opportunity to, and in fact fre- 
quently did, manifest rather divergent tendencies with 
regard to the solution of Polish problems. 

One may define the tendency of French policy as being 
on the whole extremely favorable to Poland. It was not 
invariably so, for in the dispute over Teschen France was 



70 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

consistently and vigorously on the side of the Czechs 
against Poland; and with regard to the eastern frontier 
there was a very evident desire on the part of the French 
representatives to keep the aspirations of the new ally, 
Poland, within limits that would not irrevocably an- 
tagonize the old ally that might some day be won back 
— Russia. But, with these restrictions, France was for a 
Poland "grande et forte, tres forte," as M. Pichon de- 
clared. And for obvious reasons. France and Poland, the 
two states that have gained most territory at Germany's 
expense, are, quite apart from their old and well-estab- 
lished mutual sympathies, in the very nature of things 
bound together almost indissolubly by their common 
interest in upholding the new settlement. A Poland 
"grande et forte" may become **a new France on the 
east of Germany," doubling the strength of the France 
on the west. 

Rather different was the tendency of England. While 
committed to, and doubtless sincerely anxious for, the 
restoration of an independent Poland, she did not appear 
to be particularly concerned that it should be a large or 
a strong one. Indeed, I think I may say, for it is an open 
secret, that in the case of almost every question that came 
up England's attitude was less favorable toward Polish 
claims than that of any other Power, and the Poles are 
accustomed to ascribe most of their diplomatic disasters 
at Paris to Mr. Lloyd George. Why this was so I cannot 
adequately explain. I am inclined to think it was pri- 
marily because England regarded Poland as a liability 
rather than an asset. Poland was a weak country, set 
down between a hostile Germany and a no less unfriendly 
Russia. The defense of such a state was likely to be 
something of a burden for the signatories of the peace 



POLAND 71 

treaty; the more contested territories you assigned to 
it the greater were the chances of getting into trouble on 
its account; and England seems to have had little desire 
to increase her responsibilities unnecessarily in behalf of 
a state that was a natural client of France but of no 
special interest to herself. 

The Italians were in general disposed to favor Polish 
claims, but not to advance themselves very far or to 
fight very hard in support of them. The Japanese 
scarcely intervened at all in these questions. As for the 
Americans, I think I may say that the president and his 
advisers, while very friendly and sympathetic toward 
Poland, viewed her problems primarily from the stand- 
point of the general principles involved. The chief 
Polish historian of the Peace Conference has done us 
:he honor of saying that America obviously desired that 
Poland should get neither too much nor too little, but 
just what belonged to her. 

Such seems to me to have been the general attitude of 
the several Powers toward the Polish question. But I 
should like to emphasize that whatever divergences ap- 
peared related to secondary matters ; all the great Powers 
were agreed on the fundamental propositions that there 
should be an independent Polish state, including Russian, 
Austrian, and Prussian Poland alike and possessing as- 
sured access to the sea, and that its boundaries should be 
settled chiefly upon the ethnographic basis. 

For the elaboration of detailed proposals as to the 
frontiers of the new state, the Supreme^Council, about the 
end of February, appointed a commission on Polish af- 
fairs, headed by M. Jules Cambon, who had been French 
ambassador at Berlin down to the outbreak of the war. 
This was one of the first, if not the first, of the territorial 



72 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

commissions to be appointed; and perhaps some account 
of its methods of work may not be out of place here. 

The commission received no detailed or precise in- 
structions from the Supreme Council. Individual mem- 
bers frequently sought and obtained directions from 
their superiors on particular points, but, in the main, the 
commission was left to work out its problems as it thought 
just and right, always bearing in mind the general prin- 
ciples adopted by the Peace Conference and whatever 
each of us might know as to the views of our respec- 
tive governments. And since there seems to be a wide- 
spread opinion that at Paris the Fourteen Points were 
from the start buried in oblivion, I should like to attest 
that in the discussions about Poland, both in the com- 
mission and before the Supreme Council, the particular 
"point" among the fourteen that referred to Poland was 
both the principle from which the discussion started and 
to which appeal was made again and again. The Polish 
commission made something of a record at least for in- 
dustry. It sat from February to December; at some 
periods it met nearly every day in the week and some- 
times twice a day; it held more meetings, I think, than 
almost any other commission of the Peace Conference. 
Its task, of course, was simply to work out detailed prop- 
ositions to submit to the Supreme Council; it was the 
Ten or the Five or the Four who made the decisions. 
Usually they accepted the proposals laid before them 
without serious alterations; but there were several occa- 
sions, as will be explained later, when the Supreme Coun- 
cil very substantially modified or quite set aside the rec- 
ommendations of the commission. 

The first and most important Polish question to be 
taken up was that of the boundary on the side of Ger- 



POLAND 73 

many. How difficult that problem was can hardly be 
appreciated without having made a close study of the 
extraordinary intermixture and interpenetration of Poles 
and Germans in the former eastern provinces of Prussia. 
In these regions, almost all of which were originally 
purely Polish in population, there was for centuries a 
steady inflow of German immigrants even during the 
period of Polish rule, and much more so after the annexa- 
tion of Prussia. In the last half-century the Prussian 
government has worked systematically to colonize these 
provinces with Germans, spending over $100,000,000 
for that purpose and endeavoring especially to build up 
belts of German population that would separate the 
Poles of Russian Poland from those of Posen or from 
Danzig and the sea. Hence the ethnographic map of 
these regions has become a very intricate mosaic. The 
two peoples are everywhere intermingled; there are many 
islands of German predominance surrounded by seas of 
Slavs; and to draw a frontier that would separate the two 
peoples in clean-cut fashion without leaving a large resi- 
due of the one nation in the territories of the other is a 
thing that simply cannot be done. 

Another kind of difficulty arose from the nature of the 
statistics with which one had to work. The only avail- 
able statistics as to the numbers and distribution of the 
two peoples in these territories were those issued by the 
Prussian government; and it has been repeatedly demon- 
strated by the most careful and painstaking investigations 
that these statistics are often tendentious and "doc- 
tored up," and in some cases absolutely false and mis- 
leading. They are too often designed to show that the 
success of Prussia's Germanizing policy has been greater 
than is actually the case. 



74 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

On the other hand, it was to be considered that the 
strength of Polish national feeling varied a good deal in 
the different provinces of Prussia, and with it, presum- 
ably, the desire of these different populations for separa- 
tion from Germany and union with Poland. The prov- 
inces of Posen and West Prussia, for instance, had be- 
longed to Poland right down to the partitions at the end 
of the eighteenth century (save for one interval of a 
century and a half in the case of West Prussia). It was 
there that the racial struggle had been hottest in the 
past half-century. In this case there could be little 
doubt as to the sentiments of the Pohsh population. On 
the other hand. Upper Silesia had been separated from 
Poland for six hundred years; and although there had 
been a considerable revival of Polish national feeling in 
recent decades and much animosity between Poles and 
Germans, still the case here was not so clear as in the 
other two provinces just mentioned. Finally, in East 
Prussia there was a large Polish-speaking population 
which had never been directly under Pohsh rule at all; a 
population that was Protestant, unlike the overwhelming 
majority of the Poles outside, and which had never 
shown any very marked signs of Pohsh national con- 
sciousness. Such facts raised doubts whether all the 
Poles in Prussia could fairly be treated in the same way 
just because they were Poles. It was clear that many 
Poles detested and abhorred Prussian rule, had been 
badly oppressed under it, and would never be reconciled 
to it; but it was equally apparent that other Poles had no 
such feelings, and it was not easy to draw the line be- 
tween such groups. 

The commission on Polish affairs submitted its first 
report to the Supreme Council about the end of March. 



POLAND 75 

This report recommended that the larger part of Posen 
and of Upper Silesia should be transferred to Poland, 
while leaving to Germany the western, predominantly 
German-speaking districts of both territoiies. In both 
the areas to be ceded to Poland the Poles formed about 
two-thirds of the population (6^ per cent), according to 
the German census of 191 o. In addition, the commission 
proposed to give to Poland the central and eastern zones 
of the province of West Prussia, including both banks of 
the lower Vistula and Danzig, the capital of the province. 
This was the origin of the famous Polish "corridor to the 
Baltic." This "corridor" has been so much discussed 
that it may not be out of place to enter a little fully into 
the reasons that led the commission to propose it. 

West Prussia, the province around the mouth of the 
Vistula, occupies an area of such strategic importance 
that for many centuries it has been a battle-ground be- 
tween Germans and Slavs. It has been the meeting- 
place, the point of intersection of two opposing streams 
of colonization, the Polish current from south to north, 
down the Vistula, and the German current from west to 
east, along the coast of the Baltic. In this conflict the 
south-to-north movement has been the stronger; the 
Poles have succeeded in maintaining a continuous belt 
of Polish-speaking territory extending through to the 
Baltic, while the Germans have failed to bridge the gap 
between Germany proper and the German colony in 
East Prussia. The ethnographic map of West Prussia 
showed the province roughly divided into three zones: 
a German zone on the west, and another on the east, 
along the right bank of the Vistula, while the central and 
southeastern zone was predominantly Polish. This was 
the primary reason for the construction of the corridor; 




POLAND 

SHOWING ARRANGEMENTS AND DISPOSITIONS OF TERRITORY MADE BY THE 

PEACE CONFERENCE 



POLAND 77 

the cession of this central zone to Poland was the only 
arrangement that could fit the ethnographic situation, 
the only arrangement that corresponded to the rather un- 
fortunate way in which the German and Polish popula-. 
tions had become fixed in this region, as the result of cen- 
turies of conflict. 

But there was another important reason for the build- 
ing of the corridor. Poland had been promised "a free 
and secure access to the sea." There seemed to be 
strong grounds for holding that this "free and secure 
access" could be obtained only across and through terri- 
tory actually owned and controlled by Poland, and that 
it could not be regarded as assured if the lower course of 
Poland's greatest river and the port at its mouth were 
left in the hands of Germany. For Germany has always 
been Poland's chief enemy, and unless all prevision fails 
is likely to remain so for a long time to come. 

It was true that the proposed arrangement would have 
the grave disadvantage of separating East Prussia from 
the rest of Germany. But it was a case of choosing be- 
tween two evils. Either East Prussia would have to 
communicate with Germany by land across Polish terri- 
tory (there would always be easy communication by sea) 
or else Poland's communications with the sea would have 
to be across German territory. And were the two re- 
spective interests comparable or at all commensurable? 
Was it to be argued that the interest of the 2,000,000 
Germans in East Prussia in having a land connection with 
Germany ought to outweigh the interest of 25,000,000 
Poles in having assured access to the sea? 

Such considerations led the commission to propose the 
corridor, and, it must be added, to propose to build it 
somewhat broader than strictly ethnographic reasons 



78 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

would have warranted. For it was recommended that 
the corridor should include the city and district of Dan- 
zig, although their population of about 300,000 is over- 
whelmingly German, and also a narrow belt of German- 
speaking territory around Marienwerder, on the east 
bank of the Vistula. These were the only cases in 
which the commission proposed a serious deviation from 
an ethnographic frontier. In the case of Danzig it was 
from the conviction that that city was the natural 
port of Poland, and the only port in any sense available; 
and that the only clean-cut solution of the problem 
was to annex the city outright to Poland. As for the 
Marienwerder district it was argued that the possession 
of that small area (the population is about 138,000) was 
necessary in order to assure to Poland control of the 
lower Vistula and of the one direct railroad between 
Danzig and Warsaw. 

Finally, it remained to deal with that southern zone 
of East Prussia which is generally called the District of 
Allenstein. Although the majority of the population 
here was Polish in nationality, for reasons suggested above 
it was to be doubted whether these Protestant Poles 
really desired to be annexed to Poland as a strict inter- 
pretation of the Fourteen Points would seem to have re- 
quired. Hence the commission recommended that the 
fate of this territory should be referred to a plebiscite. 

The set of proposals Just outlined was agreed upon by 
the experts of all the Powers represented in the commis- 
sion after very long discussions and a good deal of give- 
and-take on all sides. When these unanimous recom- 
mendations were then submitted to the Supreme Council 
it seemed for a time as if they would be accepted in toto. 
It soon became evident, however, that Mr. Lloyd George 



POLAND 79 

was dissatisfied ; he held that with the frontiers proposed 
the number of Germans to be incorporated in Poland 
was dangerously large, and ought, if ever possible, to be 
reduced. As a result of a first intervention on his part 
the Supreme Council decided that the Marienwerder dis- 
trict should not be transferred to Poland outright, but 
should also be subjected to a plebiscite. 

Soon after the British prime minister proposed a sec- 
ond change, of much greater consequence to the Poles, 
in the matter of Danzig. President Wilson was persuaded 
to agree to his suggestions; and Mr. Clemenceau, quite 
certainly against his own inclinations, was induced to 
acquiesce. The upshot was an entirely new plan, which 
was intended to insure Poland's economic interests in the 
port of Danzig and at the same time to avoid the incon- 
venience of annexing that German-speaking city to Po- 
land. According to this plan, Danzig and the small ad- 
jacent district were to form a free city under the protec- 
tion of the League of Nations. While with regard to most 
internal affairs Danzig was to be quite autonomous, it 
was stipulated that the free city was to be included within 
Hhe Polish customs frontiers, and that its foreign relations 
and the protection of its citizens abroad were to be in- 
trusted to Poland. Poland also received the right of 
freely using and of developing and improving all water- 
ways, docks, and Vharfs within the territory of the free 
city; and the control and administration of the Vistula 
River, and — subject to some restrictions — of the railway, 
postal, and telegraph systems of Danzig. The details of 
the arrangement were to be regulated by a treaty between 
Poland and the free city, the terms of which were to be 
fixed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers. 

With these modifications the proposals submitted by 



8o WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the commission on Polish affairs were incorporated in the 
terms of peace communicated by the Paris Conference to 
Germany on May 7, 191 9. As is well known, the Ger- 
mans returned a reply of vehement protest, objecting 
particularly to the cessions demanded in favor of Poland 
and especially to the threatened loss of Upper Silesia. 
This led to something of a crisis in Paris. The British 
Labor party and every other element in England and 
America that regarded the proposed terms of peace as too 
draconic, made their voices heard; and Mr. Lloyd George, 
after a visit to London, returned convinced of the neces- 
sity of making concessions, whether in order to induce the 
Germans to sign or in order to placate British labor. His 
colleagues again to some extent gave way to him. Among 
the concessions to the Germans that were then decided 
upon, the most important, perhaps, related to Upper 
Silesia. 

It had originally been resolved to demand most of that 
territory for Poland, because of the large Polish-speaking 
majority {6^ per cent for the whole area, and in not a few 
districts 80 or even 90 per cent); and also because the 
Silesian Poles seemed to have given sufficient proof of 
their Polish sentiments and their desire for union with 
the mother country. But it was not to be denied that the 
loss of Upper Silesia would mean a very severe blow to 
Germany. For this territory was one of the chief mining 
centres and one of the most highly industrialized regions 
of the former German Empire. Before the war it pro- 
duced about 44,000,000 tons of coal a year, i. e., 23 per 
cent of Germany's annual output, three times as much 
as the Saar basin; and it also furnished 81 per cent of 
her zinc, 34 per cent of her lead, and a very large part of 
her steel and iron products. It could well- be argued that 



POLAND 8 1 

so great a sacrifice could not fairly be proposed unless it 
was certain that the majority of the population desired 
union with Poland. And it was impossible to be quite 
certain of that without putting the matter to a popular 
vote. Hence the decision that in Upper Silesia, too, there 
should be a plebiscite, and that in case the vote fell out 
in favor of Poland, Germany should enjoy a treaty-right 
to a certain amount of Silesian coal. 

With this third important modification of the original 
proposals, the Polish-German settlement assumed final 
form and was embodied in the Treaty of Versailles. The 
results may be summarized by saying that Germany has 
been forced to cede to Poland about 16,750 square miles 
of territory and about 2,900,000 people, i. e., about 
three "times the area and one and one-half times the 
population of Alsace-Lorraine. Among the ceded popu- 
lations there are, according to the last German census, 
about 1,800,000 Poles and about 1,000,000 Germans, 
I. e., a ratio of nine to five. 

Plebiscites have already taken place in the Allenstein 
and Marienwerder districts. In both cases the results 
were overwhelmingly in favor of Germany, as was, in- 
deed, to be expected; for in the Marienwerder district 
there is a large majority of Germans and in Allenstein the 
Polish-speaking majority is a backward, rural popula- 
tion, very much under the control of German landlords, 
pastors, and officials, and a population among which the 
Polish national movement was only in its first faint be- 
ginnings. 

In Upper Silesia the plebiscite is to be held within the 
next few months. Its outcome must be awaited with some 
trepidation, for plebiscites have the drawback of raising 
national animosities to fever pitch; there have already 



82 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

been two bloody outbreaks in Upper Silesia, and both the 
contending peoples are desperately anxious not to lose 
what is undoubtedly the richest territorial prize that re- 
mains to be awarded. 

Finally, it may be remarked that the treaty between 
Poland and Danzig, which has been drawn up by the 
Council of Ambassadors at Paris, has just been signed. 
In the meantime there has been an unhappy amount of 
friction between the Poles, the Germans of Danzig, and 
the British high commissioner representing the League of 
Nations. The Poles in Danzig are frequently mobbed; 
in the face of the crisis threatening her very existence 
last summer Poland found her one port virtually closed 
to her through the animosity of the Danzigers and what 
seems to me the very ill-advised action of the high com- 
missioner — in short, it must be admitted that the com- 
phcated arrangement about the free city of Danzig has 
so far worked out rather badly. 

The Peace Conference made no definitive arrangements 
about Austrian and Russian Poland. In the case of the 
former region there were two principal territorial dis- 
putes. The duchy of Teschen in Austrian Silesia, which 
in spite of its small size is extremely valuable because of 
its excellent coking coal and its thriving industries, was 
the object of a long controversy between Poland and 
Czecho-SIovakia. After going through a great many 
vicissitudes, this dispute was finally settled by a decision 
of the Council of Ambassadors last summer, which, with 
slight regard for the rights and the vehemently expressed 
wishes of the Polish-speaking majority of the population, 
awarded to the Czechs the whole mining region and the 
chief railroad line running through the territory. As a 
result the city of Teschen is cut in two; the larger, eastern 



POLAND 83 

portion of the town goes to Poland, but the western part, 
with the railway station, goes to the Czechs ; the electric- 
light plant goes to the one state, but the gas-works to the 
other, and I do not recall what has become of the munic- 
ipal water-works. This judgment of Solomon is a curious 
monument of the wisdom of diplomats. 
. Eastern Galicia, which was in dispute between the 
Poles and the Ukrainians, also furnished the Peace Con- 
ference with a complicated set of problems, into the de- 
tails of which it is scarcely possible to enter here. The 
Conference finally decided to leave Eastern Galicia under 
Polish sovereignty, but as an autonomous province, with 
ample guarantees for the national rights of the three and 
one-half millions of Ukrainians, who form the majority 
of the population, and with provisions for a plebiscite 
twenty-five years hence. The Poles, however, have been 
unwilling to accept these conditions, which, they affirm, 
would only keep up unrest and agitation and would make 
it almost impossible to govern the country. For the past 
year the negotiation seems to have been at a standstill. 
While the Poles are actually in possession of the prov- 
ince, the ultimate fate of Eastern Galicia has not been 
settled. 

The Peace Conference also found itself unable to fix 
the eastern boundaries of Poland on the side of Russia. 
The Allied and Associated Powers were not at war with 
Russia; they had no desire to dispose of Russian territory 
without Russia's consent; and there was no recognized 
Russian Government with which they could deal. It 
was, indeed, possible to assume that Warsaw and the 
adjacent region had been renounced by Russia, because 
immediately after the revolution of March, 191 7, the 
government of Prince Lvov had spontaneously recognized 



84 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the principle of "an independent Polish state including 
all regions with an indisputable Polish ethnic majority." 
Unhappily, however, there Hes between Poland and 
Russia a large debatable zone where, because of the un- 
reliability of our statistics and other data, it is difficult 
to say what the ethnic majority is or what are the wishes 
of a very ilhterate and inarticulate population. At pres- 
ent, it is almost impossible to say with certainty just 
where ethnographic Poland leaves off and ethnographic 
Russia begins. 

The Peace Conference did, at all events, issue one pro- 
visional declaration regarding this question — a declara- 
tion that has been much referred to in recent months 
and the nature of which has, I think, been much misun- 
derstood. 
^ Wishing to reduce the area of controversy and to make 
it possible for the Warsaw Government to organize a 
permanent administration in that part of Russian Poland 
that was certain to remain to it, the Conference on De- 
cember 8, 1 91 9, defined a provisional boundary for Po- 
land on the east, including all the territory that could be 
regarded as having "an indisputably Polish ethnic ma- 
jority." This was, in short, a kind of minimum line. 
Whatever lay to the west of it was to be considered as 
belonging henceforth unconditionally to Poland. The 
Conference expressly reserved, however, the claims Po- 
land might have to territories east of this line; claims on 
which the Conference did not feel able to pronounce and 
which must therefore be left to future negotiations be- 
tween Poland and Russia. 

This provisional minimum boundary of December, 
1919, has since become famous as the "Curzon linc^^^^In 
the crisis of the Polish-Bolshevist conflict last summer, 



POLAND 85 

Lord Curzon, acting for the British Government, at- 
tempted to mediate peace on the basis of the acceptance 
of this Hne as a definitive, permanent boundary. As this 
would have involved the renunciation by Poland of 
broad areas in which, it is claimed by the Poles, there are 
majorities of Polish population, the Warsaw Government 
staved off such a settlement, and finally, by the pre- 
liminary peace signed at Riga on October 12, it has se- 
cured a boundary much farther east than the Curzon 
line and much more advantageous. 

The Treaty of Riga, while disposing of Bolshevist 
claims to whatever lies west of the new frontier, has not 
altogether settled the fate of Vilna, the largest city in 
the ceded territory. Vilna and the region about it form 
the subject of a long-pending dispute between Poland 
and Lithuania. While fully reliable data are lacking 
here, it would seem that the Polish claim is much the 
stronger, if the question is to be settled chiefly with refer- 
ence to the language and the presumable desires of the 
population. The case for Lithuania rests mainly on the 
fact that Vilna was the historic capital of the old Lithu- 
anian state, and that the bulk of the population of this 
region, though now decidedly Polonized, is probably 
originally of Lithuanian stock.^ Through the interven- 
tion of the Allied Powers an attempt is now being made 
to induce the two contending governments to decide the 
question by a plebiscite. 

Apart from this problem and that of Upper Silesia, and 
barring the possibility of a new conflict with the Bol- 
shevists, the frontiers of Poland are thus at last fixed. 

^According to the census taken by the Germans in 191 6-17 the population 
of Vilna (139,000) was made up of: Poles, 53.6 per cent; Jews, 41.4 per cent; and 
Lithuanians, 2.1 per cent. 



86 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

As now constituted, the new state has an area of about 
148,000 square miles, i. e., it is much larger than the 
United Kingdom or Italy, and about three-fourths as 
large as France. Its population, which cannot be fixed 
with any certainty because of the chaos caused by the 
war, is variously estimated at between twenty-seven and 
thirty-two millions. At all events, Poland now ranks as 
the sixth state of Europe, both in size and in popu- 
lation; and it may be considered by far the most im- 
portant of the new states which the war has produced in 
eastern Europe. 



V 

THE END OF AN EMPIRE: REMNANTS OF 
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

BY CHARLES SEYMOUR 

" If Austria did not exist, it would be necessary to cre- 
ate her." This diplomatic aphorism, coined by a member 
of one of the very nationalities oppressed by the Haps- 
burgs, had rung in the ears of European statesmen for 
many decades. It had become almost axiomatic that the 
union of Danubian territories was essential to the eco- 
nomic welfare and political tranquillity of southeastern 
Europe. There were few who did not recognize the ser- 
vice performed for Europe by the Hapsburgs in holding 
together regions naturally interdependent, and in ob- 
structing the advance up the Danube of that internecine 
strife which has characterized the political habits of the 
Balkans. The disruption of the Hapsburg empire would 
threaten economic dislocation at the same time that it 
would inflame the nationalistic jealousy and ambition of 
the peoples that had been crushed under the Hapsburg 
yoke. The prospect was regarded with a doubt that bor- 
dered upon dismay even by the nations that were fighting 
Austria in the Great War. 

But the statesmen of the Peace Conference were con- 
fronted by a condition and not a theory. However clearly 
they recognized the dangers coincident with the disinte- 
gration of Austria-Hungary, it was not for them to de- 
cide. The question had already been settled by the 

87 



88 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

nationalities of the dying empire, which in the last weeks 
of the war had set up their own governments, contemptu- 
ously brushing away the traditions of centuries. Austria- 
Hungary as a political entity had crumbled hke the 
one-hoss shay, and the most solemn peace conference 
imaginable could not put her together again. 

Such a disintegration had long been foreshadowed and 
discussed. The empire had never been a nation, and 
factors of union and disunion had always engaged in 
fierce struggles. Ties of language and blood kinship, 
which form the strongest elements of political integra- 
tion, were lacking, and neither the political skill nor the 
good fortune of the Hapsburgs succeeded in welding into 
a single whole the myriad of peoples who had come to 
sojourn in the regions that make up the modern Austria- 
Hungary. The development of revolutionary organiza- 
tion during the war was slow. It came first and most 
effectively among the Czechs, who organized wholesale 
desertion of Czech battahons from the Hapsburg armies 
and the betrayal to the AHies of Austrian military secrets. 
The Jugo-SIavs were more cautious. Especially after the 
entrance of Italy into the war they showed themselves 
suspicious of Allied propaganda, for they feared lest 
emancipation from the Hapsburg yoke might become 
simply the first step toward enslavement by Italy. Nor 
were the AHies anxious, at first, to foster revolution, since 
the disruption of Austria did not enter completely into 
their diplomatic plans. But the growing conviction that 
Austria had become the catspaw of Germany, combined 
with the disgust of the subject nationahties, resulted in 
the encouragement and the success of the revolution. In 
1 91 8 Czecho-SIovakia was recognized as an independent 
Allied state. The newly formulated aims of the Jugo- 



THE END OF AN EMPIRE 89 

Slavs for independence and union with Serbia were gen- 
erally approved, and a cordial, though informal and tem- 
porary, understanding with Italy was established. 

With the surrender of Bulgaria, the rolling back of the 
German tide in France, and the defeat of Austrian armies 
on the Piave the revolution was inaugurated. Irresis- 
tibly and with extraordinary quiet it gathered headway. 
Hapsburg officials and organs of government were not 
assailed, but simply passed over, and in their place arose 
the provisional councils representing the nationalities. 
Within the space of a month the artificial cement that 
held the empire together had crumbled, loyalty to the 
emperor had evaporated, and the overlordship of Ger- 
mans and Magyars had been cast aside. The Tyrol and 
Trieste were occupied by Italians; at Prague the new 
Czecho-SIovak Government was solidified; in Croatia the 
Jugo-SIavs seized the reins of power and prepared for 
union with Serbia, while on the coast they took over the 
Austrian fleet; in Galicia the Poles negotiated with the 
new national government of Warsaw; in Transylvania 
the Rumanians were greeted as hberators. 

When the peace conference opened, therefore, the 
empire of Austria-Hungary was a thing of the past. One 
journalistic critic complains that the conference angrily 
broke up Austria into jigsaw bits; but the accusation 
betrays a wealth of ignorance and shows how much easier 
it is to be critical than correct. The United States and 
Great Britain would have been glad to create a federa- 
tion of the Danubian nationalities which, without the 
vices that had led to the fall of the Hapsburgs, might 
have accomplished the economic integration and pre- 
served the political order so essential to the tranquillity 
and prosperity of southeastern Europe. The suggestion 



90 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

would have been no more effective than a tenor solo in a 
boiler-shop. The nationalities would have none of it. 
They had freed themselves, they were instinct with the 
sense of their own capacity, bursting with nationalistic 
ambitions, suspicious of any federation as likely to revive 
the tyranny under which they had so long suffered. The 
Conference lacked the right, as well as the power, to im- 
pose union upon them. By virtue of the principle of self- 
determination it was for the nationalities to determine 
their own destiny, and if they preferred disunion no one 
could deny them. The independent sovereignty of the 
Czechs had been recognized; the union of the Poles of 
Galicia with the mass of the nationality in Russia and 
Germany was generally admitted; the right of Rumania 
to Transylvania had been acknowledged; and there were 
few inclined to dispute the union of the Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes of southern Hungary, Austria, and Bosnia, 
with their kinsmen in Serbia and Montenegro, although 
the prospect was not hailed with enthusiasm by Italy. 

It was true that the Allies and President Wilson had 
declared that they had no intention of breaking up 
Austria-Hungary, and the Fourteen Points had stipu- 
lated merely the autonomy of the subject nationalities. 
But as Mr. Wilson pointed out in his reply to the first 
request of Austria for an armistice in September, 191 8, 
the face of circumstances had changed so rapidly that 
mere autonomy had become insufficient; the sovereign 
rights of the Czechs and the aspirations of the Jugo- 
slavs had been recognized. The Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment admitted its willingness to accept this change. 
It might fairly be argued that in the division of Hapsburg 
territory the new Austrian and Hungarian Governments 
had a right to expect that the Peace Conference would 



THE END OF AN EMPIRE 91 

allocate territory in the spirit of the Fourteen Points; 
there was at least a strong moral obligation laid upon the 
Allies to treat Austria and Hungary with the justice that 
had been so eloquently voiced by President Wilson, al- 
though in fact the armistice of November 3 had been con- 
cluded so hastily that the Fourteen Points had apparently 
been forgotten. But even so, the integrity of the ancient 
empire could not be preserved. 

The Peace Conference was, accordingly, placed in the 
position of executor of the Hapsburg estate. The heirs 
were generally recognized — Czecho-SIovakia, Poland, Ru- 
mania, Jugo-SIavia, the new lesser Austria, lesser Hun- 
gary, and Italy. The duty of the Conference was to de- 
termine the character of the division. Even this had al- 
ready been fixed in its broad lines, so that much of the 
task of the peacemakers consisted simply in the deter- 
mination of detailed frontiers. The task, however, was 
not one which could be easily and satisfactorily accom- 
plished. There were, it is true, two treaties in existence 
which had mapped out the new frontiers of Italy and 
Rumania in Austria-Hungary. The first of these, the 
famous Treaty of London, had been signed in May, 19 15, 
and it was upon the basis of the promises therein made 
that Italy had entered the war on the side of the Allies. 
The second treaty, signed in August, 191 6, had assured 
Rumania generous frontiers in Hungary. But the United 
States had not been party to either of these secret treaties, 
drawn up before our entrance into the war, and had never 
been officially informed of their existence. President 
Wilson had gone on record as opposed to the approval of 
secret treaties of any kind. Furthermore, the promises 
made by France and England were by no means in ac- 
cord with the new international ideals enunciated by 



92 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Wilson and crystallized in the Fourteen Points. If Italy 
and Rumania insisted upon holding the Allies to their 
promises and if the United States delegation refused to 
recognize the justice and the wisdom of carrying those 
promises into effect, the Peace Conference obviously 
would face a problem of the greatest difficulty. 

It soon became clear that the heirs of the Hapsburg 
empire would furnish no assistance to the Conference in 
its task of territorial dehmitation by entering into friendly 
agreements among themselves. Each nationality viewed 
affairs through the colored prism of its own ambitions. 
When the Conference assembled in January, 191 9, it was 
confronted with the necessity not merely of drawing per- 
manent boundary-lines but of composing the quarrels 
that had sprung up between the different nationalities, 
which threatened to break into open warfare. In Silesia, 
Poles and Czechs each violently claimed the district of 
Teschen with its invaluable coal-mines; in the Adriatic, 
Italians and Jugo-SIavs were face to face; in southern 
Hungary, in the Banat of Temesvar, the Rumanians and 
Serbs stood ready to come to blows. Jugo-SIavs and 
German-Austrians fought along the Drave; the Rumanian 
army that had invaded Transylvania constantly advanced 
and threatened to occupy and hold pure Hungarian ter- 
ritory. 

Such were some of the problems faced by the supreme 
council of the Conference, in addition to the necessity of 
making arrangements for the renaissance of normal eco- 
nomic life, the transportation of food, the rehabilitation 
of the railways, the opening up of river traffic, and the 
resumption of coal-mining. At first the members of the 
council of ten may have hoped themselves to settle these 
boundary disputes. But it was not long before they 



THE END OF AN EMPIRE 93 

realized that if they gave to each the time and study es- 
sential to securing a Just solution, their deliberations 
would last for long months. And after all, the Austrian 
problem was but one of many. Nothing was more strik- 
ing than the sense of discouragement that manifested it- 
self upon the faces of the statesmen of the great powers 
as they listened to the claims and charges, the counter- 
claims and counter-charges presented to them by the 
representatives of the nationalities, so recently allied 
in a common cause, now inflamed by the bitterest jeal- 
ousy. 

The hearings took place in Secretary Pichon's study 
in the Quai d'Orsay, with its old pearly gray carpet marked 
with red roses, its rich Gobehn tapestries, and high French 
windows opening on to the perfect lawns of the foreign 
office gardens. In the centre, behind the empire desk, sat 
Clemenceau, squat, stolid, gray of face, his hands clasped 
quietly, covered by the eternal gray gloves, on his counte- 
nance an expression of bored tolerance. In his cynical 
wisdom he had never believed that the end of the war 
would bring the millennium; these nationalistic quarrels 
seemed to him entirely natural, even though inconve- 
nient. His arid humor, his biting sarcasm displayed in an 
infrequent question, contrasted with the patient earnest- 
ness of President Wilson, who sat upon his right, and to 
whom, it is not uninteresting to note, the claimants ap- 
pealed by their manner, if not in form, as the man of 
justice upon whom their hopes rested. Next to the Amer- 
icans sat Lloyd George and Balfour, perfect contrast. 
The British prime minister, consumed with an electric 
energy, always on the edge of his chair, questioning and 
interrupting; Balfour, with his long legs outstretched, his 
head on the back of his chair, eyes not infrequently 



94 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

closed, philosophic in his attitude, completely proof 
against those sudden gusts of enthusiasm which some- 
times assailed his chief. Next, on the right were the 
Japanese, with features immobile as the Sphinx, enig- 
matic as the Mona Lisa. Facing Clemenceau sat the 
Italians: Orlando, florid in manner, eloquent in speech; 
Sonnino, with eagle features, powerful nose, and jaw set 
Hke a vise. In the corners were the secretaries. Behind 
the principals sat the attaches and experts, with their 
maps and tables of statistics, whispering corrections of 
the tx parte statements which the delegates of the nation- 
alities presented. 

The latter stood or sat before Clemenceau's desk, 
presenting the particular claims of their newly founded 
or expanding states. There was the black-bearded Bra- 
tiano of Rumania, rather moody, fighting for the treaty 
of 1916, resentful of opposition. Or, contrasting type, the 
young and smiling foreign minister of the Czecho-SIovak 
Republic, Edward Benes, magnetic in manner, frank in 
negotiation. He had done much to organize the revolu- 
tion that swept aside the Hapsburgs and to build up the 
Czecho-SIovak army in Siberia; his diplomatic skill had 
combined with the solid honesty of President Masaryk to 
win the recognition of the Allies for the infant state. 
Then again the claimant would be the Pole, Dmowski, 
with furrowed visage, clear logic, and power of satire 
that wounded as effectively, though less ostentatiously, 
as the scalding invective of Bratiano. Paderewski came 
to Paris only late in the history of the Conference. 
There also were the Serbs, the patriarchal Pachitch, with 
white flowing beard, veteran of many a diplomatic bat- 
tle in the Balkans, and the smooth-spoken Vesnitch, both 
representing the Serbia of old, together with Trumbitch 



THE END OF AN EMPIRE 95 

and Zholger, representatives of the newly freed Austrian 
Jugo-SIavs. 

It is easy to imagine the perplexity of the leading 
statesmen of the Allies as they listened to the conflicting 
claims. Districts of which they had heard but vaguely, 
if ever, were discussed as though upon the fair apportion- 
ment of each depended the entire security of the future. 
The Banat, Teschen, Klagenfurt, many another name 
which was soon to become familiar — how were the merits 
of each contention justly to be adjudged? And where 
the time for the study of details? Inevitably the council 
adopted a suggestion, long mooted by Colonel House 
and approved by President Wilson, as the latter appreci- 
ated the time lost in fruitless debate, namely, that the 
claims of the Austrian nationalities be heard by com- 
missions of Allied experts, who should formulate reports 
to be submitted to the Conference, and which when ap- 
proved should form the basis of the treaties. On Feb- 
ruary I, 1919, the council appointed the first of the terri- 
torial commissions, whose function it was to reduce the 
questions at issue in the matter of Rumanian boundaries 
to the narrowest possible limits and to suggest solutions. 
Shortly afterward other commissions were formed, with 
similar purpose, to study Czecho-SIovak, Polish, and 
Jugo-SIav frontiers, and in this way prepare the new map 
to replace the Austria-Hungary that had been torn to 
pieces. 

The commissions that drafted the new boundaries were 
composed of representatives of France, Great Britain, 
Italy, and the United States, two delegates for each 
power. The Europeans were generally professional 
diplomats, taken from the foreign offices, and included 
such well-known personalities as Jules Cambon, formerly 



96 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

French ambassador at Berlin; Andre Tardieu, Clemen- 
ceau's chief lieutenant and commissioner of Franco- 
American affairs; Marquis Salvage Raggi, former Italian 
ambassador to Berlin; and Sir Eyre Crowe, of the British 
Foreign Office. They were supplemented by officials not 
so well known, but qualified by their special study of the 
problems to be settled. 

The American representatives were for the most part 
chosen from Colonel House's "Inquiry," men who had 
spent the preceding fourteen months in gathering ma- 
terials of all kinds, economic, pohtical, geographic, and 
historical, which would help to form a basis for just and 
practicable boundaries. The Americans were naturally 
at a great disadvantage in their lack of diplomatic experi- 
ence; they were incapable of utihzing the time-worn 
diplomatic tricks of negotiation, even had they been so 
inclined. But the American representatives found them- 
selves as well equipped with exact facts as any of the 
foreigners. There is an incident that occurred in one of 
the commissions that is not without interest and signifi- 
cance. The commission had agreed to recommend a 
certain frontier, but on studying this frontier the Amer- 
icans decided that a change should be made. At the next 
meeting the American delegate asked permission to in- 
troduce an amendment to the boundary-line, stating 
that he had with him the statistics which would, in his 
opinion, justify the change. A foreign delegate said at 
once: "I suggest that we accept the amendment without 
asking for the evidence. Hitherto the facts presented by 
the Americans have been irrefutable; it would be a waste 
of time to consider them." 

In their labors the commissions followed the informal 
methods of discussion inaugurated by the council of ten. 



THE END OF AN EMPIRE 97 

They were presided over by the senior French delegate, 
full minutes of the debates were taken by a Joint secre- 
tariat, and remarks were translated, since proceedings 
were in both English and French. Informality was as- 
sisted by the practice of smoking, without which their 
labors would have seemed interminable. For the commis- 
sions took their responsibility seriously and spared neither 
time nor effort in endeavoring to secure ideal frontiers. 
In general, it is fair to say that their decisions resulted 
from honest study and were only slightly affected by 
selfish political considerations. The American point of 
view was that we had chief interest in securing a lasting 
settlement which would guarantee tranquillity; absolute 
justice was desirable, not merely in the abstract but as 
promising better chance of permanence. The American 
propositions were accordingly characterized by greater 
generosity toward the defeated nationalities — the Ger- 
man-Austrians and the Magyars. So far as possible, the 
Americans believed, the frontiers ought to be determined 
by the distribution of the peoples, and the creation of 
discontented groups of irredentists should be avoided. 
Common sense and Justice ahke argued against the bar- 
terings of peoples for political purposes. 

The Europeans readily accepted this point of view in 
theory, although at times they were affected by special 
considerations. Both the French and British desired to 
create a Czecho-SIovakia with easily defensible frontiers 
and solid economic strength, even though it meant the in- 
clusion in the state of a large number of Germans and 
Magyars. Bohemia was looked upon as a bulwark 
against a resuscitated Germany which might some time 
in the future plan a new drive to the east. They also de- 
sired adequate railway connections between the Czechs 



98 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

and the Rumanians, an ideal which compelled the ex- 
tension of Rumanian boundaries beyond the limit that 
strict justice might have required. They found it hard 
to forget that the Austrians and Magyars were still the 
"enemy" and easy to accord portions of their territory 
to their friends, Rumania and Czecho-SIovakia. 

The Italians, on the other hand, showed some tender- 
ness toward the Austrians, except in the Tyrol, since they 
were anxious to resume friendly commercial relations and, 
especially, because of their desire to weaken the Jugo- 
slavs. For a time they supported the claims of Rumania, 
based upon the secret treaty of 191 6, presumably because 
they wished to emphasize the validity of secret treaties, 
for they themselves had been promised important ac- 
quisitions by the secret Treaty of London of 191 5. But 
when the Americans declared that they had no official 
knowledge of the treaty and that their decisions could 
not be affected by promises made before America entered 
the war, and of which they had never been informed, the 
Italians accepted the situation and tended rather to op- 
pose the extensive claims of Czechs and Rumanians. 
Evidently they feared the political predominance in 
southern Europe of what was soon to be called the 
Little Entente, made up of the Czechs, Rumanians, and 
Jugo-SIavs. 

It would be a mistake, however, to overemphasize such 
motives in the drawing up of the new frontiers. The com- 
missions spent long hours in studying the conflicting 
claims of the nationalities and in comparing them with 
the host of statistics which were available. If nothing 
else interfered the obvious frontier was the line that 
separated the nationalities, Czechs from Germans, Ru- 
manians from Jugo-SIavs, Jugo-SIavs from Magyars. 



THE END OF AN EMPIRE 99 

But many other factors had to be considered, physio- 
graphic features, the disturbance of normal economic life, 
the cutting of railways by boundaries. If a chain of 
mountains or a river offered a natural frontier, it might 
seem advisable to depart slightly from the linguistic line. 
If an agricultural district of Jugo-SIavs were economi- 
cally dependent upon a German-Austrian city, it might 
be wise to leave the district in Austria. If the linguistic 
line were crossed and recrossed by a railway or canal, it 
would be questionable policy not to arrange the political 
frontier in such a way as to leave the railway or canal 
entirely within one state or the other, so as to avoid 
troublesome customs interference with trade. It might 
even be necessary to consider whether a district should 
not be assigned to one state because it needed its agri- 
cultural or mineral wealth in order to secure economic 
independence, whereas the rival state did not. 

With such factors in mind, the commissions labored 
steadily through February and much of March, finally 
presenting their reports to the supreme council. The 
reports were composed of definite recommendations of 
the new boundaries, illustrated with maps, and supported 
by the reasons for the decisions taken; they also con- 
tained draft clauses to be inserted in the treaties with 
Germany, Austria, and Hungary, and these clauses 
formed the basis of the territorial sections of the treaties. 
It is important to emphasize the fact, perhaps, that the 
technical aspects of the treaties were not drafted hastily 
by the statesmen of the great powers, who obviously 
must have been ignorant of many details, but resulted, 
rather, from the labors and application of a body of tech- 
nical experts who had taken pains to go into all phases 
of the situation. 



100 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

By the time the reports were completed the council of 
ten had been broken up, and the direction of the Confer- 
ence assumed by the council of four — Wilson, Lloyd 
George, Clemenceau, and Orlando. It was for them to 
approve the boundaries proposed and to settle any dif- 
ferences that might have arisen in the commissions. 
In general the reports were unanimous, for all the dele- 
gates felt the necessity of arriving at definite decisions 
as rapidly as possible, in view of the troubled condition 
of Austria-Hungary and the imperative need of a resump- 
tion of normal life; but in some cases a delegation had 
not been able to join with the others and presented 
reservations or minority reports. Such differences must 
be settled by the council of four. With few exceptions, 
the four approved the unanimous recommendations of 
the commissions without alteration. In the case of the 
northern frontier of the Czecho-SIovak Repubhc they 
failed to accept recommendations for a series of minor 
alterations in the old frontier between Bohemia and 
Germany, which had been inserted in order to secure a 
frontier more in accordance with physiographical fea- 
tures and economic convenience; their refusal was based 
upon unwillingness to disturb a boundary which has 
existed for centuries. Furthermore, in the frontier be- 
tween Austria and the Jugo-SIavs, they listened to the 
protests of the Jugo-SIavs, who demanded that the 
Klagenfurt basin be divided for purposes of plebiscite, 
whereas the commission had voted to preserve the integ- 
rity of the basin. And, in fact, the commission was later 
to be justified by the recent vote of the peoples concerned, 
which kept the basin intact and awarded it to Austria, 
a solution for which the Americans had always con- 
tended. Such changes in the recommendations of the 



THE END OF AN EMPIRE loi 

commissions were rare, and they seemed more important 
at the moment and to the members of the commission 
than they will to the historian. 

Over the points in dispute the council of four worked 
with earnest industry and surprising informality. They 
met in the front room of President Wilson's house, fre- 
quently with the members of the commissions, listening 
to different points of view. There one might have seen 
President Wilson himself on all fours, kneeling on a 
gigantic map spread upon the floor and tracing with 
his finger a proposed boundary, other plenipotentiaries 
grouped around him, also on all fours. In such matters 
the President took a keener interest than either Lloyd 
George or Clemenceau, and absorbed with extraordinary 
speed the salient points relating to an issue, which were 
frequently whispered to him by some American expert 
sitting on the sofa beside him. When finally approved, 
the draft clauses were inserted in the treaties and com- 
municated to the nationalities of the disrupted empire. 
The latter, while they were apparently in the position of 
litigants in a suit, in reality had been kept informed of 
the diff'erent decisions taken and had been able at vari- 
ous points to influence decisions in their favor. The 
representatives of the new Austria and Hungary were, 
of course, not called to Paris until the treaties were com- 
pleted, at least in their main aspects, and, like the Ger- 
mans, could plead their cause only in written notes. 

With certain exceptions, the boundaries finally ap- 
proved conform roughly to the distribution of the sev- 
eral peoples, although in all matters of doubt the balance 
turns slightly against the former dominant nationalities 
— the Germans and Magyars. One of the exceptions to 
be noted is the case of the Austrian Tyrol, where the 



102 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

demands of the Italians for annexation of the Tyrol as 
far north as the Brenner Pass were granted, as promised 
in the secret Treaty of London. It should not be for- 
gotten that this problem was not considered by any ter- 
ritorial commission, since Italy refused to permit any 
discussion of her territorial claims except by the supreme 
council. France and Great Britain were bound by their 
promises, and President Wilson, early in the history 
of the Conference, agreed to Italian demands in this 
quarter. 

To Italy the Brenner frontier appears the merest 
justice, for it is unquestionably the best geographical 
boundary and affords the surest strategical security; 
the importance of the latter factor was emphasized the 
more by Italians, inasmuch as Italy's northern frontier 
had in the past always been dominated by the Austrian 
military positions. Austria, on the other hand, while 
admitting the justice of the annexation by Italy of the 
southern Tyrol, with its 400,000 Italians, complained 
that the Brenner frontier would annex some 250,000 
German-Austrians to Italy, and that these peoples are 
of all Hapsburg subjects the most loyal to Vienna; for 
this was the home of Andreas Hofer. Austria asked, 
accordingly, that the linguistic frontier, farther south, be 
followed in assigning political boundaries. A third solu- 
tion was advanced by certain experts at Paris, and ap- 
proved by many Americans, which would have placed 
the line about midway between the other two, thus leav- 
ing the majority of the Germans in Austria, but securing 
for Italy a better defensive frontier and one less injurious 
to the economic interests of the inhabitants than the 
linguistic line. The decision of President Wilson, who 
may have desired to convince Italy of his friendliness in 



THE END OF AN EMPIRE 103 

view of the Adriatic situation, settled the problem in 
favor of Italy. 

A second exception to the general rule that the politi- 
cal boundary should conform roughly to the linguistic is 
to be found in the case of Czecho-SIovakia. The Czechs 
demanded not merely union with their Slovak cousins of 
northern Hungary, a development which in view of their 
services in the war was inevitable and probably wise, 
but also that their boundaries should be so arranged as 
to include a large number of Germans and Magyars. 
The northern rim of Bohemia is almost exclusively Ger- 
man and a strict application of the principle of nation- 
ality in this region, and in Moravia and Silesia, would 
have given something more than 3,000,000 Germans 
to Austria and Germany (for the creation of a separate 
German-Bohemian state was hardly within the realm of 
practical possibility). But the Czechs argued that to 
rob Bohemia of its geographic and historic boundary 
would be to lay it open to the attack of Germany from 
the north. Furthermore, it would deal a mortal blow 
at the economic life of the new state by taking away 
districts essential to Bohemia's industrial prosperity. 
The districts in question, even though inhabited by 
Germans, were closely bound in the economic sense to 
the Czech districts, and naturally separated from Ger- 
many; the inhabitants themselves would suffer from any 
arrangement which cut them off. Such arguments, par- 
ticularly those which emphasized the economic factors, 
seemed valid to the commissions, which accordingly 
recommended the historic boundaries of the provinces of 
Bohemia and Moravia, with slight rectifications. The 
third province, Silesia, was divided between the Czechs 
and the Poles. 



THE END OF AN EMPIRE 105 

While the Czechs argued for historic frontiers in Aus- 
tria, when it came to the Slovak districts of Hungary, 
they insisted that the historic boundaries of the king- 
dom be broken so as to permit incorporation of those 
districts in the new Czecho-SIovakia. They also asked 
that a notable Magyar minority be included on the 
south. Without the territory of these Magyars, Slo- 
vakia, which is a mountainous country with no transverse 
valleys of importance running east and west, would be 
deprived of practical means of communication between 
one part of the country and the other. Again, the com- 
mission agreed, not forgetting President WiIson*s prin- 
ciple that every state has a right to conditions that will 
assure its economic life. Czecho-SIovakia is thus a poly- 
glot, for of its 14,000,000 inhabitants there are more 
than a third belonging to other nationalities, chiefly 
Germans, Magyars, and Ruthenians. 

The new Rumania, which acquired enormous terri- 
tories in Transylvania, Hungary, and Bukowina, is like- 
wise a polyglot state. This results partly from the fact 
that in Transylvania, which is chiefly Rumanian in 
character, large colonies of Magyars (Szeklers) and Ger- 
mans are to be found. Furthermore, Rumania, like 
Czecho-SIovakia, was assigned generous frontiers on the 
Hungarian side in order to assure facilities of transpor- 
tation. Without the railways running north and south, 
communication between northern and southern Tran- 
sylvania would be costly or impossible. Hence the new 
Rumania includes a notable Magyal fringe. 

The chief interest of Rumania, however, was to acquire 
that district in southern Hungary between the Danube, 
Theiss, and Maros Rivers, which is known as the Banat 
of Temesvar. This district, which is an economic en- 



io6 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

tity, was claimed by both Rumanians and Serbs, the 
former demanding all of it, the latter only the western 
portion, since the eastern third is admittedly Rumanian. 
The problem was intensified by the confused distribution 
of peoples, Serb, German, Magyar, and Rumanian vil- 
lages being scattered in that Macedonian fashion which 
has given its name to a well-known salad. It was fur- 
ther intensified by the network of communications, rail- 
ways, rivers, and canals, through which no frontier could 
be drawn without injury to the economic interests of the 
inhabitants. But to hand the entire region to Rumania 
meant the creation of an irredentist spirit among the 
Serbs, who claimed several districts as the homes of 
national heroes, who needed protection across the Dan- 
ube for Belgrade, and who, in the western portions, un- 
doubtedly outnumbered the Rumanians. With such 
considerations in mind, the commission decided to divide 
the Banat, giving the western third to the Serbs and the 
eastern two-thirds to the Rumanians. The decision was 
probably inevitable. No one will call it satisfactory. It 
has at least this merit: it so enraged both parties to the 
dispute that they forgot the enmity toward each other 
in their common disgust with the Peace Conference. 

Whatever the disappointment occasioned to the con- 
tending nationalities of the former empire, the new 
boundaries of the states into which the fragments have 
been formed are a clear manifestation of the degree of 
importance assigned to the principle of nationality by 
the Conference. That principle was even applied to 
Austria and Hungary, the former being accorded districts 
inhabited by Germans along its eastern frontier, which 
by historic right belonged to Hungary. Respect for the 
principle of nationality forms the strong side of the 



THE END OF AN EMPIRE 107 

settlement. In place of the semi- feudal system of the 
Hapsburgs, imposing the edicts of hostile minorities upon 
subject majorities, outworn remnant of an age that is 
past, we have political power granted in accordance with 
popular desires. It is the principle for which Ameri- 
can statesmen have contended since the birth of the 
nation. 

No honest student of European conditions, however, 
can be blind to the new dangers which have been created. 
It is undeniable that a considerable stretch of territory 
has been Balkanized, that in place of a co-ordinating 
whole we find a group of small states, which by temper 
and experience are not as yet well qualified to meet the 
contingencies of the future with that moderation and 
spirit of compromise which is essential to tranquillity 
and progress. The very factors which enabled the 
nationalities to secure their freedom have intensified 
their self-confidence, their sense of nationalistic jealousy, 
their willingness to take up arms. 

Occasion for friction between the different states will, 
unfortunately, not be lacking. Each state includes 
something of a nationalistic minority, which will look for 
support to its kinsmen, who form the majority in the 
neighboring state. Czecho-SIovakia and Rumania, we 
have seen, include large minorities of aliens; Ruthenians 
are brought under the political control of Poland; Ger- 
mans and Jugo-SIavs are annexed in large numbers by 
Italy. Jugo-SIavia includes comparatively few outsid- 
ers, but the differences between Croats, Slovenes, and 
Serbs do not promise a tranquil future. In the United 
States we think little of the dangers apt to proceed from 
a racial melange, but in this part of Europe, if a man 
speaks a different language from that of his neighbor, he 



io8 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

becomes almost necessarily his enemy. With this in 
mind the Conference, much to the disgust of the states, 
drew up guarantees to be furnished to all minority 
groups, assuring them the protection and the justice 
which in this country are taken as a matter of course. 
How seriously these guarantees will be observed is a 
problem of the future. 

We may also expect that difficulties will develop from 
economic quarrels. Three of the states formed from the 
Hapsburg empire are absolutely landlocked. Of these, 
lesser Austria is perhaps in the worst plight. Cut off 
from territorial access to the sea, with its capital city of 
2,000,000 inhabitants placed on the eastern frontier, and 
poor in natural resources, the new Austria lacks many 
of the conditions conducive to economic prosperity. It 
would have been natural, in view of the purely German 
character of its population, to have permitted union with 
Germany. This was, on the whole, approved by the 
American delegates, as it was requested by the Austrians 
themselves. The French, however, set their face firmly 
against any acquisition of territory by the secular enemy 
across the Rhine. We may ask whether the six and a 
half million German-Austrians might not tend to coun- 
terbalance the Prussian domination in Germany, for they 
have much in common with the south German. Cer- 
tainly union would tend toward the economic rehabilita- 
tion of these regions which is so essential to political 
tranquillity. 

If the Conference made a mistake, the economic conse- 
quences of which may prove disastrous, in not permitting 
the union of lesser Austria with Germany, it committed 
another of equally serious character when it attempted 
to lay the sins of the Hapsburgs upon the new state. 



THE END OF AN EMPIRE 109 

The Austrian representatives at St. Germain argued 
with a logic which to many Americans seemed incontro- 
vertible, that lesser Austria was in reality a new state, 
sprung from the revolution of November, 1918, and that 
it should not be punished by being forced to assume 
responsibility for a war debt and reparations account in- 
curred by the Hapsburg government, with which it had 
no connection. In the case of Germany, the fall of the 
HohenzoIIerns had not made a new Germany; but the 
Austrian revolution had resulted h. the birth of a num- 
ber of new states, and it was unfair to impose upon two 
of those states responsibility for the misdeeds of the old 
empire. Austria, they insisted, was as much a new state 
as Czecho-SIovakia. With greater force they pointed 
out that with a population less than a seventh that of the 
former Hapsburg empire, it would be physically impos- 
sible to make good the war damage for which the old 
empire was responsible. But the Conference persisted 
in treating lesser Austria with lesser Hungary as the 
successors of the Hapsburg empire and adopted the same 
method as that used in dealing with Germany; the Treaty 
of St. Germain compels Austria to recognize her liability 
to pay full reparations, although the reparations commis- 
sion is given wide discretionary powers. 

The same attitude was taken toward lesser Hungary. 
Like Austria, that state now becomes landlocked, and it 
has been deprived of its mountainous periphery, so rich 
in coal, precious metals, lumber, and water-power. But 
Hungary retains the fertile plain, productive of cereals, 
and can always feed itself. Czecho-SIovakia, the third 
landlocked state, has inherited the lion's share of the 
industrial districts of the former empire, the coal and 
lignite fields, the great manufactories, and also fertile 



no WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

agricultural regions, so that it appears, broadly speaking, 
to be economically independent. 

But in the case of all three of these states, which lack 
seaports, there is the danger that freedom of transit 
may be denied them by the neighboring states, through 
whose territory they must send their exports. Such a 
danger was constantly in the minds of the peacemakers 
at Paris, who not merely drew up general articles guar- 
anteeing freedom of transit and international control of 
means of transportation, but gave to Czecho-SIovakia 
part of the ports of Hamburg and Stettin, and approved 
her claim to Pressburg on the Danube, although the 
population of the city included only a Czech minority. 
But the danger resulting from lack of seaports is none 
the less real, though clearly perceived at Paris and pos- 
sibly mitigated to some extent by international control 
of communication. 

That danger is intensified by the economic interde- 
pendence of the heirs of the Hapsburgs. Austria will 
have to import raw materials, coal and the like, from 
which to produce manufactured goods, and will have to 
export these goods to buy food. Hungary will have to 
exchange its grain for manufactured articles. There is 
always the opportunity for one state to exercise political 
pressure upon its neighbor through an economic boycott. 
It was this danger that as much as anything else con- 
vinced the commissions who worked on the new bound- 
aries of southeastern Europe that some general super- 
visionary agency was necessary to replace the co-ordina- 
tion that the Hapsburgs had exercised. Without such 
international supervision economic tranquillity and polit- 
ical peace would always be endangered. For this reason 
many of the delegates, certainly those from America, 



THE END OF AN EMPIRE in 

believed that the proposed League of Nations was de- 
sirable, not merely because of its abstract idealism, but 
rather as a concrete necessity. And they readily appre- 
ciated the remark of Venizelos: ''Without a League of 
Nations southeastern Europe would face the future 
with despair in its heart." 



VI 
FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 

BY DOUGLAS WILSON JOHNSON 

The story of Fiume is closely linked with the whole 
problem of Italy's new frontiers. Both in the Trentino 
on the north and in the region of the Isonzo on the east 
Italy suffered before the war from frontiers which were 
geographically unsound, and which invited invasion by 
a dangerous neighbor. The boundary ran either close 
to the southern margin of the Alps, or actually down on 
the piedmont plain south of them, leaving almost the 
whole of the formidable mountain mass in Austria as a 
well-nigh impregnable defense against Italy, while Italy 
remained virtually defenseless against possible Austrian 
aggression. 

It is difficult for Americans to conceive what this 
meant to the Italian people, for we hve secure with de- 
fenseless frontiers separating us from weaker neighbors 
on the north and south. Yet if we are to appreciate the 
Italian point of view, we must try to put ourselves in 
the position of a people who find the gateways into their 
country held by an hereditary enemy, who have often 
suffered from invasions through those gateways in the 
past, and who know that they are held by the enemy 
for the deliberate purpose of making any possible future 
invasion easy. Add to this the further fact that Austria's 
strategic designs against Italy involved the enslavement 
of hundreds of thousands of Italians, both in the north 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 113 

and in the east, and it is not difficult to understand that 
the battle-cry of ''Trent and Trieste!" should awaken 
the fighting spirit of every patriotic Italian. Whatever 
the objectives of the then-existing government of Italy, 
it would seem clear that the great mass of the people, 
who knew nothing of the terms of the secret Treaty of 
London, entered the war not to subject large areas of 
Germanic and Slavonic territory to their rule, nor even 
to gain the port of Fiume, with its remote islet of Italian 
population; rather, they entered the war in a fervor of 
exalted patriotism, to complete the great work of uni- 
fication of Italy by freeing truly Itahan territory from a 
foreign yoke, and to drive the enemy from the very 
threshold of their homes back into his own domain. 

Since certain aspects of the Trentino or Tyrol problem 
are inseparable from the story of Fiume, let us pass in 
brief review the salient features of that problem. The 
Italian Government demanded the whole Trentino to the 
line of the Brenner Pass, and in the secret Treaty of 
London the Allies promised it as part of the compensa- 
tion to be given Italy for her aid against the Central 
Powers. At the Peace Conference Italy increased her 
demands, claiming in addition to what the treaty allowed 
her several important areas on the northern slopes of 
the watershed having considerable strategic importance. 

As the Italian claims would certainly be supported by 
racial, historical, geographic, and strategic arguments, it 
was necessary for the American specialists to examine 
fully into every aspect of the problem. It is true that in 
the drainage basin of the Adige River, forming most of 
the Trentino, the majority of the population is Italian. 
But it is equally true that even the Itahan authorities 
on the distribution of races in the Trentino admit that 



114 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the Italian majority is largely confined to the south, 
while the northern parts of the basin are overwhelmingly 
German and have been so for centuries. It was found 
possible to draw in the Trentino one of the cleanest-cut 
ethnographic frontiers in the world, leaving few Germans 
to 'the south and few Itahans to the north of it. 

A careful study of the theory that the watershed 
crossing the Brenner Pass was the only natural northern 
frontier for Italy, and that the drainage basin of the 
Adige River constituted an indivisible geographic unit, 
did not substantiate that view. In the Alps, as is so 
often the case in glaciated mountains, the drainage di- 
vide is in places determined by some insignificant topo- 
graphic detail, such as a small moraine or a tiny alluvial 
fan in the bottom of a great valley. The Adige water- 
shed, instead of following along Alpine ridges, actually 
descends into and cuts squarely across the floor of the 
Pusterthal, thus dividing in an accidental and abnormal 
manner one of the most striking geographic units in the 
Alps. The true boundary between geographic units, the 
real topographic barrier separating German and Italian 
lands in that part of the Alps east of the Brenner Pass, 
lies not on the watershed, but some distance south of it. 

Italy's historical claim to a frontier on the Brenner Pass 
seemed equally weak. The former extent of the Roman 
Empire over the coveted area could not seriously be 
regarded as a basis of territorial awards in the twentieth 
century. The argument that Napoleon's annexation of 
the upper Adige to the kingdom of Italy showed the mili- 
tary and political necessity of granting Italy a frontier on 
the Brenner fell to the ground in view of the fact that 
the "Upper Adige" of Napoleon's time stopped far short 
of the Brenner and included little beyond the lands 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 115 

which to-day are unquestionably Italian. If Napoleon's 
action proved anything, it proved that that mihtary 
genius did not regard a frontier on the Brenner as vital 
to Italy. 

Yet the strategic arguments in favor of Italy's claim to 
the whole of the Trentino were the strongest which could 
be advanced. The long, narrow form of the Itahan 
peninsula, by rendering pecuharly difficult the mobiliza- 
tion of Italy's man-power, makes the need of a strong 
frontier on the north especially urgent. Fifty per cent 
of the defenders of the frontier must come from south of 
the constriction of the peninsula near the latitude of 
Bologna, and must journey to and through that con- 
striction on four main railway lines, of which three 
traverse the Apennines mountain barrier and two can be 
destroyed from the sea. Hence, Italy might with some 
show of reason demand a strategic frontier so strong that 
in case of attack a fraction of her man-power could defend 
it successfully against superior enemy forces until the 
whole could be mobihzed. 

The geographic character of Italy's northern frontier 
compels her to maintain two campaigns against a Teu- 
tonic or a combined Teutonic-Slavonic aggression. Italy's 
northern plain is vulnerable from the north and from the 
east. The armies defending the eastern frontier depend 
upon supply fines which traverse the Venetian plain for 
150 miles in sight of an enemy advancing over the north- 
ern mountains. Hence the eastern armies must always 
fight under the menace of a disaster which is inevitable 
if the enemy on the north succeeds in reaching the plain 
and cutting their communications. In the present war 
Cadorna's eastern operations came to an abrupt halt 
in May, 1916, when he was compelled to transfer large 



ii6 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

forces westward to check the dangerous Austrian advance 
across the Asiago plateau almost to the edge of the 
plains. Irretrievable disaster to the eastern armies was 
narrowly averted. The magnitude of the Caporetto 
disaster, consequent upon the Teutonic armies' breaking 
through to the plains near the extreme eastern end of the 
northern frontier, enables one to picture the far more 
serious consequences which must ensue if ever the north- 
ern mountain barrier is breached farther west, and the 
communications of the eastern armies destroyed 150 
miles in their rear. 

Since Italy's military forces will not admit of two offen- 
sive campaigns against so powerful an enemy, at least 
one of these campaigns must be defensive. Topographic 
conditions dictate that the defensive campaign should be 
the northern one, for a successful offensive across the 
main Alpine barrier, supported by but one through rail- 
way hne, has less chance of success than an offensive in 
the east, where the terrain is less difficult, railways are 
more numerous, and support by sea is possible. Hence 
we conclude that Italy's northern frontier should be 
strategically so strong as to render a defensive campaign 
in the north comparatively simple and assured of success, 
leaving the bulk of her forces free to defend the eastern 
gateways. 

It so happens that the Central Alps provide a series of 
natural trenches and mountain barriers together consti- 
tuting one of the strongest defensive terrains in the 
world. But the Austrian province of the Trentino 
drove a wedge clear through the system, rendering the 
defense of Italian territory extremely difficult, and assur- 
ing tremendous advantages to a possible Teutonic in- 
vasion. In the opinion of the American specialists, to 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 117 

push the frontier northward only so far as the ethno- 
graphic frontier would still leave Austria, or Germany 
and Austria combined in case of their future union, in 
possession of very great strategic advantages over their 
Latin neighbor, advantages which might invite aggression. 
To push the boundary farther north, to the natural 
topographic barrier referred to above, would give rea- 
sonable protection to Italy by making invasion from the 
north so difficult as to be highly improbable, and would 
add the minimum German population to Italy compatible 
with securing a good geographic and defensive frontier 
for the southern Kingdom. To push the frontier clear 
to the Brenner and eastward into the Pustertal, as Italy 
asked, would be to carry it far into purely Germanic 
territory, to enlarge the German irredenta to dangerous 
proportions, and to split the geographic and economic 
unit of the Pusterthal. In favor of the latter proposal 
it could, however, be urged that the territory to the 
Brenner had secretly been promised to Italy by England 
and France in order to secure Italy's entry into the war 
on the Allied side, that a frontier well advanced into 
Germanic territory would still more effectively protect 
Italian territory, and that generous treatment of Italy's 
demands on the northern frontier, where the mountainous 
terrain was not in any sense vital to the development of 
neighboring lands, might make Italy more willing to 
reduce her demands on the east where she claimed areas 
the annexation of which would render impossible the free 
economic development of her neighbors. 

The Conference decided in favor of the most generous 
fulfilment of Italian ambitions on the north, and gave 
her not only all the territory to the watershed frontier 
promised by the Treaty of London, but in addition the 



ii8 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Sexten valley district lying beyond the watershed and 
conferring important strategic advantages on its pos- 
sessor. With Italy's frontier established in an impreg- 
nable position on the north, and all danger of invasion 
from that direction eliminated, we may now consider the 
eastern frontier in its proper relation to Italy's frontier 
problem as a whole. 

On the east the Italian Government had demanded as 
one of the conditions of Italy's entrance into the war, 
and in the Treaty of London England and France had 
promised to give, not only the Italian-inhabited areas 
around Goritzia and Trieste, but vast areas of almost 
pure Slavonic country about the head of the Adriatic 
and on the eastern shores of that sea, as well as a large 
proportion of the Slav-populated islands fringing the 
eastern coast. 

The American Government not only consistently re- 
fused to recognize the Treaty of London, a document 
held to be, both in the manner of its execution and in 
its precise terms, fundamentally in opposition to the 
very principles for which America was fighting, but early 
recognized the right of the Jugo-SIavs to rule them- 
selves. President Wilson took certain other steps more 
or less incompatible with the fulfilment of the terms of 
the treaty, such as securing the consent of the Allied 
Powers to make peace on terms which provided for the 
determination of Italy's new frontiers "along clearly 
recognizable lines of nationahty." Throughout the ne- 
gotiations the American Government held to the view 
that the Treaty of London was obsolete in view of the 
disappearance of Austria-Hungary as a great Power (at 
whose expense the treaty was to have been executed), 
the agreement of the Alhes to erect a new Jugo-SIav 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 119 

nation associated with them and Italy, the entry into 
the war of new nations not parties to the treaty, and 
the agreement of the AHies, Italy included, to make 
peace on a new basis of right and Justice. 

When, as a resuh of the Russian revolution, the con- 
tents of the secret Treaty of London were made public, 
the Jugo-SIav forces in the Austrian army, strongly dis- 
affected toward their Teutonic master and held in con- 
trol only with the greatest difficulty, were galvanized 
into new hostility against Italy. It was not difficult for 
the Austrian leaders to show that by the terms of the 
treaty itself Italy was not fighting to set the western 
Jugo-SIavs free, but rather to transfer nearly a million 
of them to Italian rule. The consequences were most 
harmful, not only to Italy, but to the whole Allied cause. 
Thoughtful Italians deplored the fact that much Itafian 
blood was being shed by a people who were, fike them- 
selves, sufferers at the hands of a common enemy and 
oppressor. 

After the Caporetto disaster Italian appreciation of 
this anomalous situation became more acute, and infor- 
mal negotiations were begun between Italian and Jugo- 
SIav representatives looking toward an accord. These 
negotiations bore fruit in the "Pact of Rome," ratified 
by the Congress of Oppressed Austro-Hungarian Nation- 
alities at Rome in April, 191 8, according to which the 
representatives of the Italian people and of the Jugo- 
SIav people specifically agreed "in the interests of good 
and sincere relations between the two peoples in the 
future, to solve amicably the various territorial contro- 
versies on the basis of the principles of nationality and 
of the rights of peoples to decide their own fate, and in 
such a way as not to injure the vital interests of the 



120 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

two nations, such as shall be defined at the moment of 
peace." 

Later Italy, in common with the other Allies, accepted 
as the basis of the peace with Germany the Fourteen 
Points, the ninth of which read: "A readjustment of the 
frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recog- 
nizable lines of nationality." 

The beneficial effects of the Rome agreement were soon 
apparent, for Jugo-SIavs united with Italians in pushing 
a vigorous propaganda to convince Jugo-SIav troops in 
the Austrian armies that Italy was henceforth the friend 
of their national aspirations, the Pact of Rome having 
recorded the agreement that "the unity and independence 
of the Jugo-SIav nation is a vital interest of Italy, Just as 
the completion of Italian national unity is a vital interest 
of the Jugo-SIav nation." The propaganda was effective, 
and reports from independent sources gave it credit for 
being one of the several causes which brought about 
the remarkably complete disintegration of the Austrian 
armies revealed by their final debacle, when in a few days, 
on one of the strongest defensive terrains in the world, 
they surrendered wholesale to the victorious Italians. 

Such was the background of the thorny problem of 
Fiume and the Adriatic when it came before the Peace 
Conference. Instead of reducing their territorial de- 
mands to accord with the provisions of the Pact of Rome 
and the Fourteen Points, the Italian representatives be- 
lieved themselves justified in increasing them even be- 
yond the limits of the Treaty of London. While insist- 
ing upon the execution of the Treaty of London in respect 
to the territories which it assigned to Italy, the Italian 
representatives asked that it be revised where favorable 
to the Jugo-SIavs, in order that Fiume, definitely assigned 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 121 

to Croatia by the treaty, should be given to Italy. Other 
territories of much strategic or economic value, lying 
beyond the Treaty of London hne, were also included in 
the Itahan demands. The American specialists were 
thus called upon to examine into the validity of Italian 
claims to important territories scattered all the way from 
the Carnic Alps past Fiume and down the Adriatic coast 
to and beyond Valona at the mouth of that sea. 

On the basis of nationality the case was extremely 
clear. The Italian populations did not cease at the old 
Austro- Italian frontier, but were in a majority as far 
eastward as Goritzia and along the western margin of 
the Istrian peninsula from Trieste southward to Pola. 
Italy could thus claim on racial grounds a frontier co- 
inciding approximately with the western base of the 
eastern mountain barrier. From that line eastward, 
however, both Italian and Jugo-SIav authorities were 
agreed that the Jugo-SIavs constituted an overwhelming 
majority of the population. A few Italians were scat- 
tered here and there along the eastern Adriatic coast, 
but they formed remote Latin islets in the midst of a 
great Slavonic sea, the two most notable of which were 
at Fiume and Zara. By no possible interpretation could 
the principle of nationality be stretched to sanction the 
annexation to Italy of the hundreds of thousands of 
Jugo-SIavs who must be subjected to Italian domina- 
tion against their will if Italy's frontiers were to reach 
eastward over purely Slavonic territory far enough to 
incorporate the remote islets of Italian population. To 
reach the few tens of thousands of Italians in Fiume 
(approximately 24,000 according to the last official cen- 
sus, 33,000 according to Italian claims) about half a 
million Jugo-SIavs would have to be t;hus annexed. 



122 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

On the basis of self-determination the case was equally 
clear. It was undoubtedly true that many of the Slavs 
used the Italian language as well as their own, and 
that many of them were strongly influenced by Italian 
culture. But against these facts and Italy's claim that 
in general these people were not unfavorable to her 
pohtical programme concerning them, the American 
specialists had to weigh the overwhelming mass of testi- 
mony coming in from every possible source, which dem- 
onstrated beyond any possibility of doubt that the Jugo- 
slav populations in question were deeply resentful of 
Itahan occupation of their territories and violently op- 
posed to any form of ItaHan sovereignty over them. 
Even the Italian representatives ceased to press this 
argument and rejected all proposals looking toward a 
solution of the vexed question on the basis of a vote by 
the people themselves. 

The historical argument that in the days of Rome and 
Venice the east Adriatic coast came under the dominion 
of those states, and the fact that traces of Latin culture 
abound throughout the territories in discussion, were 
given full consideration. But it seemed to the special- 
ists impossible to draw frontiers on the basis of condi- 
tions in an age that is past, when such frontiers would 
violate the fundamental racial and economic conditions 
upon which the present and future peace of Europe must 
rest. Whatever political systems endured for longer or 
shorter periods in the past, we faced the inescapable fact 
that the east Adriatic coast is, and long has been, over- 
whelmingly Slavonic, and that it intensely desired its 
own rule rather than that of an alien race dwelling be- 
yond the Adriatic Sea. 

On geographic and economic grounds Italy could prop- 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 123 

erly claim much more than on the basis of nationality, 
self-determination, or history. Assuredly the old boun- 
dary across the plain west of the Isonzo River was a 
geographical absurdity, and a line close to the mountain 
base would be little better. Neither would it be wise to 
cut off the Slavonic populations of the mountain valleys 
from the Italian markets on the plain, for the two are 
economically mutually dependent. In the opinion of the 
specialists, this was one of the cases where a literal appli- 
cation of the Fourteen Points would work injury, and it 
was accordingly recommended that Italy's eastern fron- 
tier should not be determined solely along clearly recog- 
nizable lines of nationahty, but that it should be pushed 
far eastward into Slavonic territory, so as to include not 
only the Italian cities at the mountain base, but in addi- 
tion the Slavonic hinterland dependent upon them. The 
President promptly accepted this view, and agreed to 
the frontier recommended by the experts along the crest 
of the mountain barrier, the only logical frontier, geo- 
graphically and economically, in the region. That it 
gave a solid block of more than 300,000 Jugo-SIavs to 
Italy was regrettable; but it seldom if ever happens 
that the racial frontier, the economic frontier, the natural 
geographic frontier, and the historical or political frontier 
coincide in any given district. It is necessary to weigh 
each case on its merits, and to seek that line which will, 
all things considered, work the maximum of good and 
the minimum of injury to the vital interests of those 
directly concerned. In the present case this line followed 
high mountain ridges and barren limestone plateaus, 
separating the natural hinterland of Trieste on the west 
from the natural hinterland of Fiume on the east. 
As in the case of the northern frontier, so in that of 



124 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the eastern, strategic arguments loomed larger than all 
others. Here, as in the Trentino, Austria had enjoyed 
strategic advantages which made Italy's successful de- 
fense of her own territory against hostile aggression ex- 
tremely difficult, if not impossible. With the disap- 
pearance of Austria as a world power, and with the 
substitution of a new, small, and comparatively weak 
nation on Italy's eastern border, the strategic argument 
would seem to have lost much of its weight. Neverthe- 
less, it was given serious consideration, and the details of 
the so-called "American line," already located wholly in 
Slavonic territory in a dominating position on the moun- 
tain barrier, were so drawn as to insure to Italy strong 
tactical positions which would enable her to block the 
available passes with ease in case of enemy attack. The 
line was deemed strategically strong as well as economi- 
cally and geographically good. 

Strategic arguments alone could justify Italian claims 
to extensive territory in Dalmatia and on the east- 
coast islands, inhabited almost wholly by Jugo-SIavs. 
The mountainous, ragged eastern coast of the Adriatic, 
with its numerous harbors, is in strong contrast with 
the low, simple western coast, where harbors are few 
in number and inferior in quality. Any naval power 
on the eastern coast must find itself possessing immense 
advantages over Italy. A fleet taking refuge in one of 
the Itahan harbors is visible from far out to sea because 
of the flatness of the coast, whereas vessels secreted along 
the eastern shore are invisible behind mountain barriers. 
From the low western coast observation of an approach- 
ing squadron is limited as compared with the better ob- 
servation enjoyed by those on the dominating heights of 
the eastern shores. Coast defense artiflery has little 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 125 

choice of inferior positions on the Italian side and un- 
limited choice of excellent positions on the eastern coast. 
A fleet emerging from one of the western harbors to give 
battle may be taken unawares before it can develop its 
battle formation, while a fleet manoeuvring behind the 
protective fringe of islands along the east coast may 
emerge from a number of passages simultaneously and 
assume a predetermined formation without delay. The 
Itahan submarines scouting along the eastern shores 
find the bottom rough and deep, so that lying in wait 
for an enemy is a dangerous proceeding, while the enemy 
submarine finds shallow water and a smooth bottom 
upon which to he concealed pending the passage of a 
prospective victim. The clear waters along the eastern 
coast reveal hidden mines or submarines to the scouting 
hydroplane, while the murkier waters bordering the 
Italian coast make it difficult for ItaHan observers to 
locate enemy submarines or mines sown by enemy craft. 
Even in the matter of illumination the Italians are at a 
great disadvantage. Raids are usually made by crossing 
the sea under the cover of darkness and appearing ofi" 
the enemy coast in the early morning. When a raider 
thus appears off" the Italian coast, his objective is well 
illuminated by the rising sun; whereas the Italian artil- 
lerymen must look into the sun when firing upon their 
attacker. And when an Italian squadron appears off" 
the eastern coast, it finds its objective obscured by the 
shadow of high chffs and must look toward the sun when 
developing its fire, the while its own vessels are so weff 
illuminated as to form excellent targets for the east-coast 
batteries. 

On such arguments as these Italy might claim the need 
of special consideration in the Adriatic. The three keys 



126 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

to naval domination of this sea are the great naval base 
and harbor of Pola, controlling the northern Adriatic; 
the mountain-girt, impregnable harbor of Valona, guard- 
ing the southern Adriatic and the exit into the Mediter- 
ranean; and some central base, as in the Lissa group of 
islands midway between Pola and Valona. These key- 
positions could not be assigned to Italy without marked 
departures from the principles of nationality; but here 
again it was deemed wise to accord a generous response 
to the Itahan point of view, and to assure her absolute 
security for her eastern coast. The President early an- 
nounced his willingness to see all three key positions — 
Pola, Valona, and Lissa — assigned to Italy. Thus was 
Italy assured absolute supremacy in the Adriatic, along 
with strategically strong frontiers on the east and north. 

That no attempt was made to apply with strictness in 
Italy's case the principle of nationality, the right of self- 
determination, or the Fourteen Points, is evident from 
the fact that every mile of Italy's new frontiers, from 
Switzerland to Valona, as recommended by the American 
experts and accepted by the President, lay far within 
alien territory from which Itahans were nearly or com- 
pletely absent. Whether such wide departures from a 
strict application of the principles upon which it was 
proposed to execute the peace were justified by geo- 
graphic, economic, and strategic considerations, and by 
the peculiar difficulties presented by the Italian settle- 
ment, is a question of opinion lying beyond the scope of 
this discussion. Here we are solely concerned with the 
fact that such departures appeared both necessary and 
advisable to the American delegation. 

But the Italian representatives demanded far more 
than is included in the limits described above. At the 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 127 

head of the Adriatic they asked that the Italian frontier 
should be carried well beyond the crest of the mountain 
barrier down into the Jugo-SIav lands to the east, ex- 
panding their claims beyond the Treaty of London line 
at a number of critically important points, and demand- 
ing, among other things, the city and district of Fiume, 
containing the only practicable port for the new Jugo- 
SIav nation, and specifically reserved to Croatia in the 
Treaty of London. On the Dalmatian coast a vast area 
of the mainland and a large proportion of the islands, the 
former expanded beyond the Treaty of London terms 
by the addition of a request for the port of Spalato, were 
included in the Italian programme. Control over all of 
Albania, instead of the portion tentatively assigned to 
Italy by the Treaty of London, was asked. The Italian 
representatives felt that Italy was entitled to increased 
compensation partly because the war had lasted longer 
than anticipated, and partly because the collapse of 
Russia had thrown a heavier burden upon Italy than was 
foreseen when the Treaty of London was negotiated. 
The American experts studied the full Italian claims 
with the greatest care, and advised the President and 
other American commissioners of their findings. From 
the racial point of view it was clear that the Italians con- 
stituted a very small minority in each mainland area, 
and in the group of islands claimed by them. In this 
connection it must always be carefully borne in mind 
that while the Itahan representatives supported their 
claims to Fiume and Zara with the contention that those 
localities contained Italian majorities, they demanded 
the port of Fiume and much additional territory on the 
westf together with the portion of the port in the suburb 
of Susak, on the southeast; also the district of Zara and 



128 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

surrounding territory sufficiently large to give the tiny 
Italian town breathing space. As both Fiume and Zara, 
thus delimited, contained a majority of Jugo-SIavs, the 
argument that the principle of nationality favored the 
Italian claims was always invahd. The Itahan represen- 
tatives doubtless realized, as did the representatives of 
other countries, that a tiny morsel of Italian territory in 
the midst of a Slavonic sea was an anomaly which could 
not hope to endure; and at no time during the Peace 
Conference negotiations did they restrict their demands 
to areas having an Italian majority, or to which the 
argument of natlonahty could apply with results favora- 
ble to Italy. Much confusion has resulted from the 
failure to understand that the Fiume and Zara claimed 
by Italy were entirely different entities from the restricted 
Fiume and Zara represented as containing Italian ma- 
jorities. 

From the economic standpoint it was evident that the 
granting of Italy's claims must have disastrous conse- 
quences for the newly recognized Jugo-SIav nation. The 
area claimed in Dalmatia was found to be economically 
the most valuable portion of the province. It is a large 
tract of comparatively low-lying territory along the coast, 
and was so outlined as effectively to block one of the 
few practicable routes from the interior across the Balkan 
mountains to the sea. Fiume, the only practicable port 
for Jugo-SIavia, for reasons which will appear fully below, 
would be in a foreign country. Much of the rest of the 
coast would be blocked by a cordon of Italian islands 
and Italian territorial waters. Under these conditions it 
seemed fair to say that Italy would literally possess a 
strangle-hold upon the economic development of her 
neighbor. It was not necessary to accuse the Italian 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 129 

people of any desire to exercise the tremendous power 
which they would thus acquire in order to appreciate the 
evident danger to future peace in the Balkans which 
must result from sanctioning an arrangement so mani- 
festly inequitable and so pregnant with possibilities of 
trouble. It could not be forgotten that one of the potent 
causes of unrest in the Balkans had long been the mis- 
taken policy of blocking Serbia's efforts to obtain "free 
and secure access to the sea." 

The possible poHtical consequence of sanctioning 
Italy's desire to obtain a sohd foothold in the Balkans 
through control of Albania and the annexation of Sla- 
vonic territories, against the bitter protests of both 
peoples concerned, appeared most grave. The people 
who were rejoicing over the elimination of Austrian inter- 
ference in Balkan affairs were evidently equally hostile 
to anything which might savor of Italian interference. 
Under these conditions it was believed that to grant 
Italy's claims to the eastern islands and mainland must 
be to sow the seeds of a new Balkan conflict. 

When examined from the standpoint of strategic geog- 
raphy the three main areas along the eastern Adriatic 
coast claimed by Italy were seen to possess tremendous 
mihtary value. It was the manifest duty of the Ameri- 
can specialists, without in the least degree questioning 
the motives actuating the Itahan claims, to study the 
inevitable consequences which must necessarily follow 
upon granting them. It seemed obvious that the Fiume 
region and adjacent territory at the head of the Adriatic, 
by dominating the great northwestern gateway into the 
Balkans; the Dalmatian region and coastal islands by 
controlling the central route across the mountains into 
the interior and closing the ship passages to and from 



130 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the mainland harbors; and Albania with Valona, by 
commanding the most important southern routes into 
the Balkans and blocking access to and egress from the 
Adriatic Sea, did in effect constitute three extremely 
strong and admirably located military bridge-heads, assur- 
ing to Italy the possibility of moving her armies across 
the Adriatic and advancing them into the Balkans, 
should occasion require. With the mouth of the Adriatic 
sealed by a barrage protected by naval units based on 
Valona, the lines of sea communication across the Adri- 
atic from Italy to the bridge-heads would be secure from 
outside interference. Every direct access to the sea 
possessed by the Jugo-SIav lands would be blocked, and 
the power of resistance to an Italian advance enormously 
curtailed. Assuredly if the three areas in question had 
been specifically and solely claimed with the express 
purpose of gaining for Italy firm political and economic 
footholds on the eastern Adriatic as bases for future 
expansion into the Balkans, capable of serving as mili- 
tary bridge-heads for armed support of that expansion 
if need be, they could not have been better adapted to 
serve such purposes. 

The territorial specialist must judge claims on their 
essential merits and not with respect to the motives 
which prompt them, since obviously governments and 
motives may change while the acts and their conse- 
quences endure. It is appropriate, nevertheless, in order 
to show that the significance of the three areas discussed 
above is not a figment of the imagination, to note the 
fact that well-informed and influential circles in Italy 
frankly declared that the object of the proposed annexa- 
tions was to establish political, economic, and military 
bridge-heads on the eastern side of the Adriatic, in order 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 131 

to assure Italy's future expansion in the Balkans. The 
following quotation from the Giornale d* Italia of July 4, 
1 919, is of more than ordinary interest because that 
paper was generally regarded as the mouthpiece of 
Baron Sonnino. It is part of a defense of the policy 
of the Orlando-Sonnino government published shortly 
after that government had fallen from power. After 
rebuking certain influential Italian elements for refusing 
to admit ''the strategic, political, and economic reasons 
for which Italy must set foot in Dalmatia, thereby con- 
stituting with Istria and Albania the triple bridge-head 
for expansion in the Danubian and Balkan system, which 
expansion is feared by others and is the true motive of 
the resistance off'ered to our Adriatic claims," and stating 
that it is now necessary "to put our cards on the table," 
the defense enumerates the following objects, which 
Orlando and Sonnino had in view in consenting to dis- 
cuss at Paris the so-called "Tardieu project" for a free 
state of Fiume: 

First. Annexing to Italy the whole of Istria, even 
including that part of eastern Istria which Wilson denies 
us. 

Second. Giving to the small free state of Fiume 
such a statute as would have effectively placed it for 
fifteen years under our government through the long 
arm of a local government faithful to us, pending its 
eventual annexation to Italy. 

Third. Saving in Dalmatia the harmonious system 
of Zara-Sebenico and the islands, while leaving Jugo- 
slavia a part of the interior; but thus establishing an 
adequate political, economic, and military bridge-head, 
together with a substantial guarantee of the Italianita of 
Dalmatia and full security against any future contingency. 



132 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Fourth. Having Albania under mandate and thus 
insuring through its integrity and national independence 
our influence, our expansion, and our strategic safety. 

In view of all the considerations enumerated and of 
others which cannot be dealt with in this short review, 
the American speciahsts reported that the handing over 
to Italy of the areas in question would be wholly unjus- 
tifiable and extremely dangerous. In addition to the 
advice of the territorial speciahsts, the President had 
before him the reports of naval and mihtary students of 
the question, of special investigators in the Adriatic 
region, and other expert opinions. There was remarkable 
unanimity in the conclusion that the coveted territories 
could on no basis of justice or right be assigned to Italy. 
The French and British specialists, consulted informally, 
were of the same opinion, and it is an open secret that 
the French and British Governments, while loyal to their 
engagements and maintaining their readiness to execute 
the terms of the Treaty of London if Italy required it, 
nevertheless felt strongly that under the entirely new 
conditions created by the disappearance of Austria- 
Hungary from the Adriatic and the agreement to recog- 
nize the right of the Jugo-SIavs to govern themselves in 
a new federated nation, Italy's annexation of the terri- 
tories in question was neither just nor wise. 

There followed a long series of negotiations, in the 
course of which Italy reduced her demands in Dalmatia 
and among the east-coast islands, but sought at the 
same time to maintain in its essential integrity the sys- 
tem of three bridge-heads on the Balkan shore, and 
to pave the way for the early annexation of Fiume. 
Little progress was made with Orlando and Sonnino, and 
after their retirement the Giornale d' Italia correctly 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 133 

stated that this Italian delegation, in consenting to dis- 
cuss the so-called "Tardieu project" (one of many com- 
promise suggestions), "had not allowed itself to be caught 
in any actual and substantial concessions. And, in fact, 
if that scheme, together with the amendments which our 
delegates had ready, had been approved, we should have 
achieved all the claims of the London Pact, with the 
exception of a strip of the Dalmatian hinterland and of 
a few islands of no military importance; and in addition 
would have created at Fiume a situation genuinely 
Italian and susceptible of certain transformation in time 
into annexation to Italy." 

It would not be profitable to trace the history of the 
negotiations, which dragged out over many long months, 
although in a more friendly spirit in view of the concilia- 
tory spirit of the new Nitti government. Attention soon 
centred on the Fiume region, the most important and 
dangerous of the three bridge-heads, and the one over 
which the Italians were most insistent on gaining control. 

A glance at a good physical map will show that the 
Dinaric Alps, a broad belt of wild and rugged mountain- 
ous country, intervenes between the interior of the 
Balkan peninsula and the Adriatic Sea. South of Fiume 
this range is crossed by but two or three narrow-gauge 
railroads, wholly inadequate to serve the commercial 
needs of the interior. The only standard-gauge road 
crosses the mountain barrier at its narrowest point, oppo- 
site Fiume. The geographic conditions are such as per- 
manently to preclude any cheap and effective rail trans- 
port across the broad part of the barrier; hence Fiume, 
advantageously situated opposite the narrowest part, 
and at the head of a sea that makes water transportation 
both cheap and easy, is the inevitable economic outlet 



134 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

for the northern part of Jugo-SIavia. Physical condi- 
tions render Buccari and other suggested substitutes 
unavailable. 

Nearly all of the standard-gauge railroad system of 
Jugo-SIavia is in the latitude of Fiume, because the fer- 
tile river plains of the country are largely confined to 
that region; because nearly two-thirds of the people 
live in these plains and valleys; because railroad con- 
struction is easy and comparatively inexpensive there; 
and because there is sufficient local traffic to maintain 
the roads and keep rates down. Thus it will be seen 
that the life of the Jugo-SIav nation is to an unusual 
degree concentrated in the north of the country, and as 
the railroad system upon which this economic life de- 
pends has its only direct outlet to the sea at Fiume, it 
has well been said that the power that holds Fiume holds 
the life of an entire nation in its hands. Hence the 
peculiar value of Fiume as a base from which to exert 
economic, poHtical, and military power in the Balkans. 

In view of the facts that Italy had no need of Fiume, 
whereas for Jugo-SIavia and adjacent lands to the north 
it constituted an absolute necessity for their free eco- 
nomic development; that the future expansion of the 
port must be financed by those to whom it was an eco- 
nomic necessity; that it could not be annexed to Italy 
without placing under her domination an overwhelming 
majority of Jugo-SIavs; and that it was by treaty defi- 
nitely promised to one branch of the Jugo-SIav people 
by the Allies (including Italy herself) it was held that, 
regardless of what a majority of the very mixed popula- 
tion of the city of Fiume might desire, the first princi- 
ples of justice and the prosperity of the port required 
that Italy's demand for Fiume must be rejected. 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 135 

The American specialists did, however, examine into 
the claims that Fiume was in majority Italian, and that 
the city had by "self-determination" proclaimed its un- 
alterable will to be annexed to Italy. They found that 
only in the so-called corpus separatum of Fiume, which 
includes a part only of the port of Fiume, did the Italians 
outnumber the Jugo-SIavs; that even here, according to 
the last official census, there was only a relative, not an 
absolute, majority of Italians (not quite 50 per cent of 
the total population); that this number included many 
Italians who still retained their citizenship in Italy; and, 
finally, that even this relative majority was of compara- 
tively recent date and probably resulted from artificial 
encouragement by the Hungarian Government, which 
had a comprehensible interest in developing an afien 
rather than a Slavonic majority in the city. But the 
corpus separatum of Fiume is not all of the real city 
and port. The Italian representatives asked for the 
whole port, including the part in the suburb of Susak. 
When Susak is included, even the relative Italian ma- 
jority disappears, and the Jugo-SIavs constitute the 
absolute majority of the population. 

The claim that Fiume had, by exercising the right of 
self-determination, proclaimed her will to be annexed to 
Italy could not be substantiated. This claim rested 
upon the speech of Ossoinack, deputy from Fiume, in the 
Hungarian ParHament, October 18, 191 8, and upon cer- 
tain proclamations and other manifestations of later 
date. The stenographic report of Ossoinack*s address as 
submitted showed that he only demanded for the city 
the right of self-determination, and that Fiume should 
"be Itahan in the future as it had always been Itafian in 
the past." Even had he made any demand for political 



136 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

union with Italy, which did not appear to be the case, 
the expression of a single deputy elected on a limited 
suffrage could not be called self-determination. Im- 
mediately after the Hungarian authorities evacuated the 
city, a group of Itahans and Italian sympathizers consti- 
tuted themselves into the Itahan National Council of 
Fiume, and proclaimed the annexation of Fiume to Italy. 
The following day this proclamation was approved by 
some sort of a convocation of citizens. Later, renewed 
expressions of a desire for annexation were proclaimed. 
All of these manifestations appeared to have been most 
irregular, and took place under the direction of a self- 
constituted and unrepresentative body of citizens from 
which Jugo-SIav sympathizers were excluded, or under 
Italian military occupation which was accompanied by 
the imprisonment and deportation of Jugo-SIavs manifest- 
ing opposition to the Italian programme. There was no 
evidence that the people of Fiume had ever had an oppor- 
tunity to express freely their will. Indeed, it seemed not 
improbable that the large Jugo-SIav vote, augmented by 
that of other nationahties and of Italians whose interests 
in the commercial activities of the port led them to fear 
the economic consequences of union with Italy, would 
give a majority against annexation, were that vote per- 
mitted to be cast without the coercive influence of Italian 
mihtary occupation, which had from the first effectively 
stifled all free expression of public opinion in Fiume. 

Such, then, was the complex of considerations sur- 
rounding the thorny Fiume question. After it had been 
carefully examined by the chiefs of the Italian, Austro- 
Hungarian, and Balkan divisions of the territorial staff, 
as well as by the chiefs of the divisions of Economics and 
Boundary Geography, who approached the problem from 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 137 

their respective points of view, these united in submitting 
to the President their unanimous opinion that the Itahan 
claims to Fiume could not be recognized, and that no 
arrangement should be sanctioned which threatened 
future external interference with the development and 
use of the port by those who alone had any valid claim 
upon it. 

Throughout the negotiations the American delegation 
maintained this position; and if the deadlock continued, 
it was not due to differences over details, but to the 
fundamental fact that all arrangements proposed by 
Italy must inevitably have had the effect of preventing 
the normal development and use of Fiume by threaten- 
ing the freedom of the port and insuring its early annexa- 
tion to Italy. But while maintaining inviolate the prin- 
ciple that it would not unite in forcing upon a weak 
nation against its protest a solution of the Fiume prob- 
lem which it regarded as flagrantly unjust and fraught 
with grave danger for the future peace of the world, and 
which both England and France sought on occasions to 
induce Italy to abandon, the American delegation made 
extensive concessions in the effort to reach an amicable 
solution. The Sexten valley and the Tarvis basin, both 
beyond the Treaty of London line, the Lussin and Pela- 
gosa groups of islands, as well as the remaining islands of 
the Lissa group, the Albona coal region in Istria, and 
finally a mandate over a united Albania, were offered 
to Italy, in addition to the territorial concessions already 
described, which everywhere carried Italy's frontiers far 
into ahen lands. On the other hand, the American rep- 
resentatives frequently expressed their willingness to see 
the whole Adriatic question solved by any fair and 
equitable procedure. Solutions by arbitration, by vari- 



138 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

ous forms of plebiscites, and by placing the disputed ter- 
ritories under the League of Nations were proposed at 
various times; but the Italian representatives did not 
feel that any of these solutions would prove satisfactory 
to Italy. 

The latter stages of the negotiations and the ultimate 
initiation of direct discussions between the Italian and 
Jugo-SIav governments are all set forth in published 
notes and despatches. It could not be expected that 
Italy and Jugo-SIavia would meet on an equal footing in 
the recent negotiations, when Italians held the disputed 
territory, and were backed by the pledge of the French 
and British to execute the Treaty of London in case the 
Jugo-SIavs failed to accept some other solution satis- 
factory to the Itahans. The poHtical situation in Amer- 
ica had by this time eliminated this country as a factor 
in any European territorial settlement, and the Jugo- 
SIavs alone faced the Italian representatives backed by 
the French and British, the two latter committed by 
treaty obligations and anxious to get through with an 
awkward problem at almost any cost. The terms of the 
Rapallo Treaty reflect this situation. 

In the north the Jugo-SIavs yield a large expanse of 
purely Slavonic lands east of the natural frontier, thus 
bringing Italian sovereignty to the very doors of a nomi- 
nally independent Fiume. The islands dominating the 
entrance to the Gulf of Fiume go to Italy, as does also 
the Lagosta group of islands near the centre of the east 
coast. In Dalmatia Italy receives Zara with a surround- 
ing district greatly reduced from that demanded during 
the Paris negotiations, while the island of Lissa, earlier 
offered to Italy, apparently goes to Jugo-SIavia. In 
effect Italy obtains strategic and other advantages which 



FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 139 

strengthen her foothold on the Fiume bridge-head, en- 
danger the free economic development and the indepen- 
dence of the port of Fiume, and create a Slav Irredenta 
of serious proportions on her eastern frontier. On the 
other hand, when the reported terms are compared with 
Italy's original demands, it will be clear that the firm 
refusal of the American representatives to sanction the 
Italian programme of sweeping annexations, coupled 
with the moderating influence of the Nitti and Giolitti 
governments, has achieved the emancipation of several 
hundred thousand Jugo-SIavs, and made the ultimate 
settlement far less harmful and unjust than it would 
otherwise have been. It is but fair to state that what- 
ever amelioration of the harsh terms of the Adriatic set- 
tlement has been accomplished, despite the commitments 
of an unfortunate secret diplomacy, is due primarily to 
the firm stand of President Wilson in favor of equal jus- 
tice for both great and small nations. 



VII 

CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS ^ 

BY ISAIAH BOWMAN 

It is not an exaggeration to say that men now look out 
upon world conditions and upon peoples almost unknown 
until yesterday much as men looked out upon the world 
at the threshold of the Age of Discovery. People every- 
where have been shaken violently out of their former 
routine. The aspects of life familiar before the war have 
in most cases been strangely altered. The current of 
the individual's life as well as the current of national life 
has been diverted into new channels. Paderewski, when 
asked if he found it difficult to face the crowds of War- 
saw on his first appearance there two years ago, said 
that though he expected to have stage fright, actually he 
felt quite at ease, and that he supposed it was due to 
experience in facing audiences during his musical career. 
"You know I used to play," he said. "Yes," repfied his 
listener, "I used to hear you." 

A few years ago the Balkan wars were a matter of 
paramount pubfic interest. Vast uncontrollable forces 
were then unloosed. No man could have foreseen the 
way in which they were to lead through the World War 
to the present chaos. Now we look back upon them as 
incidents; the stage of the world has been reset. The 
word "Balkanized" has become the famihar epithet of 

' Most of the data for this article and some entire paragraphs are taken from 
my book entitled "The New World: Problems in Political Geography," published 
by World Book Company, Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York, 1921. 

140 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 141 

the journalist. What have the Allied leaders done to 
better the political conditions of this "dark and bloody 
ground" of Central Europe? 

Whatever practical considerations were brought to the 
peace conference of Paris by the European powers — and 
there were indeed a multitude — it remains a fact that 
never before in the history of the world was there put 
beside these practical considerations a group of idealistic 
principles which, winning "here a little, there a little," 
were finally, by the processes of fate, to end in a vital 
struggle both in the field of our own domestic politics 
and in the material field of Allied interests. 

We may take the partisan view that the idealism faded 
and died, or we may take the view that here and there 
something was accomplished that was far better than the 
world had known hitherto. Whatever view we hold, it 
must not be supposed that because of the great clamor 
of criticism against the peace treaties other leaders could 
have united more effectively upon a programme of set- 
tlement. From the first there was confusion concerning 
the objects of the war and of the peace treaties. With 
the whole fabric of society torn and disfigured it was 
natural that there should be many divergences of opinion 
as to the manner by which it could be restored. To 
some the war meant political freedom, to others the lib- 
eration of oppressed minorities. The freedom of the 
seas meant one thing to Germany and another to Eng- 
land. To one group in Russia self-determination meant 
independence, to another autonomy, to a third the rule 
of the proletariat. One soldier from America might hope 
for better working conditions at home, while another 
thought only of helping France or beating Germany, or 
possibly of a glorious adventure or a chance to follow 



142 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the invisible banners of the spirit. Men suffered and 
died for different objects. 

When the peace treaties came to be framed every per- 
son hoped to have his special object achieved; other- 
wise he would be disappointed. So diverse were the 
hopes of different nations and peoples that no set of 
formulae could have been found to fit Allied purposes. 
The Fourteen Points of President Wilson received almost 
universal approval, because they were put into general 
terms. The vast scale of the losses, the bitterness of the 
military contest, was such that the moment that specific 
settlements were proposed every interested party felt 
betrayed. Each delegation felt that only its brand of 
"doxy" was orthodoxy. 

If there was confusion, it is also true that never be- 
fore were the peoples of the world all talking at once, 
as befitted the end of a war that embraced the world. A 
delegation from Orawa in the foothill region of the Car- 
pathians came to Paris in native peasant costume to 
argue union with Poland ; Jugo-SIav representatives came 
to argue against Italian ownership of Fiume; Mace- 
donians came looking for the millennium. Each one of 
the Central European nationalities had its own bagful 
of statistical and cartographical tricks. When statistics 
failed, use was made of maps in color. It would take a 
huge monograph to contain an analysis of all the types 
of map forgeries that the war and the peace conference 
called forth. A new instrument was discovered — the 
map language. A map was as good as a brilliant poster, 
and just being a map made it respectable, authentic. 
A perverted map was a hfe-belt to many a foundering 
argument. It was in the Balkans that the use of this 
process reached its most brilliant climax. 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 143 

It is no error of political judgment to suppose that 
any international agreement of the immediate future or 
any international pohcy, whether it relates to frontiers, 
commercial opportunities, or the formation of a govern- 
ment, will have a far greater number of unfriendly critics 
than supporters. America has yet to frame its new 
programme. To have that programme accepted it will 
have to deal with much the same kind of humanity; 
it will have to deal with essentially the same human 
leaders that met in 19 19, and back of the leaders stand 
the common people with their nationahstic and at 
times uncontrollable aspirations and their simple and 
easily betrayable sense of right and wrong. 

Constantinople 

Had the secret Treaty of London of April, 19 15, been 
made public, the world would have discovered, in less 
than nine months from the opening of the World War, 
that the objects of the war had completely changed. The 
orbit of political thought could no longer be calculated 
from the events of July and August, 19 14. As Presi- 
dent Wilson said in 19 18, with full world approval, 
"whatever the causes of the war, the objects have 
changed." The great principle of the Allied commanders 
in the field and in the foreign offices was to augment and 
solidify the power opposed to Germany and her allies, 
and this could be done in the case of the materially 
minded only by offering material advantages. Though 
granting full credit to the noble idealism that pervaded 
a part of their people, it is yet true that Italy, Greece, 
and Russia were to be paid for a part of their services, 
and Constantinople and Dalmatia were as so much cash 
in hand. 



144 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

From that time until the break between the Bolshe- 
vists and the Allies, Constantinople was looked upon as 
an ultimate prize of war. Instead of Russian control of 
Constantinople, as promised in 191 5, we have Allied 
control. Instead of a free commercial passage with in- 
ternational guarantees of equality and security, but with 
a Russian flag, we have a so-called Zone of the Straits, 
to be administered by a commission of the League of 
Nations. While this arrangement is to be carried out 
through the terms of the Treaty of Sevres (August, 1920), 
it is interesting to note that it was suggested in principle 
by the head of the American Government on January 8, 
191 8, and that this view corresponded with the recom- 
mendations of "The Inquiry" (organized under Col- 
onel House) in a memorandum to the President dated 
January 2, 19 18. In this memorandum it was urged, 
among other things, that there should be friendly inter- 
course through and across the Straits, and that inter- 
national administration be invoked to the end that the 
Straits should remain a commercial passage or should 
form part of an international zone. 

It is not my purpose to expound either the historical 
or the commercial importance of Constantinople. That 
theme has been presented so often that I could hardly 
expect to add anything new or particularly ilkiminating. 
The Ukrainian section of southern Russia has in the past 
generation undergone significant economic change. The 
iron and coal deposits have invited capital and labor. A 
period of increasing agricultural production has corre- 
sponded with a period of rapid industrial development 
in Germany, Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, 
and the growing export of cereals has been one of the 
chief sources of wealth. Manganese and petroleum from 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 145 

Transcaucasia and even the dairy products of western 
Siberia have in some measure at least been turned toward 
the commercial focus of Constantinople. Here gathered 
Austrian, Russian, British, Dutch, Italian, and Greek 
shipping. Looking ahead for a period of fifty years one 
can see that both from its geographical position and from 
its economic and political importance Constantinople was 
to take a place in the modern world that accorded not 
with the ambitions and perspective of the Turk but 
with the view of the Western powers. It was to resume 
once more somewhat the place that it had as one of that 
group of four cities on or near the eastern Mediterranean 
— Constantinople, Athens, Rome, Jerusalem — from which 
for centuries have emanated religious and political move- 
ments of the first order. 

^I shall merely touch upon the place of Constantinople 
in the German political scheme. The enterprise of her 
merchants and diplomats was substantially rewarded. 
In the period 1887-1910 Turkish imports of German 
goods rose from 6 to 21 per cent, and of Austrian goods 
from 13 to 21 per cent. In the same period the imports 
of English goods fell from 60 to 35 per cent; the imports 
of French goods from 18 to 11 per cent. Between 1908 
and 19 II German contractors obtained harbor conces- 
sions at Alexandretta and concessions for a railway hne 
from Basra to Bagdad in territory of great strategic im- 
portance to India and the Far East, and in relation to 
the politics and commerce of the Mohammedan world. 
In 1 91 3 General Liman von Sanders headed a German 
mihtary mission at Constantinople, which thereafter 
practically controlled the Ottoman army. 

The city of Constantinople is an important source of 
the revenues of the Turkish state. It is the most impor- 



146 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

tant focus of trade in Turkey. Its entries in the year 
19 1 0-19 1 1 amounted to 31^^ per cent of the total imports, 
with Smyrna and Saloniki 10 per cent each. In exports, 
however, Smyrna led with 20.6 per cent, and Constanti- 
nople ranked second with 9 per cent. It has also been 
the chief focus of Turkish political life for a period ante- 
dating the discovery of America bj'^ forty years. Rep- 
resentatives of the various sections of Turkey have come 
here. It is the seat of the council of administration of 
the Ottoman foreign debt. With the capital retained at 
Constantinople instead of in an interior location, there 
is a better hold upon the functionaries of the state, a 
readier access to them, a more convenient centre for the 
spread of Allied influence in connection with the main- 
tenance of the principle of the Ottoman public debt as 
of 19 14, which continues to be administered in favor of 
the bondholders in order that the debt may be ultimately 
extinguished. 

If we throw the position of the Turk at Constantinople 
against the background of fact and judgment that I 
have briefly sketched, I think we shaH have far more 
patience, and, if I may say so, resignation. Every one 
expected the Turk to be kicked out of Europe. Follow- 
ing the defeat of the Turk at the second siege of Vienna, 
in 1683, he has been pushed step by step toward the 
southeastern corner of the Balkan peninsula. Here was 
the long-hoped-for opportunity to overwhelm him, and 
here apparently there should have been no revival of 
that historic rivalry between England and Russia which 
prolonged the stay of the unspeakable Turk. To many 
it seemed a betrayal of one of the Allied purposes to 
leave him there. 

But here, again, we are dealing with one of the actuali- 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 147 

ties of life, not with its ideologies. Constantinople is 
still to a great many Mohammedans the focus of their 
religious world. From Constantinople proceeded for 
many years an authority that extended over 260,000,000 
people. Though a rival appeared during the war in the 
sherif of Mecca (the king of the Hedjaz), who not only 
refused to acknowledge the authority of the Sheikh-ul- 
Islam at Constantinople, but even fought against the 
Turks, his influence was in the main confined to the 
Arab world. North and east of the Arab world, particu- 
larly in Anatolia, Persia, and India, were Mohammedans 
who still looked to Constantinople for religious leading, 
and among these were one group of 66,000,000 Moham- 
medans in northwestern India who had it in their power 
to set in motion vast and evil forces. Were they to 
attempt to disrupt the Indian Empire or even to turn 
their large section of India into a state of anarchy, the 
British might be unable to restore peace. 

Thus the Mohammedan question, focussed at Con- 
stantinople, leads into a maze of vital problems in the 
fields of religion and colonies and sea-borne trade and 
international politics. French and Italian as well as 
British and Greek interests are involved. Let us look 
at a particular aspect of the matter — the relation of Con- 
stantinople to the powerful secret societies or confraterni- 
ties among the Mohammedan populations. "Confra- 
ternities" is a general or collective name for the various 
religious societies of the Mohammedan world, of which 
there are from fifty to one hundred scattered from Mo- 
rocco to Bagdad. Almost every male Moslem is a mem- 
ber of one of these societies. 

The confraternities came into existence in an interest- 
ing way. After Mohammed's death Mohammedanism 



148 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS ; 

changed its aspect. It reached into the field of law and 
gave religious authority to the words and decrees of the 
lawyers. The rulers, on their side, also sought to control 
the church and make it an instrument of military and 
political conquest. In addition, the Turks and the 
Arabs developed strong racial and then political animosi- 
ties. In reaction to all these changes pious men of 
strong character founded sects or fraternities, withdrew 
to a remote region, gathered disciples, and built monas- 
teries. 

Some of these societies were widely known and their 
influence reached from one end of the Moslem world to 
the other; others were quite obscure and local. Some 
have lived for a long time; others went out of existence 
almost with the death of the original founder. Some 
were military in spirit; others were pacifistic. Some of 
them have become great missionary agencies whose chief 
goal has been the great interior of Africa, where they 
would be far from the arm of European authority and 
where there are millions of ignorant, superstitious ne- 
groes to convert. 

The most powerful of the African societies is the 
Senussi, which, with a quite special character, has been 
in existence for about eighty years. Though at first 
free from all political influence, the Senussi gradually 
were drawn into political relations which have aff'ected 
their later development. They strongly resisted the 
coming of the Itahans after the Italo-Turkish War, feel- 
ing that with Italian control over the northern seaports, 
the hicrative trade in slaves and control of the caravan 
routes would be aff'ected. Between 191 2 and 1914 they 
were supplied with arms, ammunition, and money by 
the Turks, and thus were able to resist successfully the 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 149 

Italian advance into the interior of Cyrenaica. With the 
outbreak of war in August, 19 14, Turkish agencies be- 
came active in Libya and Tripoli, and the Italian forces 
were driven back nearer the coast. As the war pro- 
gressed, the leader of the Senussi became more and more 
ambitious and desired to make himself sovereign of the 
Moslem world. He attacked the Egyptian border from 
three points, the central one being the oasis of Siwa; but 
the British defeated this movement and finally, in Feb- 
ruary, 191 7, drove him out of Siwa. 

While the confraternities represent in some respects a 
disruptive force in Mohammedan life — they have often 
quarrelled with each other and with the central rehgious 
authority — yet their fanaticism is always aroused by any 
consohdation of threatening power on the part of the 
Christian "infidel." The recent report of Tilho's work 
{Geographical Journal, London, 1920), during the war 
period, in the desert region northeast of Lake Tchad, in 
the border of the Tibesti highlands, illuminates this 
point. The virtually annual military expeditions of the 
British in the neighboring districts of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan also clearly show the constant strain involved in 
maintaining order in a remote desert region sprinkled 
with strongholds maintained by fanatical tribesmen. 

When we consider the geographical distribution of the 
military expeditions and the cost that they involve, and 
especially when we view the generally unsettled state of 
the world, shall we not agree that a poHcy of conciliation 
in deahng with the Turk is wholly justified? Is the social 
and political wreck of the whole border of the Mohamme- 
dan world not too great a price to pay for the driving of 
the Turk from Europe? For his presence at Constanti- 
nople is a mere shadow. The armed forces about the Sul- 



150 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

tan are limited to 700 guards. The total armed forces of 
Turkey shall not exceed 50,000 men, and these are to be 
distributed regionally by a mihtary inter-AIIied commis- 
sion of organization in collaboration with the Turkish 
Government. The fortifications of the Bosporus and the 
Dardanelles, and on adjacent islands of the northeastern 
JEgesin, are to be demolished, together with purely mili- 
tary roads and other works. In practice AHied war-ships 
occupy strategic positions, and doubtless will always 
remain there if the Treaty of Sevres is confirmed. At a 
moment's notice the feeble military forces of the Turk 
in Europe could be extinguished. That a patch of the 
map of Europe should be colored in a way to correspond 
with Anatolia may seem a pity to the unthinking, but it 
has no significance whatever in reality. A centuries-old 
hope of the Western powers has been realized. Effec- 
tively the Turk is no longer in Europe. 

Constantinople, seen in this light, is one of a number 
of world objects which can be protected only by a con- 
tinuance of Allied solidarity. If the Allies fall apart old 
jealousies will be revived and new groupings formed, and 
Constantinople will once more become a prize of old- 
style diplomacy. This will not only be of advantage to 
the Turk; it will revive the rivalry of the Balkan states, 
and it would almost certainly bring Russia back into a 
programme of expansion and result in the nationalistic 
control of what the world has long agreed should be an 
international waterway. 

What may happen may be judged by the status of the 
place since 19 18. With the occupation by the Allied 
fleet it was changed from a commercial thoroughfare to 
a military base. Franchet d'Esperey became the leader 
of the Allied land forces in the region, and detachments 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 151 

of French troops were distributed through the eastern 
Balkans. Commissions of control were located at im- 
portant points in Bulgaria and in eastern and western 
Thrace; and individual French officers were stationed at 
Budapest, Lemberg, and other critical localities. Con- 
stantinople also became the base for British and French 
activities, the one in the Caucasus and the other in the 
Ukraine. 

Between the French and British some sort of agree- 
ment appears to have been reached that looked toward 
French control of the Ukraine as a French sphere of influ- 
ence, and British control of the Baltic and of the Cau- 
casus as British spheres of influence. Sydorenko and 
Panyeko brought to various members of the American 
delegation a document which has since been published 
in an American periodical, purporting to represent the 
claims of France upon the Ukraine, late in 191 8, and 
these claims included French control of railways, finance, 
and the Ukrainian general staff". It is alleged that the 
withdrawal of the French from Odessa early in 19 19 was 
due to the refusal of the Ukrainians to accept the terms 
which the French proposed. British occupation of the 
Transcaucasus region was terminated soon afterward, 
when it became evident that only a strong land force 
could maintain order. 

Thus, in the interval since the armistice with Turkey 
in October, 191 8, Constantinople has been governed by 
army authorities which have had in view two objects: 
first, the military control of the city and the Straits, and, 
second, the use of Constantinople as a base of both mili- 
tary and political operations in regions political and 
strategically tributary to the Straits. In Allied hands 
Constantinople has changed its role, and we have as a 



152 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

result of the change a clearer understanding of the pre- 
cise objects which the Allied governments have histori- 
cally associated with this important focus. 

In order to set the point which we have just considered 
into higher relief, let us look at two quite concrete aspects 
of the Constantinople question — the primacy of British 
shipping in the region of the Straits and the economic 
situation of Bulgaria with respect to its foreign trade, for 
the latter country has lost advantages which it formerly 
enjoyed, and it is under a handicap in the process of 
reconstruction. Who makes a corresponding gain? 

In 191 3- 191 4 the approximate totals of ship tonnage 
in the Black Sea, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf were, by 
nationalities, as follows: 

British 14,000,000 tons 

Austro-Hungarian 6,500,000 " 

Russian 5,500,000 

Turkish 5,000,000 " 

Italian 4,000,000 " 

French 4,000,000 " 

German 2,750,000 

Greek 2,250,000 " 

Dutch, Belgian, and Rumanian, less than 1,000,000 " each 

That is, the entire block of territory included within 
these seas is a region which is primarily served by British, 
Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Turkish ships. Italy 
and France have 4,000,000 tons each; Russia and Turkey 
are for the moment entirely out of it; Austro-Hungarian 
shipping has disappeared by reason of its surrender to 
the Allies. British shipping has made the most conspicu- 
ous gains as a result of the division of the German fleet. 
Of ships. Great Britain has taken, roughly, 70 per cent. 
In the reconstruction of commerce in the Constantinople 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 153 

region, and in the revival of shipping facilities. Great 
Britain stands ready to play not merely the principal, 
but a wholly dominating part. To her statesmen it 
would be unthinkable that, with these material advan- 
tages in her hands, her diplomacy should fail to give her 
such a measure of control in so vital an outlet as the 
Bosporus as not to enable her to develop there a great 
trading realm, possibly second only to that which she 
has developed in India. While she has maintained mili- 
tary forces in Transcaucasia, in Syria (until the French 
occupation in November, 1919), and is still maintaining 
them in Egypt and Mesopotamia, she has most distinctly 
attempted to follow the policy of walking quite softly. 
Though her political agents had penetrated as far as 
Kurdistan in 19 19, they were quick to disappear (and 
the detachments that occupied advanced posts were with- 
drawn) as soon as Arab and Kurd pressure developed in 
any important degree. Though Great Britain is charged 
with almost every imperial crime under the sun, her 
policy in this section of the Arab world has been, I think 
it is fair to say, conciliatory in the extreme; for Great 
Britain recognizes the vital connection between her 
social, political, and commercial life, on the one hand, 
and her trade on the other; and in the long run the best 
trading relations are those based upon good-will. 

Having said this much, one is bound, also, to say that 
most of the political settlements of the time, though 
apparently based upon principles of justice, are very 
strongly contributory toward British material advan- 
tage. If Great Britain were to share in the control of 
the Zone of the Straits of Constantinople, it might be a 
desirable thing in contrast to Turkish control, with all of 
its effects upon minority peoples and the welfare of the 



154 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Balkan states; but it would also place Great Britain in 
an extremely favorable position at the outlet of eastern 
Bulgaria's commerce by way of the Black Sea. Like- 
wise, Rumania, encouraged in the Dobrudja, will see her 
commerce flow in increasing degree toward the Black Sea, 
and this trade also will have its outlet at the Bosporus, 
When Greece asked for eastern and western Thrace, she 
obtained the territory after long and skilful negotiations, 
and, possibly, she ought to have it; but it cuts Bulgaria 
off from the yEgean, puts her trade outlets on this sea in 
the hands of Greece, and obliges her to despatch a con- 
siderable part of her goods over the railroad to Con- 
stantinople. 

Here we have one of the complexities of the time into 
which I shall not venture to go more than a step. In 
the modern, closely organized, strongly commercialized 
world it is virtually impossible to make a clean-cut 
distinction between what is right from the standpoint of 
ethnography, nationalistic sentiment, and abstract jus- 
tice, and what is fair from the standpoint of economic 
advantage. Lloyd George said that the Germans would 
not sign the treaty if Danzig were given to the Poles, and 
this may have been true; but the alternative to Polish 
ownership was not German ownership, but a free state 
under a British high commissioner. And can we sup- 
pose that British statesmen did not also have in mind 
textile mills, railroads, oil -fields, ships, and coal? So 
that if we introduce a new set of conceptions into diplo- 
macy, if we call it, let us say, "The New Diplomacy," we 
shall perhaps be able here and there to achieve justice in 
minor cases, but the great stakes of diplomacy remain 
the same. We simply discuss them in different terms. 

If these things be true, the mandatory principle of the 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 155 

League of Nations may have in it one of the most pow- 
erful elements of international justice; and if the League 
of Nations continues, and particularly if it develops, the 
attention of a disinterested government should be very 
strongly focussed upon the precise manner in which the 
mandates of the League are exercised. With the com- 
plex relations that we have sketched above between 
trade and diplomacy, it is inconceivable that the terms 
of a mandate should be drawn up by the interested 
power. No such thing as equality of trade privileges, 
one of the objects of the mandatory principle, will fol- 
low. And to the degree to which there is an investment 
of capital and development by the mandatory power to 
the exclusion of other powers or to their disadvantage, 
there will be laid the basis for undivided control and 
outright ownership. It remains, therefore, to be seen 
whether the mandatory principle is merely a transition 
stage between the extreme of military occupation as a 
result of war and the extreme of complete ownership, or 
whether it is the first step toward the real administration 
of mandated regions by the League of Nations. 

The Balkan Countries 

From being an undernourished and undeveloped part 
of the Turkish Empire, with life demoralized or even 
degraded, with persecution rife and with society of a 
low order of development, the Balkan lands changed 
their character in the nineteenth century and were 
brought within the limits of the western European indus- 
trial realm. They became the transit lands for a part 
of the Oriental trade under that autonomy or semi- 
dependence which they had gained by several centuries 
of effort. Under the protection of general European 



156 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

treaties whose execution involved chiefly the welfare of 
western European powers, the Balkan states increased in 
population, developed cities of considerable size and 
commercial importance, and put their products into the 
current of world trade. Though principally of impor- 
tance as transit lands, the Balkans became important, 
also, because of their own economic resources and the 
increased purchasing power of their people. 

Two broad groups of Slavic peoples had developed, 
the Jugo-SIavs and the Bulgarians. The former is com- 
posed of such diverse elements as the Serbs and the Slo- 
venes, and the latter, originally Finno-Ugrian, as the 
ethnologist would say, and not Slavic, has been so thor- 
oughly penetrated by Slavic peoples in successive migra- 
tions that it is now properly classed as a Slav state. 
The South Slavs form one of two great fingers of Slav- 
dom thrust westward into Central Europe, and it ex- 
tends all along the Adriatic, enveloping the key cities of 
Fiume and Trieste. 

The degree of unity of these two Slavic groups, Jugo- 
SIavs and Bulgarians, is quite different. The Bulgari- 
ans are chiefly a peasant people, with fairly uniform 
economic advantages and ethnic qualities. Four-fifths 
of Bulgarian exports consist of agricuhural products, and 
three-fourths of the imports are manufactured wares. 
While the large estate has long been a feature of land 
tenure in Rumania, Jugo-SIavia, and Greece, Bulgaria is 
pre-eminently the land of small peasant proprietors. 
Three-fourths of her land is held in small farms not 
exceeding twenty hectares (fifty acres). Proprietors 
holding more than thirty hectares (seventy-five acres) 
hold only 14 per cent of the total area of cultivable land. 
In contrast to the Bulgarians the Jugo-SIavs are com- 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 157 

posed of most diverse elements. The Slovenes, for ex- 
ample, fought in the Austrian army and faced Italian 
divisions up to the end of the war. By the Pact of 
Corfu, signed in 1917, and the organization of a recog- 
nized, government at Agram after the November armis- 
tice, 191 8, the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slo- 
venes was created, and the group of Slovenes incorpo- 
rated with the Serbs and Croats to form a new AIHed 
state. Thus, by a political phrase, Croats and Slovenes 
became allies of the Italians, whom they had just been 
fighting ! This was one of the facts that was used 
against them again and again by the Italians to support 
their claim to a large part of the Jugo-SIav territory and 
its commercial outlets at the head of the Adriatic. 

The degree of unity of the Jugo-SIav state is altogether 
problematical, and doubt as to its political stability was 
a source of grave weakness in its diplomacy. There has 
been a steady growth of the agrarian party which seeks 
such control and division of the land and such commer- 
cial arrangements as will be of greatest benefit to it. 
Opposed to each other are two other political groups, the 
one seeking a strongly centralized government, the other 
a confederation which would leave the various states 
with a high degree of political and commercial autonomy. 
Such a state finds it difficult to manage its domestic 
affairs, and is almost groping in the dark in attempting 
to negotiate with foreign powers. 

Thus the war has completely changed the orientation 
of the Serbian state, a part of Jugo-SIavia. Its original 
thought at the opening of the first Balkan War was to 
unite only its immediate kinsmen with the main body, 
and to secure a window on the sea. Because Greek 
troops captured Saloniki from the Turks after a long 



158 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS . 

siege in 19 12 Serbia was deprived of an outlet on the 
^gean. Her eyes thereupon turned to the Adriatic, and 
here she has struggled with Italy for just two years with 
the object of controlling the eastern Adriatic littoral. 
Realizing that she could not win on the programme of 
19 1 9, Jugo-SIavia took renewed interest in her eastern 
frontier, where she was able to make gains at Bulgaria's 
expense. To understand the background of this action 
requires us to digress a moment for a view of the general 
situation and an earlier phase of the treaty-making 
process. 

The boundary settlements of the Balkans were made 
on a principle quite different from that which governed 
the making of the German treaty. The signatures of 
Germany and Austria had been obtained — and the rati- 
fication also — to the treaties of Versailles and St. Ger- 
main-en-Laye. It was a foregone conclusion that Bul- 
garia would sign. Months before, in the case of Ger- 
many, there was no such assurance. It is perhaps worth 
while, therefore, to sketch an historic incident that bears, 
if only by contrast, on the Balkan question, and which 
involves one of the most dramatic moments of the peace 
conference. 

The early days of the peace conference were filled with 
organization plans, with a multitude of questions of the 
first order respecting the management of a world still 
largely under military control, and with hearing the in- 
sistent claims of minor nationalities. It would have 
been a ruthless spirit that denied a hearing to Poles, 
Czecho-SIovaks, Greeks, to mention only the leading 
delegations of minor rank. Their representatives were 
not trained in the principles of effective speaking. When 
Dmowski related the claims of Poland, he began at 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 159 

eleven o'clock in the morning and in the fourteenth 
century, and could reach the year 1919 and the pressing 
problems of the moment only as late as four o'clock in 
the afternoon. Bene§ followed immediately with the 
counter-claims of Czecho-SIovakia, and, if I remember 
correctly, he began a century earlier and finished an 
hour later! Venizelos, a more practised hand, confined 
himself to one century of Greek history rather than to 
five, and was adroit enough to tell his story in instal- 
ments. To listen to these recitals of national claims, to 
organize field commissions to Berhn, Vienna, southern 
Russia, etc., for gathering pohtical and economic data 
on the spot, to draft the projects for reparation, the 
League of Nations, etc., filled the first two months of 
the conference. 

At last it was apparent to every one that the confer- 
ence had to be speeded up. It had accomplished a vast 
amount of labor in a brief time, but the taking of evi- 
dence in the supreme council had to stop. This work 
was thereafter largely assigned to commissions who then 
reported to the supreme council. To facilitate one 
branch of the work, the territorial settlements, and to 
determine the new boundaries. Premier Clemenceau, Mr. 
Balfour, and Colonel House planned to meet at the 
French Foreign Office on February 19. On his way to 
the conference Clemenceau was shot. Mr. Balfour and 
Colonel House went ahead with the arrangements. On 
the forenoon of February 21 a group of British and 
American experts met, at the suggestion of Colonel 
House, in my office, room 446 of the Crillon Hotel. The 
British delegation included Sir William Tyrell, Headlam- 
Morley, Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwall, and others ; among 
the Americans were Haskins, Seymour, and Johnson. 



i6o WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

When the session ended at four o'clock in the afternoon 
of that day, the boundaries of Germany were tentatively 
sketched and the way prepared for a conclusion of the 
matter in the various territorial commissions that worked 
out the details. 

The first boundary report to be presented and then 
argued before the supreme council was that of the Polish 
territorial commission, fixing Germany's eastern boun- 
dary. Jules Cambon read the report of the Polish com- 
mission. At last the time had come for settling the de- 
tails of a particular boundary. Up to this time every- 
thing had been preliminary — the taking of evidence; now 
there was to be fixed a definite frontier. Moreover, it 
was recommended that Danzig be given to the Poles, 
and the report of the commission was unanimous on this 
point. Here was an old Hanseatic town, a modern com- 
mercial port, a focus of sea-borne trade of great future 
importance. Trade is the life of the British Empire. 
It was an Englishman who wrote that shipping was to 
England like the hair of Samson, the secret of strength. 
Would Lloyd George continue in the role of irresponsible 
and playful plenipotentiary, or would he recognize the 
stake at Danzig — Danzig, behind which were textile 
mills, coal, and the petroleum of the Carpathian fore- 
lands? Suddenly Lloyd George changed from a state of 
bored indiff'erence to one of aggressive participation. 
From that moment forward Lloyd George never relaxed 
his interest or his control. Sitting forward in his chair, 
and speaking in an earnest voice, he proceeded to 
tear the report to pieces, and the argument he employed 
wiped the smiles from the faces and drove fear into the 
hearts of his listeners. "Gentlemen," he said, "if we 
give Danzig to the Poles the Germans will not sign the 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS i6i 

treaty, and if they do not sign our work here is a failure. 
I assure you that Germany will not sign such a treaty." 
There ensued a silence that could be heard. Every one 
was shocked, alarmed, convinced. Lloyd George had in- 
troduced a bogey and it had worked. Thenceforth the 
motto of the British premier might have been: "I have 
a little shadow that goes in and out with me !" 

When the report was resubmitted to the Polish com- 
mission the next morning, it was the British representa- 
tive himself who brought a typed answer to the asser- 
tions of his chief, Lloyd George. When on the same 
day the supplementary report was read. President Wil- 
son reviewed in a masterly fashion the two sides of the 
question, emphasizing what had been promised the Poles 
in Article XIII of his declaration of January 8, 191 8, 
before a joint session of the Congress of the United States. 
Thereupon, with his eyes fixed upon the trade prize of 
Danzig and his mind fortified with the historic prece- 
dents so skilfully supplied by Headlam-Morley, Lloyd 
George moved that the report be tentatively accepted 
as read, but that final decision on Germany's boundaries 
be reserved until all the territorial reports had been 
considered. Directly thereafter the council of four was 
organized, where decisions could be reached without the 
bother of territorial experts, with whose facts, or any 
other kind of facts except purely political ones, Lloyd 
George had no patience whatever. The next we hear 
of the Danzig question Lloyd George and President 
Wilson have agreed to make it a free city. 
' With this solution I have no quarrel. It was even 
with a sense of relief that we heard that the matter had 
been thus settled. While I believe that Danzig should 
be a Polish port, I also realize that there are two very 



1 62 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

big sides to the question. To find out what had been 
agreed upon and to give the agreement substance, Head- 
lam-Morley and myself waited on the President, for, 
within the space of an hour, to two different members 
of his staff Lloyd George had given two quite different 
versions as to what had been agreed upon between him- 
self and the President, and a midnight meeting between 
the British experts and myself failed to untangle the 
matter. The President reported that it had been agreed 
to follow the ethnic principle in delimiting Danzig's 
boundaries and to give the city a "free" status. Spread- 
ing out various maps upon the floor of the President's 
study, we examined the matter in some detail, and de- 
cided to avoid discussion as to the relative merits of the 
ethnic maps of the different delegations by submitting a 
small map prepared by Lloyd George's advisers. There- 
upon Mr. Paton, of the British delegation, and I set to 
work upon a large-scale map prepared by the American 
Inquiry, which was used throughout the Polish negotia- 
tions as the authoritative map on ethnic matters. Be- 
tween four and six o'clock we traced the boundaries of 
Danzig as they stand in the treaty to-day. Transferring 
these boundaries to the British small-scale map for the 
benefit of Mr. Lloyd George they were presented to 
the council of four, and there passed without delay. 

Six months thereafter, and against the protest of the 
American representative on the supreme council. Sir 
Reginald Tower was appointed high commissioner at 
Danzig. His stormy course there could have been pre- 
dicted with mathematical accuracy by any one inter- 
ested enough to see why Lloyd George labored for a 
free city on the shores of the Baltic, where British ship- 
ping and capital were to be rapidly increased, and why 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 163 

Sir Reginald was chosen on the basis of a record in South 
America quite unfavorably known to many American 
merchants. In this and in many other matters the Brit- 
ish knew just what they wanted and how to get it. In 
training and experience they were second to no other 
delegation, and they worked with a sureness of touch 
that aroused the deepest admiration. 

No such fear as that which beset the minds of the 
leading statesmen with respect to the German treaty 
assailed them when Bulgaria came to sign. The cere- 
mony of the signing was altogether extraordinary. In 
the old town hall at Neuilly stood files of soldiers, guards 
with fixed bayonets were stationed at the angles of the 
stairway, the cars of the different delegations swanked 
up to the entrance, the AIKed leaders took their seats, 
and very powerful and formidable they appeared. It 
was a splendid array. In the background was a com- 
pact mass of onlookers from the various delegations, 
including a sprinkling of women. It was a scene, and 
they were there to see it. Several bound copies of the 
treaty lay on the table. One looked to see the doors 
thrown open and a file of Bulgarian^ officials and a lit- 
tle ceremoniousness and, in short, something befitting 
the power and majesty of the sovereign Bulgarian people 
on a solemn and historic occasion. Instead, there was a 
military order in French in the hallway outside, the 
doors slowly opened, a half-dozen French foreign office 
secretaries rose and stood about the entrance, and after 
a pause a single gray-faced and very scared-looking, 
slightly stooped man walked slowly in and was ushered 
to a seat at one end of the room. Was all this cere- 
mony and this imposing array for the purpose of dealing 
with this lone individual — the peasant, Stambouliski? 



1 64 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

It looked as if the office boy had been called in for a con- 
ference with the board of directors. Of course he would 
sign, as presently he did, very courteously escorted and 
supported by the hovering foreign office secretaries; and 
then the great chiefs of the Allies signed, and presently 
the lone Bulgar, still scared and wall-eyed, was led to 
the door, and thus furtively he escaped. The break-up 
of the rest of the assemblage wore the cheerful aspect of 
an afternoon tea. The Allies were at peace with Bul- 
garia ! 

What did the treaty do? It took things from Bul- 
garia. Were any of these actively protested? On what 
principle? These are important matters over which we 
would do well to reflect for a moment, for both during 
the war and the peace conference the position of the 
American Government was Httle understood, abroad as 
at home. On the one liand, we were accused of softness 
respecting a treacherous enemy state, an ally of Ger- 
many; and, on the other, we were thought heartless and 
lacking moral courage for signing a treaty that stripped 
Bulgaria of territory and property when we had never 
declared war against her. Let us see where the line of 
justice lies and exactly what was the record of the 
American delegation. 

The Allies naturally viewed the peace now from the 
standpoint of imposing terms upon an enemy, again 
from the standpoint of abstract justice as expressed in 
President Wilson's Fourteen Points. In the settlements 
now one view, now another was dominant. Thus the 
path of conciliation was everywhere made difficult. At 
every turn one must needs give documentary evidence of 
hating the enemy or one might be thought pro-German. 
This state of things suggests a bit of self-analysis on the 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 165 

part of the man who didn't like olives: '*I don't like 
olives, and I'm glad I don't like 'em, for if I liked 'em 
I'd eat 'em, and I hate 'em." 

America's chief representative was always powerful 
and respected, and on every occasion demanding clear- 
ness and vision it was he who stood head and shoulders 
above his associates. When I suggested to some of my 
British colleagues after a debate between Lloyd George 
and the President that we should keep score on our 
chiefs to see which made the most points, the reply was 
made: "Up to now, at least, your chief has won them all !" 

But with delay in the Senate the influence of the 
American representatives grew steadily less. On one 
occasion Mr. Polk commissioned me to secure the opinion 
of Premier Clemenceau on the Fiume question, which 
was then leading up to one of its most critical phases. 
It was late in 191 9, we had not ratified the Treaty of 
Versailles, the conference was nearing its end, the Ameri- 
can delegation was soon to leave. Tardieu reported his 
chiefs answer to our suggestion: "The Americans are 
charming but they are far away; when you have gone 
the Italians remain — and as our neighbors." Just at the 
end the power represented by America had a sudden 
burst of recognition. You will not find it in the min- 
utes of the proceedings. The incident is historic. The 
German representatives were reluctant to sign the pro- 
tocol of the final proceedings respecting the ratification 
of the Treaty of Versailles. The American delegation 
was to sail on December 5. At the close of the session 
on December 3 Clemenceau turned to Mr. Polk and 
begged him to postpone the departure of the American 
delegation. On his face were no longer the aggressive 
and determined lines of the victorious leader. There was 



i66 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

a day when he had called the President pro-German 
and left the council of four in anger. Now he sought 
companionship as he walked through the dark pathway 
of his fears. Unless ratifications were exchanged all 
might be lost. **Mr. Polk, I beg you to remain. If 
you don't the Germans will not sign. I beg you to 
stay. I beg you not to go." The American delegation 
delayed its departure. 

From the attitude of the American delegation in the 
case of the Adriatic dispute, it will be obvious what their 
position was in the case of those three salients of Bul- 
garian territory toward the west which Serbia coveted 
and eventually obtained by the Treaty of Neuilly, be- 
tween Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers. 
These three salients are occupied by Bulgarian popula- 
tions, and not only in the territorial commissions but also 
in the supreme council the American representatives 
opposed to the end, and had their opposition entered 
in the record, the giving of Bulgarian territory to a 
greatly enlarged Jugo-SIavia. That state already in- 
cluded Slovenes of doubtful allegiance, colonies of Ger- 
mans and Hungarians north of the Save, Montenegrins 
and Macedonian Slavs who certainly wanted least of all 
to be added to Serbia. And now the Jugo-SIavs were 
bent, for strategic reasons — the protection of the railway 
line from Nish to Saloniki — on lopping off four pieces of 
Bulgarian territory and carrying the boundary in one 
place within artillery range of Sofia, the capital of Bul- 
garia. 

Of the four pieces of territory which Bulgaria has lost 
on the west — Timok, Tsaribrod, Bosilegrad, and Stru- 
mitsa — the southernmost one, the Strum itsa salient, rep- 
resents the most significant loss, and it is also the largest. 



1 68 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

For the lopping off of this projection of Bulgaria into 
Macedonia puts an end, at least for the present, to the 
long process begun in 1870, with the foundation of the 
Bulgarian exarchate, and enhanced in 1878 with the 
autonomy of Bulgaria, which had for its object the 
Bulgarization of Macedonia and its ultimate annexation 
to the Bulgarian realm. This act and the tacit confir- 
mation by the powers of the Serbo-Greek boundary in 
Macedonia throws the Macedonian question into its 
latest, possibly its last, phase. The refined ethnographic 
and linguistic studies of the past few years have shown 
contradictory or indefinite results as to the individualis- 
tic character of the Macedonian region. On the physical 
side it is made up of bits of several adjacent natural 
regions. On the religious side it might, in the nascent 
state in which it was in 1870, have just as readily become 
an appanage of Serbia as of Bulgaria. By 19 12, how- 
ever, over 1,100 Bulgarian churches had been estab- 
lished in the region. 

The population of Macedonia is estimated variously 
between 1,200,000 and 2,000,000, owing to the indiffer- 
ent boundaries of the region. More than half the people 
are Christians, and the rest chiefly Mohammedans, with 
some Jews. Each of the three adjacent states, Serbia, 
Bulgaria, and Greece, made an effort to impose its 
culture upon the people and to develop a nationalist 
sentiment among them. Though the Bulgarians at one 
time had possession of the region and though the racial 
character of the people is perhaps somewhat more closely 
similar to Bulgaria than to Serbia, the Serbs also held 
the country for a time and they left a deep impression 
there, as is shown by the architecture and the literature. 
Greek influence was strong in Macedonia, because her 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 169 

agents operated chiefly in the towns, and these domi- 
nated large expanses of tributary country. Even Ru- 
mania joined in the effort to penetrate Macedonia ; there 
are probably between 75,000 and 100,000 pastoral Vlachs 
of Rumanian affiliation in the whole Macedonian country. 
But greater success was bound to attend the Bulgarian 
penetration, because from the first the Bulgarian religious 
organization had a nationalistic cast. It was intimately 
associated with the Bulgarian eff*ort to achieve indepen- 
dence and to round out the Bulgarian realm so as to 
include all Bulgarian populations adjacent to the central 
group. Thus it sought to include lands in Turkish hands 
in eastern and western Thrace. It had as one of its 
objects the incorporation of Macedonia into Bulgaria 
and the recovery of territory inhabited by Bulgarians in 
the Dobrudja. When its religious teachers went into 
Macedonia they took with them not merely the faith of 
their church but the hope of freedom from the Turk, 
the pride of nationality which the Bulgarians had, and 
kinship with a closely related ethnic group. Naturally, 
under these conditions Bulgaria, at the close of the first 
Balkan War, looked upon Macedonia as her own, and the 
restriction of approach of Serbia to Saloniki on the south 
was acknowledged by the Serbians themselves. In the 
secret treaty with Bulgaria Just before the first Balkan 
War, Serbia agreed to the definition of a neutral strip 
running east-northeast to Lake Okhrida, one hundred 
miles northwest of Saloniki, which was to be the subject 
of later negotiation between her and Bulgaria. The 
later negotiation never took place, for Bulgaria made 
unexpected gains in eastern Thrace, and the powers de- 
cided to form an independent Albania in the regions 
where Serbia had hoped to increase her territory. Serbia 



1 70 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

and Greece denounced the territorial terms of the alli- 
ance, Bulgaria insisted on them in spite of changed con- 
ditions, and the second Balkan War resulted. With the 
complete success of Serbia and Greece, as opposed to 
Bulgaria, they divided Macedonia between them, leaving 
only the Strumitsa salient and the country immediately 
northeast and east of it to Bulgaria; and the Treaty of 
Neuilly, by taking away the Strumitsa salient has shut 
the door on Bulgaria's expansion in this direction. 

The Macedonian question, once the chief political prob- 
lem of the Near East, has passed into an entirely new 
phase. Neither Greece nor Serbia is expected to give up 
Macedonian territory for a possible future Macedonia. 
The Macedonians are without leaders of real ability, and 
the heterogeneous character of the population makes it 
impossible for them to have, or to express, a common 
pubhc opinion. There are no significant resources. It 
is a poor country, unwooded, rather desolate, and will 
always be commercially tributary to communities or 
states that are richer and economically better balanced. 
It is therefore improbable that the Macedonian question 
will be revived except through the possible cruelties of 
Greeks and Serbs in their treatment of the Macedonians. 

It was a part of the programme of the American dele- 
gation that, while the Strumitsa salient should properly 
be removed because of the menace which it carried to 
Greek and Serbian railway interests from Nish to Sal- 
oniki, Bulgaria should not suffer the loss of the two 
middle bits of territory — Tsaribrod and Bosilegrad. For 
Sofia, the Bulgarian capital, is brought within thirty miles 
of the new frontier, that is, within the range of modern 
gunfire; and there is no warrant at all in ethnic consid- 
erations for a change from the frontier as it stood before 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 171 

the beginning of the war. But the government of the 
kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes desired to 
rectify their frontier. Not at all sure of a satisfactory 
settlement of the Adriatic question, Jugo-SIavia sought 
to make the best of the new boundary arrangements 
elsewhere. With Greece, a friendly ally, on the south, 
she could hope for no expansion of her national domain 
toward Saloniki, and it was altogether doubtful if she 
could obtain compensation in northern Albania, as had 
been promised by the secret Treaty of London in 1915. 
But two other places remained where advantages could 
be secured : on the north, where the enemy states of Aus- 
tria and Hungary were to have their frontiers defined; 
and on the east, where the Bulgarian frontier was yet to 
be estabhshed. It was not in the interests of justice, it 
was solely in the interest of the Jugo-SIav state, that 
Bulgaria suffered territorial losses on the west. The 
American delegation protested, both in the territorial 
commissions and finally before the supreme council, 
against these losses of territory, claiming them to be un- 
justifiable according to any principle that had governed 
the peace conference theretofore, and emphasizing the 
menace of war that they invited. 

While the arguments of the American representatives 
were courteously received, our delay in ratifying the treaty 
had weakened American prestige. If the loss of territory 
pained an enemy, Bulgaria, it pleased an ally, Jugo-SIavia. 
Germany and Austria had signed; Bulgaria would also 
sign. The territory could be taken with impunity. Poh- 
tics had become quite practical; the Fourteen Points and 
their exponent, as Clemenceau had said, were far away. 
However charming the Americans might be, the Jugo- 
slavs were nearer, and there remained the Adriatic dis- 



172 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

pute to settle. Perhaps a concession on the east would 
soften the blow that impended on the west. When Jugo- 
slavia insisted on taking land from Bulgaria by the 
Treaty of Neuilly, she paved the way for Rapallo. 

On the other hand, we must remember: 

(i) That in September, 1915, Bulgaria agreed to join 
Austria-Hungary against Serbia and in return was to 
receive a certain share of Serbian land and people. 

(2) That Bulgarian authorities at one time even de- 
clared that Serbia no longer existed and had become 
Bulgarian, closed schools and churches, and even burned 
them, compelled the people to speak Bulgarian, and, like 
the Germans in Belgium and northeastern France, levied 
fines and contributions, took away food, and ruined the 
country. 

(3) That out of tens of thousands of Serbians interned 
in Bulgarian camps, at least half died. 

(4) That Bulgarian outrages upon Greeks and Serbs — 
men, women, and children — were among the most hideous 
of the war. 

The territorial losses of Bulgaria appear slight, but the 
political stability of the state has been seriously affected 
by them. By tacit confirmation of the northeastern 
boundary of Bulgaria in the Dobrud ja, on the part of the 
powers, Rumanian merchants of Braila and Galatz are 
given a vital hold upon that one-fourth of Bulgaria's for- 
eign trade that passes by way of the Danube. She is 
deprived of an outlet on the ^^gean save by the untried 
experiment of international guarantee of transit trade 
across a neighboring state, and the possible interna- 
tionalization of the Maritsa River, as provided in the still 
unratified Treaty of Sevres. Under these circumstances 
her primitive economic organization lends itself the more 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 173 

readily to exploitation by foreign capital. More than a 
fifth of so-called Bulgarians live outside her new national 
boundaries — 200,000 in Thrace, 200,000 in the Dobrudja, 
800,000 exarchists in Macedonia — or a total of i ,200,000. 
Favorable to national solidarity and political control is 
the compact layout of the land. Favorable also in this 
respect is the ethnic purity of the people. Of 4,000,000 
population, 80 per cent are Bulgarian (as contrasted with 
60 per cent of Czecho-SIovaks in Czecho-SIovakia). Turks 
are found chiefly in the east and Greeks in the towns. 

Perhaps the principal focus of territorial difficulty in 
the Balkans is Thrace, whose eastern and western sec- 
tions affect the commercial outlets of Bulgaria in a critical 
way. This whole territory was coveted by Greece and 
claimed on ground of strategy, ethnography, and com- 
mercial advantage. A secret treaty, signed in February, 
191 3, approved of the cession of Kavala to Bulgaria on 
the ground that it was the natural outlet for the western 
section of that country, and at that time there was no 
thought but that Dedeagatch would also remain in 
Bulgarian hands. The ethnography of the entire area 
would certainly indicate such a solution, and Greece had 
her eyes fixed rather on Saloniki, southern Albania, and 
the remoter borders of the eastern ^gean. But with 
Allied victory Greece's programme expanded so as to take 
in the chief elements of the Greek world, and she sought 
to consolidate the Greek peoples of eastern and western 
Thrace by including these territories within her national 
domain. 

Ultimately she won the assent of all delegations except 
the American, and American opposition continued until 
the end, at least to the extent of not desiring to give 
Greece all of the territory which she eventually obtained. 



174 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

American opinion favored a rectification of the Bulgarian 
frontier at Adrianople and Kirk-Kilisse, so as to advan- 
tage Bulgaria to some degree, and thus recognize not only 
the ethnic principle but also the historic fact that in the 
first Balkan War it was the effort of the Bulgarian army 
which defeated the Turkish legions, and that the flower 
of Bulgarian manhood fell in the sieges and campaigns 
against Turkish strongholds in eastern Thrace. 

Having reviewed a few of the outstanding problems of 
the eastern Balkans we may now turn to Albania, on the 
other side of the peninsula, where a sharp, three-cornered 
conflict has raged for two years and where there stiH ex- 
ists a problem of the first magnitude. The Albanians 
number 1,000,000 people. Like the states about them, 
they have slowly gained political self-consciousness. 
Their homeland is a broken country, and a large part of 
the population leads a pastoral fife. Its coastal towns 
and lowland cities are intimately tied up with the com- 
mercial systems of its neighbors, and its mountain popu- 
lation retains the primitive organization of the clan. 
Under these circumstances it is obvious that the Alban- 
ians should not have had a strong national programme 
or the means to advance it. It was the wifl of the great 
powers in 191 3, after the first Balkan War, that was im- 
posed upon Albania in establishing her boundaries, and 
it was the wifl of the Alhes that so long kept Italy at 
Valona and for a time threatened to bring Jugo-SIavia 
into active conflict with the northern Albanians about 
Scutari. Toward such a people in such a land it is diffi- 
cult to frame a policy. It is easy to award indepen- 
dence, but it is not equally easy to believe that right use 
win be made of it. Jugo-SIavia and Italy are equally 
hated, and Greece is no exception in disfavor , 



CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 175 

Had the terms of the secret Treaty of London of 191 5 
been carried out, Albania would have been divided. The 
central portion would have been an autonomous Mo- 
hammedan state under Italian protection; the northern 
part would have been under the protection of Jugo- 
slavia, and the southern part was to have been divided 
between Greece and Italy. Koritsa would have become 
a Greek city, Valona an Italian stronghold and point of 
penetration; Scutari and the Drin valley would have 
become an outlet for Jugo-SIavia's trade — and all of these 
points would have become places for military and political 
conflict, for the Albanians, though having no unity of 
sentiment regarding a national programme, are united in 
the belief that they can manage their afl'airs better than 
the people about them. The Italians have been driven 
from Valona by the eff'orts of the Albanians themselves, 
and Albanian independence has been recognized by the 
Council of the League of Nations. By a subsequent 
treaty (192 1) Italy is to have possession of the island of 
Sassens and the two peninsulas that embrace the Bay of 
Valona in order to complete her defense of the Adriatic. 
She is also to have prior rights of a political and com- 
mercial nature, but the reality of these rights have yet 
to be proved. 



VIII 

THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM AND THE DISRUPTION 
OF TURKEY 

BY WILLIAM LINN WESTERMANN 

The treaty of the AIHed Powers and Turkey, signed at 
Sevres on August lo of last year, marks the end of the 
Turkish Empire. The land which by the terms of this 
treaty is left under the control of the Sultan, contains in 
large percentage peoples who speak the Turkish tongue 
and are believers in Islam, however much they may 
differ in the component strains of their blood. They 
feel themselves to be Turks, or, to use the designation 
which they prefer, Osmanh. 

The Arab peoples of Mesopotamia, Syria, and desert 
Arabia have nothing in common with these Turks or 
with their rulers, other than their Moslem religion. The 
Treaty of Sevres has, indeed, freed the Arabs from the 
domination of the alien Ottoman dynasty ; but it has not 
made them free. The Greek islands off the Asia Minor 
coast which Italy was holding in 19 14 have been reunited 
with the kingdom of Greece by a separate treaty be- 
tween Italy and Greece. Here they belong by all the 
tests of language, deep desire, and other affinities which 
are inherent in our complex idea of nationahty. Pales- 
tine has been set aside as a homeland for the Jews of the 
world, under the mandate of Great Britain. If the terms 
of the treaty are carried out, thither the Jews may go, if 
they desire, and live in security as Jews, free to carry out 

176 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM 177 

their interesting plans for the social and economic better- 
ment of the Jews who may come. To the Jews of the 
diaspora, Palestine is to be the symbol of the political 
nationhood which they lost twenty centuries ago, and a 
pledge that the great tragedy of their humiliation may 
now be ended. The Arabs of the Hedjaz, lying along 
the eastern shore of the Red Sea, had been recognized, 
during the war, as forming an independent state, and the 
Cherif of Mecca, old Hussein Ibn Ali, had been called 
king of the Hedjaz, much to his amusement, by the 
great Western Powers, including the United States. The 
independence of this kingdom was confirmed in the 
Turkish treaty. 

Except in the case of the Greek islands and the king- 
dom of Hedjaz, these solutions are not as yet complete 
or secure. Men will still have to face death, fighting for 
or against the stabilizing and continuity of the decisions 
made in respect to Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia. 
Yet these four results of the Turkish treaty and other 
negotiations which accompanied and are practically a 
part of it, are, on the whole, to be rated as a gain to 
the Greeks, to the Arab peoples, to the Jews, to the 
Turks themselves, and to the world at large. This is, 
however, the sum of the satisfaction which the peoples 
of the Near East may derive out of the endless discus- 
sions of distinguished diplomats at Paris, at London, 
and at San Remo, covering in all a period of twenty 
months in 19 19 and 1920. As compared with the hopes 
men set their hearts upon at Paris, this accomplishment 
is meagre. Far-seeing men beheved that the hold of the 
Ottoman Sultan upon Constantinople would be ended. 
He still rules there — or, better, is ruled there. The world 
believed that the highlands of Armenia would be formed 



178 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

into a free state, and the policy of the extermination of 
this people would be thereafter impossible forever. The 
Treaty of Sevres does, indeed, constitute a free and inde- 
pendent state of Armenia; but that state exists only as 
a name. Its boundaries are in part undetermined, in 
part demarcated upon maps which it would be a bitter 
derision to publish. Actually there exists to-day a 
Soviet Republic of Armenia, a small territory in Trans- 
caucasian Russia. It is entirely subservient to the wishes 
and designs of the Soviet Government. The Turkish 
provinces of old Armenia, Van, Bitlis, and Erzerum, are 
under the complete military control of the rebel Turkish 
leader, Mustapha Kemal Pasha. He and his followers 
lead the organization called the Tashkilat Milli or Na- 
tional Organization. Their purpose is to defeat the prac- 
tical application of the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, 
because they see as clearly as we that the carrying out of 
its terms means the end of the Ottoman Empire and the 
foundation of a small but compact Turkish state. The 
liberation of Armenia was the one outstanding result ex- 
pected from the Near Eastern negotiations at the Peace 
Conference. The failure to meet this general expectation 
was indirectly a result of the struggle among the Allied 
Powers for equahty or priority of opportunity in the 
commercial exploitation of the old Turkish Empire in 
the case of a successful termination of the war. In the 
pursuit of these objects the independence and protection 
of Armenia became a thing men talked about, but did 
not work for. 

Directly, the United States is responsible for the pres- 
ent plight of the Armenians, by default of service. An 
essential weakness of our position in all Near Eastern 
affairs was that we had not declared war upon Turkey. 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM 179 

Hence we could not, in the period of the armistice, send 
troops into Turkish Armenia when such action might 
have saved many thousands of people from starvation. 
Not having declared war upon Turkey, we were always, 
during the period of discussion, outsiders, impotent to 
affect the actual course of the negotiations or put our 
own stamp upon the decisions taken. Even so, we, the 
people of the United States, might have saved the Arme- 
nians, had we been willing to accept a mandate, prefer- 
ably for all the northern part of the Turkish Empire, but 
at least for the Armenian portion. We may Justify our- 
selves as we will. The mandate for Armenia was offered 
us and we refused to accept its obligations and the un- 
doubted troubles which their acceptance would have 
entailed. We feared foreign entanglements. That fear 
was Justified. But it is fear. The policy of no entan- 
gling alliances advocated by the founders of our govern- 
ment was based upon a caution which served well the 
period of our immaturity and undeveloped union and 
strength. A caution justified at the turning of the nine- 
teenth century has become a counsel of cowardice in the 
twentieth century. We were asked to assist in the estab- 
lishment of a new international policy in the control of 
undeveloped peoples under the mandate system, advo- 
cated by liberal sentiment the world over, by able lead- 
ers from South Africa, Canada, China, Great Britain, 
South America, and where not. It was entirely accept- 
able, if honestly enforced, to the people to whom it was 
to be applied. When boldness, confidence in the strength 
of our own political integrity, and active support of a 
new political ideal might have saved Armenia and with 
it the Near East, we held back. President Wilson is not 
responsible for this. We are, we the people of the United 



i8o WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

States. The decision was ours and we took it. Ameri- 
can safety first. Where we might have led at the zero 
hour of political opportunity, we faltered and refused to 
go over. 

In 1908 a successful revolt, led by the Young Turk 
party, had brought to book the old tyrant, Abdul 
Hamid, the Red Sultan. The Turkish constitution of 
1876 was revived, dusted off, and patched up. The 
old absolutism of the Sultan was severely limited. A 
new spirit ran through the Turkish Empire. Extrava- 
gant hopes of liberal treatment were aroused among the 
Arabs and the Armenians. They believed that at last a 
modus vivendi had been attained by which they might 
continue to exist as loyal subjects of a state in which 
they would no longer be regarded and treated as "riayah,'* 
the declassed, but as free Ottoman subjects. This en- 
thusiasm was soon dissipated by the actions of the Com- 
mittee of Union and Progress, the central controlling 
organization of the Young Turk party. Their poHcy of 
Turkizing all the peoples of the empire was a foolish 
attempt to tear out roots which ran deeply into the his- 
tory of the Orient and drew from those depths the emo- 
tional nourishment of the centuries. The Turkizing 
policy ran afoul the Arab revival, a movement in the 
Arab world for the maintenance and further development 
of Arab culture. Up to 191 2 the Arab organizations 
which had arisen in this revival had been hterary and 
academic, harmless and unrevolutionary. These socie- 
ties with their numerous branches in this country and in 
South America continued to exist. But beside them 
grew up two secret revolutionary bodies, the one called 
the Fettah, an organization in the civilian world, the 
other and more dangerous one the Ahad. To this society 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM i8i 

were admitted only Arab military officers of the Turkish 
army. In 1914 the loyalty of the Turkish army was 
rotted away by this new loyalty among Arab officers, 
high and low, who had sworn an oath to give their for- 
tunes and their lives to the cause of the political separa- 
tion of all the Arab-speaking peoples from Turkish mis- 
rule. Many of these officers were intelhgent and well- 
trained in modern military science by Germans supphed 
to the Turkish armies by General von der Goltz and his 
staff. The plans for Arab liberation had matured to the 
point where the year 1923 had been fixed upon as the 
time for striking the blow for freedom. 

In March, 1915, began a series of negotiations be- 
tween the Allied Powers in respect to the disposition of 
Turkish territory in case of Alhed victory. From these 
issued four international compacts. By the Sazonof- 
Paleologue Agreement of March 4, 191 5, Constantino- 
ple and the control of the Straits were to go to Russia. 
By the London Pact of April 26 of the same year, Italy 
was to receive, in the event of Allied victory, full sov- 
ereignty over the Dodecanese and recognition of her 
right, in case of a partition of Turkey in Asia, to a "just 
share" of the Mediterranean region about and back of 
Adalia. In vain British liberals at that time pointed 
out to their government that it was entering upon a 
dangerous course; that it was committing itself to a 
policy of giving away rights of sovereignty or of corre- 
sponding economic priority in territories to which it had 
no legitimate claim even in the then doubtful event of 
victory. Italy's participation upon the side of the Allies 
seemed necessary for Allied success. And Italy fixed in 
advance her price for the blood her soldiers were to shed 
and the war debt she was to contract. 



1 82 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

In the spring of 1916 Russian troops had pushed for- 
ward into the four northeastern provinces of Turkish 
Armenia and were in military occupation of a large ter- 
ritorial area. Fear aroused among her alhes by this 
Russian advance undoubtedly dictated the next step in 
the series of negotiations which, with our own failure to 
participate, made impossible the application of any mod- 
ern or liberal pohcy in dealing with Turkey and rendered 
impotent at the peace conferences all those forces which 
worked for new and sounder methods of diplomatic treat- 
ment in settling the problems of the Near East. In 
May, 1 91 6, it was secretly agreed that Russia was to 
acquire in sovereignty the four Armenian vilayets of 
Trebizond, Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis. British and French 
negotiations, conducted at the same time, roughly defined 
the respective areal acquisitions or spheres of these two 
Powers by the ill-fated Sykes-Picot Treaty. Palestine, 
as then stipulated, was to be constituted as a separate 
state under a special international regime. This was un- 
doubtedly a British demand, conditioned by the neces- 
sity of protecting the Suez Canal and the narrow sea- 
way it offered to India. Zionist agitation later altered 
this decision. Established as a homeland for the Jews, 
Palestine serves equally well the vital need of British 
imperial policy for a protected seaway to her great 
Eastern possession. Zionism gives to the Palestinian de- 
cision an ideahstic motivation which saves it from the 
anachronistic baldness of nineteenth-century political con- 
ception which characterizes the Near Eastern decisions 
as a whole. 

The Sykes-Picot Agreement defined the advantages 
which were to accrue to the British Empire and France 
out of the hoped-for dissolution of the Turkish Empire. 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM 183 

The zone of French complete control gave to the leaders 
of the Near Eastern policy of France what they primarily 
desired, control over the potential cotton production of 
Cilicia, over the middle section of the Bagdad railway, 
and the reputed copper wealth of the Arghana Maden 
mines of lower Armenia. In the Tripartite Agreement 
between France, Great Britain, and Italy, which was 
signed upon the same day as the Turkish treaty and is 
essentially a part of it, this zone is actually delivered 
over to France as a sphere of special interest. British 
policy in the formulation of the Sykes-Picot Treaty 
was dictated apparently by three considerations: by the 
necessity of controlling the outlet of Mesopotamia into 
the Persian Gulf as a danger-point in the defensive fron- 
tier of India; by the need of raw cotton for the looms of 
Manchester; and by the requirement of a sufficient sup- 
ply of petroleum for the uses of the British navy. The 
British sphere of control in Mesopotamia, as delimited in 
the Sykes-Picot Treaty, may be defended as having some 
sort of geographic and ethnic justification. The French 
area defies every known law of geographic, ethnographic, 
and linguistic unity which one might cite who would 
attempt to justify it. 

One feature of the Sykes-Picot Agreement commends 
itself as dictated by a more liberal spirit than the clauses 
so far cited. The French and British, Russia later con- 
curring, made provision for the establishment of an Arab 
confederation in the Syrian desert, four sultanates which 
were to be independent, though somewhat smothered, 
perhaps, under the blanket of the French and British 
spheres of influence which lay upon them. This, the 
sole concession to the Arab movement for independence, 
was brought about as follows : when Turkey entered the 



1 84 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

war the most vulnerable spots in the British Empire were 
the Suez Canal and Egypt. German leadership under- 
stood this fact. A plan was projected for a Turkish ad- 
vance into Egypt. Djemal Pasha concentrated the fourth 
Turkish army corps in Syria in the spring of 1915 for 
this attack. The British, seeking for every aid in the 
war, seized upon the movement for Arab independence. 
Through the agency of a Syrian named Faroki, with the 
assistance of Feisal, son of the Cherif of Mecca, and an 
able young British archaeologist named T. E. Lawrence, 
they approached old Hussein Ibn Ali, the Cherif of 
Mecca. For over a year the negotiations pended. The 
old Cherif stood out for the complete and unified inde- 
pendence of the Arab-speaking world in Turkey as then 
constituted. It must be said in justice to British diplo- 
macy that its agents used in these negotiations claim 
that their correspondence shows no definite promise to 
this end. But Cherif Hussein insisted that he would 
expect consideration of this claim in the adjustment to be 
made after a successful issue of the war. It is credibly 
reported that in the consideration of this problem by the 
Arabs before Hussein at Mecca, one of the sheiks asked 
him whether he were not becoming involved in very large 
affairs. The response was quite Oriental, worthy of a 
hero of Scheherazade and the "Tales of the Thousand 
and One Nights": "I am the fish that swims in the sea. 
The greater the sea the fatter the fish." 

The entrance of the Hedjaz into the war, in revolt 
against Turkey, was precipitated by the senseless cruelty 
of Djemal Pasha in Syria. He hung the most honored 
leaders in Syria, on proof of academic rather than dan- 
gerous plotting. He starved the Lebanese, 200,000 of 
them, it is said, in their beautiful mountains, by drawing 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM 185 

a cordon about the base of the mountains and allowing 
no food to go up. The secret and really dangerous revo- 
lutionary societies represented in the heart of his own 
armies remained unsuspected by him. The pressure 
brought upon the Cherif of Mecca in his position as the 
most distinguished leader of the Arab world became too 
great to resist. In 1916 he declared the revolt of the 
Hedjaz from Turkey. The Arab camel corps led by his 
son, Emir Feisal, with Colonel T. E. Lawrence as liaison 
officer between the Arab forces and those of General 
Allenby, rendered distinguished service in the campaigns 
in Palestine in 191 7 and 191 8. 

Late in the year 19 16, at a meeting held at Saint Jean 
de Maurienne in the southeastern corner of France, 
Italy obtained a definition of her prospective territorial 
acquisition and her sphere of influence in Asia Minor, 
which had been left undefined in the London Pact of 
1 915. The territory to be acquired outright included the 
entire southwestern corner of Asia Minor, as far north 
as Smyrna. To the north of this a large zone of Italian 
special influence was delimited, the "equivalent" of the 
similar zones of Great Britain and France in the Syrian 
desert. A final clause of this Agreement of Saint Jean 
de Maurienne provided that the consent of Russia must 
be obtained. Before this could be done, the old govern- 
ment of Russia was overthrown and Russia's signature 
was never given. 

This is the complicated tale of the secret agreements. 
A change was made in regard to Palestine, when the 
British Government published the Balfour declaration of 
November, 191 7, granting to the insistent Zionists the 
privilege that Palestine should be set aside as the home- 
land of the Jews. This was an open covenant, published 



1 86 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

to the world and fought for in the open. It received 
official and public recognition from the French and 
Italian Governments. President Wilson declared his ad- 
herence to it, and many of our State legislatures passed 
resolutions urging the national government to support it. 

One more secret understanding and I am through with 
all the list of these follies of secrecy and blind self-inter- 
est. When Venizelos brought Greece into the war on 
the Allied side he was able to obtain a promise, never 
written or published, so far as I know, that western 
or Bulgarian Thrace would be granted to Greece by the 
peace decision. 

Two events of 191 8 introduced new complications into 
the Near Eastern situation, already so distorted between 
two incompatibilities, the desire of certain of the non- 
Turkish elements of the empire for freedom, and the 
secret covenants. These new complications were: the 
defection of Russia and its consequent elimination as a 
participant in the political thanksgiving which the secret 
agreements contemplated; and the clear formulation of 
the American attitude toward the principles of the peace 
as first expressed in the Fourteen Points of President 
Wilson on January 8, 191 8. The doctrine of "open cov- 
enants openly arrived at" was, unfortunately, not so 
stated as to be retroactive and thereby eliminate the 
existing secret agreements of our Allies. The whole 
spirit of President Wilson's speech was, however, in 
direct contrast to the traditionahzed diplomacy which 
gave rise to the Near Eastern agreements. It empha- 
sized the right of all peoples, strong or weak, to hve on 
equal terms of liberty. Only the practised sophistry of 
old-line diplomacy could maintain unimpaired either the 
spirit or the substance of these secret agreements after 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM 187 

the Fourteen Points had been accepted in the armistice 
terms as the basis of the formulation of the peace terms. 

In respect to Turkey, Article 12 of the Fourteen Points 
specifically provided that *'the Turkish portions of the 
Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty," 
that the non-Turkish portions should have the right of 
autonomous development, and that the narrows leading 
into the Black Sea should be permanently open under 
some international arrangement. Liberal British states- 
men saw clearly the impassable gulf between this declara- 
tion and the secret agreements. They urged their gov- 
ernment to take up with the United States the whole 
question of the basis of the peace terms, and arrive at 
some agreement as to general method and purpose, as 
well as to specific and detailed terms. The failure to do 
this vitiated the whole course of the negotiations at Paris 
regarding Turkey, blocked every effort at a common un- 
derstanding, and made the Turkish treaty as it stands 
to-day an anachronism and a by-word to all the peoples 
most" vitally concerned, except the Venezelist Greeks. 

When the Peace Conference assembled, the Sazonof- 
Paleologue Agreement lay buried in the ruins of Russia. 
Constantinople and the four Armenian vilayets had lost 
their secret tags. The President of the United States sat 
in the chair which Sazonof or Isvolsky had expected to 
occupy. It was a natural thing for men to assume that 
the United States would replace Russia in the political 
settlement of the Turkish problems as she had in the war, 
by accepting, under provisions entirely adjustable to our 
own ideals of international fair play, the territorial as- 
signments which the Russian collapse had left vacant. 
The Armenians desired this with all their hearts. Liberal 
British and French opinion urged upon our delegation the 



1 88 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

necessity of American acceptance of a mandate over 
Armenia. I was one who shared their opinion, and I 
still share it. However strongly President Wilson favored 
this plan I never heard any man say that either he, or 
any one of his colleagues on the American Peace Com- 
mission, made any promise which would tend to pre- 
empt the constitutional right of the American people to 
answer this question through their representatives in 
Congress. 

At the Peace Conference the principal delegations from 
the Near East present throughout the protracted period 
of the peace negotiations were: the Greek, headed by 
Venizelos, shrewd, tireless, and innocent-looking; the 
Arab delegation, headed by Emir Feisal, a sincere young 
man, and a stately and attractive figure in his Arab head- 
dress and flowing robes; the Zionist delegation, led by 
Doctor Chaim Weizmann, with assistance from a number 
of able American and British representatives; two dele- 
gations of Armenians, that of Turkish Armenia, directed 
by the strange figure of Nubar Pasha, a wealthy Egyptian 
landowner, and that of the former subjects of Russian 
Armenia, under the leadership of a distinguished poet 
and novelist, Avetis Aharonian. There came, also, other 
committees whose stay was temporary. These had been 
sent to represent certain more localized phases of the sepa- 
ratistic tendencies aroused amid the ruins of the Ottoman 
Empire by the new pohtical evangel of self-determination. 
Among them were the delegates of the Smyrna Greeks, 
demanding reunion with the mother country; of the Pon- 
tic Greeks headed by the archbishop of Trebizond, with 
the same Irredentist dream, or faihng that, with a demand 
for localized independence as a Pontic Republic. The 
Kurds were there, claiming rights of independent state- 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM 189 

hood over an area which covered a large portion of the 
territory claimed by the Armenians of Turkey. The dis- 
integrated expanse of old Russia has since the armistice 
been welded together again into a fairly cohesive mass 
in the fires of the new Bolshevist fanaticism. But during 
the first year of the Peace Conference it lay in broken 
pieces. In the Transcaucasian region of Russia, also, the 
doctrine of self-determination wrought its own compli- 
cated local problems. The Georgians and Azerbaijan 
Tartars presented claims to independent statehood which 
overlapped, each upon the other, territorially; and both 
delegations claimed, as their own, areas within the north- 
ern and eastern limits of the state outlined on the maps 
of the Armenians as the minimum of the Armenian terri- 
torial area. As a side-Hne the Georgians had interesting 
business proposals in manganese. The Azerbaijan Tar- 
tars talked big money in oil, especially in the Groszny oil 
regions. 

The conflict of local native desires in the Arab regions 
was no less sharp. The French interest in Syria, already 
formulated in the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, 
runs back for centuries. As distinguished from their de- 
sire to control Cilicia and central Anatoha, the French at- 
titude toward Syria cannot be regarded as bald commer- 
cial imperiahsm. For sixty years the French Govern- 
ment has regarded itself, and with some justification in 
actual accomplishment, as the privileged protector of the 
Maronite Christians. Syrians resident in France who 
were French citizens by adoption, presented to the Peace 
Conference the demand for a French mandate as that of a 
majority of the native Syrians. A Syrian by birth, named 
Chukri Ganem, who writes poetry in the French language 
and is a French citizen, spoke long and in eloquent periods 



190 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

before the Council of Ten for French control. He told 
how '*we have shed our blood" in Syria for this ideal of 
a unified Syria, including Palestine, under the French 
segis. When one knew that he had not seen Syria for 
well over twenty years, that he was a propagandist upon 
the French pay-roll, and saw that despite the terrible 
bloodletting of which he spoke, he seemed, for a poet, to 
be in quite normal health, his eloquence failed markedly 
of its effect. From Beirut the French imported (ex- 
penses paid) a committee of five Lebanese who also spoke 
for French guidance. The wishes of these Syrian groups 
conflicted with the claims of Emir Feisal, representing 
the hope of complete independence of the entire Arab- 
speaking section of Turkey as a unit (expenses in Paris 
paid by the British Government). The Zionist move- 
ment, for separation of Palestine and a special regime to 
insure the establishment of the Jewish homeland, was 
bitterly opposed by the Syrian proteges of France, less 
markedly and with vacillating policy by the Arab group 
of Feisal. 

Behind all these conflicting local hatreds and ambitions, 
more confused and comphcated, in fact, than they can 
possibly be presented here, lay always the secret agree- 
ments. These treaties were the handiwork of the old- 
style diplomatic craftsmanship of European officialdom. 
Sanctified by the signatures of the Governments con- 
cerned, they remained in the background, adaptable as to 
form, immutable in their spirit, working inevitably, Hke 
Ate in a Greek tragedy, to the destined end of the Treaty 
of Sevres and the Tripartite Agreement of August lo, 
1920. From behind it all came the sound of children's 
and women's voices crying for bread. American relief 
workers began to drift in and tell about the conditions in 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM 191 

Armenia. The younger men always spoke passionately: 
"Why do the American people permit this? Why do 
you, who are sitting at Paris, not do something?" The 
middle-aged men spoke more quietly, as if their hearts 
were old and their sympathies shrivelled. They were 
much the more terrible to listen to. 

The first of the Near Eastern claimants to appear at a 
hearing before the Council of Ten was the persistent and 
astute Greek premier, Eleutherios Venizelos. On Feb- 
ruary 3 and 4 of 191 9 he presented the claims of Greece. 
He was the favored of France and Great Britain. In 
fluent French, and with an engaging appearance of frank- 
ness, he laid claim to southern Albania, Bulgarian and 
eastern Thrace, and the western coast of Asia Minor. 
One must recall that his claims could not be answered by 
two of the parties most interested and most directly af- 
fected by his patriotic dreams of a Greater Greece. Bul- 
garia and Turkey, as enemy Powers, were not represented 
at the Peace Conference. But in the Italian delegation 
his aspirations found bitter and persistent opposition. 
In the Pact of London western Asia Minor south of 
Smyrna had been ear-marked for Italy. By the Saint 
Jean de Maurienne Agreement a large section of the coast 
of Asia Minor lying north of Smyrna had been set off as 
a sphere of Italian influence. Despite skilful and tact- 
ful compliments which Venizelos paid to Italy in the 
course of his appearance before the Council of Ten, despite 
the ponderous return compliments of the Italian premier, 
Orlando, the conflict of interest between Greece and Italy 
was one not readily to be adjusted. 

The Greek claims were then referred to a special com- 
mission of representatives of the four Powers for con- 
sideration and report to the Council of Four. The gen- 



192 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

eral disposition of this Greek territorial commission was 
to grant to Venizelos, who was consistently supported by 
French and British professional diplomacy, as great a 
measure of his Pan-Hellenic claims as could be done. 
Italy was consistently opposed to all his claims, because 
of her own political and commercial aspirations in the 
eastern Mediterranean. The American official attitude 
at that time was dictated by a desire to call the secret 
treaties into the open and register its unalterable oppo- 
sition to any recognition of these as determining factors 
in the decisions to be made. It was indisposed to grant 
the Venizelist-Greek claim to any territorial control in 
Asia Minor. The reason for this attitude lay in the 
conviction that complete control of Smyrna was an 
absolute essential to the possibility of development of 
the six or seven million people of Asia Minor whom we 
call Turks. Smyrna, or some harbor in its immediate 
vicinity, has been the one great outlet for the goods of 
this entire region in all the period since history has 
knowledge of its life. Through Smyrna, not through 
Constantinople, Anatolia pours out its goods which the 
western world desires. In return for these goods Ana- 
tolia may take in through Smyrna harbor western prod- 
ucts and ideas which it sorely needs, modern farm imple- 
ments, modern ideas of scientific agriculture and indus- 
try. Only through this means can the peasant of 
Asia Minor, whom we so harshly condemn as "the Terri- 
ble Turk," become an acceptable citizen of the modern 
world. To this end Smyrna and its harbor are the eyes, 
the mouth, and the nostrils of the people of Anatolia. 
It is the consensus of opinion of American missionaries, 
who know him through and through, of American, British, 
and French archaeologists who have worked for years 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM 193 

beside and with him, of British merchants who have 
traded with him, of British soldiers who fought against 
him, that the Anatohan Turk is as honest as any other 
people of the Near East, that he is a hard-working farmer, 
a brave and generous fighter, endowed fundamentally 
with chivalrous instincts. That these characteristics and 
instincts have been distorted by the brutalizing effects of 
Ottoman rule is self-evident, just as Ottoman rule once 
brutalized the Balkan peoples, and continues to brutalize 
the Armenians. Of all these peoples the Anatolian peas- 
ants have suffered the most. They have been conscripted 
for fifty years to fight the battles of a government whose 
corruption has been a stench in the nostrils of the world. 
They have been scraped to the bone for taxes to pay for 
the Sultan's wars. The Young Turk leaders, who were, 
be it remembered, largely from European Turkey, Mos- 
lemized and Turkized Jews and Thracians, robbed them 
blind, themselves becoming rich and mighty. They de- 
livered the Turkish peasants to the tender mercies of 
Prussian drill-masters, who beat them into shape as sol- 
diers. These soldiers starved or died of disease, chiefly 
cholera, typhus, and dysentery, literally by the thou- 
sand, while the wheat their people raised was shipped to 
Germany. 

It was the American belief that the crux in the ques- 
tion of the future welfare of the Near East lay in giving, 
for once in history, a chance to this peasantry of Asia 
Minor. The great majority of all westerners interested 
in and acquainted with the Near East — missionaries, the 
British Freshfield and Wital merchant organizations, the 
American tobacco interests — were opposed to granting 
Smyrna to Greece. Yet it was eventually done, though 
in compromised form. 



194 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

In the Greek territorial commission it was impossible 
to bring the question of the secret agreements into open 
discussion. Only once, when the Italian delegates spoke 
of the promises made to them in the Saint Jean de Mauri- 
enne Agreement, it became apparent that Great Britain 
certainly, France by its silence, refused to countenance 
that understanding as a binding contract, on the specious 
plea that one of the parties which should have been signa- 
tory to the agreement, Russia, had not signed. The 
Italian delegates thereupon withdrew from participation 
in the discussions of the Greek territorial commission 
and the subsequent recommendations, though they re- 
mained as silent observers throughout the following 
meetings. The futile result of the report was, on the 
whole, a victory for Venizelos. He had gained a favor- 
able recommendation of three elements of the commis- 
sion regarding southern Albania and the Thracian coast 
of the ^gean Sea. The French and British delegates 
recommended the Greek claim to Smyrna and an area 
about it much reduced from Venizelos's demand. The 
American delegates opposed the Greek desire for sov- 
ereignty in any part of Asia Minor. 

When Premier Orlando broke with President Wilson 
upon the Fiume issue and left Paris, the astute Venizelos 
immediately pushed forward his Smyrna claim. He was 
able to gain the support of the American leaders at the 
Peace Conference, in the face of the contrary American 
stand as represented upon the Greek territorial commis- 
sion. Under a secrecy which kept knowledge of this 
decision absolutely from the office of the American ad- 
visers upon Turkish affairs, he gained permission to 
occupy Smyrna with Greek troops. This was done on 
the morning of May 15, 191 9, in open dayhght, though 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM 195 

the Turkish local authorities were assured repeatedly 
that it would be an occupation by Allied troops, including 
Greeks. Upon May 15 and 16 Greek troops and civihans 
massacred between 400 and 800 Turks in the city and 
its environs. In the next two weeks the killing of Turks, 
with all the horrible accompaniments of Near Eastern 
massacres, spread through the countryside roundabout 
as the Greek troops advanced. It is a moderate estimate 
to say that over 2,000 Turks — men, women, and chil- 
dren — were done to death unnecessarily by this decision 
of the War Council and the Council of Four. 

It is a tribute to the skill of Venizelos that he could 
still ride high upon the wave of his astounding reputa- 
tion, despite this terrible indictment of the disciphne 
and self-control of the Greek army. Venizelos was per- 
haps only remotely responsible. The Greek officers ap- 
pointed under his dictation surely were directly so. In 
early July Venizelos was warned by the Supreme Council 
that his troops were advancing beyond the limits set 
by them. He explained and made promises, and sent 
within forty-eight hours a telegram to the Greek com- 
mand for a still farther advance. 

Knowledge of the Smyrna incident is necessary to an 
understanding of the elements which have made the 
Turkish negotiations at Paris and London and their re- 
sults, embodied in the Treaty of Sevres, entirely ineffec- 
tive, especially in respect to their provisions for Armenian 
independence. For Armenia has been betrayed by the 
civilized world and thrown upon the tender mercies of 
Bolshevist Russia and the Turkish Nationahst forces. 

News of the Smyrna massacres spread rapidly through- 
out the Near East. It caused terror and suspicion of 
the Allied intention, even in Syria. Great mass meetings 



196 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

of protest were held in Constantinople. Young Turk 
leaders had already fled into Asia Minor and were then 
attempting to organize, under the new name of the Tash- 
kilat Mini, Turkish resistance to the disruption of the 
empire. The empire had meant to many of them official 
position, whether in the army or in civil service, which 
was their means of subsistence, with limitless opportuni- 
ties of graft. The massacres gave life and purpose to 
their appeal to the Turkish peasantry, to defend them- 
selves against other massacres which would surely befall 
them when the AIHed control should be estabhshed. It 
helped, no doubt, in destroying the confidence of the 
AHies in Venizelos, and in the possibihty of a Just rule 
by the Greeks over the Turkish population of Asia 
Minor. Venizelos continued to work tirelessly through 
the fall of 1 919 and the spring of 1920, but his diplomatic 
skill could no longer meet the odds against him. In a 
last desperate cast against fortune he made promises in 
May of 1920 to defeat the forces of Mustapha Kemal 
Pasha in Asia Minor. He threw in additional Greek 
troops who advanced toward Constantinople and Ismid. 
The Turks retreated before them, fighting guerilla war- 
fare. In October of 1919 a Smyrna Greek confessed: 
"Smyrna will be the tombstone over the reputation of 
Venizelos." And it has been so. In the Turkish treaty 
the Supreme Allied Council altered its Smyrna pohcy. 
The United States had no hand in this. Instead of the 
complete Greek sovereignty over Smyrna which Veni- 
zelos had hoped for — and almost had — the Treaty of 
Sevres has made a five-year provisional arrangement. 
The sovereignty is Turkish. The administration is in 
Greek hands. After five years of this situation the pop- 
ulation in the Smyrna district is to hold a plebiscite to 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM 197 

determine whether it desires to be Turkish or to become 
a part of Greece. 

The costly and fruitless maintenance of Greek troops 
in Asia Minor gradually wore out the support of Veni- 
zelos at home. In the parliamentary elections held in 
Greece on November 14, 1920, he was overwhelmingly de- 
feated. Venizelos had ridden the crest of the wave of 
world-wide popularity and confidence for seven years. 
That wave has now thrown him, in self-imposed exile, 
high and dry upon the beach at Nice. His dream of the 
i^gean Sea as a Greek mare clausum is past. 

At the Paris Conference Syrian affairs were also kept 
from any early decision by the incompatible character of 
the secret treaties and the Arab aspirations, war-time 
diplomacy and the new doctrine of self-determination, 
and the local native hatreds based on religious groupings. 
On November 9 of 191 8 General Allenby had allowed an 
official statement to be pubhshed in Palestine, commit- 
ting both the French and British Governments to the 
policy of assisting and encouraging the establishment of 
native governments in Syria ^nd Mesopotamia. These 
native governments were to derive their authority from 
the free will and initiative of the peoples concerned. 
This solemn promise has not been kept. Emir Feisal 
came to Paris demanding independence, under manda- 
tory guidance, if necessary, for all the Arab portion of 
Turkey, and that the Allied Supreme Council send out 
an Interalhed commission to find out what sort of gov- 
ernment the Arabs really wanted. He spoke before the 
Council of Ten in the Arab tongue, recounting the aid 
rendered to the Allied cause by the Arab camel corps. 

There came also to Paris from Syria a great American, 
Doctor Howard BHss, demanding independently of Feisal 



198 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

that a commission of inquiry be sent into Syria. Oblivi- 
ous of its results, he felt that the good faith of the West- 
ern Powers was involved in the keeping of the promise 
inherent in the Allenby declaration that the Arabs should 
have a chance of making their wishes known. The word 
of great Western Powers, he said, had been passed, 
and their honor was involved. The conspicuous honesty 
of Doctor Bliss, his tremendous influence for good in the 
Near East, are deserving of a much greater recognition 
by Americans than they have received. 

Out of these and many more conversations, out of 
much diplomatic hauling and pulling, came the decision 
of the Supreme Council to send a commission into Syria. 
The French were opposed to this expedition. Never did 
they intend that it should go, to judge by their obstruc- 
tionist pohcy. Their official pohcy was to stand abso- 
lutely upon the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. 
After two months of futile conferences of all kinds Presi- 
dent Wilson, in exasperation, determined to send out an 
American commission to ascertain what the Syrians 
really wanted. In early June the Crane-King commis- 
sion departed for Syria, returning to Paris in September. 
The results of its inquiries have never been made public, 
and the reasons for suppression can only be surmised. 
Rumor has it that the overwhelming sentiment of the 
Syrian population desired an American mandate over all 
of Syria. That being impossible, they preferred a British 
to a French mandate. 

In December of 191 9 the United States Government 
withdrew from active participation in the work of the 
Peace Conference. This removed the chief deterrent to 
the settlement of the Turkish problems, in the sense that 
no force opposed to the secret treaties was any longer 



Adriaiwpp 




—"•—»■-• Pre-war botmdaries 

I I New boundarifes 
«■-■— Undefined bouitJaries 

I^opg. East ^ ferort ' 



MAP SHOWING THE DISPOSITIONS MADE BY THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF THE 
TERRITORIES OF THE FORMER TURKISH EMPIRE 



200 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

represented in the meetings of the Supreme Council. 
From this time on the application of the secret terms 
was assured. Seeing this, the followers of Emir Feisal 
proclaimed Syria an independent state and Feisal its 
king, at a meeting held at Damascus on March 1 1, 1920. 
In anticipation of the assignment of Syria to France, 
French colonial troops were already in occupation of the 
Syrian coastal towns. "King" Feisal issued an ulti- 
matum in March to the French commander that he must 
withdraw his troops by a given date. Upon April 26, 
1920, at the San Remo conference, the mandates were 
assigned, Mesopotamia to the British Empire, Syria to 
France, Palestine to the British Empire, under pro- 
vision of the application of the Balfour Zionist declara- 
tion. If we combine the mandatory assignments for 
Syria and Mesopotamia with the Turkish treaty and 
the Tripartite Agreement, it is patent that the secret 
treaties have been clamped upon the Arab world, as also 
upon the territory remaining to Turkey. The method 
of control imposed upon the Arabs is called the mandate. 
The character of this mandatory control has not yet 
been made public. Nor do we know as yet of any pro- 
vision whereby a time limit has been set upon the dura- 
tion of the mandates. 

The Arabs of Syria fought the French colonial troops 
in desultory skirmishes for four months in 1920. The 
end of all the threats of the Arabs that they would "throw 
the French into the sea," of all the dreams of immediate 
Arab independence, was shockingly simple. I quote 
from General Gourand's proclamation of July 25, 1920: 
"Emir Feisal has ceased to rule. Emir Feisal has been 
requested to leave the country with his family." Feisal 
is now in Switzerland. He made the impression of a 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM 201 

lovable and high-minded personality, too little ruthless 
to carry through to success against western diplomacy, 
western desires for commercial privilege, and western 
arms the wishes of the Arab people for real independence. 

By the Paleologue-Sazonof Treaty Constantinople was 
to go to Russia. This would have meant the elimination 
of the Sultan from the city on the Golden Horn. This 
result would have been a blessing for Turkey. It would 
have deloused that state of thousands of useless and 
venal officials and have put the ruler and his bureaucrats 
within reach of the Anatohan Turks, whom they have 
so long robbed and bled. In the first months of the 
Paris Conference it was expected that the maintenance of 
the Sultan in Constantinople, which gives a Byzantine 
character to the Turkish state, would surely be done 
away with. Then opposition developed on the British 
side. Turbaned Moslems from India appeared before 
the members of the Supreme Council, shepherded by 
Mr. Montagu. They asserted that the 60,000,000 Mos- 
lems of India protested against the ejection of the Sultan 
as a degradation of the caliphate. Two considerations 
made this alleged Moslem danger, in case of a changed 
status of the old Turkish capital, less impressive than it 
might otherwise have been. The first was that the 
British Government had not, in the secret treaty which 
gave the city of Constantinople to Russia, regarded the 
Indian Moslem danger as paramount. The second lay 
in the obvious argument that this danger was strictly an 
internal problem of the British Empire, and that the 
question of the control of Constantinople must be set- 
tled with a view to world welfare rather than from the 
standpoint of the British India office and its difficulties. 

Whatever may be the actual as opposed to the osten- 



202 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

sible reasons for the maintenance of the Turkish capital 
at Constantinople, it is so provided in the Treaty of 
Sevres. To insure freedom of navigation through the 
Straits a commission of the Straits has been established, 
which will be the real controlling power in the zone of 
the Straits. Provision is made for representation of the 
United States, whenever it desires to participate, for 
Russia, when it becomes a member of the League of Na- 
tions. As to Constantinople the Treaty of Sevres has 
made no real decision. Matters are where they were a 
half-century ago. International control means control 
by that Power which is strongest upon the commission. 
The policy of Russia will continue, as in the past, to look 
toward complete control of the Straits, as even Soviet 
Russia has already begun to do. 

The efforts of the two Armenian delegations at Paris 
were directed toward the ultimate end of establishing an 
independent state, including the Armenians of Russian 
Transcaucasus and the four northeastern vilayets of 
Turkey, stretching southwestward so as to embrace a 
part of Cilicia, and debouching upon the Mediterranean 
Sea at the Bay of Alexandretta. Their immediate desire 
was to obtain recognition of the Armenian Repubhc of 
the Transcaucasus as a de Jacto government, so that they 
might be in a position to obtain credits, money for food 
for the 400,000 refugees assembled in Russian Armenia, 
and for arms and ammunition with which they might 
defend themselves against Moslem Tartar and Turkish 
attacks and move the refugees back to their homes in 
Turkish Armenia. But the Armenian mountains have 
little to offer in exchange for help, except a brave, indus- 
trious, and broken people. 

The Armenian desire for Cilicia conflicted with the ter- 



THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM 203 

ritorial assignment to France by the Sykes-Picot Treaty. 
Cilfcia and central Anatolia, therefore, remain to Tur- 
key in the Treaty of Sevres, and are designated as a 
sphere of French interest in the Tripartite Agreement. 
Again, the secret treaties had won in the diplomatic 
field. But the attempt of the French to occupy Cihcia 
has been frustrated by the Turkish Nationahst opposi- 
tion. Bitterly disillusioned, the French press is demand- 
ing that the entire Cilician adventure be abandoned. 

By the Treaty of Sevres President Wilson was asked 
to fix by arbitration the boundaries between Armenia 
and the Turkish state. His competence was limited to 
drawing these boundaries within the four vilayets of 
Erzerum, Trebizond, Bitlis, and Van, In other words, 
the territory which he could possibly assign to Armenia 
approximates that formerly given to Russia by the 
Paleologue-Sazonof Treaty. Here, too, the territorial 
dispositions of the Treaty of Sevres are the off"spring of 
the secret treaties. Though the Turkish treaty declares 
them to be free, in actuality the Armenians have been 
betrayed by the western world. Lenine and Mustapha 
Kemal have cracked the whip and they have sovietized. 
Who of us dares look an Armenian in the face and up- 
braid him for this? 



IX 

THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND NATIVES IN 
TRANSFERRED TERRITORIES 

BY MANLEY O. HUDSON 

The gulf between German practices before the war 
and the announced aims of the Allies during the war is 
nowhere more notable than in dealing with subject peo- 
ples. It was Prince Billow's defense of German policy 
in Poland that "in the struggle between nationalities, 
one nation is the hammer and the other the anvil; one is 
the victor and the other the vanquished." "It is a law 
of life and development in history," he said, "that when 
two national civilizations meet, they fight for ascen- 
dancy." It would probably be untrue to say that such a 
conception of domination was ever prevalent throughout 
Germany. But the notorious efforts at Prussianization 
of the Poles before 191 4, and the measures taken by the 
Germans during the war to spread the German language 
in occupied territories, undoubtedly did much to bring 
German Kultur into such universal disrepute. The fail- 
ure of the Germans to enlist the sympathies and the 
ambitions of the mingled nationalities in eastern Europe 
must be counted as one of the things that destroyed them. 

When President Wilson proclaimed as running through 
the whole programme of the Fourteen Points, "the prin- 
ciple of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their 
right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with 
one another, whether they be strong or weak," the war 

204 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 205 

became for millions of men in Allied countries as for 
many thousands in enemy territory, a crusade for the 
liberation of oppressed peoples. With the acceptance of 
the President's explanation as one of the conditions of 
the German armistice, the Allied states were com- 
mitted to a programme of territorial readjustment which 
excited the most extravagant hopes in many peoples of 
Europe. The fulfilment of such a programme gave the 
Peace Conference two of its important functions : first, to 
decide on the actual territorial changes which should be 
made; and second, to take measures, after those terri- 
torial changes were arranged, to protect the peoples and 
nationahties concerned — to make sure, in other words, 
that the peace did not mean for numerous discontented 
groups the exchange of one bad master for another. I 
shall attempt to explain the work of the Paris Conference 
in this second field, and to describe the measures which it 
formulated for protecting the racial, religious, and lin- 
guistic minorities in Europe and the native peoples in 
former German territories outside of Europe. 

Obviously, self-determination as a practical measure 
has very definite limits. In any territory where races 
are mixed, where numerous languages are spoken, and 
where different religions are practised, the fixing of a na- 
tional boundary is beset with many difficulties. Any 
boundary will almost surely mean that people of different 
languages, different races, and different religions must 
find it possible to live under the same pohtical organiza- 
tion. In the case of Greece and Bulgaria, for instance, 
almost any line which might have been drawn would 
mean that many Greek sympathizers would be left in 
Bulgaria, and that many Bulgarian sympathizers would 
find themselves still in Greece, 



2o6 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

But the problem is more difficult still. It is not merely 
a matter of national sympathies which must be ferreted 
out. There is also the comphcation of determining what 
qualities identify particular famihes, or even individuals 
in the same family, with one or the other of the contend- 
ing groups. Families Greek by inheritance, religion, and 
political sympathy may, nevertheless, speak only the 
Bulgarian language; or in some cases individuals speak- 
ing Greek, and of many Greek attachments, may be 
identified with the Bulgarian church. Even the children 
of the same parents may be divided in their pofitical al- 
legiance. Obviously then, the fixing of a boundary be- 
tween two such states will leave many people dissatisfied, 
and if one envisages any degree of permanence in the 
frontiers estabfished it is necessary to encourage tolera- 
tion which will reduce dissatisfaction to a minimum. 
The history of Switzerland shows that this ideal is not 
an impossible one. 

After the armistices in October and November, 191 8, 
the wildest expectations began to be entertained by scat- 
tered groups of dissatisfied peoples throughout the Cen- 
tral Empires. During 191 8 the Allies had made it plain 
that Poland was to become independent. They had 
recognized the Czecho-SIovaks as entitled to a national 
existence. They had given assurances of sympathy with 
the territorial ambitions of Serbia, Roumania, and Greece. 
The result was that at the moment of Allied victory many 
thousands of people found themselves quite uncertain 
as to their political future. During the winter of 19 18- 
1919, in some cases this uncertainty grew into concern, 
and from concern into alarm. The chaos of defeat and 
the scarcity of food had prepared the field in which such 
alarm spread rapidly. Among the Germans in several 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 207 

parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for instance, there 
was a feeling that they were about to be handed over to 
an inferior civilization, which would rob them of their 
language, which would deny them political equality, 
which, in a word, would submerge their culture. And the 
Protestant Magyars in Transylvania began to fear for 
their religion. Some of the peoples liberated had been 
very badly treated, and their oppressors naturally ex- 
pected liberation to mean a reversal of the process, with 
the oppressor becoming the oppressed. The success of 
the Alhed armies had given a tremendous impetus to 
nationahsm — the kind of nationalism which is satisfied 
only with superlatives. 

Some of the attempts to extend the use of languages 
went very far. One of the complaints received at the 
Peace Conference was that Czech troops, on entering a 
part of German Bohemia, would immediately order all 
advertising signs on the stores to be written in the Czech 
instead of in the German language. The whole situation 
could only result in intensifying existing divisions and 
in increasing the barriers to co-operation and toleration. 
With reference to the Germans, this situation was, per- 
haps, more serious than with reference to other peoples. 
More than a million Germans lived in the territory about 
to be transferred to Poland, and fully three millions in 
territory about to become part of Czecho-SIovakia. Ger- 
man is one of the great international languages of Europe. 
The Polish language is seldom spoken out of Poland. 
The Czech language is known to but few people in other 
countries. The Serbian, the Magyar, the Roumanian, 
and the Greek languages are all restricted to particular 
regions. But in a certain sense German is in eastern 
Europe what French is in western Europe, and what the 



2o8 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

English language is so fast becoming in many parts of 
the world. To a German, therefore, there is more than 
sentimental value in making sure that his children will 
speak his own language. There is an economic interest 
in their using a language which will serve them in other 
countries. There is a cultural interest in continuing the 
use of a language which, in science and learning, is third 
only to English and French in importance. Yet the 
Germans had set an example in their efforts to force 
unwilling peoples to use the German language, and 
it was but natural if the peoples whose languages had 
been suppressed made similar attempts in reviving 
them. 

The responsibilities of the Peace Conference in this 
troubled situation were quite clear. Its first goal had to 
be the estabhshment of a stable peace. It was, there- 
fore, part of its duty to anticipate new Irredentisms, which 
might call for future vindication. In the second place, 
the Peace Conference had assumed a great responsibility 
in dealing with the pohtical fortunes of large numbers of 
Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Roumanians, Greeks, Germans, 
Austrians, Magyars, and Bulgarians living in transferred 
territories. President Wilson's insistence on "impartial 
justice in every form of the settlement," and on the "jus- 
tice that knows no favorites and knows no standards but 
the equal rights of the several peoples concerned," con- 
stituted a part of the contract under which the peoples 
in the Central Empires had laid down their arms. The ^ 
President had made it very clear that peoples and prov- 
inces were not to be "bartered about from sovereign to 
sovereign, as though they were mere chattels and pawns 
in a game," and this seemed to demand that the fullest 
possible provision should be made for the minorities in 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 209 

race, language, or religion, living in territories about to 
be transferred. ^ 

Precedents were not lacking for the decision of the 
Conference to impose special obligations on the new 
states, and on states to which large accessions of territory 
were to be made. When Greece was first admitted to the 
family of nations in 1832 the Conference of London had 
prescribed the form of her government, and when her ac- 
quisition of the Ionian Islands was recognized in 1864, 
it was made subject to guarantees for freedom of worship 
and religious toleration. In 1878 the Congress of Berlin 
had elaborated provisions on religious freedom and politi- 
cal equality to be embodied in the pubhc law of the 
Principality of Bulgaria; it imposed similar guarantees 
as a condition of its recognition of the independence of 
Montenegro and Serbia and Roumania; and specific pro- 
visions were included in the Treaty of Berlin for protect- 
ing religious liberties in the territory which remained with 
the Ottoman Empire. After the Congress of Berlin, pro- 
visions for protecting religious minorities had frequently 
been included in treaties concerning the transfer of terri- 
tories — they had proved particularly important to the 
Mussulmans, and the treaty of peace between Turkey 
and Greece in November, 191 3, went into such detail as 
to provide that "the name of his Imperial Majesty the 
Sultan, as Caliph, shall continue to be pronounced in the 
pubhc prayers of the Mussulmans." It should be noted 
also that the abortive peace of Bucharest between the 
Central Powers and Roumania, in May, 191 8, had at- 
tempted to establish equal freedom in Roumania for the 
Roman Catholic, the United Greek, the Bulgarian Ortho- 
dox, the Protestant, the Mussulman, and the Jewish 
faiths, and the Central Powers had recognized the neces- 



210 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

sity for a provision extending Roumanian citizenship to 
Jews. 

For almost a century, therefore, it had been an estab- 
lished practice, if not a principle of the public law of 
Europe, that guarantees to religious minorities should be 
included among provisions deahng with the transfer of 
territory inhabited by heterogeneous peoples. It is true 
that the practice had yielded but questionable results in 
some cases, notably in that of Roumania. But this 
would not have warranted a departure at Paris, even if 
the commitments of the AHies had not in clearest terms 
bound them to protect the ** equal rights of the peoples 
concerned." 
/ The first proposal for protecting minorities in the new 
states was made by President Wilson. It provided for 
religious freedom in terms not unhke those to be found 
in the Treaty of Berlin. His proposal went further, how- 
ever, in providing for political equality among the various 
races and nationahties in the states which might be asked 
to give guarantees. Meanwhile, at the instance of an 
American Jewish committee, led by Judge Julian W. 
Mack and Mr. Louis Marshall, the question of protect- 
ing the Jews had interested Colonel House, and the 
American delegation had prepared clauses dealing with 
minorities in Poland for insertion in the treaty with 
Germany. It was so obviously a question on which dif- 
ferences of opinion would arise, requiring perhaps pro- 
longed negotiations, that the Supreme Council decided to 
refer it to a special commission. It is unfortunate that 
this decision was not taken until May i, for with the 
presentation of the conditions of peace to the Germans 
set for May 7, the earlier work of the commission was 
necessarily hurried. 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 211 

This Committee on New States and the Protection 
of Minorities, as it was called, was composed of M. 
Berthelot and M. Kammerrer of France, Mr. Headlam- 
Morley and Mr. Carr of Great Britain, Mr. de Martino 
and Colonel Castoldi of Italy, Mr. Adatci of Japan, and 
Mr. David Hunter Miller and Mr. Hudson of the United 
States. In the later stages of the work the American 
representative was Mr. Allen W. Dulles, and valuable 
counsel was given throughout by Professor A. C. Coolidge, 
who had Just returned from his mission to central Europe. 
Between May and November the committee on new 
states held sixty-four meetings. As with many of the 
other commissions, the committee was given only the 
most general directions by the Supreme Council, and 
where unanimity was reached in the committee its work 
was usually approved without close re-examination. 

It was at once decided that the two new states whose 
independence was to be recognized by the treaty with 
Germany, and which were to receive cessions of German 
territory, should agree in the peace treaty itself to accept 
such guarantees as the Principal Powers should deem 
necessary **to protect the interests of inhabitants . . . 
who differ from the majority of the population in race, 
language or religion." This applied to the new state of 
Czecho-SIovakia, with not less than 3,000,000 Germans, 
and to the new state of Poland, which was to include at 
least 1,000,000 Germans and 4,000,000 Jews in its popu- 
lation. The incorporation of this undertaking in the 
treaty with Germany had the effect of obligating these 
states to each of the other signatories to the treaty, and 
it gives even Germany a locus standi for seeing that the 
guarantees accepted are performed. 

The same course was later adopted with reference to 



212 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the other new states. Thus the peace treaty with Aus- 
tria obliges Jugo-SIavia, Czecho-SIovakia, and Roumania 
to accept similar obligations; the peace treaty with Hun- 
gary binds Jugo-SIavia and Roumania in the same way; 
the peace treaty with Bulgaria binds Greece; and that 
with Turkey binds Greece and Armenia. The Hedjaz 
is the only new state set up by the Peace Conference 
with reference to which this course was not followed, the 
population being so homogeneous as to make it un- 
necessary. 

But one may ask, what was done for the minorities in 
other European territories severed from Germany and 
the former Austro-Hungarian Empire? What of the Ger- 
mans in Alsace-Lorraine, in the Trentino, in Schleswig, 
and in Eupen and Malmedy? In none of these terri- 
tories were the problems of race and language and religion 
so co'mplicated as in eastern Europe. Moreover, these 
accessions were not incident to settling up new states or 
reorganizing old ones. In none of these cases was the 
territory acquired by a state already subject to general 
international obhgations in its treatment of minorities. 
But it need not be concealed that some of the leaders 
of the smaller Powers, notably Mr. Bratiano of Rou- 
mania, found it very difficult to beheve that Italy and 
Roumania were not in this respect in identical circum- 
stances. Even if Italy's position as a Principal Power 
had not seemed to her representatives to preclude it, per- 
haps her record of religious toleration and political equal- 
ity would have seemed a sufficient reason for not bind- 
ing her with a separate minorities treaty. And Alsace- 
Lorraine was quite generally regarded as merely a case 
of Jisannexation. 

But some of the representatives of the new states 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 213 

found the distinction most invidious, and the incorpora- 
tion of these obligations in the treaties of peace was 
stout!}' resisted for many months. As the question first 
arose with reference to Poland, her case began the con- 
test. The statesmen who had been so engrossed in the 
herculean tasks of setting up new commonwealths had 
very naturally not found time to work out their own 
international position. People engaged in a struggle to 
be free do not easily conceive of themselves as possible 
oppressors. Where excesses and pogroms had occurred,* 
they had been, perhaps in all instances, the result of irre- 
sponsible zeal rather than of dehberate government policy. 
It was, therefore, something of a shock to the Polish 
leaders to be called upon to sign a separate treaty with 
the Principal Powers concerning what they deemed to be 
a domestic matter. It was argued that their sovereignty 
was being invaded, that their good intentions were being 
doubted, and that their national unity was being jeopard- 
ized. Roumania and Serbia thought it also a reflection 
on their past records and on their performance of the 
obligations undertaken in 1878. 

The opposition culminated in a protest made in the 
plenary conference on May 31, which was styled by the 
press a revolution of the small Powers. It was one of 
the few occasions when a real issue was discussed before 
the plenary conference. Mr. Bratiano and Mr. Paderew- 
ski were very emphatic in rejecting any obligations which 
did not inure to all members of the League of Nations^ 
Mr. Kramar, of Czecho-SIovakia, and Mr. Trumbitch, 
of Jugo-SIavia, were insistent on amending the objection- 
able clauses. Mr. Venizelos, of Greece, contented himself 
with pouring oil on the troubled waters. The occasion 
called forth the speech of President Wilson, which was 



214 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

so much debated in our 1920 presidential campaign, in 
which he insisted that the United States could share 
the responsibility of the territorial readjustments only if 
assurances were given that conditions would not be main- 
tained which would inevitably lead to new oppression 
and renewed conflict. The President is reported to have 
said: 

It is not, therefore, the intervention of those who would interfere, 
but the action of those who would help. I beg that our friends will 
take that view of it, because I see no escape from that view of it. 
How can a Power like the United States, for example — for I can 
speak for no other — after signing this Treaty, if it contains elements 
which they do not believe will be permanent, go three thousand 
miles away across the sea and report to its people that it has made 
a settlement of the peace of the world? It cannot do so. And yet 
there underhes all of these transactions the expectation on the part, 
for example, of Roumania and of Czecho-SIovakia and of Serbia, 
that if any covenants of this settlement are not observed, the United 
States will send her armies and her navies to see that they are 
observed. 

In those circumstances is it unreasonable that the United States 
should insist upon being satisfied that the settlements are correct? 
Mr. Bratiano — and I speak of his suggestions with the utmost respect 
— suggested that we could not, so to say, invade the sovereignty of 
Roumania, an ancient sovereignty, and make certain prescriptions 
with regard to the rights of minorities. But I beg him to observe 
that he is overlooking the fact that he is asking the sanction of the 
Allied and Associated Powers for great additions of territory which 
come to Roumania by the common victory of arms, and that, there- 
fore, we are entitled to say: "If we agree to these additions of terri- 
tory we have the right to insist upon certain guarantees of peace." 

This was in no sense a commitment by the President. 
It was, instead, an appeal. It did not wholly soothe 
the excited feehngs of the Poles, and the uncertainty as 
to their course continued down to the time when the 
first minority treaty was signed. The continued dis- 
affection of the Roumanians and the Jugo-SIavs led them 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 215 

to take a very determined stand with reference to the 
contents of the treaties themselves, and for this reason 
their signatures were withheld until some time after the 
Principal Powers had signed. That this attitude of the 
new states did not frustrate altogether the attempt to 
give special protection to minorities is due in no small 
measure to President Wilson, whose interest in the 
pohcy was perhaps keener than that of his colleagues on 
the Supreme Council, and to the wise and patient judg- 
ment of Mr. Frank Polk. 

The most unfortunate consequence of such opposition 
was that it inevitably affected the procedure adopted in 
framing the treaties themselves. The committee on new 
states was compelled to proceed without the assistance 
and co-operation which it would have desired from the 
representatives of the various peoples concerned. But the 
wisdom of Doctor Benes, of Czecho-SIovakia, and Mr. 
Venizelos, of Greece, had led them to recognize the de- 
sirability of the minority treaties from the start, and the 
Czecho-SIovak and Greek delegations were very helpful 
in framing their respective treaties. 

In dealing with the content of the treaties, certain 
provisions must be noticed which are common to all the 
special minority treaties and to the minority provisions 
of the treaties of peace with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
and Turkey. First, they are designed to secure to all 
inhabitants full and complete protection of hfe and lib- 
erty without distinction as to birth, nationality, language, 
race, or religion, as well as the privilege of practising in 
public and in private any religion which is not incon- 
sistent with public order and pubhc morals. In the 
second place, they aim to assure to all the inhabitants in 
the transferred territory a choice between acquiring the 



■/ 



2i6 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

nationality of the country to which the transfer is made, 
and retaining their old nationality by removing them- 
selves from the territory. As to inhabitants born in the 
future, a stipulation not unhke that in our own four- 
teenth amendment provides that all persons born in a 
state become ipso facto nationals of that state. This 
provision seemed essential to prevent such abuses as 
have been suffered by the Jews in Roumania, where the 
law continued to classify as aliens people whose families 
had lived in Roumania for generations. 

Provision is also made for securing equality in the 
enjoyment of political, religious, and cultural hberty to 
all citizens without distinction as to race or language or 
rehgion. To make this more than an expression of pious 
hope, it was necessary to be very specific about the use 
of languages and the control of schools. To a person 
who feels the necessity of perpetuating his stock and his 
kind, nothing is dearer than his mother tongue. Its 
extinction ahnost inevitably spells defeat. The stories of 
Pohsh children striking because they were forced to say 
their prayers at school in the German language, are indi- 
cations of the ruthlessness of the nationahzing process, 
and it is not strange that language requirements have 
brought such sharp contests in eastern Europe. But 
even the instruction received at a mother's knee would 
soon be forgotten if children had all their school training 
in another language. To the Roumanian living in East- 
ern Serbia, for instance, it is not enough to have his child 
taught at school to read the Roumanian language — the 
instruction must be in the medium of the Roumanian lan- 
guage if the child's loyalty to his parents' beliefs is not 
to be weaned away. So the minority treaties provide 
that in districts where a considerable part of the popula- 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 217 

tion belongs to a linguistic minority, instruction must be 
provided in that people's own tongue. Such provisions 
are enforceable in the face of a deliberate attempt 
to stamp out a language, or a religion, only if the 
minority is given some share in managing the schools. 
The minority treaties, therefore, provide for an equitable 
division of pubhc funds used in maintaining educational, 
religious, and charitable institutions among the various 
groups concerned. 

To some of us in America, such provisions are likely to 
seem very strange. They have been attacked on the 
ground that they encourage disunity within the state — 
that they make for perpetuating hyphens instead of abol- 
ishing them. Current opinion in America would not 
have much hospitality for a suggestion that instruction 
in a public school in one of our large American cities 
should be in some other language than in English. But 
the Germans in Czecho-SIovakia and the Magyars in 
Roumania are in a very different position from that of the 
Germans in St. Louis and the Magyars in Cleveland. 
They have lived for generations or centuries on the land 
where they are to-day — their hfe and their history are 
identified with the place in which they live. Their posi- 
tion can better be compared to that of the Spaniards in 
California or Arizona, and to that of the natives in Porto 
Rico. European immigrants in Chicago have come to 
a new world where an American tradition has preceded 
them, and a claim by them to replace existing traditions 
with their own would be more comparable to the Prus- 
sianizing of a Pohsh city in the days before the war. 
The situation in the United States must be distinguished 
on the one hand from that of homogeneous communities 
like France or England, and on the other hand from that 



2i8 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

of such composite states as Poland and Czecho-SIovakia. 
In a unified state like England, the protection of racial 
and linguistic and rehgious minorities is not an issue. 
Our American problems are those of fusion — the eastern 
European problems are those of union. 

The general clauses described are designed to protect 
the Germans and white Russians and Jews and Lithu- 
anians in Poland, the Germans and Jews and Ruthenians 
in Czecho-SIovakia, the Magyars and Germans and Rou- 
manians and Albanians and Mussulmans in Jugo-SIavia, 
the Magyars and Serbs and Jews in Roumania, and the 
Mussulmans and Jews and Albanians and Vlachs in 
Greece. They were also included in the treaty of peace 
with Austria to protect the Czechs and Slavs and Jews 
left within the new state; in the treaty with Bulgaria to 
protect the Germans and Roumanians and Jews; in the 
treaty with Hungary to protect the Germans and Slavs 
and Jews; and in the treaty with Turkey to protect the 
Christians and Jews. 

But special protection was thought to be needed by 
the Jews in Poland and Roumania and Greece. The 
Jews are both a race and a sect. Scattered throughout 
eastern Europe, engaged often in trade which carries 
them into several countries, and a deeply religious people, 
their problems are quite distinct from those of other 
minorities. Moreover, unlike the Germans or Magyars 
or Roumanians, they have had no Jewish country to 
which they might emigrate until the treaty of peace with 
Turkey opened Palestine to them. The Yiddish language 
was looked upon as a corruption of German, and many 
Jews in eastern Europe bore the stigma of pro-Germanism 
and Bolshevism in 1919, with the result that anti-Semitic 
agitation was revived in some places in very revolting 
pogroms. 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 219 

The Polish treaty contains a provision for the expendi- 
ture by local Jewish committees of the public money de- 
voted to maintaining Jewish schools — a provision not 
uncommon in Europe where religious schools are given 
state support. The Roumanian treaty guards specially 
against the Jews' being treated as aliens, and requires 
citizenship to be extended to them. The Turkish treaty 
provides that Jews resident in Palestine shall become 
ipso facto citizens of Palestine. In Poland, Roumania, 
and Greece the Jews are not to be forced to violate their 
Sabbath. But pious Jews may still be placed at an eco- 
nomic disadvantage if after resting on Saturday they are 
not permitted to work on Sunday. The treaties do not 
attempt to deal with that possibility. 

Several other minorities seemed to need special protec- 
tion. The Mussulmans in Jugo-SIavia and Greece, the 
Saxons and Czechlers in Roumania, the Vlachs of Pin- 
dus and the monks of Mt. Athos in Greece are given a 
measure of local autonomy in scholastic and religious ac- 
tivities. The persecution of Christians in Turkey in the 
past made it imperative that they receive special protec- 
tion also. In Czecho-SIovakia the Ruthenians living 
south of the Carpathians were given political autonomy 
and special participation in the government at Prague. 
The Italian delegation proposed that Jugo-SIavia should 
be asked to give similar autonomy in Macedonia, but this 
proposal was not supported by other delegations, and 
would doubtless have been stoutly resisted by the Jugo- 
slavs. 

The elaboration of such measures will doubtless prove 
a boon in times of stress to unpopular groups who may 
resort to them as a kind of bill of rights. But experience 
in Roumania has shown that a formal treaty provision 



220 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

will not execute itself. The Congress of Berlin had been 
content to frame provisions for protecting minorities and 
embodying them in formal treaties, without giving them 
a definite sanction. Any of the Powers signatory to the 
Treaty of Berlin might have protested against the viola- 
tion of its provisions by Roumania in refusing to permit 
Jews to own rural land because they were aliens. Only 
a collective protest of the signatory Powers was likely to 
prove availing, and it was never made. But the enforced 
emigration of Roumanian Jews to America gave the 
United States an interest in Roumanian conditions. 
Though our government had not signed the Treaty of 
Berlin, in 1902, Secretary John Hay made a very strong 
protest to Roumania, in which he described conditions 
then existing in Roumania in the following terms: 

Starting from the arbitrary and controvertible premises that the 
native Jews of Roumania domiciled there for centuries are "aliens 
not subject to foreign protection," the ability of the Jew to earn 
even the scanty means of existence that suffice for a frugal race has 
been constricted by degrees, until nearly every opportunity to win 
a hvelihood is denied; and until the helpless poverty of the Jews has 
constrained an exodus of such proportions as to cause general 
concern. 

The political disabilities of the Jews in Roumania, their exclusion 
from the public service and the learned professions, the hmitations 
of their civil rights, and the imposition upon them of exceptional 
taxes, involving as they do wrongs repugnant to the moral sense of 
liberal modern peoples are not so directly in point for my present 
purpose as the public acts which attack the inherent rights of trade. 
The Jews are prohibited from owning land, or even from cultivating 
it as common labourers. They are debarred from residing in the 
rural districts. Many branches of petty trade and manual produc- 
tion are closed to them in the overcrowded cities where they are 
forced to dwell and engage agamst fearful odds in the desperate 
struggle for existence. Even as ordinary artisans or hired labourers 
they may only find employment in the proportion of one "unpro- 
tected ahen" to two "Roumanians" under any one employer. In 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 221 

short, by the cumulative effect of successive restrictions, the Jews 
of Roumania have become reduced to a state of wretched misery. 

If these conditions existed in spite of the solemn under- 
taking of Roumania in 1878, it would seem that some 
redress should have been possible. The British Govern- 
ment seems to have been wilhng to act on Secretary 
Hay's protest, for in September, 1902, it sent the follow- 
ing reply to his circular: 

His Majesty's Government joins with the United States Govern- 
ment in deploring the depressed conditions of the Roumanian Jews 
and in regarding with apprehension the results of their enforced 
emigration. 

His Majesty's Government will place themselves in communication 
with the other Powers to a joint representation to the Roumanian 
Government on the subject. 

But no such joint representation was ever made, and 
Secretary Hay's efforts to secure the intervention of the 
Powers which had signed the Treaty of Berlin were 
fruitless. 

With such an example before it, the Paris Conference 
might have despaired, if no means of enforcing the pro- 
tection of minorities could have been found. Such means 
were found in the League of Nations. All the minority 
clauses were expressly framed as ''obligations of interna- 
tional concern," and were ''placed under the guarantee 
of the League of Nations." No modifications can be 
made in them without the assent of a majority of the 
Council of the League. Moreover, the Council is em- 
powered to enforce the provisions, and in case of "any 
infraction or any danger of infraction," to take such action 
and give such direction as it may deem proper and effec- 
tive. The Permanent Court of International Justice is 
given jurisdiction over certain disputes which may arise 



222 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

in connection with the interpretation and execution of 
the treaties. Last February the Council of the League 
consented to this guarantee of the minority provisions in 
the Polish treaty, and in October it assumed the guarantee 
of the minority parts of the Austrian and Bulgarian 
treaties. 

The method of enforcement adopted is carefully re- 
stricted so that the governments of the new states will 
not be constantly harassed. An aggrieved minority must 
interest in its behalf some government which is rep- 
resented on the Council of the League before the Council 
can act. A direct appeal by an individual Jew, or even 
by a committee of Jews, is not enough to force a govern- 
ment to defend itself at the bar of the League. The 
American and Italian delegations wanted to leave the 
international court itself to frame the procedure, and they 
would have allowed any member of the League, and not 
simply the members represented on the Council, to set 
the League's machinery into action. But the other dele- 
gations insisted that this would weaken the local govern- 
ments. In the plan agreed upon, it is important to note 
that a method of judicial enforcement is provided, and 
that this assures the new states against the dangers of 
improper political interference. 

Such a programme for protecting minorities does not 
take care of all the difficulties, however. It is almost 
inevitable in drawing a boundary in a closely contested 
area that some people will be left on both sides who 
would prefer to be on the other side. This is particularly 
true in the Balkan peninsula, and it led Mr. Venizelos to 
propose one of the most interesting innovations attempted 
at Paris, a scheme for facilitating the intermigration of 
dissatisfied peoples across the new national frontiers. 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 223 

Mr. Venizelos suggested that a mixed commission be 
set up to facilitate, during a period of two years, the 
removal of Greeks from Bulgaria into Greece, and of 
Bulgarians from Greece into Bulgaria. In some instances 
whole villages wanted to remove in this way, but it was 
only possible if government aid could assure them against 
loss of their property in their old homes and against ex- 
ploitation in the places to which they should go. The 
scheme of Mr. Venizelos was carefully studied by the 
committee on new states, which concluded that it might 
contribute to a solution of the Balkan tangle, if Greece, 
Bulgaria, Jugo-SIavia, and Turkey would co-operate in 
some such plan. The suggestion was not favored by the 
Jugo-SIav delegation, however, but such a treaty was 
signed by Greece and Bulgaria, and provision for a simi- 
lar arrangement between Greece and Turkey was em- 
bodied in the Turkish peace treaty. The Greek-Bul- 
garian treaty is now in force, and last September the 
Council of the League nominated two members of the 
mixed commission which is to supervise the intermigra- 
tion. The success of this experiment in Balkan polity is 
to be awaited with greatest interest. 

It remains to speak of the measures taken by the 
Peace Conference for the protection of the peoples inhab- 
iting transferred territories outside of Europe. Colonial 
expansion had been one of the principal objects of most 
of the governments of Europe before the war, and the 
contest in Africa and the Near East and the Pacific had 
given rise to many delicate issues in international politics 
during the decade preceding 191 4. One need not say 
that colonial expansion was an object for which the war 
was fought, on either side. But it was bound to have 
an important place in the work of a peace conference at 



224 WHAr REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

any time, and few people dreamed that the status quo 
ante helium was to be left intact. New rivalries had been 
engendered by the very progress of the war. Japan had 
seized the German Islands north of the equator, and 
Great Britain and France had agreed to support her 
claim to keep them. Austraha had seized the more im- 
portant of the German possessions in the Southern Pa- 
cific, and her representatives came to Paris determined 
that they would not be given up. In German Southwest 
and German East Africa the South African Union was 
bitterly opposed to any restoration of German control, 
and the frightful treatment of the Herreros, who had 
been all but exterminated by the Germans in Southwest 
Africa, lent support to the general attitude toward the 
German colonizers' treatment of native races. In this 
situation most of the Allied world in 19 19 was in no 
temper to see the German hold continued, and posses- 
sion as a jait accompli often means as many points in 
politics as in law. 

But the principle for action was not simple, once action 
had been decided upon. The Fourteen Points had called 
for an ** impartial adjustment," on the vague principle 
that interests of the populations concerned must have 
equal weight with the equitable claims of the govern- 
ments contending for title. Mr. Lloyd George had been 
more specific in declaring that the general principle of 
self-determination was as applicable in these territories 
as in the occupied territories of Europe. In terms of the 
next half-century in international relations, it might have 
contributed to a more stable world to have left some of 
her African possessions to Germany. Yet it was prob- 
ably true that few of the indigenous peoples desired such 
a fate, though in East Africa enough of loyalty to Ger- 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 225 

man rule survived to enable the German army there to 
fight through the war, and to keep together until after 
the armistice. In all of the German colonies there were 
fewer than 25,000 Germans before the war. It seemed 
most in line with the interests of the 15,000,000 of natives 
to regard their government an international trust, which 
would not only prevent their exploitation, but which 
would also assure to all nations equal opportunity in 
trading with them and in developing their territories. 

Various suggestions for international control had been 
made during the war. The experiments in Egypt, Mo'- 
rocco, Samoa, and the new Hebrides had not warranted 
great confidence in the possibilities of direct international 
administration, however, and the suggestion that the 
League of Nations should assume administrative respon- 
sibiKty found little support. But in his well-known 
memorandum on the League of Nations General Smuts 
had formulated a proposal widely discussed in England 
that a system of mandates should be devised under 
which the state administering a territory should be 
responsible to the League of Nations and should con- 
duct a stewardship along general Hues recognized by the 
League to be just and proper. The American delegation 
backed the English support of this proposal. The chief 
opposition came from the British Dominions, after the 
French had been won over to it. But early in the 
Conference, on January 30, an agreement was reached 
which was later incorporated in the Covenant of the 
League as Article 22. 

The mandate system provides for three types of man- 
dates. The class A mandates are to apply to the terri- 
tories formerly Turkish, which are to be set up as pro- 
visionally independent nations, subject to administrative 



226 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

advice and assistance from a mandatory Power until such 
time as they can stand alone. Such mandates are to 
apply to Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia. The class 
B mandates are to apply to Central African territories, 
administered under conditions which will guarantee free- 
dom of conscience and religion to the native inhabitants, 
will prohibit such abuses as the slave-trades, the arms 
traffic, and the liquor traffic, will prevent the arming of 
natives for other purposes than police, and will maintain 
an open door and equal opportunity for the commerce of 
all members of the League. A third type of mandate, 
class C, deals with such sparsely settled territories as 
Southwest Africa and certain of the Pacific Islands, 
which are to be administered, subject to the same safe- 
guards for the natives, under the laws of the mandatory 
as integral portions of its territory. 

After this plan was agreed upon, the next step was the 
decision as to what states should be selected as manda- 
tories, and in what territories. On May 7, on the same 
afternoon that the conditions of peace were handed to 
the Germans, the Supreme Council decided that France 
and Great Britain would make a Joint recommendation 
to the League concerning the mandate for Togoland and 
the Cameroons; that the mandates for German East 
Africa and the island of Nauru should be held by Great 
Britain; that the mandate for German Southwest Africa 
should be held by the South African Union, that for the 
German Samoan Islands by New Zealand, that for other 
Pacific Islands south of the equator by Australia, and 
that for the islands north of the equator by Japan. 
Whether this allocation to Japan of the islands north of 
the equator included the island of Yap has recently been 
the subject of some controversy. It seems quite clear 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 227 

that an American reservation was made as to this island, 
on account of its importance as a cable station, but 
this reserve may have been misunderstood and perhaps 
vaguely recorded. A later modification assigned part of 
East Africa to Belgium, and Kionga to Portugal, to 
strengthen the territorial position of those Powers in 
adjacent territory. The disposition of the territories 
severed from the Turkish Empire had to await the fram- 
ing of the Turkish treaty, and it was not until the meet- 
ing at San Remo in 1920 that the Supreme Council 
assigned to France the mandate for Syria and Lebanon, 
and to Great Britain that for Palestine and Mesopotamia. 
No state was found willing to take a mandate for Armenia. 
The formulation of the mandates themselves was un- 
dertaken by a committee which sat in London during the 
summer of 19 19. This committee framed drafts of the 
B and C mandates, subject to a Japanese reservation 
based on their desire for free immigration to mandated 
territories, and an unfortunate French reservation con- 
cerning the arming of natives for defense of the territory 
under the mandate and the territory of the state exer- 
cising it. Apparently these drafts have now been finally 
approved by the Allied Powers, and the C mandates were 
recently approved by the Council of the League of Nations. 
The other mandates have not been made definitive, al- 
though the mandatories are controlling the territory. 
Drafts of the A mandates for Syria, Mesopotamia, and 
Palestine, and the B mandates for Central Africa, are 
now being considered by the Council of the League. The 
Assembly of the League has recently created the perma- 
nent committee which will supervise their execution. In 
view of America's failure to play any part in the later 
developments of this situation, perhaps we should be 



228 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

patient with the tardiness and delay. If conditions in 
the Near East should become more settled no reason will 
then exist for any further delay in putting the mandates 
into effect. 

Evaluation of the mandate system must await experi- 
ence under it. The Allies have been criticised for a failure 
to apply it more generally — yet perhaps few Americans 
would be wilhng to extend the principle of general ac- 
countabiHty to our own receiverships in such independent 
countries as Haiti. It seemed as unnecessary to the 
Allied states to apply the mandate system to their exist- 
ing African possessions. The arrangement at Paris did 
undoubtedly mean different things to different people. 
To some of them it was a disguise for annexation. To 
others it was an extension of the field of law and order 
essential to proper protection of native inhabitants. The 
execution of the plan will determine which of these views 
is to prevail. If one mandate had been given to Germany, 
the security of the idea in public law might have been 
better assured. But it does not seem too sanguine to 
hope that the mandate system will be so administered by 
the League that it will help to banish that vulture attitude 
toward backward territories which produced so much 
international friction during the first decade of the present 
century. If it has not now been made impossible to 
repeat such international scandals as those in the Congo, 
it has at least become possible to check them effectively 
once they are known to exist. 

The attempt made at Paris to assure to native races 
and to racial and linguistic and religious minorities such 
protection that the world may not be thrown into another 
holocaust to deliver them from oppressors may prove 
only measurably successful. The limits on effective legal 



THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 229 

action are nowhere more rigid than in deahng with the 
imponderable elements which determine men's willing- 
ness to admit to or exclude from their fellowship other 
men of different shaped heads, or different styled clothes, 
or different forms of worship, or different political views. 
Our own American courts do not attempt to force men 
to be good Samaritans. With constitutional guarantees 
of freedom of speech, we are still called upon to oppose 
efforts at ruthless suppression. Our thirteenth amend- 
ment to the Federal Constitution did not prevent numer- 
ous instances of peonage worse than slavery, and the pur- 
pose of our fifteenth amendment has been defeated by 
"grandfather clauses," judiciously phrased and discrim- 
inatingly enforced. It will not be surprising, therefore, 
if subterfuges are found, where Jew or German or Mag- 
yar is disliked, for evading such provisions as those in 
the minority treaties. But a lever has been provided by 
which a group in distress can advance its claim, and which 
the world outside can seize upon for action when a just 
claim would otherwise go unheeded. 

The growth of international law is slow. Its content 
in any era depends on changing conceptions of social and 
national justice. The principle of religious toleration 
was made the basis of international action so repeatedly 
during the last century that Secretary John Hay could 
refer to it in 1902 as a "principle of international law 
and eternal justice." The Paris Conference has en- 
trenched that principle. And it has extended the pro- 
tection to racial and linguistic groups as well. It has 
created in this field a new body of public law, which 
constitutes a notable contribution to the effort to get in- 
ternational justice through law rather than without law. 
The Assembly of the League of Nations recognized the 



230 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

value of this contribution recently when it recommended 
to Albania and the Baltic and Caucasian states the ac- 
ceptance of the principles of the minority treaties in the 
event of their admission to membership in the League of 
Nations. Whatever view be taken of the satis factoriness 
of the various territorial arrangements made at Paris, 
the efforts on behalf of the minorities affected by them 
were certainly conceived in the hberal spirit which gave 
the Fourteen Points their wide appeal. 



X 

THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 

BY JAMES BROWN SCOTT 

"A treaty of peace is, therefore, an agreement to waive all discussion con- 
cerning the respective rights of the parties, and to bury in oblivion all the original 
causes of the war." — (Lord Stowell in The Eliza Ann, i "Dodson's Reports," 
244, 249, decided in 18 13.) 

I do not hold a brief for the kaiser. I have never 
met him. Indeed, I have never seen him, except from 
a distance — a very respectful distance, be it said. I 
have been familiar with his name for many years, but 
I am reasonably sure that he has never heard mine. I 
do not hold a brief for any persons in the civil or mili- 
tary employ of the former German Empire who have 
been accused of committing, or of failing to prevent, 
crimes against our common humanity, or against the 
laws and customs of war, whom some of the Allied and 
Associated Powers made up their minds to hale before a 
court of Justice. I believe that I have not met any of 
these civilians, although I may inadvertently have seen 
some of them from time to time, driving hither and 
thither in their own country, or at some receptions which 
I was privileged to attend. I do not know, personally, 
any of the military commanders, although it is possible 
that as a young man in Germany, and on later visits, 
my mother, my sisters, and I, may have been brushed 
aside by them — pushed off the sidewalk into the street, 

with the horses and dogs and other beasts of burden. 

231 



232 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

I do, however, hold a brief for justice, even to our 
enemies. 

First, let us "hang the kaiser," to use the phrase of the 
hour, although only trial is meant — for we can do it in 
this place as well as anywhere else. 

The heavy and unwieldy document which is commonly 
called the Treaty of Versailles, and which few read, al- 
though many criticise it, has this to say in its 227th 
Article, of the trial of the kaiser: 

The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of 
Hohenzoliern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence 
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. 

A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby 
assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It 
will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the follow- 
ing Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, 
France, Italy and Japan. 

In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives 
of international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obliga- 
tions of international undertakings and the vahdity of international 
morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it con- 
siders should be imposed. 

The AIHed and Associated Powers will address a request to the 
Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the 
ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial. 

The meaning of this is tolerably clear. The framers 
"^ of the treaty had no doubt as to the guilt of Germany 
or of its then emperor in causing the war, or in its prose- 
cution. Yet it is necessary to dwell upon these things, 
inasmuch as the trial of the kaiser presupposes the guilt 
' of Germany and of William II of Hohenzoliern. 

The commission on responsibilities created by the 
peace conference of Paris, on January 25, 19 19, was 
directed, among other points, to inquire into and report 
upon the responsibilities of the authors of the war. The 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 233 

commission was composed of fifteen members: two ap- 
pointed by each of the principal Allied and Associated 
Powers, the United States of America, the British Em- 
pire, France, Italy, and Japan, and five elected "from 
among the Powers with special interests," to quote the 
language of the conference. These special Powers turned 
out to be Belgium, Greece, Poland, Rumania, and Serbia. 
On the cause of the war the commission was unani- 
mous, finding it to have been due to Austria-Hungary, 
aided and abetted by Germany, or, to quote the exact 
language of the report : 

1. The war was premeditated by the Central Powers together 

with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result 
of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoid- 
able. 

2. Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately 

worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made 
by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid 
war. 

During the meeting of the commission certain docu- 
ments became pubfic and were included in the dissenting 
opinion of the American members. The first, printed 
for the first time in that document, is from Herr von 
Wiesner, who had been sent to Serajevo to investigate 
the circumstances of the assassination of the heir to the 
Austrian throne and his morganatic wife, on June 28, 
19 14 — five years to the day prior to the signature of the 
Treaty of Peace and the condemnation of the Central 
Empires. This special agent thus telegraphed the results 
of his investigation to the ministry of foreign aff'airs at 
Vienna from Serajevo on July 13, 19 14: 

Cognizance on the part of the Serbian Government, participation 
in the murderous assault, or in its preparation, and supplying the 



234 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

weapons, proved by nothing, nor even to be suspected. On the 
contrary there are indications which cause this to be rejected.^ 

The second telegram is from Count Szoegeny, Austro- 
Hungarian ambassador at Berlin, to the minister of 
foreign affairs at Vienna. It is dated July 25, 191 4, the 
very day on which the forty-eight hours would expire 
which the Austro-Hungarian Government had granted 
to Serbia to answer its ultimatum. This telegram reads 
as follows: 

Here it is generally taken for granted that in case of a possible 
refusal on the part of Serbia, our immediate declaration of war will 
be coincident with military operations. 

Delay in beginning military operations is here considered as a 
great danger because of the intervention of other Powers. 

We are urgently advised to proceed at once and to confront the 
world with a Jait accompli.^ 

The third telegram hkewise is from the Austro-Hun- 
garian ambassador, at Berlin, to the minister of foreign 
affairs at Vienna. It is dated the 27th of July, two days 
after Serbia's favorable reply, and the day before the 
Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on that devoted lit- 
tle country. It reads: 

The Secretary of State informed me very definitely and in the 
strictest confidence that in the near future possible proposals for 
mediation on the part of England would be brought to Your Excel- 
lency's knowledge by the German Government. 

1 "Report of the Commission of Responsibilities of the Conference of Paris, on 
the Violation of the Laws and Customs of War," published by the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1919, p. 61. 

Karl Kautsky, "Wie der Weltkrieg entstand. Dargestellt nach dem Akten- 
material des Deutschen Auswartigen Amts," Berlin, 1919, p. 40. English trans- 
lation entitled, "The Guilt of William Hohenzollern," 1919, p. 58. 

2 " Report of the Commission of Responsibilities of the Conference of Paris, 
on the Violation of the Laws and Customs of War," pp. 61-62. 

"Wie der Weltkrieg entstand," p. 85. "The Guilt of William Hohenzollern," 
p. 127. 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 235 

The German Government gives its most binding assurance that 
it does not in any way associate itself with the proposals; on the con- 
trary, it is absolutely opposed to their consideration, and only trans- 
mits them in compHance with the Enghsh request.^ 

These documents tell the whole story. They need 
neither explanation nor comment other than to say that 
their authenticity is not denied, and that the most com- 
petent of authorities, Karl Kautsky himself, says, refer- 
ring to the two documents last quoted: 

Both telegrams came into the hands of the "Commission of the 
Allied and Associated Governments (formed in January, 19 19), for 
fixing the responsibility of the originators of the war and the penalties 
to be imposed," and were pubHshed in its Report, which gives a 
sketch of the origin of the war as brief as it is, in the main, correct.* 

The commission on responsibilities found the German 
Government, of which the kaiser was the head, if he was 
not the government itself, aided and abetted Austria- 
Hungary to declare war against Serbia. Russia refused 
to stand by and see the little Slav brother crushed. It 
began to mobilize. Therefore the kaiser's government 
declared war against Russia on August i, 191 4, thus en- 
larging the scope of the war and making it certain that 
at least all of the great Powers of Europe would be 
involved. On the 3d of August Germany likewise de- 
clared war against France, because that country refused 
to desert Russia and to promise to stay neutral. To 
strike at France Germany rushed its armies through 
Luxemburg and through Belgium, although the German 

^ "Report of the Commission of Responsibilities of the Conference of Paris, on 
the Violation of the Laws and Customs of War," p. 62. 

" Wie der Weltkrieg entstand," p. 87. "The Guilt of William Hohenzollern," 
p. 129. 

* " Wie der Weltkrieg," p. 86. i'The Guilt of William Hohenzollern," pp. 128- 
129. 



236 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Government knew and stated at that time, through its 
chancellor, that it was violating international law; that 
it was overriding the just protests of Luxemburg and of 
Belgium, and that it would endeavor to make good the 
wrong that Germany was committing **as soon as our 
mihtary goal has been reached," to quote instead of 
paraphrasing the chancellor's language on the 4th day 
of August, 1 914. 

Prussia and the German states were parties to the 
Treaty of 1839, neutrahzing Belgium, and to the Treaty 
of 1867, guaranteeing the neutrahzation of Luxemburg. 

The preamble of the Treaty of Versailles tells the 
story, not merely the beginning but the end of the war, 
in a few short, crisp sentences. It states that the prin- 
cipal Allied and Associated Powers granted an armistice 
to Germany on November 11, 1918, on the request of the 
imperial German Government in order that a treaty of 
peace might be concluded. So much for the end of the 
war. As to the beginning, the preamble says that the 
war in which the Allied and Associated Powers "weie 
successively involved directly or indirectly, . . . origi- 
nated in the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on 
July 28, 19 14, against Serbia, the declaration of war by 
Germany against Russia on August i, 19 14, and against 
France on August 3, 1914, and in the invasion of Bel- 
gium." 

The refusal of Germany to observe the neutrality of 
Belgium brought Great Britain into the war on August 4, 
1914. ^ 

Various forms of a preamble were submitted by the 
drafting committee to the supreme council. This one 
was chosen by that august body. The absence of hon- 
eyed and generous phrases, ordinarily to be found in 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 237 

preambles, was noted. This was admitted by the mem- 
ber of the drafting committee responsible for this form, 
who replied, apparently to the satisfaction of the supreme 
council, that the commissioners who put their hands and 
seals to the treaty would, for the first time in history, 
sign a true preamble, and that any one consulting the 
treaty would, in its opening lines, have before his eyes 
the cause of the war and the defeat of Germany, admitted 
by the German commissioners, whose signatures were 
appended to the treaty. 

Was it a crime to declare war at the time the German 
Government declared it, and was it a crime, for which 
the law of nations imposed a penalty, to break the 
treaties of 1839 ^^^ 1867? It was not in point of law, 
although in the forum of morals it assuredly was. 

In view of this state of affairs, could the kaiser be tried 
for the commission of a crime, or could he be tried at 
all? The first paragraph of Article 227 arraigned the 
kaiser "for a supreme offence against international 
morality and the sanctity of treaties." The original 
draft prepared as a compromise by President Wilson 
himself — for he was adverse to any proceeding against 
the kaiser — contained an express denial that the offense 
was criminal, but at tne suggestion, it is believed, of Mr. 
Lloyd George, this was omitted. Arraigning the kaiser 
solely for an offense against international morality and 
the sanctity of treaties, and declaring that the judgment 
of the tribunal would be guided by tJie highest motives 
of international pohcy, were in effect an admission that 
law, in the legal sense of the word, did not exist for either 
offense, or that its violation was not a crime in the sense 
of criminal law. 

It will be observed that in Article 227 of the treaty 



238 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

there is no talk of trying the kaiser for a violation of the 
"laws and customs of war," for, contrary to the recom- 
mendations of the commission on responsibilities, al- 
though in thorough accord with the views of the Ameri- 
can members of that commission, a sovereign or chief 
executive of a state was not to be sued for violation of 
the laws and customs of war. At present such a person 
is exempt under international law — the law made, or 
consented to by all nations. He is immune from suit 
in any court, national or international. 

This does not mean that he is above the law. The 
people of the country whereof he is monarch or chief 
executive deal with him in their own way. In our 
country, for example, the president, like other civil 
officers of the United States, can be impeached and 
removed from office on conviction of "treason, bribery, 
or other high crimes and misdemeanors." The House 
of Representatives decides whether he shall be im- 
peached; the Senate, under the presidency of the chief 
justice, tries him. If impeachment proceedings be not 
brought against him, he or his party may be beaten at 
the polls, which is generally considered a punishment of 
no mean order. 

In the future the sovereign or chief executive may, by 
agreement of the nations, be triable for a crime or offense 
by an international tribunal. It cannot be done now. 
The action contemplated by the treaty was therefore 
political, not criminal. In the trial of the kaiser "for a 
supreme offence against international morahty and the 
sanctity of treaties," the tribunal was to be so consti- 
tuted that he should have "the guarantees essential to 
the right of defence," and in its decision the tribunal 
was to be "guided by the highest motives of international 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 239 

policy," In order to vindicate "the solemn obligation of 
international undertakings and the validity of inter- 
national morality," with the power *'to fix the punish- 
ment which it considers should be imposed." 

If we wished to be critical it would not be difficult. 
Terms are used in Article 227 without attempting to 
define them. What is morality? What is international 
morality? What is an offense against international 
morality? And what is a supreme offense against this 
thing, whatever it may be? It is safe to assume that 
opinions would differ as to the meaning and application 
of these terms. The maxim puts it, "Many men, many 
minds." Admitting, however, that these matters would 
be as clear to the judges as they were to the members of 
the supreme council, no form of punishment was pre- 
scribed, but the victim — for he was condemned in ad- 
vance — was to suffer the punishment, whatever it might 
be, which the members of the tribunal might hit upon, 
without any tangible limitation or restriction. 

But, waiving such matters, let us suppose that we 
have the special tribunal duly appointed and ready to 
inflict punishment. How is it to get the culprit? One 
of the rules of the culinary art is that you first catch the 
rabbit before you make rabbit soup. 

Napoleon Bonaparte abdicated and then delivered him- 
self up to the enemy. Not so William of HohenzoIIern. 
He dropped his crown and ran. He fled to Holland, to 
which country he is apparently more attached than in 
his earlier years. We can ransack the history of the 
world, without finding a tragedy in which the hero does 
not kill himself, is not killed, or does not give himself 
up in the fifth act, before the curtain falls. Otherwise, 
the spectators would hiss him from the stage. Were it 



240 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

not for the death of millions of men and the sorrow which 
hangs over the world and will darken it hke a cloud 
during the lives of those now living, this episode of 
William of HohenzoIIern could more aptly be termed a 
comedy than a tragedy. 

According to continental practice, a person may be 
tried in his absence, even in criminal matters. The 
Allied and Associated Powers did not contemplate this 
form of procedure. The Government of the Netherlands 
was to be asked by them to surrender the ex-emperor, 
in order that he might **be put on trial." Here the 
hitch occurred. Holland did not want the fugitive, but 
the rules of hospitality required that he should not be 
handed over. That little country had too much honor 
to think of it — more honor than the Allied and Associated 
Powers which dared to suggest it. 

However, the Allied Powers were without shame, and 
asked the Government of Holland to surrender the for- 
mer kaiser, believing, perhaps, that force would prevail 
where right was lacking. At one time the representa- 
tives of a principal Power affected to believe that Hol- 
land would yield, inasmuch as Mr. Lloyd George had not 
hitherto failed in anything which he had undertaken, 
and Mr. Lloyd George appeared to be bent on trying 
the kaiser. It may be that even one or more of the 
principal Powers hoped that Holland would refuse to 
comply with the request, inasmuch as the former kaiser 
would only be dangerous in their hands. How much 
better it would have been for the world if royal fugitives 
had always escaped, and had not been so stupid as to 
fall into the hands of their enemies ! 

However that may be, the extradition of a person 
charged with crime results only from a treaty between 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 241 

the nations involved, with the further condition that the 
offense for which extradition is asked is a crime by the 
laws of both countries. But treaties of extradition ex- 
clude political offenses, and by the express language of 
the Treaty of Versailles, the ex-kaiser*s offense was 
political, and the decision of the tribunal in which he 
was to be tried was to "be guided by the highest motives 
of international policy." Not one of the principal Allied 
and Associated Powers had a treaty with Holland for 
the extradition of a person charged with a political 
offense. It therefore followed that neither one nor all 
together could claim the kaiser as a right. Holland may 
have suspected that Mr. Lloyd George was satisfied with 
the provisions in the treaty putting the kaiser on trial, 
and that a refusal would answer his purpose. He had 
done the best he could, and he was not to blame if Hol- 
land would not give up the kaiser. Holland certainly 
knew that at least two of the principal Powers — the 
United States and Japan — were opposed to the whole 
miserable business. However, the Httle country stood 
firm. It was not to be "bullied" into comphance. It 
refused to surrender the kaiser, and he is Hkely to stay 
there, where he is well off, especially as no country — 
not even his own — seems to want him. 

Here the story might end, but it is, perhaps, fairer to 
the Allied Powers to let them state in part the reasons 
why they made the demand upon Holland, and it is 
fairer to Holland to let the government of that country 
state in its own way the reasons which caused it to reject 
the AHied demand, notwithstanding the apparent ear- 
nestness and consciousness of superior justice with which 
it was pressed. 

On January 15, 1920, the supreme council, represent- 



242 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

ing itself and claiming to represent the Allies in the 
war with Germany, addressed an official demand to the 
Government of the Netherlands, '*to deliver into their 
hands William of HohenzoIIern, former Emperor of Ger- 
many, in order that he may be judged." 

After referring to Article 227 of the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles, whereby the kaiser was to be arraigned for a 
supreme offense against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties, the note proceeds to lecture Holland 
as to its duty in the premises. "The Netherlands Gov- 
ernment," it is stated, "is conversant with the incon- 
trovertible reasons which imperiously exact that pre- 
meditated violations of international treaties, as well as 
systematic disregard of the most sacred rules and rights 
of nations, should receive as regards every one, includ- 
ing the highest-placed personalities, special punishment 
provided by the Peace Congress." 

The note taxes the kaiser with at least moral respon- 
sibility, expresses the inability of the Powers to conceive 
that the Government of the Netherlands "can regard 
with less reprobation than themselves the immense re- 
sponsibility of the former Emperor," and that "Holland 
would not fulfil," to quote the exact language of the note, 
"her international duty if she refused to associate her- 
self with other nations as far as her means allow in un- 
dertaking, or at least not hindering, chastisement of the 
crimes committed." 

In endeavoring to impose a duty upon Holland and 
to bring that country to a reahzation of this duty, as 
the supreme council saw it, the note dwelt upon the 
peculiar nature of the offense, and in so doing supplied 
Holland with an answer which would defeat the pur- 
pose, if indeed the Allied Governments wished at this 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 243 

time the surrender of the former German kaiser. Thus 
the note continued: "In addressing this demand to the 
Dutch Government the powers believe it their duty to 
emphasize its special character. It is their duty to 
insure the execution of Article 227 without allowing 
themselves to be stopped by arguments, because it is 
not a question of a public accusation with juridical char- 
acter as regards its basis, but an act of high international 
policy imposed by the universal conscience, in which 
legal forms have been provided solely to assure to the 
accused such guarantees as were never before recognized 
in public law.'* 

The supreme council was truly in a morahzing vein. 
It was not merely the duty of Holland to surrender the 
ex-kaiser, but it was, so the note maintains, "to the 
highest interest of the Dutch people not to appear to 
protect the principal author of this catastrophe by allow- 
ing him shelter on her territory." It is also held to be 
in the highest interest of the Dutch people "to facihtate 
his trial, which is claimed by the voices of millions of ^ 
victims." 

It was not very difFicuIt to reply to a note of this 
kind. The Dutch minister of foreign affairs, speaking 
on behalf of the Dutch Government, called attention to 
the fact that Holland was not a party to the Treaty of 
Versailles ; that Article 228 of the treaty did not impose 
a duty upon Holland; that it looked at this question, 
therefore, from its own conception of its duty. It was 
not connected with the outbreak of the war; it was not 
a party to it; it was a neutral, and in no way bound 
"to associate itself with this act of high international 
policy of the powers." 

Then follows a very important suggestion which Hoi- 



244 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

land took the opportunity of making, and which will 
be referred to later. "If in the future there should be 
instituted by the society of nations an international 
jurisdiction, competent to judge in case of war deeds 
qualified as crimes and submitted to its jurisdiction by 
statute antedating the acts committed, it would be fit 
for Holland to associate herself with the new regime/' 
In the absence of an international duty which would be 
created in this manner, the case was to be decided by 
"the laws of the kingdom and national tradition." 

The note ended with the statement that "neither the 
constituent laws of the kingdom, which are based upon 
the principles of law universally recognized, nor the age- 
long tradition which has made this country always a 
ground of refuge for the vanquished in international 
conflicts, permit the Government of Holland to defer to 
the desire of the powers by withdrawing from the former 
Emperor the benefit of its laws and this tradition." 

The Dutch reply was not pleasing to the supreme 
council. Therefore, on the 14th of February, a second 
note was sent by the council of ambassadors, as suc- 
cessor to the supreme council, which had ceased to 
exist on January 20, 1920, in which that august body, 
speaking in the name of all the Allies, twenty-six in 
number, sought again, and with no better success, to 
teach Holland its duty; that duty being, according to 
the Allies, to make common cause with them in the 
punishment of the former kaiser. 

Again, and in vain, the council speaks of the criminal 
acts whereof the kaiser was guilty, and the suff'ering of 
mankind because thereof. The Allied Governments rep- 
resented by the council of ambassadors could not "con- 
ceal their surprise" at not finding in the Dutch reply a 
single word of disapproval of these crimes. 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 245 

Apparently the council felt that Holland was not to 
be moved, and that it should make the best of a bad 
situation. As the ex-kaiser was not to be dehvered, and 
as he was to remain in Holland, the council, claiming to 
represent the twenty-six Allied nations, which were prob- 
ably not consulted, reminded the Government of Hol- 
land that the imperial fugitive was allowed to reside too 
near the German frontier, that adequate measures to 
prevent his escape had not been taken, and that if he 
should escape it would impose upon Holland a heavy 
responsibility. 

But the Dutch Government was obdurate. On March 
5 a reply was made to the second Allied note. It was 
shorter and, if possible, it was plainer, that Holland 
"would be committing an act contrary to laws and jus- 
tice, and incompatible with the national honor if it con- 
sented, at the request of the powers, to violate these 
laws by abolishing the rights which they accord to a 
fugitive finding himself within the country's territory.'* 
The reply further stated that Holland appreciated its re- 
sponsibility to take adequate measures to prevent the 
departure of the kaiser. "Mindful of its duties in this 
connection, the government has, and from the begin- 
ning, borne in mind the obligations imposed by its duties, 
and will continue to do so, being in a position in the free 
exercise of Dutch sovereignty to take on the spot all 
necessary effective measures of precaution, and to sub- 
ject the freedom of the ex-kaiser to necessary limitations." 

The kaiser is still in Holland. 

I am bold enough to say that the American commis- 
sion rendered a service to the world at large in standing 
as a rock against the trial of the kaiser for a legal offense, 



246 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

and that Holland has made the world its debtor by refus- 
ing to surrender the kaiser for the commission of an 
offense admittedly political. As it is, the kaiser is being 
punished. He has lost his crown, to which he attached 
much importance; he has lost the respect of the world, 
including that of his own people; and it may be that 
his own self-respect is not what it once was. In any 
event, he does not show himself in public; he does not 
review his troops; he does not change his uniforms with 
the hours of the day; he is not photographed nor are 
his features painted. His words are not eaten up by 
an expectant world, and his views on art, literature, 
music, rehgion, assyriology, and the other fifty-seven 
varieties of *'oIogies," as the American advertiser would 
say — are of no interest. 

One shudders to think what might have happened if 
the British and French commissioners had had their 
way, for they were the two who really seemed set upon 
getting the kaiser. Heroes are sometimes made out of 
very cheap stuff, and it apparently takes but little per- 
secution to make a hero of a monarch. As James Rus- 
sell Lowell puts it in "The Bigelow Papers," the best 
way to make a goose a swan is to cut its head off. It 
may be said that the best way to restore a dynasty seems 
to be to decapitate its headless ruler. Mary Queen of 
Scots, is a heroine, and her son became not merely king 
of Scotland but of England as well, succeeding that very 
Elizabeth who had her tried and caused her death. The 
male children of Charles I succeeded in turn to the 
British crown, and the two brothers of Louis XVI be- 
came kings of France. Even the exile of Napoleon 
Bonaparte seated his nephew upon the throne of France. 
Stranger things could happen than the restoration of 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 247 

the house of HohenzoIIern in the person of the kaiser's 
grandson. 

That German Boswell, the faithful Busch, reports a 
conversation with the great Bismarck on the 14th of 
October, 1870, in which that man of blood and iron is 
made to say that he had "a lovely idea in connection 
with the conclusion of peace." This idea was to appoint 
an international court for the trial of those who had 
caused the war. Among those to be included was Napo- 
leon III, of whom he said: 

He is not quite so innocent as he wants to make out. My idea 
was that each of the Great Powers should appoint an equal number 
of judges, America, England, Russia, and so forth, and that we 
should be the prosecutors. But the Enghsh and the Russians 
would of course not agree to it, so that the Court might after all be 
composed of the two nations who have suffered most from the war, 
that is to say, of Frenchmen and Germans.* 

It is better for the world that the suggestion of Bis- 
marck has not been followed. 

So much for the kaiser. Now for his erstwhile civil 
and military subjects. The case here is different. A 
sovereign is immune either because it is deemed best 
that he be immune, or because sovereigns made the 
law, securing to themselves immunity. Subjects or citi- 
zens are held universally liable to municipal law, and 
they are, in appropriate cases, subject to foreign law. 
They always are, or should be, responsible to the law of 
nations. A breach of the laws and customs of war is a 
crime. The question is one of the court or tribunal 
before which the accused shall be passed. But it is com- 
plicated by the question to what extent a civil or military 

1 Moritz Busch, "Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History," 2 vols,, New 
York, 1898, vol. I, p. 189. 



248 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

official committing a crime is covered or protected by 
the command of his superior. The commission consid- 
ered this phase of the subject. There is, however, no 
mention of it in the treaty. It need not detain us here, 
as it is a question for the court to determine. 

The commission on the responsibility of the authors 
of the war and enforcement of penalties was directed, 
among other things, to inquire into and report upon 
"the constitution and procedure of a tribunal appro- 
priate for the trial of these offences." 

Without meaning to give offense to the members of 
the commission, it may be said that from the American 
view-point they committed a number of errors. They 
were wrong in holding that a sovereign could be tried. 
But that is out of the way. They were wrong as to their 
Jurisdiction. Being appointed to inquire into and report 
upon the facts as to breaches of the laws and customs 
of war, they insisted on dragging in ''offences against the 
laws of humanity" — a very different thing. They were 
wrong as to a court, wishing to create out of whole cloth 
a new tribunal which never had any existence, and, 
therefore, could not have had authority to try the offenses 
when committed. They were wrong in vesting that 
court with the power to punish offenses against the laws 
and customs of war and the laws of humanity, when no 
penalty had been affixed to the breach thereof by the 
law of nations. 

The American members of that commission repeatedly 
called the attention of their colleagues to these facts. 
They did not claim to be wiser than the other members. 
They were, however, more detached, inasmuch as their 
country had not suffered to the same degree as had 
other countries by the ruthless conduct of the Germans. 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 249 

Perhaps the nature of our government — being a union 
of states, in which there was no federal law of crimes, 
except what was created by and for the Union, and after 
its establishment — may have led them to note more 
clearly and more quickly the difficulties of the situation. 
In their dissenting opinion, they cited the leading case 
of United States v. Hudson,^ decided by the supreme 
court of the American states in 181 2, in which it is held 
that "the legislative authority of the Union must first 
make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare 
the court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence." 
They stated in their dissenting opinion that what was 
true of the American states must be true of this looser 
union called the Society of Nations, and they admitted 
that they knew of no international statute or convention 
making a violation of the laws and customs of war — not 
to speak of the laws or principles of humanity — an inter- 
national crime, affixing a punishment to it, and declaring 
the court which has jurisdiction over the offense. They 
were, however, in thorough sympathy with the punish- 
ment of offenders against the laws and customs of war. 
They wanted them to be punished, but insisted that it 
should be done according to law, not according to pas- 
sion. Their purpose, which was misunderstood at the 
time, it is believed, by most of their colleagues, was to 
show how violators of the laws and customs of war 
could be punished according to law to which was affixed 
a penalty, and in a tribunal universally recognized. 
They had a concrete case in mind — that of Henry Wirz, 
commandant of the Confederate prison at Andersonville, 
Georgia, during the Civil War, who, after that war, was 
tried by a military commission sitting in the city of 

^ 7 Cranch, 32. 



250 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Washington, for crimes contrary to the laws and customs 
of war. He was convicted, sentenced to be executed, 
and actually was executed, curiously enough, on the i ith 
of November, 1865. 

It would have been, of course, a simple matter if the 
treaty had provided that Germany should try, in its 
own courts, the persons accused of breaches of the laws 
and customs of war, whose names the Allied and Asso- 
ciated Governments should submit. They would not 
hear of this then, although they have heard of it later. 

Without dwelling upon this matter further, it will be 
sufficient to say that the American members filed a 
memorandum which, grudgingly and partially accepted 
by the commission, was approved, as we shall see, by 
the conference, and forms the basis of Articles 228-229 
of the Treaty of Versailles deahng with this subject. 
This memorandum is thus worded: 

1. That the military authorities, being charged with the interpre- 

tation of the laws and customs of war, possess jurisdiction 
to determine and punish violations thereof; 

2. That the mihtary jurisdiction for the trial of persons accused of 

violations of the laws and customs of war and for the pun- 
ishment of persons found guilty of such offences is exercised 
by military tribunals; 

3. That the jurisdiction of a military tribunal over a person accused 

of the violation of a law or custom of war is acquired when 
the offence was committed on the territory of the nation 
creating the military tribunal or when the person or prop- 
erty injured by the offence is of the same nationality as 
the military tribunal; 

4. That the law and procedure to be appHed and followed in deter- 

mining and punishing violations of the laws and customs 
of war are the law and the procedure for determining and 
punishing such violations estabhshed by the military law 
of the country against which the offence is committed; and 

5. That in case of acts violating the laws and customs of war 

involving more than one country, the military tribunals 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 251 

of the countries affected may be united, thus forming an 
international tribunal for the trial and punishment of per- 
sons charged with the commission of such offences. 

Let us now turn to the Treaty of Versailles. Article 
228 has this to say on Jurisdiction: 

The German Government recognises the right of the Allied and 
Associated Powers to bring before mihtary tribunals persons accused 
of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of 
war. Such persons shall, if found guihy, be sentenced to punish- 
ments laid down by law. 

Article 229 deals with offenses which affect more than 
one nation, the first two paragraphs saying: 

Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the 
Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before the military 
tribunals of that Power. 

Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than 
one of the AIHed and Associated Powers will be brought before mili- 
tary tribunals composed of members of the military tribunals of the 
Powers concerned. 

Article 228 has an additional phrase which should be 
quoted, to the effect that ** proceedings or prosecution 
before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her 
allies " were not a bar to jurisdiction of the military tri- 
bunal, and the last paragraph of Article 229 provides 
that the accused should, in every case, be entitled to 
name his counsel. 

As in the case of the kaiser, so in the case of his sub- 
jects — the rabbit must first be caught. If a person 
accused of violating the laws and customs of war — for 
the conference rejected the heresy of the majority of 
the commission as to the laws of humanity — were in the 
hands of the enemy, he could be passed before the ap- 
propriate military tribunal, but if not, he should not be 



252 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

tried. Many of them would, of course, be in Germany, 
and Germany could be obliged to surrender its subjects. 
Thus the treaty, in the second paragraph of Article 228, 
requires that: 

/ The German Government shall hand over to the Alhed and Asso- 
ciated Powers, or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons 
accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and 
customs of war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, 
office or employment which they held under the German authorities. 

But conviction must be based upon proof; hence, it is 
provided in Article 230 that: 

The German Government undertakes to furnish all documents 
and information of every kind, the production of which may be con- 
sidered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating 
acts, the discovery of offenders and the just appreciation of respon- 
sibihty. 

Clauses of a like nature appear in the other treaties 
ending the war. 

But how about the Germans who imitated the kaiser 
and took refuge in neutral countries. Can they be ex- 
tradited? Not unless the treaty of extradition between 
the country making the request and the country in which 
the fugitive was found contains an obligation to sur- 
render persons accused of what, for want of a better 
name, may be called "war crimes." 

These articles of the treaty were naturally offensive 
to the Germans. They did not hke to have their armed 
forces accused of the commission of crimes; they did not 
want to have them tried by military tribunals of the 
enemy. To these they would have preferred inter- 
national tribunals composed of neutral members, or tri- 
bunals with a sprinkhng of neutrals. They preferred, of 
course, their own courts, and after much haggling the 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 253 

Allied and Associated Powers have made lists of persons 
whose names have been submitted to the German author- 
ities. These persons are to be tried before the supreme 
court at Leipzig. Each country (with the exception of 
the United States and Japan, which refused to present 
lists) had a very imposing list, and thousands might 
have been put on trial. When, after the ratification of 
the treaty, the first list was presented to the German 
representative in Paris, he refused to receive it, and 
rather than transmit it he resigned his position. Inas- 
much as Germany has been "scotched,'* not killed, it 
apparently seemed more prudent to allow the Germans 
to punish the accused in their own way, provided they 
punished them. If they were found guilty, it would 
reflect credit upon the German authorities. If they 
were acquitted they were innocent, or the Germans 
were to be blamed. 

Here are some of the "chief offenders" in a list pub- 
lished in the London Times for February 2, 1920: 

Ex-Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. 

Duke of Wiirtemberg. 

General von Kluck. 

General von Biilow. 

Field-Marshal von Mackensen. 

Admiral von Capelle. 

Field-Marshal von Sanders. 

In the Times for February 28 of the same year the 
following names appeared: 

General von LudendorfF. 
Admiral von Tirpitz. 
General von Falkenhayn. 
von Bethmann-HoIIweg. 
Hindenburg. 



K 



254 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

According to the Times for February 9, 1920, Great 
Britain presented a fairly representative list of admirals 
and submarine commanders. 

One does not need to be a prophet to divine what 
would happen if the Allied and Associated Powers had 
insisted on passing persons like these before their tri- 
bunals. We can imagine the feelings of the American 
people if the fortunes of war had permitted Germany to 
demand that General Pershing, commander-in-chief of 
the American armies should be handed over to the 
enemy. Let Shakespeare answer for us: 

O, it is excellent 
To have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous 
To use it like a giant. 

As in the case of the kaiser, we might stop here. It 
is, however, better to set forth the correspondence pass- 
ing between the German Government and the Allied 
Powers, by which an agreement was reached to try the 
accused in Germany. 

On February 3, 1920, the council of ambassadors 
drafted a note to Baron von Lersner, then the president 
of the German peace delegation at Paris, calling the 
attention of Germany to its obligation to surrender for 
trial Germans accused of violations of the laws and cus- 
toms of war, who, by Article 228 of the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles were to be specified either by name or by the 
rank, office, or employment which they held under the 
German authorities." The list of persons, amounting 
in all to about 900, was presented on behalf of Great 
Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Poland, Rumania, and 
the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In 
addition, proof which might be necessary and which 
was in the possession of Germany was demanded. 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 255 

The list, large as it was, was not final, and the presi- 
dent of the conference, on behalf of the powers, reserved / 
the right to demand the extradition of further persons. 
Baron von Lersner refused, as has been said, to transmit 
the list, and resigned his position. Therefore, it was 
sent by special messenger to the German chancellor at 
Berlin. 

The commotion in Germany was great and immediate, v 
A meeting of the council of ministers was held and the 
unanimous conclusion was reached and given to the 
press that it would not comply with the Allied demands. 
Before the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, and 
before as well as after the deposit of ratifications at 
Paris, on January 10, 1920, the German Government ^ 
had stated that it was impossible to comply with these 
provisions. 

In anticipation of the demand Germany had prepared 
a note, dated January 25, 1920, to the president of the 
peace conference, stating that for political as well as 
economic reasons it could not surrender the persons 
accused of war crimes, but that it was willing to try them 
before the supreme court at Leipzig. This note reads 
in part as follows : 

The German Government is willing to instruct the German legal 
authorities immediately to take proceedings based upon the material 
to be transmitted against all the Germans who are named by the 
Entente as guilty of offences against the laws and usages of war. It 
will suspend all the laws which might stand in the way of such pro- 
ceedings, and will go so far as to suspend the existing amnesty law. 

The highest German Court, the Imperial Court in Leipzig, shall be 
authorized to conduct the trial. Furthermore, the Alhed and Asso- ■ 
ciated Governments which are concerned in each particular case 
will be given the right directly to participate in the proceedings. 
Judgments given by the Imperial Court will be published immedi- 
ately together with the grounds on which they were given. 



256 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

The situation was indeed serious. Germany either 
would not or could not surrender its subjects for trial. 
It offered, however, to try them, and to allow the Allied 
and Associated Governments to assist in their trial. 
Under these circumstances the Allied Powers accepted 
the proposal of the German Government contained in 
its note of January 25, 1920. 

In a note of the council of ambassadors, dated Febru- 
ary 13, 1920, it was stated that: 

The prosecution which the German Government itself purposes 
immediately to institute in this manner is compatible with Article 
228 of the Peace Treaty, and is expressly provided for at the end of 
its first paragraph. 

This was a lucky discovery, as it enabled the Allied 
Powers to withdraw from an embarrassing position, and 
put Germany, as it were, upon trial and upon its good 
behavior. This they did by refusing to participate in 
the proceedings of the supreme court at Leipzig, reserv- 
ing the right to pass upon the findings of the court, and 
specifically reserving themselves their right under the 
treaty to constitute their own tribunals and to try any 
and all Germans accused of war crimes, if the Allied 
Governments should be convinced that justice had not 
been done by the German court. 

The Allied Powers created a mixed inter-AIIied com- 
mission to examine and to communicate to Germany the 
details of the charges brought against each of those 
whose guilt should be estabhshed by the investigations 
of this commission. 

This commission got to work, and from the many 
cases before them, picked out forty-six which might be 
called test cases. Of these Belgium presented fifteen. 



THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 257 

France twelve, Great Britain seven, Italy five, Rumania 
three, Poland three, Serbia one. It will be observed 
that there were none from the United States and Japan. 

Should, however, the nations decide that violators of 
the laws and customs of war should be brought to trial 
and punishment, they can take action now, and in so 
doing anticipate the future. 

A committee of the assembly of the League of Nations 
has Just reported to the assembly that "there is not yet 
any international penal law recognised by all nations, 
and that, if it were possible to refer certain crimes to 
any jurisdiction, it would be more practical to establish 
a special chamber in the Court of International Justice." 
On the 1 8th of December, 1920, the assembly approved 
this report. 

This means that there is no international penal law, 
but if there were, questions arising under it should be 
submitted to a court already in being, not one to be 
constituted specifically and after the commission of the 
acts. 

It is well for our common humanity that every war of 
which we have the record teaches us that the reports of 
crime and of cruelty are grossly exaggerated, and we 
know from our own experience in ordinary hfe that 
people laboring under excitement and smarting under a 
sense of injustice are not in a position to see things as 
they do later, when they have recovered their balance 
and poise. 

We should have sympathy with those who have suf- 
fered, and we should not criticise them for wishing to 
bring to punishment those who have been the architects 
of their misery. Our alhes were disappointed at the 
time that the kaiser was not tried and that an inter- 



258 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

national tribunal was not created for the trial and pun- 
ishment of persons accused of breaches of "the laws and 
customs of war or the laws of humanity." The time 
will come when they will be glad that they did not suc- 
ceed. Perhaps it has come already. "La nuit porte 
conseil." 



XI 

REPARATIONS 

BY THOMAS WILLIAM LAMONT 

The subject of reparations caused more trouble, con- 
tention, hard feeling, and delay at the Peace Conference 
than any other point of the Treaty of Versailles. There 
was, of course, difficulty on the question of boundaries; 
there was grave controversy over the Polish frontiers and 
Danzig; the question whether German Austria should be 
allowed to join with Germany was of serious concern ; the 
disposal of the Saar Basin coal-fields brought about a 
savage, personal attack by M. Clemenceau on President 
Wilson, and there were other topics, too, that were dis- 
posed of with the utmost difficulty. But, taking it all 
in all, the question of how much reparation Germany 
should be compelled to pay, how she should pay it, and 
what sanctions should be exacted to insure the payment, 
was the hardest of the lot. 

The Conference set about the reparations question in 
the same manner that it did the various other topics that 
were up for adjustment, namely, by the appointment of 
a commission made up of leading members from the vari- 
ous delegations, including in the number, together with 
the alternates, for Great Britain, Lords Sumner and 
Cunliffe, J. M. Keynes, of the British treasury, and E. S. 
Montagu; for France, MM. Klotz and Loucheur, of the 
Clemenceau cabinet; for Italy, Signors Crespi and Chiesa; 
for Japan, MM. Tatsumi and Mori; and for the United 

259 



26o WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

States, Messrs. Norman Davis, B. M. Baruch, Vance 
McCormick, and myself. 

This plenary commission upon reparations held its first 
session on February 3, 1919, and resolved itself into three 
important subcommissions. Commission No. i treated 
the question of categories; that is to say, its purpose was 
to define the character and, in general, the scope of the 
reparations for which Germany and the enemy states 
were responsible. Commission No. 2 was to determine 
what was Germany's capacity to pay and how payment 
should be arranged. Commission No. 3 charged itself 
with the duty of suggesting sanctions or guarantees by 
which the payments by Germany, when determined upon, 
should be enforced. The work of commissions i and 2 
was bound to prove, as it did, of the greatest importance. 
That of No. 3 became less important as time went on, 
and I am not aware that that subcommission ever made 
to the Peace Conference any final report. 

The work of subcommission No. i, to determine 
of the categories of damage, was, of course, dependent 
upon what principles should be adopted on the whole 
question of reparations, these principles being determined 
and defined by the main commission itself. Subcom- 
mission No. 2, on the other hand, was not so dependent 
for its work upon the general scheme that might be laid 
down by the plenary commission, by reason of the fact 
that the subcommission's investigation and determination 
of Germany's capacity to pay could be made quite inde- 
pendently of any other question involved. 

The Controversy over War Costs 

I shall go back directly to describe in some detail the 
workings of these important subcommissions, but, briefly, 



REPARATIONS 261 

I may explain that, before the plenary commission as a 
whole, the chief principle involved was as to whether or 
not the costs of war (aside from material damage done) 
incurred by the AHies should be included in the amount 
that Germany was to pay. The controversy on this 
point was a long and bitter one, and it was finally deter- 
mined — in accordance with the American principle — that 
war costs should be excluded. When this principle had 
once been determined, the chief work of the plenary com- 
mission had been accomplished. 

Thereafter the work of subcommission No. i on the 
question of categories became, of course, of decided and 
continuing importance, but not of such great moment as 
that of subcommission No. 2, around whose work the 
prolonged controversies of the Conference centred. For 
it soon became apparent that, regardless of the im- 
portant principles laid down by the main commission, 
and regardless of the detailed categories of damage that 
might be filed and accepted, Germany must, perforce, pay 
reparations to the utmost extent of her capacity. What- 
ever that extent was, it was bound to fall far below the 
amount of damage that she had caused for which she 
could properly be adjudged responsible. 

Therefore it became manifest that whatever was deter- 
mined as Germany's total capacity to pay would nat- 
urally be fixed as the amount she must pay. So that the 
real question that was waged with such fierceness from 
early in February almost up to the signing of the treaty 
at the end of June was, "How much, at her utmost capac- 
ity, can Germany pay?" All factions were agreed that 
whatever sum that might prove to be, was the sum that 
Germany must pay. 

After long weeks of argument, proof, and counter-proof 



262 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

on this question of what Germany's capacity to pay was, 
and of trying to determine the definite capital sum that 
she should have to pay — the so-called ** experts" still 
continuing to be wide apart in their estimates — the chiefs 
of state finally determined that, politically, it was unwise 
at the time of the peace settlement to fix any definite sum. 
M. Clemenceau was the first of the premiers — prompted 
in this instance by his minister of the treasury, M. Klotz 
— to make the declaration that whatever sum the ** ex- 
perts" might finally compromise and agree upon as the 
sum to demand from Germany, that would still fall far 
short of the expectations of the French populace; that 
no government accepting such a sum as final could endure. 
Mr. Lloyd George, who never lent a deaf ear to political 
considerations, readily fell in with this point of view. 
There had, in his election campaign of 191 8, been made 
such excessive estimates as to the amount that Ger- 
many would pay, that he felt that if the figures, as de- 
termined upon, fell — as they were bound to — far short of 
his campaign promises, then he too would, like Clemen- 
ceau, be tipped out of office. To Orlando, the premier 
of Italy, the question was comparatively unimportant. 
He could readily accept the solution of an immediate 
sum to be fixed or the indemnity programme that was 
finally adopted. Therefore, it became of prime impor- 
tance to M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George to con- 
vince President Wilson of the correctness of their position. 

America Argues for a Fixed Sum 

Now from the start the contention, not only of the 
American delegates upon commission No. 2, organized 
for the purpose of determining Germany's capacity to 



REPARATIONS 263 

pay, but of the whole American delegation, was that a 
fixed sum should speedily be determined upon and noti- 
fied to Germany as the amount of Germany's indebted- 
ness which she should be required to pay. The American 
delegation consistently urged this course of procedure, 
not as being particularly advantageous to America, be- 
cause America's material interest in the actual amount 
of reparations was, in any event, slight; but because, 
chiefly, a definite settlement of the question would soonest 
bring about settled financial conditions in Europe and 
soonest yield improved credit and financial stability to 
France, Belgium, and such other Allied states as were, 
in part, dependent upon German reparations for the 
balancing of their budget. 

Moreover, the American delegation asserted that until 
she knew the amount of her debt Germany would never 
properly and vigorously address herself to her own task 
of working out the reparation payments. This attitude, 
however, on the part of the American delegation, although 
it was cordially shared in by several leading members of 
the British, Italian, and Belgian delegations — and even, 
in their private utterances, by certain members of the 
French delegation — was, as a whole, obnoxious to the 
French. Oppressed, as indeed they were justified in be- 
ing, by the terrible devastation that Germany had ruth- 
lessly wrought throughout northern France, by the 
destruction of their coal-mines, by the deliberate looting 
of their factories, by the laying waste of their farms and 
orchards, the French, in general, felt that any suggestion 
which seemed for a moment to relieve Germany of the 
necessity of paying every penny of the damage caused, 
was, in eff'ect, favoring Germany at the expense of 
France. 



264 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Of course, no such thought had for even a moment 
been in the minds of the Americans. We simply wanted 
to be practical, not visionary; we simply realized, as 
many of the French did not seem to do, that it was 
impossible to pick up Germany's static wealth, like her 
railways, and transfer them bodily to France; that, 
therefore, France would benefit most by taking every- 
thing that she possibly could, by taking it quickly and 
writing off the balance. 

The points of view, though they were so divergent, 
seemed gradually, after many weeks of argument, to be 
drawing toward a solution, when M. Clemenceau be- 
came, as I have said, concerned over the political situa- 
tion, and he and Mr. Lloyd George made the proposition 
of postponing the determination of the question. They 
then undertook to convert President Wilson to their 
point of view. He, naturally, was skeptical, but his 
difficulty was that it was quite impossible for him to 
determine the attitude of M. Clemenceau's and Mr. 
Lloyd George's constituencies. He could not have the 
temerity to declare to these statesmen that they were all 
wrong; that if they adopted a common-sense course of 
determining upon a fixed sum, disappointing as it might 
be to their constituents, still they could make a sound 
and proper defense of it, and, therefore, would not lose 
their seats. 

Clemenceau and Lloyd George, with the utmost grav- 
ity, declared the contrary. They asserted that they were 
ahnost certain to be called to an immediate accounting, 
and to be turned out of office. They "pointed out the 
serious consequences of any such step. It would mean 
the reconstitution of the British and French delegations; 
it would mean that the Peace Conference would have to 



REPARATIONS 265 

start all over again. Such a course was unthinkable. 
Therefore, no matter how much he might disagree with 
them in their judgment, President Wilson was bound to 
bow to this political crisis, as it was insisted upon by M. 
Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George; and inasmuch as 
America's direct interests were not greatly involved, to 
agree with them in the postponement of fixing the sum 
of German reparations. 

The Power of Clemenceau and Lloyd George 

It sounds absolutely unwarranted for me to place my 
opinion against those of two chiefs of state hke Clemen- 
ceau and Lloyd George; yet I am convinced, as I was at 
the time, that they were wrong, that they entirely mis- 
read their own constituencies when they believed that 
if they adopted the business course of fixing the German 
indemnity and proceeding to collect it they would, be- 
cause of the disappointment of their voters, be turned 
out of office. Let me point out that at that time they 
were both at the height of their success. In France 
Clemenceau had, in the eyes of the multitude, won the 
war. He had come into office late in 191 7, at a time 
when France was at a low ebb of her fortunes ; when there 
was disaffection in the army, intrigue at home, dismay 
even in the breasts of the faithful. France's heroism 
and gallantry had had a rude shock, her resources were 
rapidly diminishing; she was being bled white. At that 
crisis Clemenceau came into power, and at once he 
stemmed the tide of disaffection and pessimism. He was 
like a great, rugged boulder in the midst of swiftly run- 
ning water. The tide was bearing down upon him, 
threatening to overwhelm him, but there he stood, a 



266 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

rock with all the forces of dismay and despair breaking 
impotently against his rugged shoulders and flanks I By 
the sheer force of personal will and dogged determination, 
he stopped that running tide. Gradually he swung it 
around until the stream again was flowing back, full of 
courage and of renewed hope. He lifted France from the 
slough and held her firm. To change the figure, Clemen- 
ceau became a mighty fortress, in and around which the 
hosts of France rallied and became vahant in boldness 
and in force, until, with their Allies, they had smashed 
the foe and won the victory. 

Clemenceau began the Peace Conference with all this 
prestige undimmed — with this halo about his head. You 
cannot tell me that any reasonable decision that he had 
arrived at would not have been accepted by the French 
people at that time. There might have been argument, 
there might have been bitter debate, but Clemenceau 
would have carried his people with him. 

In like manner, though possibly not so romantically, 
Lloyd George had the backing of the people of England. 
He had proved to be the **man of the hour." When the 
war began in 1914 Lloyd George still had, as he has to- 
day, many bitter opponents in England. At that time 
he was chancellor of the exchequer, and the business 
community questioned his financial judgment; but imme- 
diately upon the outbreak of the war he showed great 
shrewdness and foresight in mobihzing the financial forces 
of the community under the leadership of the Bank of 
England and, through a series of extraordinarily wise 
measures, preserved the empire from financial panic. 
This gave Lloyd George a great fillip among the power- 
ful conservative and investment circles in England. 
Then when the munitions situation proved beyond the 



REPARATIONS 267 

capacity of Lord Kitchener to handle in connection with 
the onerous duties of his war ministry as well, Lloyd 
George became minister of munitions. At once there 
was an immediate change in England's outlook and 
handhng of the war. I can say this of my own personal 
knowledge, because the firm of which I am a member was 
then acting on a large scale as purchasing agents for 
Great Britain in America. At once, when Lloyd George 
became munitions minister, there was a speeding up, a 
new vigor, a fresh drive. All England awoke to reahze 
this fact. Then later, when, after the question of muni- 
tions had been remedied, the British handling of the war 
in general was not going well, Mr. Lloyd George came in 
as premier. The manner of his entry may be criticised — 
I do not know as to that — but certainly he was the right 
man in the right place. Even his worst enemies admitted 
it, and almost from that time forward things began to go 
better. With all the prestige that he had thus gained, 
with his tremendous driving power and his marvellous 
celerity in adjusting matters to changed circumstances, 
Lloyd George could surely have fixed any reasonable sum 
for German reparation and still, as the phrase is, "gotten 
away with it." 

At the time when this question of naming the sum was 
a burning one, Mr. Lloyd George summoned one or more 
of the financial delegates many times into conference with 
him and his own experts, and at one time I thought he 
had become convinced of the utility of the American pro- 
gramme. Then he began to turn the other way to M. 
Clemenceau's solution. We begged him not to do so. 
We even went so far as to declare that if he would go back 
to England and address the House of Commons as he 
alone could, pointing out boldly that his pre-election 



268 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

estimates as to Germany's capacity to pay were wrong, 
he would gain overwhelming support and a tremendous 
added political prestige. But lie declined to do this — 
and who am I to say that Mr. Lloyd George, probably 
the most skilful politician of modern times, was in this 
particular situation impolitic? All I feel is, if at this 
critical juncture both M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd 
George had had a little more confidence in their own 
strength they would have joined with President Wilson 
and settled this question of German indemnity once 
for all, thus avoiding, to a considerable measure, the ter- 
rible consequences of continued unsettlement that have 
plagued Europe and the whole world since the Peace 
Conference adjourned and left the German indemnity 
question open. 

The Argument for War Costs 

To return now to the manner in which the reparation 
question was developed and handled in the treat3\ You 
will recall that, first of all, the plenary commission on 
reparations undertook to settle the great question of 
principle as to what should be included in the phrase 
which President Wilson and the Allies had set down, and 
which, prior to the armistice, the enemy had accepted: 
*'That compensation will be made by Germany for all 
damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and 
their property by the aggression of Germany, by land, 
by sea, and from the air. At once the British delegation, 
under the leadership of Premier Hughes, of Australia, 
and of Lord Sumner, undertook to argue that damage 
to the civilian population meant the actual costs of war. 
They declared, in general, that inasmuch as the costs of 



REPARATIONS 269 

war fell upon the civil population of each country, be- 
coming an enormous financial burden and limiting the 
gainful occupations of the civilian population, therefore 
war costs were a proper charge. In the British conten- 
tion that the costs of war should be included in repara- 
tion, France, Serbia, and other nations joined. This 
attitude on the part of France was difficult to under- 
stand. Germany's capacity to pay being limited, France 
would naturally receive a higher proportion of the total 
amount Germany did pay if the costs of war, which on 
the part of Great Britain were heavier than those of 
France, were to be excluded. 

The British contention went very far. Premier Hughes, 
for instance, declared that if the little shepherd in Aus- 
tralia had been obfiged to mortgage his house because of 
distressful conditions of trade brought on by the war, 
then finally, through foreclosure, lost his little roof, then 
that loss to which he had been subjected was fairly a cost 
of war and should be reimbursed to him by Germany. 
On this and similar points the Australian premier made 
many arguments, and at times bitterly assailed the Ameri- 
can delegation for their contention that costs of war could 
not properly be included in reparation. Mr. Hughes de- 
claring that this contention was based, not upon princi- 
ple, but upon a desire to favor Germany. In one of his 
arguments, I remember, turning around and shaking his 
finger at the American delegation, he shouted: **Some 
people in this war have not been so near the fire as we 
British have, and, therefore, being unburned, they have 
a cold, detached view of the situation." At another time 
he spoke slightingly of the Wilson notes which had pre- 
ceded the armistice, declaring that Solf, the German 
foreign minister, had outmanoeuvred Mr. Wilson, and, 



270 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

in shaking tones, asserting that Solf had been crawling 
through the Wilson notes "like a serpent through dead 
leaves." 

To the American delegation the whole point was per- 
fectly clear. Actual costs of war, military effort, and the 
like, could not by any possibility be considered strictly 
as damage to the civilian population of the Allied states, 
and, therefore, could not properly be included in the 
sum to be paid by Germany in reparation. For the 
American delegation, Mr. John Foster Dulles, the in- 
heritor of a name illustrious in American diplomacy and 
the possessor of a mind of great force and quality, made 
the chief argument against the inclusion of war costs. 
His summing up was an admirable one, and all those who 
are particularly interested in the detail of this question 
I refer to Mr. Bernard M. Baruch's excellent volume, 
**The Making of the Reparation and Economic Clauses 
of the Treaty," in which Mr. DuIIes's arguments are given 
in full. 

It became evident, after a fortnight of argument on 
the question of principle, that the delegations by them- 
selves could not possibly agree as to the principle. At 
this time President Wilson was on the ocean returning 
to America, and, accordingly, in behalf of the American 
reparation delegates, Colonel House addressed a wire- 
less to Mr. Wilson, stating the position of the delegation 
and asking for his judgment. The President approved 
the stand of the American delegation, declaring that the 
contention on the part of the other delegations that war 
costs should be included *'is clearly inconsistent with 
what we deliberately led the enemy to expect and can- 
not now honorably alter simply because we have the 
power." 



REPARATIONS 271 

The Inclusion of Pensions 

When the American delegation acquainted the other 
chiefs of state with this vigorous declaration on the part 
of President Wilson, they finally withdrew their conten- 
tion, and the great principle was, therefore, settled that 
reparation should be limited to what might actually be 
called material damage. It was, however, later deter- 
mined to include as a part of the reparation the costs for 
separation allowances and pensions incurred by the Allied 
states. The American delegation as a whole, while deeply 
sympathetic, sentimentally, with the idea that pensions 
should be included as damage to the civilian population, 
found it difficult to reconcile this contention with actual 
principle, feeling that pensions fell more properly into 
the category of military costs of war. Mr. Lloyd George 
however, advocated with great vigor and ingenuity the 
inclusion of pensions under the head of damage to the 
civilian population. Said he: "You mean to say that 
France is to be compensated for the loss of a chimney 
pot in the devastated district, but not for the loss of a 
life? Do you set more value upon a chimney than you 
do upon a soldier's life?" This argument was appeal- 
ing, but not necessarily sound. 

However, it was General Jan Smuts who finally pre- 
pared the argument which convinced President Wilson 
that pensions and separation allowances should be in- 
cluded in the reparation bill. General Smuts's summing 
up was: "What was spent by the Allied Governments 
on the soldier himself, or rather mechanical appliances of 
war, might perhaps not be recoverable from the German 
Government under the reservation, as not being in a 
plain and direct sense damage to the civilian population, 



272 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

but what was, or is, spent on the citizen before he be- 
came a soldier, or after he has ceased to be a soldier, or 
at any time on his family, represents compensation for 
damage done to civilians and must be made good by 
the German Government under any fair interpretation 
of the above reservation." I well remember the day 
upon which President Wilson determined to support the 
inchision of pensions in the reparation bill. Some of us 
were gathered in his library in the Place des £tats Unis, 
having been summoned by him to discuss this particular 
question of pensions. We explained to him that we 
couldn't find a single lawyer in the American delegation 
that would give an opinion in favor of inckiding pensions. 
All the logic was against it. *' Logic ! Logic ! " exclaimed 
the President, **I don't give a damn for logic. I am 
going to inchide pensions !" Now Mr. Wilson was, least 
of all men, lacking in logic. For logicians who may stand 
aghast at his offhand utterance, I hasten to explain that 
it was not a contempt of logic, but simply an impatience 
of technicality; a determination to brush aside verbiage 
and get at the root of things. There was not one of us in 
the room whose heart did not beat with a like feeling. 

Thus it was determined that pensions should be 
assessed on the French system of calculations, being 
about an average as between the British pensions, which 
were higher, and the Italian pensions, which were lower. 
It was roughly figured at the Conference that this pen- 
sions item would amount to about fifteen billion dollars, 
capital sum. 

President Wilson's Generous Attitude 

I am going to take this opportunity to say a word in 
general as to President Wilson's attitude at the Peace 



REPARATIONS 273 

Conference. He is accused of having been unwilling to 
consult his colleagues. I never saw a man more ready 
and anxious to consult than he. He has been accused 
of having been desirous to gain credit for himself and to 
ignore others. I never saw a man more considerate of 
those of his coadjutors who were working immediately 
with him, nor a man more ready to give them credit with 
the other chiefs of state. Again and again would he 
say to Mr. Lloyd George or M. Clemenceau: "My 
expert here, Mr. So-and-So, tells me such-and-such, and 
I believe he is right. You will have to argue with him 
if you want to get me to change my opinion." President 
Wilson undoubtedly had his disabilities. Perhaps in a 
trade, some of the other chiefs of state could have "out- 
Jockeyed" him; but it seldom reached such a situa- 
tion, because President Wilson, by his manifest sin- 
cerity and open candor, always saying precisely what he 
thought, would early disarm his opponents in argument. 
President Wilson did not have a well-organized secre- 
tarial staff. He did far too much of the work himself, 
studying until late at night papers and documents that 
he should have largely delegated to some discreet aides. 
He was, by all odds, the hardest worked man at the 
Conference; but the failure to delegate more of his work 
was not due to any inherent distrust that he had of men 
— and certainly not to any desire to "run the whole 
show" himself — but simply to his lack of facility in 
knowing how to delegate work on a large scale. In exe- 
cution we all have a blind spot in some part of our eye. 
President Wilson's was in his inability to use men; an 
inability, mind you, not a refusal. On the contrary, 
when any of us volunteered or insisted upon taking re- 
sponsibility off his shoulders he was delighted. 



274 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Throughout the Peace Conference Mr. Wilson never 
played politics. I never witnessed an occasion when I 
saw him act from unworthy conception or motive. His 
ideals were of the highest, and he clung to them tena- 
ciously and courageously. Many of the so-called "lib- 
erals" in England have assailed Mr. Wilson bitterly be- 
cause, as they declare, he yielded too much to their own 
premier, Mr. Lloyd George, and to M. Clemenceau. 
But could he have failed to defer to them on questions 
in which no vital principle was involved? I well remem- 
ber his declaration on the question whether the Allies 
should refuse, for a period of five years during the time 
of France's recuperation, to promise Germany reciprocal 
tariff provisions. What Mr. Wilson said to Mr. Lloyd 
George and M. Clemenceau was this: "Gentlemen, my 
experts and I both regard the principle involved as an 
unwise one. We believe it will come back to plague you. 
But when I see how France has suffered, how she has 
been devastated, her industries destroyed — who am I 
to refuse to assent to this provision, designed, un- 
wisely or wisely, to assist in lifting France again to her 
feet?" 

I am not attempting to give a technical description of 
the reparation clauses. You can get those from the 
treaty of peace itself and from books that have already 
been printed upon it. What I am rather trying to do is 
to give a sweeping picture of how the reparation question 
was handled and of the way in which some of the chief 
figures connected with it treated it. I have hitherto 
pointed out that the first great principle settled by the 
plenary commission on reparations was, after long debate, 
to exclude from the bill the costs of war. I have next 
shown how it was determined by the chiefs of state to 



REPARATIONS 275 

include the costs for pensions and separation allowances — 
this item amounting to a probable total of fifteen billion 
dojiars- Next came the question of categories, that is to 
say, other specifications which should be included in the 
bill of costs. To this phase of the question Mr. Vance 
McCormick gave the most painstaking and intelligent 
attention. 

The American engineering experts were the only ones 
at the time of the Peace Conference that had made any 
attempt to survey the actual material damage that had 
been caused by Germany's aggression. Their calcula- 
tion was in the neighborhood of $15,000,000,000. French 
estimates, which, however, were acknowledgedly rough 
and approximate, exceeded that figure. But here we 
have, at any rate, in the two items of damage and pen- 
sions, a total figure of not less than $30,000,000,000, 
present capital sum, which could be figured as the sum 
Germany must pay. 

As TO Germany's Capacity to Pay 

From this point then we took up the question of Ger- 
many's capacity to pay, the question that was referred 
to subcommission No. 2. Lord Cunliffe of the British 
delegation, was chairman of this commission, and, after 
a few sittings, he called upon the various delegations to 
submit their several estimates as to what Germany 
could, with her present economic and financial resources, 
pay. We naturally asked Lord Cunliffe first to sub- 
mit the British estimate. This he seemed disinclined 
to do, stating that he would rest upon the figure 
given out in Mr. Lloyd George's pre-election campaign. 
This figure was 24,000,000,000 pounds sterling — call it 



276 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

$120,000,000,000 — a perfectly absurd figure so far as col- 
lectibility was concerned. 

The French, too, for political reasons, seemed disin- 
clined to submit their figure. Consequently, when the 
chairman called us together the American delegation, 
just as in other instances, was the only one prepared to 
make any concrete suggestion. It, therefore, submitted a 
preliminary report, indicating its belief that if proper 
steps to conserve Germany's assets were taken, a sum ap- 
proximating $5,000,000,000 might be collected prior to 
May I, 1 92 1, and, thereafter, a capital sum might not un- 
reasonably be levied as high as $25,000,000,000, always 
provided, first, that the other clauses in the treaty did not 
too greatly drain Germany's resources; second, did not, 
by tariff discrimination and otherwise, impair her indus- 
trial effectiveness; and third, permitted her to pay a 
reasonable part, say one-half of the total sum in German 
marks, which might, conceivably, mean the reinvestment 
in German domestic enterprises by British and French 
recipients of their payments. 

Subcommission No. 2 then asked Lord Cunliffe, Minis- 
ter Loucheur, of the French delegation, and myself to 
draft a report for the subcommission's consideration, indi- 
cating our views as to how Germany might pay such sum 
as might be assessed against her, and, in effect, asked the 
three British, French, and American delegates to concur 
in their own views as to a definite sum before submitting 
the report back to the subcommission. In making the 
first draft of this report, from which the final treaty 
clauses were in part drawn, I inserted the same figure of 
$30,000,000,000 with the same qualifications as hereto- 
fore expressed, and then showed the report to the French. 
They expressed satisfaction with its form and stated 



REPARATIONS 277 

that if we could revise our estimates up to a figure of 
$40,000,000,000 they could recommend to their chief of 
state such a figure. 

The British delegation said that they could not accept 
a figure below $47,500,000,000, but even this was con- 
siderable of a come-down from the figure of $120,000,- 
000,000 which they had before stuck at. At this stage 
of the proceedings it looked as if the delegations could 
probably agree upon some definite figure. While we 
were quite a distance apart, the difference did not seem 
to be irreconcilable. 

Soon after this, however, pohtical considerations began 
to arise, and the question became one practically for the 
chiefs of state themselves to finally determine. In an 
endeavor to reach a solution of the question, the chiefs 
of state practically withdrew the determination from the 
commission on reparations itself, and delegated it to an 
informal commission, upon which a few of us sat from 
day to day. We worked upon various schemes, one of 
them being that of trying to establish a maximum and 
a minimum figure; that is to say, the minimum that 
Germany must in any event pay and the maximum up 
to which she might be compelled to pay if circumstances 
permitted. 

A Permanent Reparations Commission 

It was in this connection that the proposal of setting 
up a permanent reparations commission for handling the 
whole matter was first made. This was the idea of Mr. 
John Foster Dulles and was in discussion rapidly devel- 
oped. As a matter of fact, Mr. Lloyd George especially, 
and even M. Clemenceau, seized upon the idea of a 
permanent commission as an efficacious method to enable 



278 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

them to postpone, until the political horizon had cleared, 
the decision of a definite sum for Germany to pay. 

I shall not attempt to describe the almost interminable 
discussions that continued on this whole subject: First, 
the endeavor to effect a compromise upon a fixed sum; 
next, upon maximum and minimum fixed sums, and 
then, finally, the postponement of the whole question to 
the permanent reparations commission. When such prin- 
ciple had been determined upon, the constitution of the 
commission, its powers, and its operations constituted 
another topic requiring days of discussion. Whenever 
the informal committee in charge of the matter reached 
an impasse, they referred the matter to the chiefs of 
state, who, perhaps, after an afternoon of discussion, 
would settle it for them, and we would proceed with 
our plans. 

The final result of all this was embodied in the clauses 
of the peace treaty itself, dealing with reparation and 
finance, and here I shall give you a brief summary of 
those clauses, taken directly from Volume H of **The 
History of the Peace Conference," edited by H. W. V. 
Temperley, to the publication of which I was able to lend 
my aid. 

The summary is as follows: 

First. Germany accepts tlie moral responsibility for having caused 
all damage suffered as a consequence of the war. 

Second. The treaty specifies what portion of this damage is to 
become a financial liability of Germany. 

Third. It does this by determining precisely what Germany shall 
pay /or; it does not determine in general how much Germany shall 
pay nor in what form her obHgations are to be discharged. 

Fourth. How much Germany is to pay in all, both by way of 
reparation and on account of other treaty claims, is left to the deci- 
sion of the reparation commission. 



REPARATIONS 279 

Fifth. The amount is to be determined by the commission by 
valuation and addition of claims conforming to the different cate- 
gories of damage for which compensation is due under the treaty. 

Sixth. In arriving at its decision the commission will have no 
regard to the ultimate total nor to the capacity of Germany to pay 
this total. 

Seventh. The decision is to be notified to Germany by the first 
of May, 1 92 1, after the German Government has been heard as to 
the admissibihty and the valuation of particular claims. 

Eighth. The reparation commission will also decide wheri pay- 
ment is to be made, except that the equivalent of £1,000,000,000 
must be paid as a first instalment within the period assigned to the 
commission for arriving at its decision as to the total reparation 
debt. 

Ninth. How payment of the first £1,000,000,000 is to be made 
is also a question left to the discretion of the commission. 

Tenth. How payment is to be made after the first of May, 1921, 
is left to the discretion of the German Government, except as regards 
certain specified amounts to be paid in kind. 

Eleventh. The commission has no discretion to abate its aggregate 
award for reparation, when once it has been arrived at, except with 
the specific authority of the several governments represented upon 
the commission. 

Twelfth. But though it may not vary the reparation debt, the 
commission has a wide discretion over payments. It may extend 
their date and modify the form even of such payments as are required 
by the treaty to be made in a specified way. 

Thirteenth. The sanctions by which the commission is enabled 
to enforce its decisions are the ordinary international sanctions of 
force supported by public opinion. It has no special sanction to 
support its authority against Germany. 

The Priority for Belgium 

Before touching upon the formation of the perma- 
nent reparations commission and upon its workings, I 
must mention the priority of $500,000,000 that was 
arranged for Belgium. A priority, without specifying 
the amount of it, had, in effect, been pledged to Belgium 
long before the end of the war, but nobody seemed to 



28o WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

be very keen to establish the priority. Colonel E. M. 
House, however, with the foresight, kindliness, and wis- 
dom which he displayed throughout the entire Peace 
Conference, late in February suggested a plan to Mr. 
Balfour of the British delegation, and M. Klotz, of the 
French delegation, granting Belgium a priority of 
$500,000,000 on the German reparation, this sum being 
sufficient to set Belgium well on her way to recovery. 
There was, however, great delay in getting final assent to 
this priority. Mr. Norman Davis, the able and leading 
United States Treasury representative, and all the Ameri- 
can delegation worked hard to bring it about and to 
push the plan on every occasion, but it still hung fire. 
The Belgian delegation, finally becoming alarmed, in- 
sisted on formally taking up the question with the Coun- 
cil of Four. The Belgian delegation, under the leadership 
of Mr. Hymans, minister of foreign affairs, made two 
chief demands, one for the priority and one for reimburse- 
ment for what the war had cost her. To this latter item 
there was vigorous objection on the ground that it was 
inadmissible to provide for Belgium's ''costs of war" and 
not for those of England, France, Italy, and the other 
Allies. 

As a compromise to meet the situation a formula was 
finally proposed in'a phrase to the effect that Germany was 
to be obligated especially "to reimburse Belgium for all 
the sums borrowed by Belgium from the Allies as a neces- 
sary consequence of the violation of the treaty of 1839." 
Inasmuch as all such sums borrowed by Belgium were 
used for the prosecution of the war, this phrase was sim- 
ply a euphemism for granting Belgium the war costs 
that she had demanded. But it was finally agreed to 
on all hands, and the crisis was averted. It should be 



REPARATIONS 281 

noted that from the beginning the American delegation 
had claimed for Belgium full reimbursement of war costs 
on the ground that, irrespective of the armistice agree- 
ment, Germany had made herself liable for these through 
having violated the neutrality of Belgium. Germany in 
fact herself repeatedly recognized her obligation to in- 
demnify Belgium completely. 

German Prior Lien Bonds for Belgium 

In connection with this priority, as arranged for Bel- 
gium, three of the chiefs of state, namely, President 
Wilson and Premiers Lloyd George and Clemen ceau, 
agreed to submit for the consideration of their respective 
legislative bodies the proposal to accept German Govern- 
ment bonds in lieu of the various sums owed to them by 
the Government of Belgium. If — in the case of the 
United States Congress — this proposition were approved, 
it would mean that the United States Treasury would 
turn over the Belgian obligations it holds, to the amount 
of approximately one hundred and seventy million dol- 
lars, and receive in place thereof an equivalent amount 
of German Government bonds. When this proposition 
was discussed at Paris, and later publicity given to it, 
both there and in the statement which Mr. Lloyd George 
made in regard to it in the House of Commons, it was 
pointed out that the German bonds, to be received in 
place of the Belgian bonds, were probably of equal, if 
not greater, validity, owing to the priority granted to 
them under Article 232 of the Treaty, which reads as 
follows : 

In accordance with Germany's pledges, already given, as to com- 
plete restoration for Belgium, Germany undertakes, in addition to 



282 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the compensation for damage elsewhere in this Part provided for, 
as a consequence of the violation of the Treaty of 1839, to make re- 
imbursement of all sums which Belgium lias borrowed from the Allied 
and Associated Governments up to November 11, 191 8, together 
with interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per annum on such 
sums. This amount shall be determined by the Reparation Com- 
mission, and the German Government undertakes thereupon forth- 
with to make a special issue oj bearer bonds to an equivalent amount 
payable in marks gold, on May i, 1926, or, at the option of the Ger- 
man Government, on the first of May in any year up to 1926. Sub- 
ject to the foregoing, the form of such bonds shall be determined 
by the Reparation Commission. Such bonds shall be handed over 
to the Reparation Commission, which has authority to take and 
acknowledge receipt thereof on behalf of Belgium. 

The reparation clauses further went on to specify 
concrete methods by which Germany should immedi- 
ately begin to make restitution in kind. That is to say 
in view of the terrific inroads which German submarine 
warfare had caused in Great Britain's and France's mer- 
cantile fleets, it was provided that practically all of Ger- 
many's merchant marine should be surrendered so as to 
make good, at least to a certain extent, the Alhes' terrible 
losses. Upon the whole question of shipping Mr. Lloyd 
George was, not unnaturally, particularly insistent, by 
reason of the fact that for generations Great Britain's 
mercantile marine had been the arteries of the empire's 
commercial life, and without it England was compara- 
tively helpless. 

In similar ways concrete provisions were adopted pro- 
viding for the delivery of large quantities of coal by Ger- 
many to France and Italy. Germany had created such 
havoc in the Lens coal-fields of France, which furnished 
fuel for all French industries in the north, that, as experts 
calculated that these coal-mines could not be put back 
into \\orking condition within five years, very properly 



REPARATIONS 283 

therefore, in addition to the coal supplies made available 
to France by means of the settlement of the Saar Basin, 
further definite supplies were to be allocated and deHvered 
to France, month by month and year by year, for a period 
of time. As a matter of fact, the capacity of the Germans 
to deliver the specified amount of coal was overestimated, 
and modification of the tonnage has been arranged. 

The delivery of several other items was also specified 
— particularly that of cattle, horses, sheep, goats, etc. 
Great outcry has been raised by Germany on the score 
that in compelling her to dehver over milch cows to France 
and to Belgium, the Allies were working a cruel hard- 
ship upon German children. Germany seems completely 
to have overlooked the fact that in the most cruel fashion 
she drove over into Germany enormous herds of cattle 
from both France and Belgium, and deliberately took 
away draft horses and all sorts of other useful animals, 
depriving both the French and Belgian peasant farmers 
of their stock in trade. In fact, Germany did this so 
openly that before the war was over she boasted of her / 
possession of an entire herd of famous French stallions 
and brood mares, advertising that, having taken this 
herd, she (Germany) was now in sole position to furnish 
this valuable stock for the future. 

As an earnest of good faith in carrying out the repara- 
tion provisions of the treaty, it was provided that Ger- 
many should deliver over to the reparation commission 
forthwith 20,000,000,000 marks gold bonds, not bearing 
interest, but payable within the two-year period provided 
for the original payment of this amount. Of course, any 
sums paid in commodities, or otherwise, were to apply 
against the principal of these bonds. Further provision 
was made for delivery by Germany of 40,000,000,000 



284 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

marks gold bonds, bearing interest upon an ascending 
scale; and, within the discretion of the reparations com- 
mission, of a still third instalment of 40,000,000,000 
marks of gold bonds, bearing interest at 5 per cent. 
Thus, it was provided that as a total Germany should, if 
so instructed by the reparations commission, issue a total 
of 100,000,000,000 marks gold bonds, amounting at the 
old rate of exchange to, roughly, 125,000,000,000. 

Much confusion has existed as to the issuance of these 
bonds among persons having the impression that they 
were over and above the actual reparation which Ger- 
many should have to pay. This is incorrect. These 
bonds were given as a pledge of Germany's good faith 
and, under certain circumstances, could be utilized by 
the various countries just as any financial obligation 
may be utilized. If the total amount of reparation that 
Germany finally paid was, say, $30,000,000,000, then any 
outstanding bonds that she might have given, say, to the 
extent of $25,000,000,000, would be included in the first- 
named sum. 

Advantage of American Participation 

The permanent reparations commission, which was 
charged with the duty of determining the amount of 
material damage for which Germany's aggression was 
responsible, and was also instructed to use its discretion 
along various lines, was, roughly, to be composed of five 
members, representing respectively the United States, 
Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, with, how- 
ever, a qualification that when matters relating to ship- 
ping were under discussion, Japan's delegate was to take 
the place of Belgium's; when matters relating to Austria- 



REPARATIONS 285 

Hungary were under discussion, then the Serbian dele- 
gate was to take the place of Belgium's. 

The powers of this permanent reparations commission, 
as set up in the treaty, were so great, and the effect of 
its decisions upon the financial and commercial work- 
ings of all the Allied and Associated countries, including 
America, was likely to be so far-reaching, that obviously 
it was necessary that the delegates should be men of the 
highest capacity, courage, and wisdom. Of course, at the 
time the constitution of this commission was drawn up 
and its powers granted, there was no thought on the part 
of any one that the United States would fail to have a 
representative upon the commission. We all know that 
her failure in this respect has been due to the fact that 
the United States has not ratified the treaty; nor was 
the Senate willing to accede to President Wilson's sugges- 
tion that, temporarily at any rate, because of America's 
interests in the situation, he should be allowed to name 
an American representative. 

This omission has, in my judgment, been, in consider- 
able measure, responsible for the lamentable delay that 
has occurred in fixing the amount of the German indem- 
nity. The Americans were always a moderating influ- 
ence throughout the Peace Conference. There was no 
reason why they should not continue as such in the post- 
treaty deliberations. They would have occupied a posi- 
tion of peculiar impartiality by reason of the fact that, 
under the action of the reparations commission itself, 
the United States expected to receive little or no com- 
pensation. Our failure to name a delegate for this com- 
mission has been not merely a great disappointment to 
our former associates in the war, but has, I believe, been 
largely responsible for the continued economic unsettle- 



286 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

ment in Europe, with its unfortunate reflex upon our own 
industrial and commercial business. 

The situation in which we find ourselves to-day is this : 
The determination of reparations, after dragging along 
for eighteen months, has finally come to a head in the 
settlement agreed upon at Paris in February, 1921, be- 
tween Mr. Lloyd George and M. Briand, under which 
notification has been made to Germany that, over a series 
of forty-two years, she will have to pay a total sum of 
approximately $56,000,000,000 (at the old par of ex- 
change). If, however, this sum wxre to be amortized 
at 6 per cent and brought back to present value, it would 
amount to a trifle under $18,000,000,000. Amortized at 
8^ per cent (which is not an unfair rate to take, inas- 
much as Belgium and France are paying at least that 
sum for their borrowings in America to-day), the capital 
sum would be reduced to a figure of about $13,000,000,000 
plus whatever amount Germany has already paid "on 
account." 

Now, even the most moderate of the experts figuring 
at Paris thought that Germany could pay a capital sum 
of $10,000,000,000 to $15,000,000,000, so that, not count- 
ing in the so-called "export tax," which is a part of the 
recent Paris settlement, the schedule arrived at does not 
seem to be unreasonable. Certain it is that the Allied 
and Associated Powers would be delighted to receive 
as reparation a capital sum to-day of $13,000,000,000 
rather than what that sum would amount to with 
interest spread out over a series of thirty or forty 
years. 

Criticism has been heard on the point that the repara- 
tion payments may have to be strung out over a long 
period of years — thirty or perhaps forty. Of course, the 



REPARATIONS 287 

Allies would welcome the payment in a much shorter 
time — at once, in fact. But their feeling is that, inas- 
much as Germany cannot pay all at once, she should 
continue to pay until such time as her debt is discharged. 
As a matter of fact, I believe that no one expects Ger- 
many to be making reparation payments thirty years, 
hardly even ten years, from now. We expect that before 
many years are past Germany's real capacity for con- 
tinued performance will have been made so manifest 
that some discounting or short-cut method of final set- 
tlement and payment, in long-term bonds or otherwise, 
will be arrived at and the whole disturbing question 
settled once and for all. 

Germany Able to Pay Large Amounts 

The ** export tax," so-called, to be levied on Germany 
may be difficult to defend, yet it is manifestly an attempt 
on the part of the Allies to gauge their reparations some- 
what upon Germany's own prosperity. It is the same 
principle that we worked on so long at Paris to establish, 
a maximum and a minimum figure. Whether or not this 
extra levy will work out remains to be seen, but don't 
let us allow ourselves to be deceived by the protest and 
outcry that come from Germany. 

We have, in my Judgment, rather fallen into the error 
of estimating Germany's capacity to pay purely on a 
basis of her pre-war exports and imports. We have not 
taken into account sufficiently the fact that, while 
France's industrial machinery was ruthlessly destroyed 
by Germany, Germany's factories are still absolutely 
intact. Germany's aggression in starting the war re- 
sulted, not only in the frightful civil damage which, as I 



288 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

have stated, would amount, including pensions, to a 
figure of at least $30,000,000,000 capital sum to-day, but 
has brought, in dollars and cents — forgetting, for the 
moment, the blood and suffering — a staggering load upon 
the world's shoulders. 

Accountants now are figuring that the total cost of the 
war to the world has been not less than $348,000,000,000. 
While the causes of the war may be still in dispute, we 
cannot reconcile ourselves to any theory but that Ger- 
many's aggression was responsible. Therefore, when the 
Allies now propose that Germany shall pay a sum which, 
capitalized to-day at present going rates of interest, 
amounts to only about $13,000,000,000, it does not seem 
unreasonable. 

And do not let us forget that it was the German people 
— not their rulers alone — who were responsible for the 
war. Don't let us overlook the fact that at the time 
when German fortunes were on the top of the wave, her 
people were acclaiming with glee the thought that they 
would be able to impose an indemnity upon the Allies of 
not less than $500,000,000,000. 

Don't let us forget, too, when it comes to actual com- 
parisons and estimates of Germany's capacity, that fifty 
years ago, when the world's industry and commerce were 
on a scale only a fraction of what they are to-day, Ger- 
many compelled France, within a period of two years, 
to pay over a sum of $1,000,000,000. If France was able 
to do that, ought not Germany, with a population almost 
twice as large — skilful, able, industrious, with her indus- 
trial machinery unimpaired — to be able (unless the 
Allies proceed to handicap her economic development) to 
meet pretty nearly the present schedule? 



REPARATIONS 289 

No American Pledge as to War Debts 

This whole question, however, in my judgment, will 
never be properly and finally settled — nor will the ad- 
justments be carried out in a manner to bring about 
world restoration — unless, and until, America has an 
official share in these discussions. America is already in 
the situation. She cannot disentangle herself. Europe 
is her greatest customer, her greatest purchaser of grains, 
cotton, copper, and all other raw materials. If our own 
industry and commerce are to be restored, if we are to 
get back to former prosperity, then, indeed, must we 
lend our own eff"orts to European restoration. 

In this connection I note constant reference to some 
alleged secret understanding arrived at in Paris between 
President Wilson and his advisers on one hand, and the 
French and British representatives upon the other, to 
the eff'ect that Allied indebtedness to the United States 
should, in whole or in part, be cancelled, or forgiven. 
There is no such thing. From start to finish of the 
Peace Conference President Wilson and his advisers, 
without exception, opposed vigorously and finally any 
such suggestion or proposition of cancellation. The ques- 
tion in one form or another constantly arose. It was 
always "stepped on" by the American delegates. There 
was no commitment, expressed or inferred, near or re- 
mote, moral or otherwise, as to the handling of the 
Allied indebtedness to the United States Government. 

That whole question of international debts is a most 
important one. It is bound to be the subject of discus- 
sion. The American people must, in the last analysis, 
determine it upon the principle of what course is best 
calculated to benefit the world as a whole, including 



290 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

America. And so far as the Peace Conference or any 
implied understanding there is concerned, the American 
people, in arriving at their decision, are as free and un- 
trammelled as air. 

We must, of course, give to our brethren abroad — 
with whom shoulder to shoulder we fought for Ger- 
many's defeat — we must give to them our counsel, our 
wisdom, our help. In no way can we do it otherwise 
than by sitting in with them, day by day; by discussing 
with them these problems; by showing them a moderate, 
dispassionate point of view; by trying to realize their 
own terrible difficulties, the disasters through which they 
are passing, and thus arrive with them upon a common 
basis of sympathy, of permanent understanding, of good- 
will, and of abiding friendship. 



BY ALLYN ABBOTT YOUNG ) 

Half of the Treaty of Versailles is made up of economic 
provisions. These provisions comprise literally hundreds 
of separate and distinct stipulations. Read them with 
any care and imagination and you will construct for 
yourselves, I venture to say, a better picture of how the 
treaty was made — of how it must inevitably have been 
made — than you will get from most of the published 
accounts of the Peace Conference. 

No four men, you will decide, wrote those clauses. 
Undoubtedly the members of the Council of Four con- 
sidered them, passed upon them, altered them at certain 
points, and of necessity assumed a final responsibility 
for them. Undoubtedly, too, a number of particularly 
knotty points, on which agreement was difficult, must 
have been referred to them for solution. And back of 
these hundreds of clauses, it will occur to you, there 
must have been a thousand complex facts — facts of his- 
tory, of geography, of international law, of precedents, of 
past or existing treaties, of faith to be kept, of economic 
needs, of national interests and policies, and of domestic 
politics. Many men, you will conclude, must have had 
a hand in the making of the treaty, and for that task 
they must have needed all the knowledge and all the 
preparation they could command. 

This much, I think, is no more than a fair inference 

291 



292 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

from a careful study of the economic sections of the 
treaty. So far as it goes it is wholly right. But while, 
on the one hand, it corrects a too prevalent notion that 
the details of the treaty were evolved through a process 
of debate by the Council of Four, it fails, on the other 
hand, to suggest the full importance of the share that 
President Wilson and his immediate associates had in 
its making. It is clear, of course, that most of the larger 
matters of the treaty had to be handled by the President. 
This is especially true of what may be called the major 
strategic points, upon which opposing interests and poli- 
cies focussed. And then, as I have suggested, there were 
many difficult problems upon which the groups of dele- 
gates who framed the different economic sections of the 
treaty found it impossible to agree. These sections came 
before the Council of Four for review with American, or 
British, or French, or other "reservations" attached to 
particular clauses. In the Council of Four agreement 
had to be reached in some way. Some one had to yield. 
The president had to decide in each case whether the 
matter was one on which the American position must be 
maintained at whatever cost, or whether it was one on 
which a concession might be made to an opposing view. 
It is hardly necessary to add that the President, like the 
other American plenipotentiaries, was frequently con- 
sulted by the American economic representatives, as 
when the American policy on any matter of large impor- 
tance was being formulated, or when unforeseen obsta- 
cles were encountered. It should be remembered, too, 
that each of the American plenipotentiaries (including the 
President) was a member of at least one of the different 
commissions which drafted the different sections of the 
treaty. 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 293 

I do not want you to infer from what I have just said 
that, in respect of the economic clauses, there was ever 
any serious difference of opinion as to what American 
policy ought to be. The President had made what we 
were proud to call American principles luminously clear. 
In the actual work of framing the economic clauses there 
was rarely any doubt as to what, in the hght of these 
principles, the American attitude should be. This, I 
think you will grant, is a remarkable and significant fact. 
The practical difficulty always was to determine just how 
far, as a last resort, it was justifiable and wise to accede 
to a departure from those principles in order to secure 
agreement. In the work of the subordinate commis- 
sions this problem always took a particular form. With 
reference to some matter it would become clear that the 
commission simply could not or would not agree to a 
solution that the American delegates could whole- 
heartedly accept. Should the American delegates do 
the best they could to secure a compromise that de- 
parted as little as might be from what they believed to 
be fundamentally right? Or should they stand by their 
guns, refuse any concession, and increase the President's 
burden by sending the disagreement up to the Council 
of Four? Always, I repeat, the problem before the 
American representatives on the various commissions 
which dealt with economic matters was a problem of 
just what was the best practicable solution of an actual, 
concrete, and pressing situation. Never was there much 
doubt as to the solution they preferred. They knew 
what sort of a treaty the President and his colleagues 
wanted. They believed, as I must still believe, that 
such was also the sort of treaty the American people 
wanted. 



294 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

There are two definite impressions I have tried to con- 
vey in what I have Just said. To make the first of these 
points clear, let us admit that there may have been cer- 
tain defects in the formal organization of the American 
Commission to Negotiate Peace. Very hkely there were. 
I do not believe they affected the character of the out- 
come. They were negligible as compared with the unity 
of spirit and of purpose that characterized the work of 
the whole organization. It is easy to see differences. 
They stand out and obtrude themselves. The full sig- 
nificance of agreement, of unity, of co-operation, is not 
so easily seen. Even those who were at Paris hardly 
realized the significance of this unity. They merely 
accepted it. They had a common cause and a common 
loyalty to high leadership. 

I have also emphasized — and this is my second point — 
the element of compromise, concession, mutual give-and- 
take, in the economic clauses. Just here is where the 
critics of these clauses find their opportunity. The critic 
is prone to think in terms of clear-cut general principles, 
of absolute right and wrong. Compromise is a departure 
from principle. It is easy, then, to find serious flaws in 
these economic clauses, reached as they were through 
compromise and agreement. You may believe that Ger- 
many should have been more severely dealt with, or you 
may believe, as I do, that the economic clauses, as a 
whole, are unwisely harsh and exacting. In either case 
the clauses depart from your standards of what they 
ought to be. 

But not one of the critics, so far as I know, has ever 
dealt with the matter with complete candor. Not one 
of them has squarely faced the alternatives. What would 
they have had the President do, when he saw that although 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 295 

the great and essential interests of the peace could be 
safeguarded, there were a good many important points in 
the economic settlement upon which agreement could be 
had only through concession? Would they have had the 
American representatives abandon the Conference and 
return to the United States? Or would they have had 
the President and his associates dictate the economic 
terms and force them down the throats of our Allies? 
The two alternatives are equally unthinkable. Left to 
themselves, with the firm, persistent, steadying pressure 
from America withdrawn, the various conflicting forces 
at Paris, if perchance they could have been brought into 
any sort of agreement, could have produced only a treaty 
that would have delivered the world over to militarism, 
imperialism, and economic suicide. On the other hand, 
peace terms dictated to our Aflies might have been signed 
but would not have been accepted. Either course would 
have meant prolonged bitterness and misunderstanding, 
new dissensions in Europe, the overturning of govern- 
ments, and a clear field for militarism — or worse. 

Look the facts squarely in the face, and there is no 
other conclusion than that the only way out and the only 
way forward was and is through international agreement 
and understanding. And as things were — and remain — 
agreement and understanding among the Allies were — 
and are — the indispensable prerequisites to any larger 
and more inclusive agreements. There is no other road 
to the maintaining of peace or to the mending of the 
wrecked economic structure of Europe. A refusal to see 
in the situation any questions save those of absolute 
economic right and wrong is not far removed from sheer 
intolerance. 

These things are not said by way of apology or extenua- 



296 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

tion. I am merely trying to restore a right perspective 
to matters that have become obscured and distorted by 
controversy. 

I shall return to that subject again. But I must 
record here my emphatic dissent from the notion that 
the economic clauses were made harsh and intolerable 
through unnecessary concessions yielded by President 
Wilson because he was misled and outmanoeuvred by his 
colleagues in the Council of Four. In the first place, those 
who were associated with the President at Paris will tell 
you how supremely quick and alert he was in discussion 
or conference, and how easily and accurately he pene- 
trated to the heart of the most complicated proposal. In 
the second place, the notion which I am trying to dispel 
conveys a false impression of the way the treaty was 
made. 

The Council of Four was not a debating club. Its func- 
tions were to make decisions, to reach agreements, and 
to give a sanction to agreements that had already been 
reached in one way or another. Naturally, its method 
was that of discussion. Proposals were made and inter- 
preted. Attitudes and points of view were explained 
and defended. But it was not a game of fence. 

The Peace Conference, has been overdramatized. In- 
terpretation of it in terms of tactics and strategy and dra- 
matic incidents is superficial. Mere cleverness had very 
little to do with it, one way or the other. Judgment, 
courage, and understanding were the qualities that 
counted for most. 

Then there has been some curious gossip to the effect 
that the economic clauses and other parts of the treaty 
failed fully to represent the American position because 
the President, in some way, had lost "his control of the 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 297 

situation." This is wrong in two or three different ways. 
In particular it gives a false suggestion of what the situa- 
tion was. Taking only the immediate personal situation 
into account, I suspect that the President, from the be- 
ginning to the end, had more power than he thought wise 
to use. But the whole situation, in its larger aspects, 
was an immovable and unchangeable fact, beyond the 
control of the President or of any other man. 

That situation, of course, was highly complex, but in 
it there were two outstanding factors. One was a matter 
of contract: the pre-armistice agreement made with the 
defeated foe, embodying, with certain reservations, the 
Fourteen Points. This furnished the basis of the Ameri- 
can programme at Paris. The other was psychological: 
the state of mind of the peoples of Europe. 

The task was peace; the state of mind was one that 
war had evoked. It even seemed that the defeat of the 
enemy had released a fresh flood of war passions. The 
final victory of the war was to be the peace. 

This state of mind was not confined to any one coun- 
try. It was not even peculiar to Europe. It manifested 
itself in America. With us, if one may trust its visible 
signs, it was hardly more than an undercurrent of feeling 
among a rather small minority. But even here it was 
the kind of thing unscrupulous or reckless leaders might 
have seized upon, guided, developed, and used to advance 
some disastrous purpose. This state of mind, however, 
was more nearly dominant in some countries than in 
others, just as everywhere it was more prevalent among 
certain classes of the community than among others. 
But so far as its bearing upon the economic clauses of the 
treaty is concerned, the important thing about this state 
of mind is that it was expressed in the French attitude at 



298 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the Peace Conference. For reasons that must be clear to 
any sympathetic understanding that state of mind which 
saw in the peace a crowning act of retribution and judg- 
ment was particularly common in France. More than 
that, it was perhaps the most important single factor in 
the French domestic political situation. And it was 
built upon and used for political purposes. 

What, then, was the French attitude at Paris? At its 
best it was the attitude of Clemenceau and of his ablest 
lieutenants. France could not be exposed to the danger 
of another unprovoked attack like that of 19 14. In some 
way, in whatever way, France had to be secured against 
that danger. All other things were subsidiary to that 
end. But I do not think that Clemenceau had any illu- 
sions respecting the wisdom or the practicability of the 
more extreme economic proposals his ministers urged 
upon the Peace Conference. 

At its worst the French attitude was that of a few 
men who seemed to be less interested in the ultimate 
effects of the economic provisions of the treaty than in 
its immediate use as an instrument of painful humilia- 
tion. They would have filled the treaty full of little 
poisoned darts that would have stung and rankled, but 
could not have advanced the interests of France, and 
would very certainly have tended to reduce the measure 
of her moral advantage over Germany. Very few of 
these unfortunate proposals got into the treaty. Getting 
rid of them took a good deal of time and effort on the 
part of both British and American delegates. But it is 
right to say that they had the generous and effective 
co-operation of Frenchmen with a broader and clearer 
view of the interests of their own country. 

Occupying 3^et another position were those Frenchmen 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 299 

who, like every one else, wanted France's safety to be 
assured, but could see safety in nothing short of her com- 
plete supremacy in Europe. On its political and mili- 
tary side this supremacy was to be secured through 
spheres of influence and military alliances, coupled with 
the partitioning of the enemy states. Economic suprem- 
acy was to be attained by repressing the trade and indus- 
try of the enemy states, by sapping the roots of their 
economic life. Never was there a purpose more tragi- 
cally blind. No nation can gather strength from the 
weakness of other nations. 

This is true in a special way of the states of Europe, 
with their dense population, their highly specialized in- 
dustries, and their dependence on each other and on the 
outside world for markets and for food and raw materials. 
I do not see how there can be any sound plan for the 
economic rehabilitation of Europe that does not take its 
economic solidarity into account. 

The care of French interests in the economic sections 
of the treaty was assigned to different ministers at Paris. 
Their more important proposals, taken as a whole, seemed 
to embody the extreme and suicidal economic pohcy I 
have Just described. Especially when they were coupled 
with other French proposals, it was easy to read into 
them a purpose to destroy the foundations of the eco- 
nomic life of the Central Powers, and of Germany in 
particular. Mihtarism and economic policy seemed to 
have joined hands. 

I am convinced, however, that these proposals had no 
such calculated purpose. In the first place, the French 
ministers were men of political experience and sagacity, 
and they had able advisers — although the best economists 
in France were not among them. They must have known 



300 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the futility of some of the things they proposed. In the 
second place, some of their demands were inconsistent 
one with another. This is obviously so of the exagger- 
ated bill for reparation payments as contrasted with 
the proposals to reduce Germany's export trade, upon 
which her ability to make reparation payments de- 
pends. 

In the third place — and this is the consideration to 
which I attach most importance — in the discussion and 
modification of these proposals their true character was 
revealed. They were, I believe, essentially political. 
Their ultimate effect upon the economic situation of Ger- 
many counted for less than their immediate reception 
by the French press, the Chamber of Deputies, and the 
French voters. 

I do not mean that these proposals were consciously 
insincere — that they were merely staged. Probably the 
motives and purposes back of them were mixed. I mean 
that when the issue was pressed the sound and fury of 
them seemed to be cherished even more than their effec- 
tive content. The French Government at that time was 
riding on the surface of a perilous sea of popular feeling. 
The ship had to be steered according to the waves and 
the wind, regardless sometimes of the true direction of 
the port. 

I do not pretend to a knowledge of the inwardness of 
French politics, but from this distance it appears that 
the cabinets that have been set up in France since the 
Peace Conference have been following the same compass- 
less course. The situation as a whole remains built on 
the illusions, the expectations, and the state of mind 
created during the war. One cabinet, balked by the 
practical difficulties it encounters, gives way to a sue- 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 301 

cessor willing to try to salvage a little more of the eco- 
nomic fruits of victory. 

The new reparations proposals, discussed at the re- 
cent London conference, are a case in point. They are 
much more exacting than the reparations clauses of the 
Treaty of Versailles. I cannot explain them except in 
times of political exigencies in France, with Lloyd George 
assenting for some inscrutable reasons of his own. Even 
with the best will in the world (and that is not reason- 
ably to be expected) Germany could not meet the pay- 
ments demanded of her. Competent French and British 
experts must know that such is the case. And the critics 
who have been clamoring for a revision of the reparation 
terms of the Versailles Treaty, and who have complained 
that these terms did not absolutely fix a maximum rep- 
arations sum, must now understand that, wholly desirable 
and right as it would have been, the fixing of a maximum 
sum that would have been anywhere within the bounds 
of reason was definitely impossible. 

There has been measurable economic progress in 
France since the war, but any substantial recovery must 
probably wait until the French people have been told 
the whole truth about the position of the nation's finances 
— the drastic measures that will be necessary to balance 
the budget and restore the currency to a position where 
industry and foreign trade will be on a dependable basis 
— and about the relatively small sum that can be obtained 
from Germany by way of reparation. 

I have experienced much the same difficulty in saying 
these things about the French attitude that the American 
delegates at Paris felt in opposing the French economic 
proposals. They knew that the grounds of their objec- 
tions would be misunderstood. In fact, more than once 



302 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

their motives were sharply challenged. But they tried 
to take full account of the difference between France's 
experience in the war and ours. There was sympathetic 
understanding, I know, of the inevitable effect which 
living for four years under the shadow of imminent 
national disaster must have upon the attitude of men. 
There was full consciousness of the world's immeasurable 
debt to France. But in loyalty to what they believed 
to be the interests of France and of the world, they had 
to refuse to accede to many of the French economic pro- 
posals. It is right to stop a man who is bent on com- 
mitting suicide. 

If the attitude of the French ministers at the Confer- 
ence was based in any large measure on political consid- 
eration, that fact must be reflected in the character of 
the clauses that were the outcome of the negotiations. 
Read these clauses carefully with this suggestion in mind, 
weigh their real significance, and you can hardly fail to 
decide that such is in fact the case. 

Take, for example, the reparations clauses. Germany 
signs a blank check to cover all the injuries she had 
done to civilians and to civilian property. Except for 
the inclusion of the questionable item of the cost of 
military pensions, this is clearly a reiteration of the pre- 
armistice agreement. Without the military pensions the 
blank check may be assumed to cover a sum as large as 
$15,000,000,000 or $20,000,000,000 in capital value; in- 
cluding military pensions probably doubles that figure. 
But this blank check is a political exhibit. The specific 
obligation imposed upon Germany was for the payment of 
a sum of not over $15,000,000,000, in terms of present 
worth, an amount which could not be increased except in 
the really impossible event that Germany should be found 
to be able to pay more, and then only by unanimous vote 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 303 

of the reparations commission. The new reparations 
proposals, it is possible, may have been prompted by the 
fact that the "blank check" was beginning to lose its 
value as a political exhibit. 

It is especially hard to see anything but a political 
motive — a regard for the expectations of the French 
people — in the French delegates' advocac}^ of the inchi- 
sion of war costs in the reparations bill, and their later 
acceptance of the item of military pensions. This de- 
creased France's proportionate share in the claims against 
the reparation payments, and on any reasonable view of 
the total amount Germany can pay, it reduces the amount 
France is likely to receive. 

Then take the commercial clauses. A number of them 
impose definite obligations upon Germany with respect 
to the treatment she is to accord to the citizens, the trade, 
and the shipping of the Allied and Associated Powers. In 
most cases there are no assurances of reciprocal treatment 
of German citizens, trade, and shipping, these matters 
being left for the different Powers to decide for them- 
selves. But these one-sided obligations, for the most 
part reasonable in themselves, hold for only a few years 
— generally five. Then they stop, except that in some 
cases their prolongation is left to the discretion of the 
League of Nations. 

Or consider the following clause: 

Each of the Allied or Associated Powers, being guided by the 
general principles or special provisions of the present Treaty, shall 
notify to Germany the bilateral treaties or conventions which such 
Allied or Associated Power wishes to revive with Germany. . . . 
The date of the revival shall be that of the notification. 

This rather unusual but really necessary provision 
leaves the matter wholly in the hands of the Allied 
Powers. Germany has no voice in the revival or non- 



304 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

revival of her commercial treaties with these Powers. 
But it is to be observed that by the terms of these treaties 
themselves Germany is able to abrogate them by giving 
due notice. 

More examples could be given, but these will suffice. 
My purpose has been to show you that the treaty is not, 
in reality, the disguised instrument of economic oppres- 
sion that it sometimes has been held to be. If any are 
deceived by its economic clauses, it is those who have 
been counting on its use as Just such an instrument. 

It is a hard and exacting document — it could and 
should have been nothing else — and makes some regret- 
table but necessary concessions to the prevailing state 
of mind in Europe, and especially to the political exigen- 
cies of the situation. There were times at Paris when 
that situation seemed like an impenetrable wall, blocking 
the way to any tolerable or even possible solution of the 
economic problems of the peace. But the very fact that 
the situation, w^hile in part natural and inevitable, was 
also in part political and artificial, made it possible to 
find a way through. 

Many of the economic clauses of the treaty are parts 
of a temporary scaffolding set up to hold things in place 
until a more enduring structure can be erected. The 
treaty does not purpose to settle the economic relations 
of the European states for all time. It is a forward- 
looking document. It leaves the way open for new and, 
it is to be hoped, better adjustments just as soon as the 
political situation in Europe makes those adjustments 
possible. In the long run the economic settlement will 
be just what the world makes of it. 

There is one criticism which may rightly be made of 
the economic provisions as a whole. They are too minute 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 305 

and detailed, and there are too many of them. Reading 
them you are likely to say that nothing that could have 
been thought of was left out. That is not quite true. 
More proposals were left out than were put in, but the 
provisions as they stand are a formidable array. Leave 
to one side the larger matters, such as the clauses relating 
to reparations, finance, and the disposition of German- 
owned foreign property, and the multitude of stipulations 
that remain give the impression not so much of severity 
as of unnecessary and meticulous concern for the inter- 
ests of the Allied Powers. 

This is again a more or less inevitable outcome of the 
concrete situation. A large number of Powers were 
jointly determining the terms on which peace should be 
made with a relatively small group of enemy Powers. 
Their outlooks and interests differed. To one delegation 
certain proposals seemed to provide for matters that 
were clearly essential. Other delegations attached more 
importance to other sets of proposals. Then there were 
the limited or special interests of the individual Powers. 
Some of these interests were wholly legitimate; that is, it 
was proper and necessary that they be safeguarded. But 
in practice it is hard to recognize any special interests 
without recognizing others. The representatives of the 
smaller states, in particular, sometimes explained that 
they would be accused at home of having been inatten- 
tive to their country's interests if they failed to secure 
special provisions corresponding to what had already 
been conceded, properly enough, on the insistence of 
some other state. Such things as these sometimes led 
to difficult and perplexing situations, calling for tact and 
patience on the part of those who had the broader and 
more general interests of the treaty at heart. Generally 
those difficulties were finally resolved in a reasonable 



3o6 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

way and without undue concessions to special national 
interests. 

It is easy, however, to exaggerate the real importance 
of this large group of detailed economic specifications. 
With very few exceptions each one taken by itself is 
defensible, and most of them are necessary. The Ameri- 
can delegates believed, however, that much the same or 
better results might have been obtained through simpler 
and more general provisions. 

Much has been written of the Council of Four, and 
much emphasis — perhaps too much emphasis — has been 
put on the clash of personalities and purposes in its coun- 
cil room. If space permitted, I should want to try to 
fill in some of the details that may be wanting in the pic- 
ture of the Peace Conference at work by describing, as 
concretely as I could, the way in which the business of 
the various commissions and subcommissions that dealt 
with economic matters was handled. But I shall have 
to confine myself to saying a word about the men who 
composed them. Here I have especially in mind, merely 
because I know^ it best, the economic commission, which 
dealt with commercial relations and the status of eco- 
nomic treaties, of pre-war debts and contracts, of seques- 
tered or liquidated enemy property, and of patents and 
other forms of industrial property. 

One had to give ungrudging admiration to the effi- 
ciency of the British economic delegates and technical 
advisers, a number of whom were Board of Trade officials. 
Highly competent in all technical matters, always care- 
fully prepared, they were never without an easy mas- 
tery of the subject in hand. Keenly alive to British 
interests, they always had also at heart the general inter- 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 307 

ests of the treaty. Despite some sharp differences of 
opinion, the American delegation is indebted to them 
for a large amount of helpful and generous co-operation. 

Among the French representatives there were more 
varied shades of personal attitude. Those who repre- 
sented the Ministry of Commerce had a carefully prepared 
programme which they upheld with ability and tenacity. 
I should be doing this particular group of men an injus- 
tice if I did not record their patient courtesy under con- 
ditions that must sometimes have been trying, and their 
generous comprehension of other points of view. 

There were distinctly able men among the Italian 
economic delegates, but they seemed to be rather closely 
bound by instructions from their government, and less 
free to make decisions, even on matters of distinctly 
minor importance. Among the economic delegates from 
other states, I venture to single out the representatives 
of Belgium and of Brazil as conspicuous in respect of 
abihty, technical knowledge, and breadth of view. The 
Belgian delegates, I am sure, did not weaken Belgium's 
cause because they added to their solicitude for her wel- 
fare a manifest ambition that the treaty as a whole 
should establish a just peace. 

(The selection of the heads of our war boards and of / 
representatives of the treasury to take charge of Ameri- 
can interests in the economic sections of the treaty was 
an obvious one to make. Mr. Baruch, Mr. McCormick, 
Mr. Davis, and Mr. Lamont had all been concerned with 
the common economic problems and policies of the AHies 
during the period of our participation in the war. They 
had become familiar with many of the matters that were 
to come up for discussion at Paris; they understood the 
different points of view of the other Powers; they had 



3o8 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

earned the confidence of the country. In addition to 
their responsibilities in connection with the treaty, they 
had to deal with important and pressing current matters 
of economic relations and economic poHcy. For this 
purpose a new body, the Supreme Economic Council, 
superseding various agencies of Interallied co-operation 
that had been developed during the war, was set up at 
Paris. Mr. Hoover, an important member of the Supreme 
Economic Council, was not officially associated with the 
drafting of the treaty. This does not mean, however, 
that his counsel was not frequently sought. 

Adequate sources of information were available to the 
American delegates. Care had been taken to anticipate 
the economic problems that might be discussed and prep- 
arations had been made accordingly. It was inevitable 
that information should have been gathered on many 
matters that did not come up for discussion. It was im- 
possible to foresee the precise course events would follow. 
The important thing was that whatever information was 
needed should not be wanting. Supplementing the large 
accumulations of information that were in the hands of 
the war boards, a fairly large amount of useful material 
had been brought together by The Inquiry. Much of it 
bore upon the territorial rather than the more general 
economic problems of the peace. Agriculture, mining, 
industry, commerce, transportation routes, and the like, 
had been studied with special reference to their bearing 
upon the shifting of boundaries, the creation of new 
states, and the reorganization of colonial systems. 
Through the co-operation of the United States Geological 
Survey there was available the most complete and accu- 
rate body of information respecting the location and 
magnitude of the mineral reserves of the world that had 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 309 

ever been brought together. Various bureaus of the 
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Com- 
merce also compiled economic statistics or prepared eco- 
nomic maps for the use of the American delegation. The 
United States Tariff Commission had supplied a very 
complete index and digest of the commercial treaties 
of the world. A small statistical organization was main- 
tained at Paris, so that facts could quickly be put into 
usable form. A group of American army engineers, it 
should also be said, had made careful studies in the 
field which gave a reasonably accurate notion of the 
amount of damages for which Germany was liable under 
the terms of the pre-armistice agreement. 

The matters I have just been discussing have taken us 
away from our main theme — the influences which deter- 
mined the shaping of the economic clauses of the treaty. 
I have reserved two of the most important factors in the 
situation for the last. 

In June, 1916, before the United States had entered 
the war, an economic conference of the Allies was held 
at Paris. A common economic policy after the war was 
agreed upon. During the period of reconstruction im- 
ports from enemy countries were to be restricted or even 
prohibited, and enemy subjects were to be excluded from 
industrial and professional activities within the Alhed 
countries. Some measure of discrimination against the 
enemy countries, it was suggested, might be continued 
as a permanent policy. 

In most quarters the resolutions of the Paris economic 
conference were not taken very seriously. They were 
interpreted as an aimless release of war passions, as a 



310 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

gesture of intimidation, or at the most as an attempt to 
organize the economic advantages of the Allies so that 
they could be bargained with to best advantage when 
peace came to be made. A year ago two of the British 
delegates said these resolutions were a reply to an earlier 
declaration of economic war by the Central Powers. 

Even before the armistice the Paris resolutions had 
become well-nigh forgotten — at any rate in the United 
States. I recall them here merely because they were 
revived, in effect, at the Peace Conference, in proposals 
made by the French Ministry of Commerce for a special 
economic regime for the period of reconstruction. They 
had lost, of course, most of their mihtary significance. 
The emphasis was now put upon the special needs and 
deserts of the countries which had suffered most from 
the war, and especially upon the injustice of permitting 
German industry to gain an advantage at the start over 
the industries that had to be rebuilt because the German 
armies had wantonly destroyed them. Much was said, 
in other countries as well as in France, about the neces- 
sity of "priorities" in supplies of raw materials and in 
allocation of shipping. 

There were some who went even further and urged 
that the whole world situation was such as to compel a 
complete supervision of the distribution of raw materials 
and the necessaries of life among the different nations. 
The ordinary forces of the market, it was held, were 
inadequate. Allocations should be based on fundamental 
needs rather than on present ability to buy. Those who 
wanted priorities with a view to special national interests 
and those who urged a world system of priorities in 
which immediate national interests should be disregarded 
wanted the same general sort of system, although un- 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 311 

doubtedly it would have operated very differently in the 
one case and the other. 

It cannot be denied that some of these proposals made 
a telling appeal to the sense of justice. Their wisdom 
and their practicability were other matters. It is far 
from clear that they would have afforded any real mea- 
sure of relief or that they would have been as effective as 
unimpeded private enterprise. The arguments back of 
them rested in part upon exaggerated estimates of world 
shortages in raw materials and shipping. In most in- 
stances "priorities" would have been meaningless, for, 
given effective methods of distribution, there was more 
than enough to go around. In the arguments for special 
priorities for the industries of the devastated regions, 
there was a general tendency to underestimate the extent 
to which German industries, Kkewise, had been stripped 
for the benefit of the German armies, as well as to forget 
the direct connection between Germany's ability to export 
goods and her ability to make reparation payments. 

But quite apart from the wisdom of the proposed tran- 
sitional regime, it would have encountered insuperable 
practical difficulties. In the first place, it would not of 
itself have removed the chief obstacle to the speedy eco- 
nomic rehabilitation of the countries that might have 
been granted priorities. I mean the financial obstacle. 
Priorities are valueless unless they are accompanied by 
ability to buy. It should be said, however, that these 
proposals for priorities were often associated with finan- 
cial propositions, such as pooling the war debts of the 
Allies, or pooling the proceeds of special war taxes to be 
imposed in all of the Allied states, or the joint under- 
writing of the reparations payments. 

In the second place special restrictions upon Germany's 



312 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

export trade, coupled with priorities for the needs of the 
industries of the devastated regions, would have made 
it necessary to continue not only the machinery of inter- 
alhed economic co-operation, but also an effective na- 
tional control of trade in each Allied country. And that 
was a practical political impossibihty. 

Finally, let us turn to another proposal — and one of a 
very different sort. The proposal to which I refer was 
made by President Wilson on January 8, 191 8. The 
third of the Fourteen Points called for ''The removal, so 
far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establish- 
ment of an equality of trade conditions among all nations 
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for 
its maintenance." 

The words "the removal of economic barriers" gave 
rise to some real or pretended misgivings in American 
political circles. Our protective tariff is an "economic 
barrier." Was it the President's purpose that it should 
be removed? Finally the President was forced to explain 
that of course he "meant to suggest no restriction upon 
the free determination of any nation of its own economic 
policy, but only that whatever tariff any nation might 
deem necessary for its own economic service, be that 
tariff high or low, it should apply equally to all foreign 
nations; in other words, there should be no discrimina- 
tion against some nations that did not apply to others." 
The President's explanation further made it clear that 
what most of all he meant should be done away with 
was the exertion of economic discrimination for hostile 
purposes. This proposal, then, was closely linked to his 
other proposal that the economic weapon should be 
intrusted solely to the League of Nations. The passing 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 313 

of the power to discriminate against the trade of some 
particular nation or nations was to be like the reduction 
of national armaments. 

The full significance of this proposal is not easily seen 
by Americans, accustomed to tariff schedules definitely 
set by Act of Congress. Not that our tariff system is 
wholly without its discriminatory features, but these are 
not what give it its special character. In continental 
Europe, however, legislation fixes two (or in some cases 
more) sets of tariff schedules, or fixes the upper and 
lower limits of the duties that may be put into effect. 
Each country, then, in principle at least, is in a position 
to refuse to make tariff concessions to countries which 
do not, in turn, give favorable treatment to its own 
trade. 

Under this system a discriminatory tariff is to one 
state a necessary means of defense against possible dis- 
crimination on the part of other states. But defensive 
weapons are prone to be used for offense. And this is 
true of differential tariffs. The most systematic and 
consistent development of such tariffs has been in France, 
but Germany was the first state to grasp their full possi- 
bilities as methods of controlling and dictating the com- 
mercial policy of other states. Even in supposedly sober 
and scientific discussions the German tariff was not in- 
frequently referred to as an instrument of Machtpolitiky 
as a means of "imposing Germany's will" on other states. 

The European commercial system before the war was 
held together by commercial treaties. Generally these 
specified the tariff schedules which should apply as be- 
tween the two contracting states. They also contained 
most-favored-nation clauses, which assured to each state 
the advantages of any further concession either of them 



314 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

should make to a third state. As a result, the revision 
of an important commercial treaty was likely to be fol- 
lowed by sweeping changes in European tariffs. 

I imagine that the '* equality of trade conditions,'* 
which President Wilson proposed would mean in prac- 
tice something like a general or multilateral commercial 
treaty, in which the signatory Powers would guarantee 
to each other equal, i. e., most-favored nation, treatment 
in respect of tariffs and other commercial matters. 

Whether colonial tariffs of the sort which give free 
trade or reduced duties to the home states and discrimi- 
nate against but not among other states, are to be deemed 
infringements of equality of trade conditions, is a more 
difficult question. It depends, I suppose, upon the 
degree to which a state and its colonies may be consid- 
ered a unified political system, with one centre of sov- 
ereignty. It is probably wiser to consider this matter 
of the open door in colonies as a distinct and separate 
problem. The Covenant of the League of Nations, it 
will be remembered, provides for the open door in all 
regions that are to be administered by mandatories. 

There are other important aspects to equality of trade 
conditions. What I have said merely suggests the gen- 
eral nature of the problem. The matter was not thrashed 
out at Paris. The immediate and all-absorbing task was 
to determine the terms of peace with the enemy Powers, 
rather than adjust the commercial relations of the mem- 
bers of the League of Nations. But the proposal was 
not forgotten or put aside. In the Covenant of the 
League of Nations is this clause: 

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international 
conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of 
the League will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 315 

communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the com- 
merce of all members of the League, In this connection, the special 
necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 191 4-19 1 8 
shall be borne in mind.^ 

In the summer of 1920 some attempts were made to 
raise an alarm by urging that this clause looks toward 
free trade among the members of the League. It is not 
even necessary to show that the words of the clause can- 
not possibly be tortured into such a meaning. Any one 
who has any knowledge of the history or present status 
of the protective tariff policies of European states will 
realize how impossible it is that any clause to which such 
a meaning might be attributed could have passed the 
watchful scrutiny to which every word in the treaty was 
subjected. 

In one way, it must frankly be admitted, the treat- 
ies framed at Paris create new "economic barriers." 
In eastern Europe the treaties shift and multiply po- 
litical boundaries. Following, for the most part, lines 
of cleavage between nationalities, these boundaries cut 
across established channels of economic intercourse and 
sever territories that have been and remain economically 
dependent one on another. In part the old economic 

^ In the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the observations of the 
German delegation on the conditions of peace, there is further reference to the 
matter: 

"The principles which the Allied and Associated Powers desire to bring into 
application when the world returns to normal conditions are those which Presi- 
dent Wilson has enunciated on various occasions in his speeches, and which are 
embodied ... [as above] ... in the Covenant of the League of Nations. . . . 
After the necessary period of transition is over, and when a reformed Germany 
is admitted to membership of the League of Nations, the Allied and Associated 
Powers will be able to co-operate with her in arriving at a more permanent 
arrangement for the establishment of an equitable treatment for the commerce 
of all nations." 



3i6 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

systems in eastern Europe were artificial. Agriculture 
and industry had grown up inside of high-tariff walls and 
had, perforce, found their markets very largely within 
those same walls. But if artificial, the old system of 
market relations was none the less real. It cannot sud- 
denly be upset without a shock greater than the new 
states, in their present weakened condition, can safely 
absorb. 

If the treaties had been drafted by a group of despots, 
irresponsible but benevolently inclined, some measure of 
compulsory economic co-operation on the part of the 
states of eastern Europe might very easily have been 
insisted upon. But as things were, compulsory customs 
unions or similar arrangements were outside the field of 
possibilities. There was some fear, justified or not, that 
economic unions might pave the way to the re-estabhsh- 
ment of the old political systems. But the real obstacle 
was the highly nationalistic attitude of the new states 
themselves, showing itself in an insistence on economic 
autonomy and independence. The best that could be 
done was to give the new states power to reduce or 
remove certain economic barriers in their own discretion. 
Thus at any time within three years Austria, Hungary, 
and the Czecho-SIovak state may enter into special 
customs arrangements. The Czecho-SIovak state may 
choose between such a customs union and one with 
Poland. Poland, in turn, is left free to enter into special 
customs arrangements with Russia or with states whose 
territories were formerly parts of Russia. But Poland 
cannot give exceptional tariff concessions to Austria or 
Hungary or Germany. 

These provisions are not adequate. They recognize 
the problem and its importance, and probably go as far 



THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT 317 

toward a solution of it as was humanly possible under 
all the conditions that existed at Paris. They afford a 
temporary and tentative solution. More permanent ar- 
rangements will have to be reached under the guidance 
of the League of Nations when the political situation in 
eastern Europe makes such arrangements possible. 

But it is absurd to believe that the treaties are in any 
way responsible for the economic plight of Europe or of 
any part of it. Nothing has happened that has lifted 
that responsibility from the place where from the begin- 
ning it has rested, and that is on the shoulders of the 
former governments of the territories that were once the 
Central Powers. It is hard to be patient with men who 
point to the economic dissolution war has wrought, and 
say: ''There are the fruits of your peace." 

I have tried to give a candid account of the economic 
clauses of the treaties. I have not tried to gloss over 
their imperfections, or to pretend that they afford a final 
settlement of all the matters with which they are con- 
cerned. But I trust I have made it clear that they are 
not the outcome of secret arrangements and understand- 
ings; that they were worked out slowly, clause by clause, 
in the face of formidable and sometimes discouraging 
difficulties. 

I have emphasized the element of compromise and 
concession in these economic clauses. No one of these 
compromises represents a capitulation on the part of the 
American delegation. Every one of them, I believe, 
embodies a large concession to the principles for which 
the American delegation stood. From one point of view 
every compromise represents the partial defeat of a 
principle. From another point of view every compro- 



3i8 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

mise in the treaties is a recognition of another principle, 
a step forward in that path of international agreement 
and understanding which is the only road left to the 
world. 



XIII 

THE LABOR CLAUSES OF THE TREATY 

BY SAMUEL GOMPERS 

American labor did not leave the Peace Conference in 
Paris with all it felt it ought, in justice, to have secured, 
but it left with all it was possible to get. American labor 
felt then, as it feels now, that the proper course was to 
make the best fight possible, and to work during the 
ensuing years for the securing of amendments. 

It was not to be expected that a treaty satisfactory to 
every nation, or all the people of any nation, could be 
secured in the Paris Conference. Those who had eyes 
to see knew, also, that it would not be possible to secure 
a treaty written in the spirit of America's participation 
in the war, because there were present in Paris those who 
were selfish and those who were in reality the emissaries 
of the old condemned order of things. 

In my opinion there are serious defects in the labor 
provisions of the treaty. But I also know that those 
defects could not be removed in Paris, because every 
possible effort was made to secure their removaL 

The direct opening for the insertion of a labor clause 
in the treaty was provided in the original draft of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 20 pro- 
vided as follows: 

The high contracting parties will endeavor to secure and maintain 
fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children, 
both in their own countries and in all countries to which their indus- 

319 



320 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

trial and commercial relations extend; and to that end agree to 
establish as part of the organization of the League of Nations a per- 
manent bureau of labor. 

To give effect to Article 20 the supreme council rep- 
resenting the Allied and Associated Powers at Paris 
created the commission on international labor legislation. 
I had the honor to be appointed by the President a mem- 
ber of that commission, and later by the commission to 
be elected its president. 

Due to a number of circumstances, one of which was 
that many nations did not see fit to name a true repre- 
sentative of labor to membership on this commission, 
much of the time I found myself in the position of being 
the sole representative of trade-union thought. It may 
be of interest to say that some countries appointed So- 
cialists to membership, and that the struggle to secure 
consent of these Socialists to constructive proposals was 
as difficult and discouraging as it was to secure the con- 
sent to similar proposals from government representa- 
tives. It is a just indictment of these political party 
spokesmen that they obstructed constructive work and 
that they seemed unable to bring themselves to deal 
with definite relations of men and nations. They con- 
stantly were of assistance to those who were trying to 
weaken the labor provisions that were to be written into 
the treaty. 

I have had much experience with politicians who 
claimed to speak in the name of labor and who claimed 
to be revolutionary and uncompromising for labor's 
cause. I have not had any more enlightening experience 
than that in Paris, nor any that was more convincing in 
regard to the lack of understanding possessed by such 
people. It is due to the fact that proposals favored by 



THE LABOR CLAUSES OF THE TREATY 321 

the European Socialists were defeated, and proposals op- 
posed by them were finally driven through, that Ameri- 
can labor was able to indorse overwhelmingly the treaty 
and the labor provisions. During the darkest days in 
Paris this prospect seemed so unlikely that the American 
labor mission, of which I was chairman, thought seriously 
of departing for home in despair of being able to serve 
the cause of humanity by remaining. 

But it was my duty to make the fight as long as there 
was opportunity and it was possible finally to secure a 
completed work that could be accepted, not grudgingly, 
but whole-heartedly and with enthusiasm. 

The commission held thirty-five sessions. The Ameri- 
can members made every effort to secure ample op- 
portunity for the public to be informed as the work 
progressed, but we were compelled to submit to the pre- 
vailing system of communiques which kept the public 
informed of essential developments, but conveyed nothing 
of the surrounding conditions. 

The report of the commission, submitted to the peace 
commissioners, was in two parts. The first part was a 
draft convention creating a permanent organization for 
international labor legislation. The second part con- 
tained the labor clauses, known as "Labor's Bill of 
Rights," consisting of nine essential clauses expressing 
fundamentals for insertion in the treaty of peace. 

The draft convention provided for the establishment 
of a permanent labor organization, adherence to this 
organization to be obhgatory upon all of the high con- 
tracting parties. Acceptance of the principles enun- 
ciated in Labor's Bill of Rights was to be a part of the 
act of approval of the treaty as a whole. 

The international labor organization itself is divided 



322 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

into two parts. One of these parts is the international 
labor conference and the other is the international 
labor office, controlled by a governing body selected 
annually. 

The composition of the international labor confer- 
ence was one of the points upon which there was serious 
difference of opinion. The provision in this regard is 
that for each nation there shall be one delegate selected 
by the recognized labor organization, one by the most 
representative organization of employers and two by 
the government. This makes it possible for a combina- 
tion of employer and government delegates to outvote 
the labor delegates on any question, a contingency which, 
in the American view, was improper, inadvisable, and 
indefensible. Obviously, under such circumstances it is 
only by courtesy that a conference can be called a labor 
conference. It may be that there will never be such a 
combination, but the fact remains even now that such 
a combination is possible. The American view on this 
question was supported by the French, Italian, and 
Cuban delegations. Some of the foremost Socialists of 
the world were members of the Conference and fought 
and voted to sustain the provision giving governments 
this disproportionate representation. Their view-point 
was egotistical and, therefore, perhaps characteristic. It 
was to the effect that Socialists shortly would be in 
control of most of the governments of the world, and 
therefore the workers would have the majority in all 
international labor conferences. 

If the hope of the working people of the world had 
found in Paris no more substantial support than the 
support of the Socialists who were given membership on 
the commission empowered to draft the labor proposals 



THE LABOR CLAUSES OF THE TREATY 323 

of the treaty, that hope would have been a most forlorn 
one. 

I may say with candor, and with many a memory of 
those days still fresh in my mind, that the contest against 
reaction and misunderstanding and wilfulness and Uto- 
pian foolishness was one of the most difficult of my life. 
Striving day after day against all of these conditions 
and these forces, in order to bring into existence a docu- 
ment having in it something of constructive thought, 
something of worthy and workable purpose, was an ex- 
perience through which I have no desire to pass again, 
though that is not to say that I would not if human 
welfare demanded it. 

The compensation came when we were able to report 
to the peace commissioners a document that did measur- 
ably meet the requirements of justice and freedom and 
that did measurably come up to the standards set by the 
American labor movement, standards which I unhesitat- 
ingly set down as the highest standards presented by la- 
bor anywhere during the Peace Conference. The Amer- 
ican labor movement carried the foremost banner of 
freedom and human progress into that great discussion, 
and it succeeded in planting that banner at a position 
far more advanced than seemed possible at the outset. 

The adoption of the bill of rights as adopted by the 
commission on international labor legislation was moved 
at the plenary session of the Peace Conference, April 28, 
1 9 19, whereupon the following redraft was moved as an 
amendment, adopted and inserted in the treaty of peace 
(Article 427) : 

The high contracting parties, recognizing that the well-being, 
physical, moral and intellectual, of industrial wage-earners is of 
supreme international importance, have framed a permanent ma- 



324 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

chlnery associated with that of the League of Nations to further this 
great end. They recognize that differences of cUmate, habits and 
customs of economic opportunity and industrial tradition make 
strict uniformity in the conditions of labor difficult of immediate 
attainment. But holding, as they do, that labor should not be 
regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there are 
methods and principles for regulating labor conditions which all 
industrial communities should endeavor to apply so far as their 
special circumstances will permit. 

Among these methods and principles the following seem to the 
high contracting parties to be of special and urgent importance: 

First. The guiding principle above enunciated that labor should 
not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce. 

Second. The right of association for all lawful purposes by the 
employed as well as by the employers. 

Third. The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to 
maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their 
time and country. 

Fourth. The adoption of an eight hours' day or a forty-eight 
hours' week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already 
been obtained. 

Fifth. The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four 
hours, which should include Sunday whenever practicable. 

Sixth. The abolition of child labor and the imposition of such 
limitations on the labor of young persons as shall permit the con- 
tinuation of their education and assure their proper physical devel- 
opment. 

Seventh. The principle that men and women should receive equal 
remuneration for work of equal value. 

Eighth, The standard set by law in each country with respect 
to the conditions of labor should have due regard to the equitable 
economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein. 

Ninth. Each state should make provision for a system of inspec- 
tion in which women should take part in order to insure the enforce- 
ment of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed. 

Without claiming that these methods and principles are either 
complete or final, the high contracting parties are of opinion that 
they are well fitted to guide the policy of the League of Nations and 
that if adopted by the industrial communities who are members of 
the league and safeguarded in practice by an adequate system of 
such inspection, they will confer lasting benefits upon the wage-earner 
of the world. 



THE LABOR CLAUSES OF THE TREATY 325 

The labor section of the treaty of peace with Ger- 
many (Part Xni) upon the absolute and uncompromis- 
ing insistence of the American delegation was made to 
include a provision completely safeguarding the advanced 
standards of living of countries hke our own. The pro- 
vision which gives us that safeguard is this (Article 405, 
last paragraph) : 

In no case shall any of the members of the League of Nations be 
asked or required, as the result of the adoption of any recommenda- 
tion or draft convention by the conference (the international labor 
conference), to lessen the protection afforded by its existing legisla- 
tion to the workers concerned. 

I think it important briefly to clear up some miscon- 
ceptions and misapprehensions regarding the labor sec- 
tion of the treaty. 

The international labor conference cannot impose its 
will upon any nation. It has none of the functions of a 
superparliament. It cannot compel any nation to lower 
its existing standards, or to improve them. It cannot 
punish member nations for non-adoption of recommen- 
dations or draft conventions agreed upon. 

The whole organization for labor created by the treaty 
is nothing more than a moral force which has the power 
to bring truth into the light and give reason and Justice 
an opportunity to be heard. 

The procedure with regard to recommendations or 
draft conventions is this: The international labor con- 
ference may agree that certain standards should be set 
up. It may put these proposed standards in the form of 
(a) a recommendation to be submitted to the members 
for consideration with a view to effect being given them 
by national legislation or otherwise, or (6) of a draft 
international convention for ratification by the members. 



326 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

The only binding agreement between the members 
is that each will, in no case later than eighteen months 
from the closing of the session of the conference, bring 
such recommendations or draft conventions as are adopted 
by the Conference before the authority or authorities 
within whose competence the matter lies, for the enact- 
ment of legislation oi other action. 

If on a recommendation, no legislative or other action 
is taken, or if the draft convention fails to obtain the 
consent of the proper authorities, no further obligation 
shall rest upon the member. 

Furthermore, our states' rights were fully protected by 
the insertion of a paragraph providing that in the case 
of a federal state, the power of which to enter into con- 
ventions on labor matters is subject to limitations, it 
shall be in the discretion of the government to treat a 
draft convention as a recommendation only. Thus it 
will be seen that member nations may enact laws giving 
effect to recommendations or draft conventions. They 
also may refuse. If they refuse there is no power of 
punishment or coercion or blockade or influence of any 
kind beyond the moral effect of the world's opinion. 
Nations have only opinion to fear, and they may elect to 
meet that opinion with whatever course seems to them 
wisest, most just, or, if they so desire, most deceptive. 

The bill of rights, as it appears in the treaty (Article 
427) is not the bill of rights as reported to the Peace 
Conference by the commission on international labor 
legislation. It is not exactly what American labor 
wanted. Nor was the bill of rights, as reported by the 
commission itself just what American labor wanted. 
But let me say this: If American labor had been able to 
get in a conference where twenty-eight nations were rep- 



THE LABOR CLAUSES OF THE TREATY 327 

resented all that it wanted it would have been an achieve- 
ment beyond that of any other section of the Peace 
Conference. It was not possible. 

There has been some criticism of the use of the word 
"merely" in the bill of rights, in that section which 
specified that labor must be regarded "not merely as 
an article of commerce," and it has been said that the 
word is used in a disparaging sense. 

This is the criticism of prejudiced and unthinking 
minds. The bill of rights appears in the labor section of 
the treaty as a resohition which must be interpreted as a 
whole. The preamble cannot be left out of account. In 
this case the preamble makes a definite, high-minded, 
and progressive declaration for the increasing freedom 
of labor, and on that foundation the treaty declares that 
labor must no longer be regarded merely as a commod- 
ity. What is clearly the language and the spirit of the 
paragraph and of the whole section is that the hour has 
struck when labor is and must be regarded by the world 
as something far above commodity classification, when 
labor must be undisputed in its possession of the free- 
dom and the rights that go with manhood and woman- 
hood and citizenship. 

It stands to the everlasting credit of America that the 
thought of American labor is the guiding thought ex- 
pressed throughout the whole labor section of the treaty. 
American labor, the freest and most truly progressive in 
all the world, wrote into the labor section the heart and 
soul of that section. What others were able to do was 
to soil in some measure the garb, the expression. The 
heart and soul are to that extent deprived of their present 
opportunity to be expressive of the full meaning which 
was given to them by the workers of this country. 



328 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

For the sake of full comparison, I quote here the bill 
of rights, with the preamble, as reported to the Peace 
Conference by the commission on international labor 
legislation : 

The high contracting parties declare their acceptance of the fol- 
lowing principles and engage to take all necessary steps to secure 
their realization in accordance with the recommendations to be made 
by the International Labor Conference as to their practical appH- 
cation: 

First. In right and in fact the labor of a human being should not 
be treated as merchandise or an article of commerce. 

Second. Employers and workers should be allowed the right of 
association for all lawful purposes. 

Third. No child should be permitted to be employed in industry 
or commerce before the age of fourteen years, in order that every 
child may be insured reasonable opportunities for mental and physi- 
cal education. 

Between the years of fourteen and eighteen young persons of 
either sex may only be employed on work which is not harmful to 
their physical development, and on condition that the continuation 
of their technical or general education is insured. 

Fourth, Every worker has a right to a wage adequate to main- 
tain a reasonable standard of life, having regard to the civihzation of 
his time and country. 

Fifth. Equal pay should be given to women and to men for work 
of equal vakie in quantity and quahty. 

Sixth. A weekly rest, including Sunday or its equivalent, for all 
workers. 

Seventh. Limitation of the hours of work in industry on the 
basis of eight hours a day or forty-eight hours a week, subject to an 
exception for countries in which chmatic conditions, the imperfect 
development of industrial development or industrial organization 
or other special circumstances render the industrial efTiciency of the 
workers substantially different. 

The International Labor Conference will recommend a basis ap- 
proximately equivalent to the above for adoption in such countries. 

Eighth. In all matters concerning their status as workers and 
social insurance foreign workmen lawfully admitted to any country 
and their families should be insured the same treatment as the 
nationals of that country. 



THE LABOR CLAUSES OF THE TREATY 329 

Ninth. All states should institute a system of inspection in which 
women should take part, in order to insure the enforcement of the 
laws and regulations for the protection of the workers. 

Because it is brief and because I believe you will want 
to know the views of the working people of our own 
country, I present to you the bill of rights presented by 
the American delegation. It is then possible to see the 
three stages of development. The American proposals 
follow : 

The high contracting parties declare that In all states the follow- 
ing principles should be recognized, established and maintained: 

First. That in law and in practice it should be held that the 
labor of the human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. 

Second. That involuntary servitude should not exist except as 
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con- 
victed. 

Third. The right of free association, free assembly, free speech 
and free press should not be denied or abridged. 

Fourth. That the seamen of the merchant marine shall be guar- 
anteed the right of leaving their vessels when the same are in safe 
harbor. 

Fifth. That no article or commodity should be shipped or dehv- 
ered in international commerce in the production of which children 
under the age of sixteen years have been employed or permitted to 
work. 

Sixth. That no article or commodity should be shipped or deliv- 
ered in international commerce in the production of which convict 
labor has been employed or permitted. 

Seventh. It should be declared that the workday in Industry and 
commerce should not exceed eight hours a day, except in case of 
extraordinary emergency, such as danger to life or to property. 

Eighth. It should be declared that an adequate wage should be 
paid for labor performed — a wage based upon and commensurate 
with the standard of life conforming to the civilization of the time. 

Ninth. That equal wages should be paid to women for equal work 
performed. 

Tenth. That the sale or use for commercial purposes of articles 
made or manufactured in private homes should be prohibited. 



330 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

The amendment of the bill of rights as reported to the 
Peace Conference by the commission on international 
labor legislation requires some explanation. The com- 
mission made its report to the Peace Conference, thus 
concluding its labors and completing the period of its 
existence. This having been the case, I returned with 
my colleagues to the United States. At the time the 
report of the commission came before the Peace Confer- 
ence for adoption I was not only in the United States, 
but, as the result of an accident, I was in bed, unable to 
attend to any business or to have any business brought 
before me. 

When I had partially recovered from the accident, 
and while the convention of the American Federation of 
Labor was in session in Atlantic City, I sent the follow- 
ing cablegram to President Wilson : 

Atlantic City, N. J., June i6, 19 19. 
Hon. Frank L. Polk, 

Assistant Secretary of State, 
Washington, D. C. 

Because of its importance and urgency, will you please transmit 
the following message to the President: 

"Upon my advice executive council of the American Federation 
of Labor has recommended to the convention of the American Fed- 
eration of Labor, now in session, the indorsement of the League of 
Nations, including the labor provisions. 

"Reports pubhshed here indicate that the labor provisions have 
been so changed and weakened as to practically nuHify effectiveness. 

"I cannot ask the convention or the rank and file of labor to 
indorse propositions which have been or may be made valueless. 

"The convention must necessarily take up consideration of the 
matter on or before Friday, June 20, 191 9, and I urgently request 
full and definite information upon the subject, together with copy of 
provisions affecting labor as now framed." 

Samuel Gompers, 

President American Federation of Labor. 



THE LABOR CLAUSES OF THE TREATY 331 

To the above I received the following cabled reply 
from the President: 

Samuel Gompers, Esq., Washington, D. C, June 21, 1919. 

Hotel Alamac, 

Atlantic City, N. J. 

Following message for you from the President: 

"Comparison between your draft labor convention as reported to 
the plenary conference and the labor provisions as they now appear 
in the treaty of peace shows the following Categories of changes: 
First, redraft of what is called in commission's report 'clauses for 
insertion in treaty of peace.' In actual treaty they appear under the 
title 'general principles' and read as follows: 'The high contracting 
parties recognizing that the well-being, physical, moral and intellec- 
tual, of industrial wage-earners is of supreme international impor- 
tance, have framed in order to further this great end the permanent 
machinery provided for in section i and associated with that of the 
League of Nations. They recognize that difference of chmate, 
habits and customs of economic opportunity and industrial tradition 
make strict uniformity in the conditions of labor difficult of imme- 
diate attainment, but holding as they do that labor should not be 
regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think there are 
methods and principles for regarding labor conditions which all 
industrial communities should endeavor to apply so far as their 
special circumstances will permit. Among these methods and prin- 
ciples the following seem to the high contracting parties to be of a 
special and urgent importance: 

"'First, the guiding principle above enunciated that labor should 
not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce; sec- 
ond, the right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed 
as well as by the employers; third, the payment to the employed of 
a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is 
understood in their time and country; fourth, the adoption of an 
eight-hour day or a forty-eight-hour week as the standard to be 
aimed at where it has not already been obtained; fifth, the adoption 
of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours, which should include 
Sunday wherever practicable; sixth, the abolition of child labor and 
the imposition of such limitations of the labor of young persons as 
shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their 
proper physical development; seventh, the principle that men and 
women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value; 
eighth, the standard set by law in each country with respect to the 



332 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

conditions of labor should have due regard to the equitable economic 
treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein; ninth, each state 
should make provision for a system of inspection in which women 
should take part in order to insure the enforcement of the laws and 
regulations for the protection of the employed. 

"'Without claiming that these methods and principles are either 
complete or final, the high contracting parties are of opinion that 
they are well fitted to guide the policy of the League of Nations, and 
that if adopted by the industrial communities who are members of 
the league, and safeguarded in practice by an adequate system of 
such inspection, they will confer lasting benefits upon the wage- 
earners of the world.' 

"The second part of your cable seven has been transferred into 
body of the convention and now appears under Article 405 of the 
treaty of peace under clause 19 of your report. I am convinced that 
except for changes in wording, which do not affect the substance and 
spirit of these clauses, they remain the same; second, likewise your 
protocol to Article i has been transferred to body of treaty under 
Article 405. The 'resolutions' adopted by the commission do not 
appear in the treaty, inasmuch as they were merely proposals of sep- 
arate delegations and no part of the report as unanimously adopted 
for incorporation in the treaty. Third, a number of changes of form 
have been made in draft convention to make it conform in phrase- 
ology with the covenant of the League of Nations as redrafted by 
the League of Nations commission. For example, the words 'the 
high contracting parties* now read 'member?,' and other similar 
unimportant changes. Fourth, on April 1 1 at the plenary confer- 
ence, which adopted the report of the labor commission. Sir Robert 
Borden made the following remarks: 'This convention is linked^ in 
many ways by its terms to the covenant of the League of Nations, 
and I think it desirable to make it perfectly plain that the character 
of its membership and the method of adherence should be the same 
in the one case as in the other.' He then offered the following reso- 
lution, which was unanimously adopted by the conference: 'The 
conference authorizes the drafting committee to make such amend- 
ments as may be necessary to have the convention conform to the 
covenant of the League of Nations in the character of its member- 
ship and in the method of adherence.' 

"In pursuance of this resolution the following changes were made: 
Article i, your commission reports, together with the first two 
clauses of your Article 35, together with Article 36, have been com- 
bined as Article 387 of the treaty to read, 'a permanent organization 
is hereby established for the promotion of the objects set forth in 



THE LABOR CLAUSES OF THE TREATY 333 

the preamble; the original members of the League of Nations shall 
be the original members of this organization and hereafter member- 
ship of the League of Nations shall carry with it membership of the 
said organization.' 

"As you doubtless have in mind, the changes have the effect of 
giving the British dominions and colonies separate representation 
on the general conference. When you give your final judgment upon 
the importance of these changes, I earnestly urge you to entertain 
the following considerations: one, that Borden could not go back 
to the Canadian people, who occupy a position of considerable im- 
portance in the industrial world, and tell them that they were not 
entitled to representation on the general labor conference at Ver- 
sailles; two, that the changes did in fact bring the labor convention 
into harmony with the League of Nations' covenant; three, that the 
changes are not substantially important, inasmuch as every labor 
convention adopted by the conference must be submitted to our gov- 
ernment for ratification; thus the choice of acceptance or rejection 
lies in our own hands, irrespective of the constitution of the general 
conference; four, that the problems of the chief British colonies and 
dominions are much more our own than like Great Britain's so that 
their representation will be a source of strength to our point rather 
than an embarrassment; five, that in my opinion the changes do not 
introduce any weakness or threaten particular weakness in the 
labor provisions. They stand still, thanks to your efforts and gui- 
dance, as one of the great progressive achievements of the Peace 
Conference, something from which peoples the world over may 
take courage and hope and confidence in a better future. I am sure 
that you will agree that nothing could be more fatal to first aspira- 
tion than any failure to indorse these provisions. I count upon your 
support and sponsorship." p, t p . 

It will be seen that finally the very best that could be 
had was secured; and it must be borne in mind that 
amendment and improvement wait only upon the pro- 
gressive thought and energy of the nations that are 
party to the treaty of peace and the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. It is a fact, patent to all, but seem- 
ingly denied by some, that it is not possible to make 
progress in agreement with the world any more rapidly 
than agreement can be had. In the labor section as it 



334 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

stands we have got the utmost to which agreement was 
possible. I need not tell this audience, but it has been 
necessary to tell some, that unless all parties agree there 
is no agreement. The task of those who look forward 
now is to strive onward to secure agreement upon a still 
higher plane to still more perfect expression. 

I want to say a word to those, not necessarily present 
in this assemblage, who have protested that progress 
and justice were jeopardized by the granting of a vote 
to each of the British dominions. The fact is, in my 
opinion, that progress is safeguarded by the British pos- 
sessions having been given the vote. These common- 
wealths, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, 
and so on, went into the Peace Conference as states. I 
am convinced that they were entitled to that status in 
the Conference, and that they are entitled to it in the 
various bodies set up by that Conference. 

It was my experience, and I look upon it as something 
of a dependable guide, that the votes of the representa- 
tives of these dominions and commonwealths were more 
often with the United States than with England, and 
that they were more often with progress than against it. 
There is more than a httle significance in this. With 
but a few exceptions, the view-point of the American 
labor movement, constructive, democratic, uncontami- 
nated by any of the philosophies that are cousin to Bol- 
shevism, is shared only by the labor movements of these 
self-governing dominions and commonwealths. I com- 
mend that fact to the consideration of thoughtful Ameri- 
cans. 

With all the drawbacks that there were in Paris, with 
all the appetites that came there to be satisfied, with 
all the ambitions that grouped themselves about the Peace 



THE LABOR CLAUSES OF THE TREATY 335 

Conference, here still was an idealism and a determina- 
tion that would not be denied. Let not all of us forget 
that America gave to that idealism and determination 
its great leadership. 

A fact of paramount importance in gauging the integ- 
rity of the Peace Conference was the fact that millions of 
people were Hberated and set up under independent gov- 
ernments of their own choosing. 

The Paris Conference sought, as no other peace con- 
ference ever has sought, to reach into the mind of the 
people and write into definite terms the deepest and best 
thought to be found there. 

So it was that the interests of the world's toilers came 
to be considered. This was truly an epoch-making step. 
The Covenant of the League of Nations is the written 
verdict and agreement of the civihzed world that until 
justice is done to those who work, justice has been done 
only in part. 

Not even the most ardent advocate of the League of 
Nations Covenant or of the labor section of the treaty 
of peace will contend that perfection is to be found in it. 
The Paris Conference did not produce a perfect docu- 
ment and did not give a prefect expression to the high 
ideals that animate the civilized world to-day. 

The Conference did produce a document that measur- 
ably expresses the best and most constructive thought 
of the world, and that opens the way absolutely to a 
complete expression of the highest ideals which mankind 
may have. 

The treaty of peace establishes no barrier to progress 
anywhere. 

It opens the way to progress everywhere. 



XIV 

(THE ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION DURING THE 
^ ARMISTICE 

BY HERBERT HOOVER 

During the course of the war itself the economic diffi- 
culties in every direction were dominant factors in its 
conduct. With the moment of the armistice we were 
confronted with a host of new and unprecedented diffi- 
culties. These difficulties flowed not only from the over- 
night reversal in the whole alignment of economic ma- 
chinery built up steadily during the war, but also from 
the added burden of our being confronted with economic 
and social currents from the enemy countries that threat- 
ened immediately to overwhelm Europe in chaos. The 
danger to civilization from militarism was at once re- 
placed by the imminent danger from economic collapse. 
I propose to enumerate some of the major problems that 
lay before us. 

A. Some 160,000,000 people in liberated and enemy 
nations were face to face with the most terrible famine 
since the Thirty Years' War, when a third of the people 
in those areas died. Their food-supplies had steadily 
degenerated through the war, by blockade and diversion 
of man-power, until the consequent breakdown of morale 
in the civil population had contributed more than any 
other one factor to their revolutions and subsequent sur- 
render. 

All the four old empires were in the midst of revolu- 
tion, from which fourteen states emerged in a month. 

336 



THE ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 337 

Many of the new states started without even the most 
rudimentary machinery of government. All had estab- 
lished representative governments in replacement of the 
former monarchies, and in each case these were of neces- 
sity directed largely by men with little experience in gov- 
ernment. 

Except for parts of Russia, all of these fragmentary 
states were highly industrialized, intimately interdepen- 
dent as regards raw materials and supplies, with railway 
systems and communications built up to serve economic 
frontiers now suddenly shifted. In the explosion lead- 
ing to this separation of states and these new govern- 
ments the racial hatreds of centuries reached white-heat, 
and in this atmosphere each state grabbed for every 
movable economic resource, and proceeded to erect 
physical and economic barriers against the other along 
ill-defined borders which not only dismembered trans- 
portation systems, but also paralyzed such production 
and interchange of commodities as could have been car- 
ried on. 

With impending famine, food-hoarding became a 
mania with almost every farmer, every village, every 
city, and every state. The discipline and regulations of 
war suddenly relaxed and the control of distribution 
seemed lost. Agricultural populations in the main were 
able to support themselves, but cities and towns — the 
centre points of social danger — were in acute need. The 
production of coal and other essential industrial com- 
modities, maintained during the war under a strong mili- 
tary arm, immediately collapsed. Strikes, seizure of pri- 
vate property by governments, the general let-down of 
discipline, and, above all, the socialistic background of 
much of the revolutionary movement, contributed to the 



338 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

demoralization. The whole mass of urban humanity 
formerly under enemy domination seemed headed directly 
for Bolshevism, or anarchy — from which there could be 
no hope of peace. 

B. New problems arose in the European Allied coun- 
tries in addition to those which came from enemy sources. 
From the diversion of man-power to war purposes the 
Allies had throughout the war become increasingly de- 
pendent upon imports of food and textiles from overseas. 
Owing to the losses of shipping and to the vast tonnage 
required to transport the American arm}^ it had become 
necessary to abandon the long voyages to the food-pro- 
ducing areas of the southern hemisphere, principally the 
Argentine and Australia. The burden of supplying the 
Allies, and to a large extent the neutrals, had thus fallen 
upon North America, the nearest market and the point 
connected by the safest routes. 

To meet this demand, we in America — through the 
extra exertion of our farmers and the savings of our 
women — had at the armistice prepared a surphis of some 
20,000,000 tons of food and textile supplies, the minimum 
amount necessary to have carried the European Allies 
in the war until the harvest of 1919. 

In order to stimulate production in the United States 
and to meet the economic levels resulting from Allied 
buying before we came into the war, we had given moral 
pledges and in some cases legal pledges to our farmers 
that they should realize certain basic prices for their 
produce. The price levels at the armistice in the isolated 
markets of the southern hemisphere were scarcely one- 
half those in the United States, and the Allies naturally 
wished to abandon our market. 

The motion of this swollen stream of supplies that 



THE ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 339 

passed from the farmhouse, through the manufacturer, 
to the American seaboard could not be interrupted by 
a diversion such as the Allies contemplated without a 
price collapse, thus not only betraying the assurances 
given to American farmers but bringing a complete 
financial crash to the whole of our interior banks — for 
they, in loans to the farmer and manufacturer, had given 
confidence in the stabihty of prices. 

While stocks of food-supplies and textiles had accumu- f\ 
lated in the southern hemisphere (due to their isolation), i 
the totality of supplies available to the increased num- \ 
bers to be fed and clothed was barely enough to get all M 
hands through until the harvest of 19 19, even with the 
most careful and just distribution over the whole of Eu- 
rope. 

C. The tension upon world shipping was in no sense 
relaxed with the armistice, for while some relief was ob- 
tained by reason of the fact that it was no longer neces- 
sary to continue the shipment of troops and munitions 
abroad, the Allies and ourselves were immediately faced 
with the necessity of the repatriation of some 6,000,000 
men from overseas, and we had further to find the ton- 
nage with which to transport the vast amount of supplies 
required to stem the famine in liberated and enemy ter- 
ritory. 

To add to our difficulties, shipping and port strikes 
became epidemic and greatly reduced the carrying ca- 
pacity of the mercantile fleet. 

D. None of the liberated countries — Poland, Finland, 
Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Jugo-SIavia, 
Serbia, Roumania, Belgium, or Armenia — possessed a 
pound of commodities or a dollar of securities or gold 
with which to pay for supplies for their civil populations. 



340 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Therefore credits from our own and the Allied Govern- 
ments had to be created to enable them to live. Beyond 
these financial necessities, continued credits were re- 
quired by the Allies, particularly Italy, until they could 
in a measure restart productive life. The enemy states, 
Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria, possessed gold and 
securities, but Austria had nothing but hunger. 

E. The coal situation was a series of calamities in it- 
self. In Central Europe, the failure of production in 
the three states possessing coal-mines, endangered the 
municipahties and railways of a dozen other states. 
Therefore, production had to be reorganized and coal 
distributed from producing states to critical areas out- 
side their borders, even though hardship resulted to the 
producing states by reducing their own consumption 
below real need. Added to this was the dependence of 
France and Italy upon British coal, of which the produc- 
tion steadily decreased in the general let-down and strikes 
following the armistice. 

F. At the time of the armistice, the enemy areas were 
under vigorous blockade and the neutral countries were 
all under restrictions as to exports and imports, either 
for the purpose of pressing the enemy or to save shipping. 
The blockade was more than a naval blockade — it was 
an effective control penetrating back to every seaboard 
country in the world with a vast bureaucracy that did 
not easily yield to the sudden change in direction. 

G. During the whole progress of the war, every gov- 
ernment in the world had, to a greater or less degree, 
been compelled to assume the direction and control of 
economic hfe amongst its peoples. With the armistice, 
there was the insistent necessity for all countries to turn 
their production from munitions to civil supplies and 



THE ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 341 

to restore business to normal. To do this it was first 
essential to free business and enterprise from stifling 
restraints and to secure an enormous shift of labor from 
armies and the production of war material. Freedom 
of business and industry demanded a rapid expansion 
of free shipping for commerce, and this in the face of 
increased demand for primary supplies. A 

H. The economic problems were inextricably en- 
tangled in the social problems. The misery of war )}/ 
famine, the weakening of institutions because of revolu- 
tion, furnished the fertile grounds of social desperation 
for the resulting propaganda of a Bolshevist and An- 
archistic order. Had this propaganda been successful, 
no peace would have been possible nor could intensive 
production have been stimulated to that degree neces- 
sary to lay the foundation of support to the excessive 
urban populations. Furthermore, it would have been 
impossible for us to expect even to maintain the Allied 
or our own institutions if Central Europe had suc- 
cumbed to this sort of chaos. 

With all these problems, the first issue was to secure 
co-operation in action by which each of the principal 
Allied and Associated Governments should bear its re- 
sponsibility in the necessary readjustments. At the 
same time, essential liberty of action of each country 
could not be subordinated to the will of others, for the 
United States could not place her resources under the 
control of others. For this purpose, all of the various 
inter-AIIied war committees, which co-ordinated finance, 
shipping, food, coal, and blockade during the war were 
grouped together under one common committee of some- 
what shifting character, but ultimately known as the 
Supreme Economic Council. 



y 



342 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

The American point of view was that the solution of 
the major economic problems required some very direct 
and positive steps: First, that the blockade should be 
removed; second, each nation should contribute its 
share of shipping to be devoted to the movement of 
primary commodities such as food and coal, even against 
the clamor for higher earnings to be made in the world's 
trade; third, that some 2,000,000 tons of enemy shipping 
in enemy and neutral ports should at once be placed in 
service of supplies and repatriation of troops; fourth, 
that the stream of American food-supphes should be 
absorbed by the Allies, pending their diversion into the 
enemy area; fifth, that assistance should be given in the 
erection of the necessary economic functions of new gov- 
ernments, that they might restore transportation, sup- 
press hoarding, secure the distribution of imported 
supplies within their own frontiers; sixth, that ports 
be opened, transportation across hberated and enemy 
states be recreated by both rail and canal, that the inter- 
change of vital commodities such as coal, salt, oil, etc., 
should be resumed, that seeds and animals be distributed; 
seventh, that the production of coal should be revived 
and its distribution equitably arrived at, even though 
it brought hardship upon the nations possessing the coal- 
mines; eighth, that minimum credits should be extender^ 
to the liberated nations upon which they could cover 
their immediate necessities; ninth, that enemy people 
should pay for their supplies in cash; tenth, that pro- 
vision for the unemployed, pending resumption of pro- 
duction, should be estabhshed, in order that suffering 
and social disorder might be mitigated; eleventh, that 
special charitable relief to the masses of orphan waif 
children, and measures in combat of contagious disease 



THE ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 343 

sweeping Europe should be at once organized; twelfth, 
that every possible step should be taken to demobilize 
government control of industry, not alone to revive in- 
dividual initiative, but to demobilize hatred through re- 
placement of governmental economic contact by the 
softening processes of individual business. 

While these steps were clear enough at the outset, and 
while they were all ultimately accomplished in the end, 
unity of view as to their necessity and their accomplish- 
ment was not secured in a single day. 

In the first instance the Allies insisted that the changed 
situation at the armistice should be utilized to secure a 
general reduction in price levels of overseas supphes; 
they felt that their populations could not be rightly called 
upon to pay the higher price levels of the United States, 
when they could obtain cheaper supplies from the south- 
ern hemisphere, at greatly reduced prices. 

We Americans, on the other hand, were compelled to 
insist that we could not have a break in the level which 
we had assured our farmers and our manufacturers in 
order to secure production on Allied behalf. We ulti- 
mately succeeded in preventing a break by using the 
resources made available under our own war powers in 
purchase of food-supplies, and we were able to tide over 
the readjustment period without a debacle in the United 
States. 

We also insisted that the blockade on neutrals and 
liberated peoples should be withdrawn, and the blockade 
of enemies should be steadily and rapidly reduced, so as 
to allow food-supplies to move inward, and industrial life 
to recuperate. This insistence was based, first, upon 
the inhumanity of continuing a food blockade after sur- 
render — that we had no fight with women and children; 



V 



344 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

second, upon the necessity to fight famine as the mother 
of anarchy; and, last, to secure the return of enemy 
populations to productivity, in order to have world relief 
from starvation and the disorders that must daily flow 
from it. 

Unfortunately, the militaristic view of dominated com- 
merce and continued mobilization of economic power 
over the enemy died hard in Europe. The Allied mili- 
tary authorities contended that it was vital to maintain 
the blockade until peace was signed, lest the enemy 
might revive its military strength and might be less dis- 
posed to accept dictated terms of peace. The Ameri- 
cans' answer to this contention was that it was always 
within the power of the Allies to reimpose the blockade, 
that its terrors would be multiplied tenfold if the popu- 
lation had once appreciated the value of its relaxation, 
that the primary necessities of civilization required its 
abandonment. 

After a compromise allowing the relaxation of the 
blockade on the import of food had been agreed to, new 
contentions arose out of the insistence of the Americans 
that enemy countries should pay for their supplies by 
shipment of commodities or by negotiable securities or 
gold. Some of the Allies felt that the removal of large 
quantities of gold and liquid securities reduced the ability 
of Germany to pay indemnity and became their particu- 
lar loss. The view was advanced that America should 
furnish supplies to the enemy on credit, as being a func- 
tion of the establishment of peace. Aside from the legal 
impossibility of such an undertaking the American eco- 
nomic representative did not believe such calls upon the 
American taxpayer could be justified, and that we were 
indeed carrying as heavy a burden as could be asked by 



THE ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 345 

furnishing the Allies and liberated countries supplies on 
credit for a long period after the armistice. 

Aside from securing unity of view amongst the Allied 
and Associated Governments as to these measures, it was 
necessary to secure co-operation of the Germans and 
Austrians in their execution. It was finally agreed with 
them that — as a condition of supplies — they should for 
reasonable hire hand over to the Associated Governments 
their entire merchant shipping. Incidentally, this re- 
sulted in a three months' earlier return of the American 
army than would have been otherwise possible. It was 
not until the end of March that a final agreement with 
regard to Germany was consummated in Brussels on the 
24th of that month, and, indeed, furnished one of the 
dramatic episodes of the war. Here, to that city which 
had suffered so terribly of famine under the iron hand of 
the German staff, came the representatives of the revo- 
lutionary German government in plea to the Allies — in- 
cluding the Belgians — for food. 

Germany was the last of the countries with whom 
arrangements were completed. Supplies had been long 
in motion to Finland, the Baltic States, to Poland, to 
Bulgaria, to Czechoslovakia, to Roumania, to Austria, to 
Jugo-SIavia, to Armenia, and elsewhere in Russia. The 
blockade had been relaxed with respect to the neutral 
countries, and the steady stream of supplies had been 
maintained to the AIHes. Coal-mines in parts of Europe 
were placed in control where necessary; railways were 
placed under the command of American directors. 

Measures had been established by which the philan- 
thropy of America should advance its regiments of mercy 
across Europe, until provision had been made for the 
children and helpless of twenty nations. At its maxi- 






346 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

mum load, America alone was providing in charity, food 
and shelter for over 7,500,000 children of Allied and Hb- 
erated races. The Allied Governments established un- 
employment allowances to their stagnant labor and other 
governments were induced to do so. At one moment 
15,000,000 families in Europe were receiving such allow- 
ances — 75,000,000 people living on charity. 

This is no occasion to recount the difficulties and de- 
tails of negotiation, the great masses of statistics of dis- 
tribution, the minutise of organization, the method in the 
control of shipping, the control and stimulation of pro- 
duction and distribution of coal, the operation of rail- 
roads, opening of canals and ports, establishment of the 
functions of many new governments, the vast financial 
operations that flowed from all these acts. They will 
furnish the historical student material for thought during 
the next hundred years. 

In one item alone— the feeding of Germany — some 
$250,000,000 of gold had to be managed, and between 
all governments the movement of some 35,000,000 tons 
of commodities of one kind or another had to be arranged, 
consummated, and settled for. 

It is sufficient for this occasion to say that America 
bore the major burden in negotiating these arrange- 
ments, and that her disinterestedness, her sense of ser- 
vice, carried Europe through this — the most terrible 
period of its history. 

Despite all these efforts, at one time or another Bol- 
shevism succeeded in planting itself in Western Europe 
in temporary control of a number of large cities; but the 
stability given to other parts made possible its isola- 
tion and eradication. At times the maintenance of so- 
cial order during the overprolonged peace negotiations 



THE ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 347 

seemed hopeless, for the very processes of peacemaking, 
its use as an excuse for military interference, contributed 
every stimulant to instabihty and interfered with eco- 
nomic rehabihtation. As great and important as were 
the steps toward reconstruction under united action these /^ 
controls could not go on without developing from them- | 

selves great sources of friction, and the signature of V 
peace came none too soon. 

The final signing of peace marked a great turning of 
the political and economic forces from disintegration and 
destruction on the one hand, toward freedom of com- 
merce, of production and of renewed hope on the other. 



( 



XV 

THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE GREAT WAR 

BY HENRY THOMAS MAYO 

For nearly three years after the beginning of the war 
in Europe our country was neutraL The desire of the 
administration and of the country was to avoid being 
drawn into the war. And the idea prevailed largely that 
even should this country be brought into the war, our 
participation would largely consist of furnishing money 
and supplies. No one even dreamed of an American 
army of 2,000,000 men in Europe. 

Of course these ideas changed rapidly. Congress, in 
August, 1 916, had passed the three-year programme for 
increase of the navy, the largest and most costly pro- 
gramme ever considered, and also had authorized a 
material increase in number of personnel and provided 
for the development of a naval reserve force. Our entry 
into the war came too soon after the passage of this navy 
bill for the service afloat to have felt any of its eff'ect. 

The navy had not been asleep nor unmindful of what 
was going on in the world. On the contrary, the progress 
of the war abroad was closely followed, every item of 
information received was carefully considered, and all 
that the navy itself could do to keep up with new devel- 
opments was done in the fleet. This was especiafly so 
after the sinking of the Lusitania in May, 1915, which 
indicated that sooner or later we would have to engage 
in the war. The result was a closer attention to every- 
thing pertaining to battle efficiency. 

348 



THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE WAR 349 

On February 3, 191 7, when diplomatic relations with 
Germany were broken, the active Atlantic Fleet was at 
Guantanamo, Cuba. The fleet consisted of fourteen 
battleships, sixteen destroyers, three mine-layers, four 
tugs, used as mine-sweepers, an aeroplane ship, and the 
train consisting of supply and fuel ships. The destroyer 
force included a cruiser, used as a flag-ship, and mother 
ships fitted with repair-shop facilities. No submarines 
were with the fleet. As it seemed plain that war must 
foflow, the fleet was at once placed on a war footing. 
The base was shifted to Guacanayabo Bay, where more 
room was available. Little apprehension of a German 
attack was felt, but it was essential that officers and men 
should become accustomed to war routine and war pre- 
cautions. These were at once put into effect, while the 
usual drifls and target practices were carried on. When 
the fleet went north late in March, 191 7, there existed a 
general feeling of confidence. The work done by the 
destroyer and mine forces prior to the war showed in the 
results achieved as the war progressed. 

In March the administration decided that the situation 
demanded that United States merchant vessels be armed. 
Accordingly, the fleet was called upon to supply the nec- 
essary officers and gun*s crews. This was the start of a 
continuous demand on the fleet for trained gun's crews, 
and it became necessary to use special methods for their 
intensive training. The reports of encounters with Ger- 
man submarines during the war show how successful was 
this training and how excellently these men maintained 
the spirit and traditions of the service. The fleet reached 
Hampton Roads late in March and the fleet base was 
transferred to York River, Virginia. 

In April, 191 7, the Allied navies had command of the 



350 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

sea, except as regards enemy submarine operations against 
merchant ships. German sea commerce had ceased, and 
German-armed ships had been driven from the sea, but 
the menace of the submarine remained serious. The 
German high-sea fleet kept in the security of its harbors, 
its morale dwindling by inaction, until, when it was 
desired to make a final forlorn-hope effort, the personnel 
revolted. Upon the unrestricted submarine campaign 
had been placed the main German reliance for destroying 
sea communications and isolating Great Britain; in the 
spring of 191 7 these efl'orts appeared increasingly suc- 
cessful. The monthly destruction of tonnage mounted 
to alarming pT-oportions. The anti-submarine measures 
taken were not sufficient and the cry was "ships — more 
ships," in the hope of keeping pace with the sinkings and 
maintaining the supply of food and materials for the 
Allies. Early in April the Navy Department directed 
the organization of a patrol force. The mission assigned 
to the force was **to give the maximum possible protec- 
tion to the transatlantic commerce of the United States 
and of friendly powers in the area to seaward of and 
contiguous to the areas guarded by naval district forces." 
It became apparent that protection of commerce against 
submarine and raider operations could not be made eff'ec- 
tive by continuous sea patrol. Therefore, the patrol forces 
soon disintegrated until but one squadron remained. 
This did duty in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean 
throughout the war. 

War was declared on April 6. On April 10 Rear-Ad- 
mirals Browning, R. N., and Grasset, F. N., command- 
ers-in-chief of their countries* naval forces on the North 
American station, arrived at Hampton Roads, where 
they were met by the chief of operations. United States 



THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE WAR 351 

navy, the commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet, and 
the commander of the newly organized patrol force. 
They stated the kind of assistance the United States 
navy might give and asked us what we were prepared to 
do. The conference reconvened the following day in 
Washington, with the secretary of the navy presiding 
and with the general board present. At this conference 
the representatives of the British and French navies were 
assured of full co-operation by our navy, and appeared 
entirely satisfied with the result. The United States 
navy assumed responsibility for patrol of nearly all of 
the western Atlantic, and agreed to furnish small vessels 
as rapidly as possible for work on the French coast, and 
to send a division of destroyers to operate ofl" the English 
Channel. The request for these destroyers seemed to be 
based on the desire that our navy should appear in con- 
nection with the anti-submarine operations rather than 
on any idea that we could or should send destroyers in 
great number. Admiral Browning stated that the moral 
effect of even one United States destroyer operating with 
those of Great Britain would be excellent. Destroyer 
Division 8 accordingly sailed for Queenstown, Ireland, on 
April 18. This is the division whose commander — Taus- 
sig — reported on arrival "ready now," when asked how 
much time he wanted to prepare for active operations. 
These destroyers were followed at frequent intervals by 
others as rapidly as they could be made ready. 

All naval vessels were being rushed into commission, 
together with hundreds of yachts, tugboats, small craft 
for district work, and vessels of every kind. These all 
demanded men and officers, and the demand for trained 
gun's crews for merchant ships was constant. Although 
the navy expanded in numbers very rapidly, growing to 



352 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

a total in October, 191 8, of nearly 33,000 officers and 
497,000 men, yet these were almost entirely untrained, 
and the demand was for trained men. Officers and men 
for new vessels of the navy proper were also to be trained. 

The fleet in commission contained practically all the 
trained men available. Upon it constant drafts were 
made, especially in the commissioning of the chief war- 
rant and warrant officers and large numbers of the best 
petty officers. The Atlantic fleet thus became a great 
training force and source of supply for personnel; thou- 
sands of men were turned out sufficiently trained to be 
able to perform regular duty on the many vessels which 
the navy had to operate. This hard training work was 
continued through the war period. 

Just prior to our entrance into the war Rear-Admiral 
W. S. Sims had been sent abroad to get into touch with 
AHied naval authorities, especiafly British, and obtain 
information which would be useful to us when war came. 
The first vessels — destroyers — sent over were ordered to 
report to him. This was also done as others were sent, 
and he was soon designated as ''commander of United 
States naval forces in European waters," all these forces 
being nominally part of the United States Atlantic fleet, 
but operating as a detached force. However, it was re- 
quired that the commander-in-chief be informed in regard 
to all these forces sufficiently for him to take immediate 
control in case the course of events should require that 
fleet operations be undertaken or that the United States 
and British fleets be combined. 

The office of the "commander of United States naval 
forces in European waters" was in London and his duties 
there — which constantly increased during the progress of 
the war — were so multifarious and important, and re- 



THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE WAR 353 

quired him to be in such close touch with the admiralties 
of the Allies, that it was a practical impossibility for him 
to exercise more than a general command over the whole. 
Therefore, in order to insure full co-operation, all our 
vessels were operated by the senior officer of each com- 
bined force. On the French coast, however, Admiral 
Wilson, United States navy, by arrangement with the 
French commander-in-chief, operated his own forces. 
The United States mine force was operated by Admiral 
Strauss, although he was obliged to arrange his mining 
** excursions" to meet the wishes of the commander-in- 
chief of the British grand fleet, being dependent upon 
him for details of ships for escort and protection during 
mine-laying operations. 

During the month of May, 191 7, the destroyer force of 
the Atlantic fleet disintegrated — as a force — all suitable 
destroyers being designated for duty abroad. The com- 
mander, Rear-Admiral Cleaves, was detached and ordered 
to New York to assume charge of convoy operations, 
being later designated as "Commander of Cruiser and 
Transport Force, Atlantic Fleet." 

In June a squadron of patrol vessels — armed yachts — 
was despatched for duty on the French coast. They 
were foHowed by other vessels of various classes — yachts, 
mine-sweepers, tugs, repair ships, salvage ships. A patrol 
force of gunboats, coast-guard ships, and armed yachts 
was also sent to Cibraltar, together with destroyers from 
the Philippines; later a small force of destroyers and sub- 
marines was based on the Azores. 

In May, 191 7, the major part of the Pacific fleet under 
Admiral Caperton came through the Panama Canal and 
took charge of the patrol of the South Atlantic. Admiral 
Caperton also had duties of a somewhat diplomatic 



354 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

nature on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of South 
America. 

In August, 191 7, the commander-in-chief, Atlantic 
fleet, was sent abroad to attend a conference in London 
with naval representatives of the nations associated in 
the war, and with the added purpose of getting into per- 
sonal touch with the foreign officers with whom he would 
co-operate in case of Joint fleet operations. At this time 
the commander-in-chief took up with the British admir- 
alty the subject of a mine barrage in the North Sea. 
Returning to the United States, he advised that the 
North Sea mine-barrage project be pushed, that a divi- 
sion of battleships be sent to the British grand fleet, and 
that all forms of assistance to nations with whom we 
were associated in the war be extended and expedited, 
stressing the importance of the time element. But it 
was not until the chief of naval operations had himself 
visited London, a short time later, that it was decided 
to send the battleships to the grand fleet. 

On our entering the war, it was wisely decided, in view 
of the special demand for anti-submarine craft, not to 
push the larger vessels authorized by the 19 16 programme, 
but to concentrate shipbuilding facilities upon the con- 
struction of anti-submarine craft. The building of 222 
destroyers, 20 submarines, 442 subchasers, 51 mine- 
sweepers, 6 coast submarines, 20 sea-going tugs, 30 har- 
bor tugs, and 16 motor tugs was authorized and pro- 
ceeded; 100 subchasers for France were included. Later 
the construction of 60 of the so-called Eagle boats by 
Henry Ford was agreed upon. The active war ended 
before any of the Eagle boats were finished and tested. 
The subchasers were rapidly turned out and did useful 
service. These little craft, only no feet long, crossed 



THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE WAR 355 

the Atlantic and did good work as patrols in the Irish 
Sea, English Channel, on the French coast, and in the 
Mediterranean and in northern Russia in 191 9. 

Convoy 

When the Germans began their unrestricted submarine 
warfare, on February i, 19 17, the question of convoys 
began to be seriously considered. Our first troop convoy 
sailed in June, and by July we were fully committed to 
the convoy system. It proved very successful, most of 
the objections disappearing upon actual trial. Many 
German merchant steamers had been in United States 
ports since 19 14. These ships — 103 of them — were taken 
over by our government and placed under the shipping 
board. Sixteen of the largest and best were turned over 
to the navy to be used as troop transports, followed by 
eighteen more for use as freight transports. It was found 
that in every ship the machinery had been disabled by 
the German crews, the injuries being principally the 
breaking of cast-iron parts, cylinders, pump casings, etc. 
Those executing the destructive work believed that repair 
was impossible and that new castings could not be made 
and installed within a year at least, especially as all plans 
of the ships and machinery were missing. The repair of 
this machinery by the navy, using the electric welding 
process, was one of the great successes of the war — and 
to this success was largely due the navy's ability to 
transport troops to France in the spring of 191 8, in num- 
bers greater than had been thought possible. It has 
been stated that this work saved a year's time and 
$20,000,000, and also that it was so well done that there 
was not a single instance of a defective weld developing. 
The success of the first trials caused the shipping board 



356 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

to turn over to the navy twenty more ships for repair 
and return. 

The convoy system, once started, rapidly developed. 
The convoys were made up according to speed of ships, 
and the escort work was participated in by English, 
French, and American cruisers. Certain large and fast 
ships, like the Leviathan and Olympicy were sent without 
ocean escort, but were met by destroyers and escorted 
through the submarine danger zone and into port. The 
convoy system was a material factor in combating the 
submarine efforts, although it was but one factor. In- 
creased efficiency and experience of the destroyers and 
other anti-submarine craft, the depth charge and means 
for handling it, the use of submarines against submarines, 
mystery ships, aviation patrols, zigzagging tactics, arm- 
ing of merchant ships, smoke-boxes, and the instruction 
and increased experience of shipmasters in proper hand- 
ling of their ships in convoy and under attack, all were 
factors. One other factor should be mentioned, the 
method of keeping track of the movements of submarines 
practically from the time of leaving German ports until 
their return, which was brought to a high state of effi- 
ciency by the British, and enabled proper routing orders 
to be issued. 

The convoy system continued with little change until 
the summer of 191 8, when, fearing that the Germans 
might attempt operations against troop convoys with 
battle cruisers or swift raiders, the older battleships were 
assigned to escort duty with troop convoys. Under con- 
voy approximately 2,000,000 Americans were transported 
to France, without a single man being lost while under 
escort of United States vessels. No navy troop trans- 
ports were torpedoed on east-bound trips. Four were 



THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE WAR 357 

torpedoed on west-bound (return) trips. Of these the 
Antilles, President Lincolny and Covington were sunk, 
while the Mount Vernon, although badly damaged, was 
able to return under her own steam to Brest. One hun- 
dred and thirty-eight lives were lost in these ships. 

Battleships 

In November, 191 7, the ninth division of the Atlantic 
fleet was formed, and sent to join the British grand 
fleet. It operated for the rest of the war, until after 
the surrender of the German fleet, under the orders of 
the. commander-in-chief of the grand fleet, being desig- 
nated as the sixth battle squadron of that fleet. In 
organization, up-keep, and gunnery, our ships were found 
satisfactory and, indeed, were able in some respects to 
give points to their British associates. 

In midsummer, 191 8, it was feared that the Germans 
might attempt successfully to get battle cruisers or fast 
raiders to sea to operate against our transports. The 
sixth division of our battleship force was, therefore, sent 
in August to Bantry Bay, Ireland, to be in position to 
combat the situation if it developed, the eighth division 
of superdreadnaughts being held in readiness to base on 
Halifax if required, and the older battleships were assigned 
to escort duty with troop convoys. 

While the ninth division, operating with the grand 
fleet, engaged in no fleet action, it certainly had all sorts 
of war experience, including North Sea cruising, convoy 
escort work, and encounters with submarines, in which 
several times torpedoes were narrowly avoided. 

Destroyers 
Our destroyer list at the entrance into the war con- 
sisted of fifty-one destroyers, of which only sixteen were 



358 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

in full commission with the fleet. Others were in com- 
mission with reduced complements and many had been 
on neutrahty duty at our principal ports up to the out- 
break of war. As destroyers were prepared they were 
sent overseas until we had destroyers operating from 
Queenstown, Brest, Gibraltar, and the Azores. Twenty- 
eight had sailed for Queenstown by May 28. The num- 
ber at each base varied, but the maximum reached at 
each port was about forty-four at Queenstown, thirty- 
eight at Brest, six at Gibraltar, and four at the Azores. 
The work of these ships was arduous and constant. 
While at sea they were engaged in escort duty and in 
patrolling and hunting for submarines, and during their 
so-called **rest" days in port they were hard at work 
overhauling machinery, fuelhng, and generally preparing 
for going to sea again. They kept the sea in all weathers, 
and winter cruising was by no means a picnic. But they 
were always effective and reliable, and the German sub- 
marines grew to fear them. The Cassin had her stern 
blown off by a torpedo from a German submarine, the 
Jacob Jones was sunk by a torpedo, the Chauncey was 
sunk by collision, and the Shaw was cut down by the 
Aquitaniay which she was escorting, but she made port. 
Admiral Bayley, R. N., under whom the Queenstown 
destroyers served, praised their work in no uncertain 
terms. The destroyers accounted for several German 
submarines, the number being, as it always will be, 
somewhat uncertain; but their great work was in pro- 
tecting other vessels, especially the convoys. The same 
kind of work was also performed on our own coast, al- 
though it was not as strenuous and constant as similar 
work abroad. 



THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE WAR 359 

The Mine Force 

In the spring of 191 7 the mine force of our Atlantic 
fleet consisted of two old cruisers and one gunboat, which 
had been converted to mine-layers, and four fleet tugs 
fitted for mine-sweeping. While this force was entirely 
too small to mine extensively, it had sufficed for practice 
work and to develop a system and doctrine which later 
enabled a large and efficient mine force to be rapidly 
improvised. 

The Naval Bureau of Ordnance had, even before we 
entered the war, considered the possibility of anti-sub- 
marine mine barrage in the North Sea or off the German 
coast. Our entrance into the war brought increased 
interest in this subject. In April, 191 7, Mr. Ralph C. 
Browne, of Salem, Mass., brought to the bureau an in- 
vention which he caHed'^The Brown Submersible Gun." 
This was not considered practicable in its proposed form, 
but the electric principle involved was at once applied to 
mines, and in it was seen the possibility of a suitable mine 
for a deep-sea mine barrage. By July, the tests were so 
successful that the bureau confidently urged the plan for 
a North Sea barrage. While attending the naval con- 
ference in London, the commander-in-chief of the Atlan- 
tic fleet pushed the project and secured a tentative agree- 
ment with the British admiralty, who at once sent a 
naval mining expert to the United States to witness tests 
and obtain details of the mine and its operation. The 
mine barrage as agreed upon extended from about ten 
miles off the Orkney Islands — the ten-mile passage being 
heavily patrolled — to the Norwegian coast. The Nor- 
wegian coast waters, inside the three-mile limit, were 
mined by Norway. 



36o WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

The British admiralty was somewhat doubtful regard- 
ing the project. But since the United States offered the 
mines, estimated to cost $40,000,000, as well as the ships 
to lay them in by far the largest area, the proposition 
was agreed to. The manufacture of the mines and acces- 
sories was rushed. Eight merchant steamers were pur- 
chased and converted to mine-layers. The experience of 
the small mine force of the Atlantic fleet was utilized, 
with the result that our mine-laying vessels in the North 
Sea carried, on a much smaller displacement, many more 
mines than the British mine-layers and were able to lay 
their mines with greater rapidity. Parties were sent 
ahead and established mine depots and assembly plants 
in Scotland at Invergordon and Inverness, bases 17 and 
18. The procedure was to ship mines to Corpach and 
Lyie on the west coast of Scotland, thence by the Cale- 
donian Canal and by rail to bases 17 and 18. At these 
bases the assembly was completed, after which they were 
loaded on the mine-layers preparatory to planting. The 
Baltimorey in April, laid about 900 mines in assisting the 
British mine force off the north coast of Ireland, and part 
of the mine squadron made two mine-laying excursions. 
The entire force, however, was not ready until the end 
of June, 191 8. Mine-laying then proceeded rapidly, and 
the barrage soon began to show effectiveness, although it 
was worked up to the time of the armistice. A total of 
56,611 American and 13,600 British mines were laid in 
depths ranging from 40 to 160 fathoms. 

The actual submarine losses due to the mine barrage 
will probably never be exactly known, but it is probable 
that at least ten submarines were destroyed and others 
damaged, and the effect was to close the North Sea to 
such an extent as to make exit or entrance difficult and 



THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE WAR 361 

dangerous to enemy submarines. The laying of the 
North Sea barrage ranks among the big undertakings of 
the Great War. It was equalled by the task of destroy- 
ing it after the armistice. In this work about ninety 
vessels were employed, two being lost and many badly 
damaged, and eleven lives lost. The whole operation 
was successful, and by September 30, 1919, Rear- Admiral 
Strauss was able to report the work completed. 

Naval Overseas Transportation Service 

To insure the expedition and regular supply of our 
naval forces abroad and to assist in the supply of the 
army, the naval overseas transportation service was 
established in January, 19 18. The navy was called on 
to man ships acquired by the shipping board. This was 
a new task and made a new demand for trained officers 
and men. But it was cheerfully assumed and efficiently 
performed. In ten months this service grew to about 
320 vessels, with a tonnage of 2,800,000, and requiring 
about 3,000 officers and 29,000 men. 

Aviation 

The development of the navy's aeronautical service 
during the World War was remarkable. In April, 191 7, 
the navy's aviation group totalled 38 officers and 163 
men, their equipment being only 45 machines of various 
types, mainly for training. During the war about 2,800 
officers were assigned to aviation and about 46,000 men. 
Of these more than 1,200 officers and 19,000 men were 
sent abroad. At the date of the armistice we had some 
2,100 planes and about 300 fighter-than-air craft. Five 
hundred and seventy aircraft had been sent abroad. A 
naval aviation group of 7 officers and 122 men was the 



362 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

first organized force from the United States to land in 
France. The advent of our young, enthusiastic aviation 
personnel, the information as to our extensive plans, and 
observation as to the thorough way in which the execu- 
tion of these plans was started, had a very beneficial 
eff'ect at a time when there were many indications of a 
faltering morale among the Allies. As the work pro- 
gressed information regarding its intended scope must 
have reached the Germans, where it also had its effect. 
Our navy established and placed in commission abroad 
twenty-eight operating aviation stations, two training 
aviation stations, and six bases. These were distributed 
in England, Ireland, France, and Italy, and included a 
marine aviation station in the Azores. 

The entire aviation service had to be built up, materiel 
and personnel, on the assumption that the war might 
last several years. A story of this work would be a 
volume in itself. It is hard to say just what direct effect 
our aviation efforts had on the suppression of the sub- 
marine. The records show a probability of over forty 
attacks on submarines from our aircraft. A measure of 
the efficient work of our aircraft is, perhaps, to be found 
in the immunity from attack enjoyed by vessels passing 
close to the AHied coast under escort of aircraft. Our 
aviators patrolled the coasts, searched for submarines 
and mines, convoyed vessels, took part in bombing expe- 
ditions from stations in northern France against German 
centres, and from Italian stations against Austrian ports. 
Most of the aircraft used were bought abroad, but before 
the armistice the force was fairly well equipped with 
American materiel for serious and extensive work. It is 
claimed that fifteen enemy vessels were sunk or dam- 
aged through the efforts of United States aviators. 



THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE WAR 363 

The Railway Battery 

In November, 191 7, the Bureau of Ordnance recom- 
mended that some of our naval 14-mch guns be utilized 
on shore on the western front. They were 50-caIiber 
guns, that is, nearly 60 feet long, weighing 90 tons each, 
with projectiles of i ,400 pounds, containing 88 pounds of 
explosive, and having a range of over 25 miles. Use of 
these guns on railway mounts was approved, and design- 
ing of mounts and accessories was begun. By working 
night and day, complete plans and specifications were 
ready on January 2^, 191 8. The first mount was com- 
plete, ready for firing, April 25, 1918, and the last of the 
five on May 25, 191 8. Each unit consisted of the gun 
car, a locomotive, and twelve other cars ; besides the five 
battery units a staff train was provided. To design and 
build the above called for and received the complete co- 
operation of the Navy Department, American railroad 
men, and manufacturers. The work was rushed with 
patriotic speed. The first ship-load of materiel left on 
June 29. It was unloaded and assembled at St. Nazaire, 
France, and on August 1 1 , the first unit was ready to 
leave for the front. On September 16, the entire group 
of naval railway batteries was ready for action on the 
western front. The force was manned and operated 
entirely by naval personnel. In general, batteries Nos. 
I and 2 operated with the French armies, and Nos. 3, 4, 
and 5 with the American army near Verdun. 

For two months preceding the armistice the navy had 
in action the five largest mobile guns on the western 
front. No. 2 battery on September 6, 191 8, fired the 
first American shell from an American gun manned by 
Americans on the western front. These batteries were 



364 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

very effective against the German railroad communica- 
tions and centres, and were therefore of importance in 
convincing the Germans that only surrender or an armi- 
stice could prevent complete disaster. 

Communications 

During the war the naval communication service was 
expanded until it included England, Scotland, Ireland, 
France, Belgium, Gibraltar, Italy, Corfu. To insure 
transatlantic communication for our army the navy 
began the building of the Lafayette radio station in 
France, which has been completed since the armistice 
and turned over to the French Government. The navy 
also took over the operation and censorship of all com- 
mercial radio stations in the United States, the inspection 
and sealing of radio apparatus of all merchant vessels 
which arrived in United States ports, the furnishing of 
operators to United States merchant vessels, the censor- 
ship of radio and cable communications. The above was 
in addition to the carrying out of the primary mission of 
naval communications — that of maintaining efficient 
communication for United States vessels at sea, includ- 
ing the transports. After the armistice the navy handled 
the communications for the President and our delega- 
tion at the Peace Conference in Paris. 

German Submarines on Our Coast 

In 1 916 the German commercial submarine Deutschland 
twice visited United States ports, and October 7, 19 16, 
the L^-53, a strictly naval vessel, appeared at Newport, 
R. I. The voyages of the Deutschland were apparently 
for purely commercial purposes. That of the t/-53 was 
in the nature of a path-finding expedition, and may also 



THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE WAR 365 

have had the purpose of warning the United States as 
to what we might expect if we engaged in the war. The 
day after leaving Newport the {7-53 sank three British 
and two neutral steamers off Nantucket Light vessel. 

In 1918 German submarines appeared offensively on 
our Atlantic coast. Warning of their probable arrival 
had been received from London. Inchiding all that came 
west of 40 degrees west longitude, six German submarines 
operated off our Atlantic coast between May and Octo- 
ber, 1918, and destroyed seventy-nine United States ves- 
sels, most of which were of small size, by bomb or gun- 
fire, and fourteen vessels by torpedoes. These included 
steamships, sailing vessels, motor-boats, barges, and one 
light vessel, ranging from a 19-ton motor-boat to a 
io,ooo-ton tanker; they also inchided one west-bound 
transport, the Ticonderoga, The submarines also planted 
mines in seven different areas in the track of commerce 
on the coast. By these mines seven vessels were dam- 
aged or destroyed, among them the steamship San 
Diego, which was sunk, and the United States battle- 
ship Minnesota, which proceeded into port. The others 
were merchant steamships. Although the fact was 
never verified, the belief exsted that the X^-151 suc- 
ceeded in cutting two cables, on May 28, 191 8. 

The United States was not stampeded by the submarine 
operations. Transports and cargo vessels for Europe 
sailed as usual, and coastwise traffic soon proceeded regu- 
larly, although naturally great care was exercised in rout- 
ing vessels. When German submarine operations began, 
the offensive was at once taken by our patrol vessels, by 
submarines already distributed for the purpose, by flo- 
tillas of subchasers and by converted yachts armed with 
small guns but provided with depth charges. Despite 



366 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the number of vessels destroyed, the German submarine 
campaign on our coast was a failure. It neither inter- 
rupted the despatch of vessels to Europe nor succeeded 
in leading us to recall destroyers from Europe or even 
to retain vessels designated for duty in Europe. 

Our Submarines 

Prior to the war our submarines were not regarded as 
more than coast submarines, with limited radius of 
action. They were therefore utilized on our own coast 
only, until in October, 191 7, a division of the L-boats 
left to take station at the Azores as an anti-raider and 
anti-submarine force. They remained there for the rest 
of the war. They had no contacts with the enemy, but 
their mere presence prevented enemy raiders and sub- 
marines from operating near the Azores. One division of 
four K-boats voyaged from Hawaii through the canal 
and to Key West, Fla., and took up patrol duty in the 
Straits of Florida and the Gulf of Mexico. In Decem- 
ber, 191 7, the fifth submarine division of seven L-boats 
proceeded via the Azores to Ireland. After a hard, 
stormy passage they arrived at Bantry Bay, and began 
training in British methods of anti-submarine work. Our 
submarines soon were able to take their part in the anti- 
submarine patrol off southwest Ireland and in St. George's 
and Bristol channels, which continued for the rest of the 
war. Numerous contacts were made, but no sinkings of 
enemy craft so far as known. The boats had exciting 
experiences in being depth-charged and fired upon by 
friendly destroyers and airplanes, which believed them 
to be enemy submarines. 

The eighth submarine division of eight 0-boats started 
for duty in European waters in the fall of 1918, but had 
only reached the Azores when the armistice was declared. 



THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE WAR 367 

Subchasers 

When we entered the war the great need was for vessels 
to undertake anti-submarine operations. Hence the des- 
patch of our destroyers to assist in the English Channel. 
For such work on our own coast other vessels of the 
speed and handiness required were not existent, although 
large numbers of yachts were armed and flocks of small 
motor-boats provided for use off our principal ports. 
Then the iio-foot subchasers were devised and built. 
They were equipped with gasolene engines, had a speed 
of about fifteen knots, and were armed with almost any- 
thing that could be found in the way of small guns. 
Later they were given depth charges. They proved to 
be excellent sea-boats and valuable in the emergency, al- 
though such a type would have no permanent place in 
the navy. Many of them crossed the ocean — having 
some rather tough experiences en route — and did good 
service in operations from Queenstown and Plymouth, 
and from Corfu in the Mediterranean. The French were 
much pleased with the boats built for them. 

The Marine Corps 

A marine-corps unit reached France with the first 
expedition of American troops and a total of nearly 
32,000 officers and men were sent overseas as part of the 
American expeditionary forces. This includes 1,540 offi- 
cers and men who did duty in Europe with naval units 
ashore. 

From June, 191 7, to November 11, 191 8, marines 
served 137 days at the actual front, of which 66 were in 
active sectors. They were represented in eleven differ- 
ent divisions. The fourth brigade of marines — a unit 



368 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

of the second division — was in actual battle in eight dis- 
tinct operations. We all remember Belleau Wood and 
the part taken by our marines in checking the German 
advance toward Paris. A total of 2,453 officers and men 
were killed in battle or died from wounds (or gas) received 
in action, while 8,529 were wounded, and the total casual- 
ties, from all causes, of marines in France reached 12,285. 
The fifth and sixth regiments of marines were cited three 
times in French army orders, the sixth machine-gun bat- 
talion twice, and the fourth brigade once. Marines re- 
ceived 763 American decorations, inckiding 14 medals of 
honor and 1,721 foreign decorations. They served in 
both army and navy aviation operations, on board our 
battleships in the grand fleet and at Bantry Bay, and in 
the crews of cruisers and other vessels doing escort duty, 
as well as in the vessels of our main fleet. 

Other Activities 

A smaH force which gave exceflent service consisted of 
four ships which constituted the American cross-channel 
transport force. It was found necessary to have this 
force when, in the spring of 191 8, our army in France was 
being rapidly increased and men were sent by every pos- 
sible vessel. Many were landed in English ports, more 
than the already overtaxed British cross-channel ships 
could handle. Ships were therefore purchased and rushed 
over to perform this duty, which continued to the close 
of hostilities. 

A naval pipe-line unit was organized, sent over, and 
constructed a fuel-oil pipe-line across Scotland. 

The bureau of medicine and surgery provided hospital 
facilities in connection with every naval activity abroad. 
These were so excellent as to excite the admiration of 



THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE WAR 369 

the Allied services. Our hospital outfits and facilities on 
board ship have always been to foreign officers something 
of a source of wondering admiration. 

In the fall of 191 8 the U. S. S. Olympia was sent to 
northern Russia, arriving at Archangel October 28, and 
during the year following three other cruisers, two gun- 
boats, three Eagle boats, and three subchasers were, at 
various times, in these waters looking out for American 
interests in various ways, operating on the coast and in 
the rivers. 

Some of the greatest activities of the navy have not 
been commented on, nor is there space to do so. They 
were numerous and extensive. The expansion of train- 
ing-stations and the opening of new ones; the taking over 
and fitting out of vessels of all sorts ; the commandeering 
and operation of numerous commercial activities; the 
handling of supplies for ships at home and abroad and 
for shore establishments; the research laboratories; the 
great expansion of work in the Navy Department and 
its bureaus, all deserve to be, and will be, part of the 
history of the war. A knowledge of these activities will 
indicate how great is the general question of prepared- 
ness for war. 

Prior to the war many had feared that patriotism was 
lessening, that the feeling of individual responsibility, of 
duty owed to country, was dying out, and that instead 
we thought usually of what the country owed to a class 
or to the individual. The war showed that patriotism 
was still alive, that individual responsibility did exist. 
The spirit, patriotism, adaptability, and general intelli- 
gence of the young men, and women, also, of our country 
was amply demonstrated. 



XVI 

THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 

BY TASKER HOWARD BLISS 

The problem of the limitation of armaments differs, 
in one important aspect, from all the other important 
problems of the Paris peace conference. Those other 
problems, however much they affected for good or ill the 
relations of the world at large, primarily, and many of 
them mainly if not entirely, concerned the nations that 
were then making peace. They were created by the war 
itself, or were those for the sohition of which the war was 
fought. And the general line of their sohition was a 
foregone conchision the moment it became evident with 
which side victory would rest. The factors were known; 
the case could be concretely expressed; waiving differ- 
ences of opinion as to the relative value of these factors, 
some sort of a solution could be arrived at without great 
difficulty. And a discussion of them is, largely, a his- 
torical statement of these factors, the various opinions 
expressed as to their value, and the conchisions reached. 

But the problem of the limitation of armaments differs 
from all these. It did not grow out of the World War, but 
long antedated it. That war accentuated it but did not 
create it. Its factors are vague and complex, growing 
from the very roots of national pohcies and intertwined 
in the growth of these policies. The failure to solve it 
made such a war as the recent one possible, and directly 
brought it on. This all-important one is still unsolved, 
and until it is solved other such wars are as certain to 

370 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 371 

come as the sun is to rise, with their grim threat of de- 
struction of our civilization. It underlies the possibility 
of the existence of an association of nations for the 
maintenance of international peace, and the successful 
operation of an international court of justice and arbitral 
court. 

The conference recognized the existence of this prob- 
lem but made no direct attempt to solve it. I think that, 
whether consciously or not, the national representatives 
there assembled realized that it must be discussed by a 
conference differently constituted from that one; that 
while a world problem, its solution depended upon a 
workable agreement between only a small number of the 
nations; that an atmosphere in which the elements of 
war and violence were still muttering amid the clouds 
hovering over the ravages of the recent storm was not 
serene enough to permit the clear vision necessary to see 
and fix in substantial form this dim phantom of hope that 
has mocked men so long. The peace conference recog- 
nized a limitation of national armaments as the very 
cornerstone of the foundation that it was attempting to 
lay for a lasting peace, and in two ver}^ important chapters 
of its final treaty it pledged itself to do what could be 
done to bring it about. In the first of these it provides 
that the nations forming the League ** recognize that the 
maintenance of peace requires a reduction of national 
armaments to the lowest point consistent with national 
safety." This, of itself, is vague; but that some sort of 
reduction was contemplated appears from the provision 
that plans shall be formulated ** for such reduction for the 
consideration and action of the several governments." 
In the other chapter appears a more definite statement. 
It recognizes the behef universally expressed before the 



372 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

war, and during it, that it was the German armaments 
which forced the world to adopt that country's system, 
and that with its drastic modification the rest of the 
world could then do the same. Thus the preamble to 
the military peace terms in the treaty provided that, 

"/n order to render possible the initiation of a general 
limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany un- 
dertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air 
clauses which follow." 

Now you will note that when Germany affixed her sig- 
nature to one side of the last page of that document, 
twenty-seven other nations of the earth, including all 
the great Powers, signed it on the other side. Therefore, 
in all good faith and honor these nations have pledged 
themselves to initiate, as soon as practicable, a general 
limitation of armaments after Germany shall have com- 
plied with her first obligation. Germany is compelled to 
limit her armament in order that the other nations may 
be able to do likewise. It will be interesting to note, 
later, what we compelled Germany to do, as throwing 
light on what it was hoped that all the rest of the world 
might do as rapidly as is practicable. 

And so the problem has been thrown by the peace 
conference in the face of the world as one yet unsolved. 
As such, it is open to discussion in a sense that does not 
apply to others. 

In such a discussion the first question that will be 
asked is this: "Why has the problem suddenly become so 
urgent? The world may never see such another war as 
the one we have recently passed through; it may jog 
along, as before, for generations or centuries, with limited 
international struggles, upon which the larger part of the 
world looks with more or less indifference, and without 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 373 

any special dislocation of its normal energies." The an- 
swer to this goes to the very root of the question of ex- 
cessive armaments and will throw much hght on a pos- 
sible remedy, if a remedy can be found. 

The problem is now urgent because, for the first time 
in modern history, we are confronted by war of a nature 
that threatens the continuity, if not the existence, of our 
civihzation. This is due to one primary cause and cer- 
tain inevitable resulting tendencies of it. 

The primary cause is the radical change in the char- 
acter of war, due entirely to the modern doctrine of the 
** nation in arms." 

What is the nation in arms? It is a nation with all its 
dynamic forces — physical, material, moral — trained and 
controlled in time of peace, some of these forces entirely, 
all of them to a large extent, for eventual use in war; 
and directed in war so that all this concentrated force 
may be brought to bear in one blow for the destruc- 
tion of its adversary. Nations which must depend for 
their security upon their individual preparedness for war 
cannot be content with measures taken merely for the 
training and equipment of armed forces. The recent 
war demonstrated the absolute necessity for each bellig- 
erent to mobilize all its civil activities for the purposes of 
war. But we learned the bitter lesson that one can- 
not mobilize for war unless prepared for it in peace. 
Mobilization means nothing else than the making 
promptly available on the outbreak of war all the agen- 
cies necessary for the prosecution of the war. We know 
now that, even if it be necessary only to give help to a 
friend, we cannot rely upon our preparedness unless we 
conduct these activities in time of peace with a view to 
their best employment in war. How will it be if we 



374 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

should ever have to fight for our life? We find that 
military utility must be a large and often a controlling 
factor in determining the nature of our industries, the 
training of our workmen, and even the use of our land 
for agricultural purposes. 

And so a nation in arms is a nation of combatants, men, 
women, and children — some drafted to the front, the 
labor of others commandeered and directed to maintain 
the former at the front. In this first and only war of the 
nations in arms that we have had, it was abundantly 
proved that the morale of the army was nothing unless 
supported by that of the people at home. Every military 
and political leader gave more thought to the latter than 
to the former. And, therefore, each belligerent employed 
every available agency of war to destroy the moral re- 
sistance of his adversary at home quite as much as to 
destroy his physical and material resistance at the front. 

Now there are certain inevitable tendencies, I maj^ say 
almost inevitable consequences, of the general applica- 
tion of this doctrine of the nation in arms. They have a 
direct bearing upon the statement that a war between 
two such nations will begin at once to drag the others 
into it until it becomes a world war. 

The first of these consequences is the necessity of alli- 
ances. In times not long since, when one of the great 
powers expected to have to put into the field a maximum 
army of half a million men, or thereabouts, it had no ap- 
prehension as to lack of man-power. It could still call 
out another half a million, and then another. Mean- 
while there was always the possibility of a conclusion 
long before the total man-power was seriously touched, 
and terms of peace for the loser which, however onerous, 
would not be destructive. 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 375 

But see what happens when a nation, after straining 
every nerve during long years, and bearing many of 
the burdens of war, has trained the last of its avail- 
able man-power, and sees that man-power not increas- 
ing, has accumulated all the costly material for equip- 
ment, scrapping much of it from time to time for the 
products of new invention — when, after all that, it 
finds itself confronted by potential or probable enemies 
with still more millions of trained man-power, grow- 
ing year by year. The weaker nation can then have 
no hope except in an alliance that will at least restore the 
balance. And what is true of the single nations is true 
of the alliances themselves. When one is formed, and 
then another, every addition to the one side must be 
met by an added counterbalance on the other. That 
was the condition in Europe for some time before 1914. 
And it was the fact that every possible combination in 
the way of alliances and entente seemed to have been 
made that convinced many military students that the 
Great War was near at hand. If you will study the mili- 
tary journals of Europe for the three or four years pre- 
ceding the war, you will find this as a growing conviction. 

We know now that neither the individual preparedness 
of nations nor the alliances of nations so prepared pre- 
vented war. They delayed it, but the inevitable end 
was only the more terrible because the delay was only 
for the purpose of securing as nearly as possible every 
ounce of the world's energy for the struggle. Now that 
it is over, what are you going to do about it? Is it to be 
more preparedness and more alliances? If there is the 
one there must be the other. With them can you give 
any more assurance for the future than for the past? It 
is Just this which makes such a tremendous problem for 



X 



376 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

us, the people of the United States, and which we must, 
for our own personal interest, do our share in solving. 
Some believe that the United States should make a solemn 
declaration that in the event of another war in Europe 
threatening civilization, we shall immediately take part 
to protect civilization. But, gentlemen, I maintain that 
in the conditions of this modern world a war cannot be- 
gin between two of the great powers of Europe without 
threatening civihzation. And if it should come within 
this generation I doubt if civilization could stand the 
added strain. 

Such a declaration as I spoke of would constitute a 
moral alliance of the United States with an unnamed and 
unknown nation, or group of nations. Because, what- 
ever be its threat against civihzation, no one now knows 
who will begin the next war, nor with whom it will begin. 

It was my fortune while in France to hear many dis- 
cussions of prominent men in private, where men speak 
their minds, at a time when France was basing large 
hopes upon an alhance with Great Britain and the United 
States. And I never heard other than one conclusion, 
which was this: France must have, in the event of such 
another war, from 2,000,000 to 4,000,000 men available 
for her assistance, part of them immediately, the rest as 
rapidly as transportation can get them there. And 
these men must be constantly reinforced. Nor did they 
think there would be any moral force in an agreement 
that was not supported by the physical force necessary 
to make it good. We often say that the moral force of 
a declaration by the United States that she would sup- 
port France against Germany would have prevented the 
latter's invasion in 19 14. From the mihtary point of 
view I do not think that Germany would have begun 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 377 

the war with France when she did had she not firmly 
believed that It would have been won within from six 
to eight weeks, during which time she would have no fear 
of what the United States might do. 

Be this as it may, I agree with the French themselves 
that in the event of such another war France can have 
little hope without an alliance; and if war must come, 
then, whether as the result of a moral alliance or not, I 
earnestly hope that my country will go more promptly 
than before not only to her assistance, but to that of 
any nation whose downfall would be a menace to civihza- 
tion. If the present military policy of the world is to 
continue, such a war will come and we must bend our 
backs to carry the load of preparation. Is it or is it not 
better to minimize the cost of insurance of our civihza- 
tion by putting out a little of the fire that threatens it? 
Instead of contemplating the possibility of being forced 
into such another war, is it not better, in our own inter- 
ests, that we should at least try to effect a modification 
of the systems and policies that alone make such wars 
probable or possible? 

The second consequence of the doctrine of the nation 
in arms is the accumulation of the enormous amount of 
costly material for its man-power. Although every able- 
bodied man in a nation be trained to arms, his services 
are ineffective unless he and the military organization to 
which he is to belong have at once ready all the initial 
equipment which he and his organization require. There 
must, therefore, be immediately ready not only a vast 
accumulation of infantry arms and ammunition, but 
artillery of every kind, tanks, aeroplanes, motor-trucks. 
These require years to obtain; yet there is always the 
chance that some new invention may throw much of it 



378 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

on the scrap pile. But that chance must be taken if 
there is to be preparedness when the emergency comes. 
A nation may train every man within its borders, but, 
without the necessary material at the outbreak of war, 
it may find that, in the temper of people of this modern 
world, in addition to a war abroad it will have a revolu- 
tion at home. 

Note another thing that tends to bring about the alli- 
ances that will make future wars more formidable. The 
antagonism growing out of opposing commercial interests 
or out of racial differences is no longer confined to any 
two nations. These interests bind them together in groups 
on each side. The result is great alliances bound to stand 
together until changed conditions result in new alliances, 
because the interest of one is the interest of all. By the 
very necessities of war, one side or each of them begins 
to put restrictions on neutrals with a tendency toward, 
sometimes with the object of, forcing them into it. When 
the relations of all kinds between the nations, especially 
the great ones, were not so close as now, when war meant 
generally a relatively small indemnity, with or without a 
relatively small loss of territory for the defeated side, 
other nations found it not difficult to keep out of it. But 
now the war of two nations in arms is so serious that the 
victor feels he must leave his enemy powerless for genera- 
tions to come. It becomes a war almost, if not Hterall}^, 
for fife and death. Some nations may think they have 
an interest in bringing this about for one or the other 
of the contestants. But there are others who are vitally 
interested in preventing it. So there is a tendency to 
bring one after another into the maelstrom, until, as I 
have said, the war of two nations in arms becomes one 
of the World in Arms. 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 379 

A third consequence is the rigid blockade. The recent 
war showed that when the man-power of a nation is in 
the field, the surest way to defeat it is to break the 
morale of the people at home. It is not possible for any 
nation, even one with the most abundant and varied 
resources, to store up in peace the supplies necessary for 
the enormous, immediate, and continued demand in war. 
There is always something that must be obtained from 
abroad. And the withdrawal of men from productive 
labor makes it more and more difficult for a nation to 
utilize its own resources. Science may do much to pro- 
vide substitutes for lacking material; but in war there 
are time limits, even if no other, to the operation of 
science. It was this which forced a more and more 
stringent blockade, regardless of previous rules or of 
national interpretations of them, much to the irritation 
of the United States, and which continued until the 
United States learned that the ruthless blockade was to 
her own interest as well as to that of European Allies. 

And the character of this latest and, probably, of 
future wars justifies the extreme blockade. It will make, 
and it is to be hoped that it will make, future wars more 
difficult in their inception, because, unless the whole 
world accepts this new rule, it will require a nation or 
an alliance strong enough to defy the rest of the world, 
in order to block all avenues of commercial access to the 
nation with which it is at war. But it will do it if it can. 

You will now see why it is that in a war of ** nations 
in arms" it becomes increasingly difficult for any nation, 
with however little original interest in the matter, to 
maintain its neutrality. Modern agencies of warfare 
have already made it impossible to blockade directly and 
close at hand, with any certainty, enemy ports and coasts. 



38o WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Therefore, when it has become necessary, in order to 
effect our purpose, to blockade whole seas and oceans; 
when, to stop all trade of every kind whatsoever with an 
enemy country, to prevent every possible pound of food 
or supplies of any kind from leaking through a neutral 
country to an enemy country, whether their borders are 
contiguous or not, it has become necessary to put those 
neutrals on short rations of food, of clothing, of fuel, of 
everything — then these neutrals can escape many of the 
hardships of war only by joining in it on one side or the 
other. And it may be that some will join a side because 
they think it will win rather than because they think 
it is right. 

The basic reason for the ruthless blockade is not far 
to seek. With the modern nation in arms every woman, 
old and young, who can knit a woollen sock for the soldier 
at the front, every child able to knit a mitten, every old 
man who can cultivate a bushel of potatoes or wheat 
beyond his own needs — each of them is a soldier; their 
work is commandeered and directed by the government 
for the purposes of the war. The merchant deals in the 
goods that the government permits him; the farmer sows 
the crops that the government orders him. Every one 
is drafted for the war. The tendency has been to abolish 
the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, 
to treat all as soldiers — the mother rocking the cradle at 
home, as the husband or son in the trenches. And it is 
to be feared that it will be as bad, or worse, in the next 
war, unless the good God gives us sense at least to try 
some plan by which warfare may be made impossible. 

Again, a characteristic of modern war is its startling 
suddenness. When nations, whether singly or in alli- 
ances, arm to the limit against each other, and each side 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 381 

knows that the armament of the other has no use against 
any other than itself, we can all see that when one has 
reached its limit and knows that the other is capable of 
still further expansion, war, without warning, is inevitable. 

Finally, the new warfare is marked by the ruthless use 
of every possible agency for destruction of life and mate- 
rial. When the Hague Convention pronounced against 
the use of toxic or asphyxiating gases and the dropping 
of bombs from aeroplanes, these agencies were regarded 
merely as irritants, making the struggle more bitter, and 
accomplishing nothing in the attainment of the ends of 
the war. But no agency, however terrible, has continued 
to be unlawful from the moment it is discovered to be 
practical and effective in determining the course of a 
battle or in bringing the war to an end. The use of 
gas has been legalized by war, as is shown by the prep- 
arations for its further use made by all the great armed 
nations. In every nation in Europe it is expected that 
the use of aeroplanes for the bombing of cities in the 
next great war will be on a scale without precedent in 
the last one. And all this is due to the fact that a war 
of nations in arms is in reality one of life and death, in 
which each will and must do what it can to save itself 
and destroy its adversary. 

Now, I think we can accept the following statement 
of facts : 

First, that it is a world war, as distinguished from the 
old-time warfare, that constitutes a menace to our exist- 
ing civilization. 

Second, such a war depends upon a few so-called great 
Powers. 

Third, a war between any two 01 them, which formerly 
created, relatively, only a ripple on the surface of world 



382 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

politics, now has an irresistible tendency to draw them 
all into the roaring maelstrom. 

Fourth^ to meet this, these few nations must stagger 
under an increasing burden during years of armed peace, 
solely to train what, if they can find some other method 
satisfactory for their purpose, is an unnecessary number 
of men in purely destructive arts, and to accumulate 
enormous quantities of costly material, which does not 
add a penny to their permanent wealth, and w hich when 
used for the only purpose for which it can be used, is 
finally represented by an atmosphere of stinking gas 
and by the destruction of every form of real and other- 
wise permanent wealth. 

Fifth, such wars, resulting in the application of every 
ounce of accumulated energy on both sides, must result 
in the practical destruction of one by the other, even if 
both are not ruined. 

Sixth, such wars, necessarily characterized by an inten- 
sity of national passions heretofore unknown, come to be 
regarded by each side as wars for life or death, in which 
each, to save his life and destroy his adversary, will use 
every agency of destruction available to him; that, there- 
fore, such agencies as the absolute blockade to starve 
people who heretofore were regarded as non-combatants, 
noxious gases, night and day bombing of cities from 
aeroplanes, the submarine, have come to stay until re- 
placed by more destructive agencies. 

Seventh, various causes will operate to draw neutrals 
into the struggle. 

Eighth, when such war comes it will be without warning 
and every one must be ready. 

Ninth, all of this is due to the acceptance by a few 
governments of the military doctrine of the nation in 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 383 

arms; to their belief that no way can be found to guaran- 
tee their rights except universal preparedness, no guar- 
antee against a general war except a general preparation 
for it. 

Andy lastly, with all that staring us in the face, is the 
fact that after the last ounce of strength has been accu- 
mulated and the last combination of the Powers has 
been made, one side or the other must strike or forfeit 
every dollar and every hope bound up in its preparation. 

That, I think, is a fair summary of the war through 
which we have recently passed. First was a period of 
individual preparation. Then, as nations began to fore- 
see the limits of their possibility for preparation, and in 
the hope that by joining forces with others they need 
not go to their hmit but could save some of their energy 
for other purposes, came the formation of alliances fol- 
lowed by ententes. In that status of things, the general 
war broke out, although for forty years the great nations 
had been bleeding themselves white in the belief that by 
getting ready for it they would prevent it. Six of the 
eight great Powers entered it at once, followed shortly 
after by the seventh, and finally by the eighth. And 
many minor neutrals, from one cause and another, were 
successively brought in. The blockade came, at first 
relatively mild, then more and more stringent; the grad- 
ually growing ruthless use of the submarine for the alleged 
purpose of establishing a counter-blockade; the use of 
toxic gases to break what seemed to be a strangle-hold 
which each adversary had of the other, all the other 
accompaniments and results of the war which you know 
only too well. 

It is not necessary to speak in vague terms about 



384 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

such a war being a menace to civilization, because it 
was a war of civilization against itself, or, rather, a 
civil war between two parts of it. It involved every 
one of the great civilized Powers. It has set one 
great nation on the road to an atheistic anarchy. It 
has weakened others in their powers of resistance to the 
seeping poison. It has destroyed, for a time at least, 
one great barrier between Oriental civilization and the 
narrow strip of Latin and Anglo-Saxon civihzation cling- 
ing to the western coast of Europe. Uncivilized races 
took part in it only to learn our arts of war, perhaps in 
time to be used against us. And the pity of it is ap- 
parent from this: If we exclude Russia but include many 
peoples scarcely deserving it, our civilization in 2,000 
years has now less than 500,000,000 adherents. It seems 
a far cry, and it probably is a far cry, to a struggle be- 
tween our own and an alien civilization; but in consid- 
ering our problem, I think it is our duty to view it in 
terms of generations or centuries, to regard ourselves not 
as conservers of the relatively petty interests of to-day 
and to-morrow, but as guardians of the ages to come. 

The menace to civilization of the kind of war that I 
have been referring to consists in the magnitude of its 
shock. A structure that steadily withstands the impact 
of frequent blows of a lesser force may crumble under 
one blow of those forces combined. The modern system 
of preparedness has undoubtedly made wars rarer; but 
when they come it is with the accumulated shock of many 
lesser wars. A few figures will ilhistrate this: In all of 
the wars waged between the years 1790 and 191 3, the 
total death loss was 4,449,300. An approximate esti- 
mate of their cost to the world I have not been able to 
obtain. In the recent World War, lasting from August of 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 385 

19 1 4 to November of 191 8, the total death loss in battle 
was 9,998,77 1 . The number of wounded was 20,297,55 1 ; 
prisoners and missing, 5,983,600. If we accept the usual 
estimate of the dead in the list of prisoners and missing, 
we have a total death list of 12,991,000. To this total 
there must be added the many more millions of people 
— old men, women, and children — who died from hard- 
ships and deprivation as a direct result of the war. To 
produce the energy necessary to kill and wound this num- 
ber of men, to destroy property, and to occasion the 
other costs of the war, it cost the nations concerned a 
total of $337,946,179*657. "The figures presented in 
this summary are both incomprehensible and appalling, 
yet even these do not take into account the effect of the 
war on life, human vitality, economic well-being, ethics, 
morality, or other phases of human relationship and 
activities which have been disorganized and injured."^ 
Who can deny that such a war was a greater shock to 
our civihzation than the many lesser wars of many pre- 
ceding generations could have been? 

Now, assuming for the moment that this analysis of 
causes of the kind of war that the civilized world has 
most to dread is approximately correct, is there any 
remedy? If I were an unreasoning radical I would an- 
swer: "Yes; the universal abolition of the system which 
is the concentration of all the causes." But that is im- 
possible. Is there any single step that can be taken, 
with the reasonable hope that it may in time be followed 
by others, that will greatly minimize the chances of a 
general war? Yes, there are more than one; and if the 
five great Powers really want peace, it ought to be only 
a question of a fair conference to decide which step, from 

* "Preliminary Economic Status of the War," No. 24, Carnegie Endowment. 



386 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the point of view of all of them, it is most practicable to 
take first. 

To get a clew to these steps, let us take an extreme 
case, and consider what was done to Germany by the 
peace treaty, and the reasons for it. 

As you know, the armistice of November 1 1 was, in 
accordance with its own provisions, twice renewed for 
successive periods of thirty days. When the third time 
approached, there were many who perceived serious dan- 
gers in this course. The supreme war council therefore 
decided that it should be renewed for an indeterminable 
but short time, during which the peace conference should 
draw up the final military, naval, and air terms which it 
was intended to embody in a preliminary treaty of peace 
with Germany. Accordingly, in February of 191 9, the 
conference appointed a committee charged with the work 
presided over by Marshal Foch. Its task was promptly 
completed, but, due to various causes, action on it by 
the conference was delayed; the final terms appeared in 
the complete treaty of June 28. 

The first question before the committee concerned the 
number of efi'ectives that should be left for a German 
army. That country was still in the throes of the revo- 
lution which had followed the armistice. A government 
was in nominal power that had in it the possibilities of 
democratic development. The world at large had every 
interest in the maintenance of this government unless 
and until a better one should present itself. It was being 
fought by monarchist reactionaries and Spartacist Com- 
munists. Disorder reigned in all the great centres of 
population and industry. Manifestly, it was better that 
a democratic government should be permitted to grow 
stronger by its own successful efforts to maintain and 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 387 

develop itself than that it should go to pieces, a contin- 
gency which would necessitate occupation of the country 
by large alien armies for the indefinite future. 

It was unanimously agreed that the force must be 
reasonably sufficient to maintain internal order, and yet 
too weak for external aggression. This number was not 
capable of mathematical demonstration. But it was 
unanimously agreed that the number should be 200,000 
men, provided that they were to be raised by conscrip- 
tion with a very short term of service, and a much smaller 
number if they were to be long-service men under volun- 
tary enlistment. 

The issue thus raised by differences of opinion as to 
short-term conscription and long-term voluntary enlist- 
ment is the very heart of the great question of the limita- 
tion of armaments. It may seem a curious thing that 
the military men of those nations that had had most 
reason to fear Germany should favor conscription and 
short service. But it was natural enough. The total 
force proposed to be allowed for Germany was so small, 
in the scale of existing European armaments, that they 
had no fear of it so long as their own were maintained. 
Nor did any of them advocate reduction in their own 
for an indefinite future. But the fear, guardedly ex- 
pressed, was this: The common people will say, "For 
forty years we have patiently and loyally endured a 
blighting military system because we beheved it neces- 
sary in order to meet the menace of the German system. 
We have cheerfully withdrawn from productive labor, 
year in and year out, a great number of our best men 
and have borne the burden of constantly increasing taxa- 
tion falling on the reduced productive labor. Now we 
have crushed the Germany that originated the evil system 



388 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

and we have crushed her system. Why should we bear 
it any longer? Under the guise of a penalty you have 
bestowed upon Germany the blessing that we have longed 
for and we demand a share in it, too." So it is natural 
enough that men who beheved it unwise for their govern- 
ments to change their present military systems should 
hesitate to put such an argument in the mouths of their 
people, which perhaps those governments could not 
withstand. 

This difference of opinion had, finally, to be decided 
by the council of the Powers, which wisely, in my opinion, 
ruled in favor of the army of 100,000 men, of voluntary 
enlistment, and the abolition of conscription. 

The remaining matters involved no difficulty. In order 
to complete the destruction of the military system it was 
provided that universal military service and training 
shall be abolished. 

It was provided that there should be only the amount 
of arms, ammunition, and equipment necessary for the 
small authorized army to perform its function of main- 
taining internal order. 

The accumulation of stocks of arms and munitions of 
any kind was prohibited. This provision alone makes 
impossible international war on a large scale on the part 
of Germany. The immense stocks of costly munitions 
and other apparatus formerly accumulated by that na- 
tion, and which the other nations are still accumulating, 
presupposes a war of the ''nations in arms" in which it 
must be possible for every able-bodied man to receive 
his initial equipment, together with the enormous reserves 
of material, the destruction of which will at once begin. 

The material permitted to be on hand, which is to be 
sufficient only to replace the annual waste, must be stored 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 389 

at points of which the Allied and Associated Powers 
approve. All other material must be delivered to com- 
missions of those Powers for destruction. 

The manufacture of war material of any kind whatso- 
ever, except of the kind and in the amounts permitted 
by the treaty, is absohitely prohibited. Their permitted 
manufacture can be carried on only in estabhshments 
that are approved by the Powers. "All other establish- 
ments," says the treaty, "for the manufacture, prepara- 
tion, storage or design of arms, munitions, or any war 
material whatever, shall be closed down." 

In subsequent clauses the German navy was reduced 
to a force sufficient only for a coast guard, and sufficient 
for that, it may be remarked, only in case other navies 
should be similarly reduced. No submarines are allowed. 
All war vessels not authorized must be delivered to the 
Powers or broken up. No new war vessel can be con- 
structed or acquired except to replace those that are 
allowed. Further to guard this restriction, no vessel can 
be replaced unless it has been totally lost in the hazards 
of the sea or otherwise, or unless, for one class of vessels, 
it has been in service for twenty years, and for the other 
class, for fifteen years. All fortifications commanding 
the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic 
shall be demolished, nor shall any such be hereafter 
erected. 

Finally, says the treaty, "the armed forces of Germany 
must not include any mifitary or naval air forces." 

There were, of course, numerous clauses relating to de- 
tails and methods of execution. 

The committee wrote nothing but the straightforward, 
cold-blooded clauses. It was not their business to do 
more. But when the peace conference approved them 



390 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

it added the very significant preamble which I have al- 
ready quoted: 

" In order to render possible the initiation of a general 
limitation of the Armaments of all Nations, Germany 
undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and 
air clauses which follow." 

Now, what did we require German}^ to do that we 
would not gladly do ourselves, provided that every other 
nation loyally did the same, to our assured knowledge, 
and at the same time as ourselves? I can think of no 
other answer than — Nothing. But that is now impos- 
sible. It is the dream of the idealist. 

It will be a long time before the nations will be relieved 
of a certain fear of each other; a fear which undoubtedly 
exists in varying degree is largely bred out of the existence 
of excessive and necessarily unequal armaments, and 
which results in continuing them. And it is this fear, 
whether unreasoning or not, that must be taken into ac- 
count in any attempt to come to an agreement about these 
armaments. Fear results in armaments, and the arma- 
ments are simply a concrete expression of national policies. 
It is because they are so completely interwoven with the 
growth of these national policies that any question of 
their limitation is the most complicated one that confronts 
the world. It is not true that armaments on their present 
scale have been maintained solely for defense against 
wanton and unprovoked attack. It is because national 
leaders know that their policies may invite or even pro- 
voke attack, or because they know that these policies 
may force themselves to attack. 

Now, if any business man has a competitor who, in 
some senseless form of competition, is not only cutting 
his own throat but is forcing you to do the same, you 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 391 

are not going to any third party to discuss the mat- 
ter; sooner or later you will have to go to him to see 
whether you can arrive at any better modus Vivendi. If 
it is true that certain nations are needlessly burdening 
their peoples in a competitive race for this or that form 
of armament, they, and no one else, must get together in 
a fair discussion of the problem to see if they, too, can 
find a better modus viveiidi. When the legislators of 
various nations have before them the question of taxing 
their people for the great sums necessary to maintain 
and expand their military and naval establishments, you 
may be sure that in their secret discussions they justify 
these expenses on the gound of a fear of some other na- 
tion's policy. And these policies are those of only some 
five or six Powers. It is they, therefore, that must come 
together. The nations will get nowhere in asking their 
mihtary and naval experts: "Can we safely reduce our 
expenses for building programmes? Can we safely de- 
cide not to adopt the military doctrine of the nation in 
arms?" Their answer must be: "No, not until the other 
nations, our rivals in this business, do the same." There- 
fore, sooner or later, these questions must be asked of 
the nations the results of whose policy we fear. 

And so the first step in the solution of our problem 
must be a conference of the Powers concerned. It need 
not include more than five. It must be free and un- 
pledged. It must not be composed of military and naval 
men but of the most far-sighted statesmen. It were 
better held in our own country, where the other nations 
can more clearly realize what confronts them if they force 
us into military competition with them. 

Assume such a conference to be assembled. Naturally, 
the representatives of the other Powers may say that as 



392 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

we have called the conference it is incumbent on us to 
submit the first proposition for their consideration. 
What attitude might patriotic American representatives 
take? It seems to me that the following would be such 
an attitude for these representatives and result in a 
reasonable basis for discussion with some hope of good 
result. 

They will declare that the United States will not lay 
up a single ship, nor cease building them, will not disarm 
a single soldier, will not cease or diminish — but rather in- 
crease — its efforts at preparedness, except as the result 
of an agreement between all the great Powers to do the 
same. 

They will divide national armaments into their three 
component parts : 

(a) Land fortifications; 

(6) Navies; 

(c) Universal training of a nation for war, together 
with the manufacture and accumulation of all the ma- 
terial necessary for international war. 

It will be noted that these component parts of arma- 
ment increase in cost from the first to the third, and that, 
in the same progression, they increase the menace to the 
common peace. The first menaces this peace not at 
all, and imposes the least financial burden; the third is 
a perpetual menace to international peace and imposes 
the greatest burden. The subsequent discussions of the 
conference must be solely devoted to determining whether 
there is any possible modification in any or all of these 
three parts of national armaments that w^ill materially 
relieve the people of their burden and give more assured 
peace. 

As a preliminary to these discussions the American 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 393 

representatives could well accept the following basic as- 
sumptions : 

First, it is as impossible to have equality in the limited 
armaments as it is to have equality in the present exces- 
sive armaments. And it would seem that nations which 
have had to endure the one inequality ought to endure 
very patiently the other. 

Second, no government can be expected willingly to 
face the possibility of its own destruction. Therefore, 
it must have whatever force it finds necessary to 
maintain itself against the forces of disorder and disrup- 
tion. 

Third, before complete progress can be made there 
must be a radical change in the Russian situation. 

Fourth, under the mandates over uncivilized peoples 
granted by a league of nations, the United States, whether 
it has anything to do with a league or not, should demand 
as its right, and the right of civilization, that under the 
guise of such mandates millions of men of savage races 
shall not be trained to take part in possible wars of civi- 
lized nations. If civilization wants to destroy itself it 
can do it without barbarian help. 

Then, in this parley between the Powers, we must re- 
member that the other nations are looking to us, not to 
take the first step, but to suggest one which none can re- 
fuse to take along with the others. They are saying to 
us: "We want your help in world afi'airs, because with- 
out you there can be no continued peace." We are say- 
ing to them: "The help you want of us will not make for 
our peace, but war." Why should we not take them at 
their word and test what it means ? Why should we not 
say to them, and give them a chance to accept or refuse, 
something like this: "Will you, the nations that signed 



394 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the preamble to the military peace terms with Germany, 
sign this further document with us? 

"*We will agree with you that each nation that so de- 
sires shall keep and build whatever frontier and coast 
fortifications it wishes. Fortifications cannot stride across 
the earth, devastating fields and destroying cities. 

"*We will agree with you that each nation may main- 
tain its navy. No navy without an army can conquer 
and hold foreign territory. 

"*We will agree with you on a date when we shall 
simultaneously begin to abolish any mihtary system 
which is solely necessary for international war, so long 
as no other nation retains it. 

'"We will agree with you on a date, as remote as the 
existing conditions make absohitely necessary, when we 
shall begin the gradual reduction of our armed forces. 
In coming to an agreement about this we will accept any 
reasonable just principle of proportion, but admitting in 
advance that reduced armaments can no more be equalized 
than excessive ones. We will trust to the ultimate good 
sense of the common peoples of the nations, who suffer 
most from excessive armaments, to see to it that when 
the movement has once begun it is pushed as rapidly as 
may be to its proper limit. 

"*We will agree with you on the proper amounts of 
material to be kept on hand for the reduced forces. And 
we will further agree with you to cease the manufacture 
of material until the amounts now on hand are reduced 
to what we agree upon as necessary for the reduced 
lorces. 

Are these propositions reasonable? And if agreed 
upon will they accomplish anything in the maintenance 
of international peace? 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 395 

Manifestly, they do not guarantee against war, and I 
know of nothing that now will. But they will undoubt- 
edly have a tendency to deter any nation from under- 
taking international war. And they will ultimately 
minimize the chances of the occurrence of another war 
such as the last one. Because, I repeat and insist, that 
such a war is only possible with the entire male popula- 
tion of the nations trained to war, and with the enormous 
accumulation of material for that population when called 
to arms. 

But they will tide over the long period of mutual fear 
that will exist before the nations understand that they 
can be menaced by no sudden war in which defeat means 
death. Nations will retain as long as they choose their 
material defenses on land and sea. They w^ill be left 
with gradually reducing mihtary forces. And this reduc- 
tion being made at simultaneous periods, they may gain 
a gradually increasing confidence in each other's good 
faith. They will not destroy their present vast stocks 
of material, but will agree to stop the manufacture of 
any new material France and England and Italy, dur- 
ing this period of reduction and for long thereafter, need 
have no military fear of Germany, due to a reduction in 
their forces and stoppage of manufacture of material. 
Because, while there are now millions of young men in 
civil life on both sides trained in the recent war, on the 
one side there will be ample reserves of the present 
material for these millions, if called to arms, while on 
the other side there will be none at all. But, above all, 
we will have gradually accomplished a radical change in 
a system which alone is a standing threat to international 
peace. 

I admit that perhaps the greatest difficulty will be in 



396 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

coming to an agreement with European Powers as to the 
reasonable force that each nation requires to maintain 
internal order. But I do not believe that this difficulty 
is insurmountable. Underlying this question with them, 
is the latent fear of Germany. Under present conditions 
we can hardly understand this. None can, except those 
who have lived under this dread for a long generation. 
Nevertheless, I see no reason why an agreement cannot 
be reached. They all admit that a large part of their 
forces have been maintained solely because of the men- 
ace of the German system. With that menace removed 
— removed not only as coming from Germany but from 
anywhere else — the peoples themselves are not likely to 
allow any excessive number under the guise of preserving 
order. 

No one can tell what would be the conclusion of such 
a conference. One thing is certain; we need not accept 
anything that we do not hke. And another thing is 
certain; if the government of the United States were 
to-day to transmit an open telegraphic note to those of 
the four other great Powers, a note that to-morrow would 
be published in all the newspapers of the world, inviting 
them to a free, unpledged conference on the subject of 
armaments, there would be an immediate favorable re- 
sponse. Further, should such a conference meet, and 
should a fair abstract of its discussions be published to 
the world, its propositions and the objections to them 
and who make the objections, the common peoples of 
the five nations would not permit that conference to sep- 
arate until it were prepared to show them at least the first 
step toward a practicable solution of the problem. For 
the first time in two generations the psychological mo- 
ment is here and now, but it will rapidly pass. We 



THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 397 

have a world, appalled by the magnitude of its losses, 
desirous of finding some way, any way, that will in 
some degree help its recovery from them and minimize 
the chances of their recurrence; a world that realizes, 
for the time at least, that the great insurance company 
in which it had invested has failed. We have the assur- 
ance for the present that the great exponent of the sys- 
tem which has brought the world to the verge of ruin is 
itself crushed and ruined; and we have the possibility of 
replacing it, in due time, by a law-abiding democratic 
member of the family of nations. Is it not the time for 
us to cease asking ourselves, helplessly and hopelessly, 
the question, "Can it be done?" and at least attempt 
to do something? 

I have often heard it asked: "Has the United States 
failed to attain its ideal in the war?" Not if, as the 
result of it, the United States can show the world, and 
prevail on it to take, one assured step toward the pre- 
vention of its recurrence. Surelj^ among the small 
number of nations concerned there must be some men 
wise enough to work out a plan designed, not to give 
this or that its "place in the sun," but one that will set 
us all on the path to the sun. If not, then you and your 
sons and brothers did not fight to destroy an overgrown 
mihtarism, but only German mihtarism. You will have 
killed one giant only to set up five more in his place. 



XVII 

THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 

BY DAVID HUNTER MILLER 

My discussion of the making of the League of Nations 
is from the point of view of a party to the proceedings. 
The historian of the subject will hereafter be able to 
bring together the many threads of the fabric, to trace 
the motives of all the figures in the scene, to show not 
only what they did, but why. My present purpose is to 
tell a part of the story, rather than to recount the his- 
tory, to testify rather than to pronounce judgment. 

One of the first acts of the Conference of Paris was the 
adoption at its opening session on January 25, 1919, of a 
resolution declaring that a League of Nations should be 
created, that the League should be treated as an integral 
part of the treaty of peace, and that a commission of 
the Conference should work out the details of its consti- 
tution and functions. 

But history does not begin with a resolution. 

The whole world had agreed without any dissent, or 
at least without any expressed dissent, that some plan 
for the preservation of future peace should emerge from 
the chaos of the World War. Many statesmen in many 
countries had long preached such a result. President 
Wilson had declared that a league of nations was one 
of the essential terms of the settlement, although, curi- 
ously enough, the phrase which the President employed 
in his most important utterance, the phrase which is 

398 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 399 

found in the Fourteen Points, is not "league of nations," 
but "association of nations," a phrase which has since 
come into somewhat prominent use by others who are, 
perhaps, unaware of its origin. 

Indeed, the declaration in the Fourteen Points for the 
establishment of an association of nations had, as shown 
by the note of our government of November 5, 191 8, 
formally become one of the bases of the peace terms with 
Germany; so that the resolution of the Peace Conference, 
a resolution drafted by the British delegation, simply 
looked toward carrying out a part of the bargain with 
Germany which ended the fighting. 

Furthermore, the provision of the resolution that the 
League should be "treated as an integral part of the 
General Treaty of Peace," was itself of the substance of 
the pre-armistice agreement. It was the right of Ger- 
many to insist upon the establishment of a league of 
nations for her own protection. The German delegates 
presented their plan for such an organization and the 
absence of any such plan from the treaty would justly 
have been regarded by Germany as a gross breach of 
faith; indeed, Germany always vigorously insisted that 
President Wilson's words, "a general association of na- 
tions," meant not only an association framed by the 
treaty, but an association of which Germany should 
be at once and forthwith a member. 

The idea, once widely prevalent, that the writing of 
the Covenant into the treaty delayed the proceedings of 
the Conference, has, of course, long since been exploded. 
The Paris negotiations did not commence until January, 
1 9 19, after the results of the British elections were known. 
The conditions of peace were presented to the German 
delegation on May 7, some four months later. Even 



400 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

if this could be considered a lengthy period for the dis- 
cussions and work involved in the preparation of a legal 
document of some hundred thousand words or more, 
that work was delayed by well-known differences of view 
in regard to reparations and other questions quite remote 
from the Covenant. 

But it was one thing to agree upon the general prin- 
ciple of a league of nations and quite another to formu- 
late its details. For no agreement as to those latter 
had been reached except that the association should be 
constituted with ** mutual guarantees of political inde- 
pendence and territorial integrity to great and small 
states alike"; that detail, as a part of the Fourteen 
Points, had been agreed upon between the Allied and 
Associated Powers and Germany. Strangely enough, 
those words, which constituted the only prehminary 
point of definite agreement about the League, became, 
when incorporated almost hterally in Article lo of the 
present Covenant, the point chiefly disputed after the 
treaty was signed. 

And while the resolution of the Peace Conference stated 
generally some purposes of the League, declared that it 
should be open to every civilized nation which could be 
relied upon to promote its objects, and that it should 
meet periodically and have a permanent organization 
and secretariat, ahiiost any structure could be built 
around those phrases, which indicate perhaps by their 
silences a fear of going too far rather than of not going 
far enough. 

So the work of preparing the agreement of the League 
of Nations was intrusted by the Peace Conference to a 
commission, or, as we would say, a committee; but there 
were very many advisers, official and unofficial, in and 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 401 

out of Paris, who were willing, even anxious, to antici- 
pate the work of the committee by the preparation of 
drafts in advance. The number of such drafts was very 
great; the number of them which it is necessary to men- 
tion is very small. 

Before mentioning any of them, I shall allude to what 
I believe to be the fact, that the work and the utter- 
ances of Lord Grey had a deep influence upon the minds 
of all the official and semi-official draftsmen, even upon 
those who were unconscious of that influence; the mem- 
orandum of Lichnowsky had compelled even the ene- 
mies of Lord Grey to admit that his efforts to prevent 
the war had been unselfish and sincere; the frantic con- 
fusion of the diplomatic telegrams of the latter part of 
July, 1914, through which the threatened tragedy stum- 
bled blindly into reality, had convinced most people of 
the vital importance of at least some change in the 
machinery of diplomacy, so that we would be rid of the 
dangerous absurdity of a telegram about what Vienna 
had wired to Belgrade, sent by London to Paris, with 
the hope of averting hostilities between Berlin and Petro- 
grad. Every one who has examined the various colored 
books of the different governments regarding the events 
of 1 91 4, has sought in vain to decipher even the exact 
chronological order of all the despatches; it was Lord 
Grey's splendid failure which produced in the minds of 
all the reaction in favor of a system of meetings face to 
face of the representatives of important countries when- 
ever there was anything important to discuss. Almost 
every plan for a league of nations had some form for 
such meetings, large and small, the Assembly and the 
Council, whether called by those names or by others. 

Now, international committees are not unlike other 



402 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

committees in one respect. As soon as it is determined 
that a paper is to be drafted, the member of the com- 
mittee who presents a definite scheme will certainly have 
many, even, perhaps, most of his ideas accepted. 

The history of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
presents a striking illustration of this principle. If you 
compare the paper first laid before the League of Nations 
commission with the final text of the Covenant in the 
treaty, you will find that the latter is very different from 
the former in its language; you will find that it contains 
quite numerous additions of the utmost importance; but 
you will also find that with the exceptions of one article 
recast and of one other omitted, everything that is in 
the first paper appears in substance in the last. 

So the first important question to be decided by the 
commission on the League of Nations, to state it in the 
language of diplomacy, was: What draft should be 
adopted as the basis of discussion ? And while a decision 
of this question in eff'ect was made before the commission 
met, it was not made until a few hours before the time 
of that meeting. 

President Wilson had prepared at least one draft of a 
covenant some time before he went to Europe. And 
General Smuts, who was one of the two British members 
of the League of Nations commission, had prepared, with 
the collaboration, I believe, of some of the *' Round 
Table" group, what he called "a practical suggestion." 
By direction of Mr. Lansing, secretary of state. Doctor 
James Brown Scott, and myself, as legal advisers of the 
American Commission, had formally submitted a draft 
early in January, 19 19, and in point of time this had 
been preceded by some suggestions of my own submitted 
to Colonel House while I was acting as legal adviser of 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 403 

his mission before the arrival in Paris of the American 
delegation to the Peace Conference. 

Doubtless influenced to some extent by the views of 
General Smuts, President Wilson prepared and had 
printed at Paris a new draft of his own, which was re- 
printed a few days later with some changes and additions, 
and was subsequently made public at the hearings before 
the Senate committee on foreign relations. Lord Robert 
Cecil, who was at the head of the League of Nations sec- 
tion of the British delegation, had prepared a draft of his 
own, and this was the basis of the official British draft. 
How much attention Mr. Lloyd George paid to the 
League of Nations question, I do not know. It always 
seemed to me that Lord Robert Cecil, although not a 
member of the British Government, had authority to go 
ahead "on his own," and proceeded accordingly; but he 
undoubtedly gave much weight to the views of the British 
colonial representatives at Paris, whose interest in the 
League of Nations was profound. Indeed, the question 
of colonial representation in the League was distinctly 
understood and agreed to between President Wilson and 
Lord Robert Cecil before the League of Nations com- 
mission first met. 

There were only two instances in which I knew that 
decisions as to policy in the matter of the League were 
referred to the British prime minister, and from that fact 
I have, perhaps wrongly, inferred that other decisions 
were not. Those two instances were the Japanese pro- 
posals regarding racial equality and the American pro- 
posals regarding the Monroe Doctrine. 

Lord Robert Cecil was undoubtedly one of the com- 
manding figures at Paris. With a character of almost 
austere simpficity he had a winning charm of manner, 



404 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

and the force which was behind his observations rested 
largely upon his almost incredible frankness and his 
obvious sincerity. His mental attitude is an extraordi- 
nary combination of the conservative, the practical, and 
the idealistic. He conservatively felt, wrongly I beheve, 
that the Great Powers would have to be the real directors 
of the League for it to be a success. He very practically 

, doubted the advisability of Article lo, and opposed the 
French scheme for an international general staff. But 
he was an idealist as to a new era in international affairs, 

^ he favored the admission of Germany into the League, 
and he believed in disarmament and arbitration. 

As no other delegation except the British had prepared 
any detailed draft plan at all, the question which was 
presented in January, 191 9, to Colonel House, who was 
in charge of the whole matter on behalf of the President, 
was how to reach an agreement upon a draft between the 
British and ourselves. With this end in view. Colonel 
House brought about conferences between Lord Robert 
Cecil and myself during the latter part of January. 
While those conversations were based upon President 
Wilson's draft and the British draft, they were not 
wholly limited by those papers; any agreement reached 
could only be tentative; my instructions were not rigid 
in regard to questions having a legal aspect; under such 
circumstances modifications of view were inevitable and 
substantial agreement was not found difficult. 

The results of those talks were then discussed at a 
meeting between the British and American members of 
the League of Nations commission, that is to say, Presi- 
dent Wilson, Colonel House, Lord Robert Cecil, and 
General Smuts, a meeting at which I was present. Sev- 
eral important decisions were taken at that meeting. 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 405 

One of them was that owing to the Italian opposition, it 
was impossible to attempt to abolish conscription. An- 
other was that the plan should contain a general provi- 
sion, without specific details, for the creation of a Per- 
manent Court of International Justice. It was also de- 
cided that a new draft should be drawn by Mr. Hurst, 
the legal adviser of the British, and myself, and that any 
questions upon which Mr. Hurst and I did not agree 
should be referred for consideration to Colonel House 
and to Lord Robert Cecil as representing the two gov- 
ernments. 

As a matter of fact, Mr. Hurst and myself, having 
before us the results of the previous discussions and drafts, 
did agree upon a composite draft, which was completed 
on the day before the League of Nations commission first 
met. This draft, accepted by President Wilson and sub- 
mitted by him, became the basis of discussion before the 
League of Nations commission. Thus it marked the end 
of the first of the three stages in the history of the Cov- 
enant at Paris. The second was completed by the text 
first reported to the Peace Conference, the one President 
Wilson brought back to this country in February, and the 
third by the paper in its present form, the form in which 
it finally became part of the treaty. 

This first draft, the Hurst-Miller draft, to give it a 
name it bore at Paris, was drawn under conditions which 
made it impossible that it should be wholly satisfactory 
to anybody. Its acceptance by President Wilson was a 
great surprise to me, for on the very evening before its 
presentation by him to the commission, he had expressed 
dissatisfaction with it and a preference for his own draft 
with some modifications. Certainly, from my point of 
view, the text was subject to criticism, both for things 



4o6 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

omitted and for things contained; the most important 
of the former was that it said nothing about the Monroe 
Doctrine. On this point, at least, my Paris conscience is 
clear. I had brought up the question of the Monroe 
Doctrine in the observations which I submitted to 
Colonel House. I had verbally proposed a Monroe Doc- 
trine clause to Mr. Lansing. Such a clause was con- 
tained in the draft submitted by Doctor Scott and my- 
self, and my views in general on the question had been 
more emphatically expressed in a rather severe confiden- 
tial criticism of President Wilson's plan, which I prepared 
in Paris. 

This criticism has been made public. A copy of it was 
obtained at Paris by one of the personnel attached to 
the American Commission, and was delivered to the 
Senate committee on foreign relations; and as the paper 
had been widely quoted from, particularly during the 
late political campaign, I think it only fair to my asso- 
ciates at Paris to say that it was wholly my own work, 
and that no one else had even an opportunity to con- 
sider the paper during the week in which it was pre- 
pared or until after it was printed and dehvered. 

One other chief objection to the original draft of the 
Covenant was that it contained a clause regarding relig- 
ious equality, an article which President Wilson favored, 
but which was afterward dropped because of the practi- 
cally unanimous view of the League of Nations commis- 
sion that it would be utterly impossible to adopt general 
language in regard to the subject which would not un- 
warrantedly interfere with the internal policies of certain 
countries; even in Great Britain, for example, a Catholic 
is excluded from the succession to the crown. The 
principle of the article was subsequently applied in sep- 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 407 

arate treaties with particular countries, looking toward 
the protection of minorities. 

In matter of form, too, the paper left much to be de- 
sired; but this was unavoidable under the circumstances 
and was unimportant in view of the later opportunities 
for redrafting; and, despite its defects, it was this paper 
which became the basis of the existing Covenant; which, 
indeed, with certain notable additions and changes, and 
after much rewriting and rearrangement, was moulded 
into the text now contained in the Treaty of Versailles. 

The second phase of the Covenant comprised its con- 
sideration by the League of Nations commission of the 
Peace Conference, resulting in the report to the Peace 
Conference of a draft Covenant on February 14, 1919. 

During the period which commenced on Monday, Feb- 
ruary 3, and ended on Thursday, February 13, the League 
of Nations commission held ten meetings. This meant 
a meeting nearly every day and sometimes twice a day. 
The average length of the meetings was more than three 
hours, so that, with their other duties, the members of 
the committee spent a pretty busy ten days, and those 
who were attending them in their labors were occupied 
almost continuously, in a very hteral sense of that word. 

Aside from the Council of Four and the Council of Ten, 
this commission was undoubtedly the most notable body 
of the Conference of Paris. Not only was it presided 
over by President Wilson, but many of the other mem- 
bers were statesmen of world-wide reputation. Among 
them was Signor Orlando, the Italian premier, who had 
a most virile and attractive personality. He lacked a 
knowledge of English, but combined a practical com- 
mon-sense view with a profound learning in matters of 
international law, and was one of the impressive figures 



4o8 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

of the meetings. Other lawyers of distinction and cul- 
ture were M. Vesnitch, of Jugo-SIavia, and M. Kramarz, 
of Czecho-SIovakia. And of the same profession was the 
brilliant and eloquent but erratic Hymans, the foreign 
minister of Belgium, who, during his speeches, was some- 
times so carried away by his thought that he changed 
abruptly from English to French. What I saw of Mr. 
Venizelos did not seem to me to bear out his very great 
reputation as a statesman, but his opinions were treated 
with much respect. Mr. Venizelos was responsible for 
the language at the end of what is now Article 15 of the 
Covenant, which has been so much criticised here in 
connection with the votes of the British Dominions in 
the Assembly. One of the ablest of the debaters was 
Mr. Wellington Koo, of China, who made one of the 
really brilliant speeches of the meetings on the subject 
of the rights of small states. The Japanese delegates 
spoke comparatively seldom and were perhaps listened 
to with all the more interest and attention on that ac- 
count. Nor was General Smuts very often heard, as 
Lord Robert Cecil usually spoke for the British Govern- 
ment. And the observations of President Pessoa, of 
Brazil, while impressive, were not very frequent. 

But of all the nineteen members of the commission, 
the cne heard least of all was an American. Colonel 
House spoke only at one meeting, and that was an occa- 
sion when the President was away and a few words from 
a representative of the United States were necessary. 
But a pilot does not have to talk, if he steers well. And 
the final agreement of the commission, its rejection of 
the proposals which would have sunk the ship and its 
acceptance of those changes which were necessary to 
obtain unanimity, were due to the confidence which the 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 409 

representatives of Great Britain, of France, of Japan, 
and of other less important Powers had in Colonel House, 
and to the extraordinary influence which he exerted, sup- 
ported as he was by the authority of the President. 

The meetings of the commission lost their original 
character of informality as they progressed. At the very 
beginning there were no secretaries present at all. In- 
deed, President Wilson said to the commission that he 
hoped the meetings would be informal, as he wanted to 
be able to change his views without having somebody 
quote to him what he had said before — a rather curious 
statement to be made by a man who has been supposed 
never to change his mind at all. While some of the gen- 
tlemen on the commission did not speak English, its 
proceedings were really more in English than they were 
in French. The proposed draft of the Covenant, the 
basis of discussion, was an English paper, and while 
French translations of the various documents, amend- 
ments, and the like, were usually prepared, the time be- 
tween meetings was so short that a finished translation 
was almost always impossible, and sometimes it was 
physically impracticable to have any translation at all. 

Of course the members of the commission spoke in 
French or English, as they saw fit. The experiment of 
having remarks translated from one language to the 
other after their delivery, was very soon given up, and, 
instead, a secretary or attache sat behind the French 
and Italian delegations, and translated in a whisper the 
speeches made in English. A corresponding service in 
regard to the French speeches was performed for the 
President and Colonel House, usually either by Mr. 
Frazier or by Colonel Bonsai. 

While most of the members of the commission spoke 



410 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

sometimes in French and sometimes in English, only the 
Portuguese delegate, M. Reis, seemed to me to be as 
wholly at home in one as in the other. The head of the 
French delegation, M. Bourgeois, the president of the 
French Senate, spoke frequently, with great deliberation 
and impressiveness and with equal fluency. His col- 
league, Professor Larnaude, spoke less often, but took a 
very active part in the detailed framing of the text, par- 
ticularly in regard to questions of law. Professor Lar- 
naude's felicity of expression and his diction were well- 
nigh perfect; his choice of words was in the utmost 
degree precise; and whether one agreed or not with what 
he said, it was impossible not to grasp exactly what his 
beautifully clear language meant. 

And while the result of the February meetings of the 
commission was the adoption of a paper having many 
similarities to the first draft, it is not to be supposed that 
the deliberations were at all perfunctory. There was 
very decided opposition on the part of the majority of 
the commission to the provisions of the original draft 
regarding the Council, which made that body little more 
than a committee of the Great Powers; this opposition 
carried its point and made the Council what it now is, a 
body on which four of the smaller Powers are always 
represented. 

The French programme for an international military 
force or staff of some kind met with very little support 
from other delegations but provoked a great deal of 
debate. It was as a slight concession to the French pro- 
posal that provision was made for an advisory military 
commission, and that the last sentence of Article lo as it 
now reads was added to the text. 

The guarantees of Article lo represented the ideas of 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 411 

President Wilson, but he was by no means alone in 
those ideas. The same principle was expressed in the 
official British draft; but that draft, as well as the Paris 
draft of President Wilson, contained clauses looking 
toward future boundary changes under some form of 
supervision by the League of Nations; any such idea 
always seemed to me impossible; it would invite per- 
petual agitation for boundary changes all over the world, 
particularly along frontiers where a jumble of peoples of 
different bloods, of different religious and of different 
economic interests make impossible any final impartial 
judgment as to a boundary theoretically correct. And the 
supporters of such ideas were thinking of eastern Europe 
only, and forgot that any such principle declared gen- 
erally would be as applicable to the boundary between 
France and Spain, or even to that between Montana and 
Saskatchewan as to any other. 

Even when limited to attack by a foreign Power, the 
territorial guarantees of Article 10, while defensible in 
principle, went farther than public Opinion on this side 
of the Atlantic was willing to go; and, indeed, the most 
forcible argument against Article 10, an argument supe- 
rior in my judgment to that of any critic here, was sub- 
mitted in Paris by Sir Robert Borden. 

I cannot even mention all the other changes of im- 
portance made at the February meetings of the commis- 
sion. One was the dropping of the article regarding 
religious equality, to which I have aUuded, which did 
not find support from any delegation represented except 
our own, although the Japanese attempted to use it as 
a sort of peg on which to hang their proposal for racial 
equality. And the article about mandates, which is 
now Article 22, was not written by the League of Nations 



412 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

commission at all, except for its last clauses. It was a 
resolution which had been adopted by the Council of Ten 
on January 30, the history of which has been told else- 
where. While its idea was bitterly opposed by Mr. 
Hughes, of Australia, and although it was not liked by 
the French, it did not go as far as President Wilson 
wished; but he accepted it as being a decided improve- 
ment over the former colonial system. 

The ending of this second stage in the history of the 
Covenant marked the beginning of public discussion. 
The world now had for criticism not an idea but a pro- 
posal. This was, indeed, one purpose in completing for 
the time being the work of the commission. It would 
have been too much to suppose at that time that its 
work was final. And while, of course, the paper was not 
such as any one delegation, or even any half-dozen dele- 
gations, would have written, nobody was seriously dis- 
appointed with it except the French, and the reason for 
their disappointment was that the French attitude, 
speaking broadly, was different from the attitude of 
nearly every other country. Nearly everybody thought 
that any league of nations was, after all, a novel experi- 
ment, and that the danger of any novel experiment was 
in going too far. If it was found to work, agreement to 
go farther would not be very difficult to obtain, but to 
go too far at the beginning would perhaps wreck the 
whole scheme. But the French wanted to go farther, 
very much farther. The French visualized a league of 
nations as a sort of an extension of the combination of 
the Allied and Associated Powers by taking in the neu- 
trals. The sole idea to which all French officialdom was 
devoted, was the idea of safety for France against Ger- 
many, and while different views led to great divergence 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 413 

in French thought as to how that safety was to be ob- 
tained, shown most notably, perhaps, by the breach be- 
tween Clemenceau and Foch, there was no serious ele- 
ment of French political opinion, except the extreme 
left, which conceived of a league of nations without a 
background of force, as any possible protection to France 
at all. It is not difficult to criticise the French view- 
point. It is more difficult not to sympathize with it. The 
French never abandoned their view at Paris; traces of it 
may be found in the treaty, even in the Covenant; but 
they never obtained for it any decided support, for the 
world at large was of a different opinion then, and remains 
unconvinced now. 

The third and final stage of the drafting of this docu- 
ment was ahead. The opinion of the neutrals, the 
opinion of America, of the leaders of thought in this 
country other than President Wilson, was to make itself 
felt, and the most determined contests over what the 
Covenant was to contain or to omit were yet to be fought. 

The visit of President Wilson to Paris, the first visit 
of an American president to Europe, had undoubtedly, 
on the whole, been an enormous success. He had been 
in Europe two months; long enough to show that his 
influence was almost unbounded, and that the prin- 
ciples that he had enunciated Iiad sufficient popular 
support behind them to make them a vital force even in 
those governmental circles where they were disliked. 
A draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations, his 
chief project, had been completed for insertion in the 
treaty; he left Europe in February, before decision had 
become strictly necessary on the detailed application 
of his principles and without having been long enough 
away from the United States to get out of touch with 



414 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

the currents of opinion in this country. His decision to 
leave Paris at that moment, even if it had not been nec- 
essary because of the approaching end of the session of 
Congress, was wise and judicious. No admirer of Presi- 
dent Wilson can regard his first visit to Paris as other 
than a triumph. 

In the third stage of the building of the structure of 
the Covenant there was great difficulty in regard to 
some of the additions and changes that were made; but 
much greater difficulty in respect of the proposals which 
were not adopted. The volume of suggestions which 
had to be seriously considered was large; various neutral 
Powers formally submitted their views at great length, 
but even additions which seemed harmless might raise 
opposition in some minds; the Covenant had plenty of 
critics; any changes in the nature of fresh legislation 
would add more; and, aside from certain matters of 
detail, the American view -point was generally against 
changes which were not proposed and supported by 
American public opinion. 

The French proposals for some international force, 
some staff, or at least some international supervision of 
national forces were pressed to the end. But they were 
doomed in advance to be rejected. Neither the British 
nor ourselves would listen, to them, and M. Bourgeois 
pleaded in vain. The French attitude had no substan- 
tial result except the proposed treaties of support by 
Great Britain and the United States, which seem destined 
both to fail, as each is dependent on the ratification of 
the other. 

Nor did the Japanese fare better with their amend- 
ments for racial equality. Each successive proposal 
made asked for less than the one before, and finally they 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 415 

requested simply a few words in the preamble. Their 
negotiations with us in the matter had been entirely 
friendly, for, even regardless of our attitude, the Japa- 
nese could not succeed. When their final proposal was 
submitted, at the last meeting of the commission, sup- 
ported as it was by one of the most impressive speeches 
I have ever heard, the Japanese called for a vote. Only 
the affirmative vote was taken, and neither the President 
nor Colonel House voted. The majority of the commis- 
sion were in favor of the seemingly mild addition to the 
preamble. But Lord Robert Cecil, obviously moved, de- 
clared formally that he was instructed by his government 
to refuse to accept the proposal of their ally. The views 
of the dominions had prevailed. Australia had more 
influence with London than had Tokio. 

There was another and less important struggle over 
the attempt of the Swiss to obtain a special clause recog- 
nizing their neutrality. This the British supported, and 
even Colonel House consented. The Swiss representa- 
tive, Professor Rappard, labored eloquently to induce me 
to advise President Wilson in accordance with the Swiss 
view; but I feared the effect of such a clause upon 
neutral and American opinion, and the President main- 
tained his position. While the Swiss obtained a recog- 
nition in the treaty of their special position and while 
the Council has since passed a resolution to the same 
effect, the Covenant was not changed to meet the opinion 
of Switzerland. 

The most vital amendment, from the American stand- 
point, was doubtless that accepting the Monroe Doctrine. 
Regardless of any quibbling about the special language 
used, any formal declaration by all the Powers of the 
world recognizing the existence and beneficence of the 



4i6 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

Monroe Doctrine was an enormous advance in the status 
of that policy, and was an advance that had never before 
even been suggested; nothing but the results of the 
World War could have made any such declaration even 
remotely possible. 

It was the pressure of American public opinion that 
compelled the presentation and support of such an 
amendment by President Wilson. 

The attitude of the British toward our proposal was 
unknown; before the meeting of the commission at which 
the Monroe Doctrine article was proposed and adopted, 
no one in the American delegation, from President Wilson 
down, was informed whether Great Britain would ven- 
ture an open criticism of America or not. But while the 
British representatives acquiesced, the French delegation 
opposed the proposal. They argued that it meant a 
renunciation by the United States of its interest in the 
peace of the world, an argument that seemed ungracious 
in view of the fact that the Monroe Doctrine had not 
held back an American army from those achievements 
on French soil which ended at Sedan. At the close of 
the debate, President Wilson replied to the French in an 
extempore speech of witching eloquence — a speech made 
after midnight, which left the secretaries gasping with 
admiration, their pencils in their hands, their duties for- 
gotten, and hardly a word taken down ; the proposal was 
then adopted. 

But the matter was not at an end ; for at the next meet- 
ing, the last of all, the French sought by amendment to 
obtain some definition, some description of the Monroe 
Doctrine that would limit the right of the United States 
to insist upon its own interpretation of that Doctrine in 
the future as in the past. The French delegates, hoping 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 417 

for some advantage for their own proposals, urged such 
a definition; and at that last meeting I thought for a 
moment, in despair, that President Wilson would yield 
to the final French suggestion, which contained only a 
few seemingly simple words; but he stood by his position 
through the long discussion, and the meeting and the 
proceedings of the commission ended early in the morning 
in an atmosphere of constraint and without any of the 
speeches of politeness customary on such an occasion. 

Another contentious matter was the choice of the seat 
of the League. A fable which has been printed almost 
as often as any of ^Esop's is that President Wilson, by his 
self-willed opposition, prevented the choice of Brussels. 
The fact is that aside from the perfunctory support of 
the French, Brussels had no adherents outside of Bel- 
gium. The British were especially in favor of Geneva, 
and the opinion that some neutral city was advisable 
was almost unanimous; this made Geneva and The 
Hague almost the sole possibilities; and in view of its 
central position, its chmate, and the history of neutrality, 
of democracy, and of peace that Switzerland presented, 
the balance swung very heavily in favor of the choice 
which was made. 

Another problem which was to be solved was the 
choice of the four smaller Powers to sit first on the Coun- 
cil. Clearly, one of these should be a Latin-American 
country, and that meant Brazil; and one should be a 
neutral, if the League was not to seem merely a successor 
to the Allied and Associated Powers; of the neutrals, 
Spain was the largest and the most natural choice. Bel- 
gium was certainly entitled to the honor of one of the 
two other places. For the remaining vacancy, taking 
into account geographical considerations, there remained 



4i8 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

in theory nine countries from which to choose, but in 
reality only six — five in eastern Europe, and China in 
the Far East. In view of the confidence which Lloyd 
George and President Wilson had in Venizelos, the five 
states in eastern Europe meant for this purpose only 
one, and Greece was selected. By the irony of fate, 
Venizelos has since fallen, and Greece has now been suc- 
ceeded by China, the only other Power which was thought 
of for her place at Paris. 

The question as to what states should be asked to 
join the League presented no serious difficulty. Coun- 
tries with governments not formally recognized by the 
Powers generally, such as Russia, Mexico, and Costa 
Rica, were omitted. Otherwise, the invitation was 
quite general. The immediate admission of Germany 
was favored by America and Great Britain, but French 
opposition necessitated postponement; provision was 
made, however, for a possible increase in the Council, so 
as to permit in the future not only membership in the 
League, but also representation on the Council of both 
Germany and Russia. 

Various changes deemed important by influential 
opinion in this country were agreed to with comparatively 
little discussion. Some of them, such as the provision 
that acceptance of a mandate is not obligatory, the state- 
ment that each member of the League has one vote and 
one vote only, and that unless particularly specified to 
the contrary all decisions must be unanimous, were 
merely declaratory. But the withdrawal clause was 
more important, and its insertion was directly due to the 
feeling in its favor in the United States Senate. The 
principle was not liked by the French, but it could hardly 
be expected that any state would agree to be forever 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 419 

bound; and the vague idea expressed in some quarters 
that an implied right of withdrawal existed was not 
approved by the international lawyers, and if accepted 
would have created a dangerous precedent as to the 
sanctity of every treaty. 

The fear that in the League there might exist some 
jurisdiction over what have been called domestic ques- 
tions, though doubtless not justified by the text of the 
Covenant, was wide-spread in this country. This timidity 
was not felt by the representatives of the other Powers 
at Paris, who have as much desire and reason to be 
unrestricted in such matters as we have; the British, for 
example, with a very serious domestic question, then 
acute though less so than now, had no idea that their 
rights of sovereignty were being infringed; indeed, the 
absence of such infringement has since been criticised 
here; but those who want an international agreement 
recognizing all of our rights and none of those of any 
other country, will wait as long for such a paper as those 
who seek for an international court which is certain to 
decide according to our view; but certainly there was no 
objection at Paris to almost any sort of declaration which 
recognized the exclusion of so-called "domestic ques- 
tions" from the competence of the League. 

Just before President Wilson left the United States 
for his second visit to Europe, one of his leading sup- 
porters in the Senate reported to him that there were 
six matters as to which sentiment in the Senate favored 
amendment of the Covenant; and this matter of "domes- 
tic questions" was thought by the senator to be the 
most important of all. In order to meet this objection, 
President Wilson proposed a clause drawn by Mr. Taft 
and cabled by him to President Wilson on March 18. 



420 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

In substantially the language suggested by Mr. Taft, the 
clause was accepted as an amendment to Article 15. 
Despite its authorship, the lawyers at Paris did not like 
the qualified wording of the clause, which was subse- 
quently severely criticised in the Senate; more simple 
and more sweeping language would better have antici- 
pated the efforts of the Senate reservation to meet the 
difficulties of the question by elaborate enumeration of 
so-called "domestic questions," difficulties which any 
such attempt will only increase. To assert, for example, 
in the vague language of the debates, that the tariff is in 
its nature a "domestic question," does not get very far; 
suppose a dispute arises as to the interpretation of a 
reciprocity treaty; that is clearly an international and, 
indeed, justiciable difference between states, despite the 
fact that its decision may touch the sacred ark of the 
tariff. Even without Mr. Taft's amendment, the pro- 
visions of the Covenant followed in principle those of 
previous treaties of the United States; and in regard to 
compulsory judicial determination or arbitration of inter- 
national disputes, the Covenant made no provision at all. 
This question of compulsory arbitration, as it may be 
generally called, was much mooted at Paris. The neu- 
trals supported compulsory arbitration, and, as in the 
past, many smaller Powers favored it in principle. But 
to open up such an issue without at the same time dis- 
cussing all the difficulties presented by the framing of 
an International Court of Justice was not possible, and 
no one in Paris believed that all the Powers would agree 
to compulsory arbitration in any form; recent history 
demonstrates the correctness of that view, for the com- 
pulsory feature of the Root-Phillimore plan has not 
been accepted, despite the weight of the names behind it; 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 421 

so that with the addition of a list of cases which were 
declared to be "generally" suitable for submission to 
arbitration, the clause of the Covenant providing for the 
future formation of an International Court of Justice 
stood substantially as in the earlier draft; President Wil- 
son's plan for American participation in that task has 
been realized, for when Sir Eric Drummond asked in 
Paris what American should be a member of the com- 
mittee on the International Court, the name of Senator 
Root was proposed, and, accordingly, it was Senator 
Root who sat as an American representative on the com- 
mittee of jurists which completed its labors last summer 
at The Hague, and whose recommendations were in large 
part accepted by the Assembly in November. 

One of the novelties of the procedure of the League of 
Nations commission toward the close of its sessions was 
the hearing of a delegation of women leaders from various 
countries. They urged an extension of the functions of 
the League along what may be called non-political lines 
— lines of international co-operation, and to a very con- 
siderable extent their ideas are reflected in the present 
text. 

In matters of international concern relating to health, 
to the suppression of the traffic in opium and of the 
white-slave traffic, to the supervision of the arms traffic 
with uncivilized countries, to the preservation of the 
freedom of transit and of communications, the latter 
most important addition being the proposal of Colonel 
House, and generally in matters of international co-opera- 
tion the League was made the clearing-house of inter- 
national action. Another addition due to Colonel House 
was the Red Cross article, which a drafting committee, 
taking a very liberal view of its powers, inserted. 



422 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

It may be that the historian of the future, thinking of 
the nations of the world as aggregations of families rather 
than as bands of voters led by politicians, will regard 
these less spectacular features of the Covenant as being 
more really mile-stones of human progress than its great 
political tribunals and its contentious clauses. 

Even after the commission on the League of Nations 
had ended its labors, the text of the Covenant was not 
absolutely finished. The British dominions were con- 
cerned about their status as members of the League. It 
seemed to them that the use of the word "States" in cer- 
tain places in the text limited their rights, particularly in 
the matter of eligibility as members of the Council; and 
this view was correct, for the language had been very 
carefully chosen in that regard; so the dominions urged 
that the wording be changed. The question was a diffi- 
cult one; that the dominions and India should be sep- 
arately represented in the League had been early con- 
ceded; any other decision would have been impossible; 
and, perhaps now, with a member of his majesty's oppo- 
sition sitting in the Assembly as a delegate from South 
Africa, and with Canada openly criticising the wishes of 
London, no one would deny that it was wise from every 
point of view; to ignore the importance of Canada as 
compared with Haiti would be absurd; but while the 
international status of the British dominions has greatly 
changed and is still changing, that status could not yet 
be asserted by any lawyer to be technically that of inde- 
pendent states with a common sovereign. President 
Wilson yielded to the wishes of the dominions against 
the views of some of his advisers, and whether they were 
right or wrong, it is certain that Canada, Australia, and 
the others will never yield that independence of position 



THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE 423 

in the world's affairs which belong to them as a com- 
bined result of the war and of the peace. 

So the Covenant was finished, but it was thus far fin- 
ished only in English. There were various French trans- 
lations, but no French text. The heart-breaking labor of 
making one took several days, and, as a matter of intel- 
lectual interest, I recommend to every student of the 
language of diplomacy the task of putting into French 
that specimen of President Wilson's English which is 
•found in the preamble of the Covenant; and after the 
student has finished let him compare the result with the 
French text of the preamble; that portion of the French 
text appears in the treaty just as it was written late at 
night or, rather, early in the morning in Professor Lar- 
naude's beautiful apartment at Neuilly, after all previous 
attempts at expressing President Wilson in French had 
been rightly discarded as being, perhaps, accurate in 
language but certainly impossible in style. 

The Covenant has two schools of critics, perhaps three: 
those who think it goes too far, those who think it does 
not go far enough, and those who approve of it but who 
do not like some of the people who wrote it. I am not 
going to discuss any of the questions raised by those 
various opinions. But in view of the fact that the Cov- 
enant is not very old as an international document, I 
am going to suggest that there is one test to be applied 
to such a paper, a test from which the critics of all schools 
are, perhaps happily for them, free. They do not have 
to draw a paper with the idea of its presentation to any 
country for acceptance. But no matter how beautiful 
a scheme for world peace may appear to its authors, it 
will be worth httle if it is not such that it can be agreed 
to, and even if it is not perfect it will be worth every- 



424 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

thing if it prove to be the basis of agreement. Those 
who framed the Covenant have seen it accepted by the 
competent governmental authority of nearly every coun- 
try in the world, and that is the first real test of success. 
And when I say nearly every country, I include my own; 
for so far as the Lodge reservations made changes in the 
League, they were of a wholly minor character, they left 
its structure intact, and they would have interfered with 
its workings not at all. Indeed, if any one thinks that 
there is no art in writing a great treaty which eighty 
senators of the United States and forty-eight govern- 
ments will accept in substance as written, I suggest to 
him to wait a century, or perhaps two, and see how the 
next attempt succeeds. 

Such is something of the story of the making of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. That the men who 
created that paper were working with a noble purpose, 
with a wish for peace, and with a singleness of heart 
which is without precedent in the annals of diplomacy, 
that I know. That what they did has changed the his- 
tory of the world is common knowledge. But whether 
their work is lasting, whether it will bring the world 
nearer to the realization of the dream of the prophet: 

"... and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, 
and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift 
up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war 
any more." 

no one knows, save God. 



XVIII 

THE VERSAILLES PEACE IN RETROSPECT 

BY EDWARD M. HOUSE 

It was but natural that the greatest of all peace con- 
gresses should have followed the greatest of all wars. 

While the results fell short of public expectations, yet 
it is doubtful whether more could have been done, con- 
sidering the conditions existing after the signing of the 
armistice. Theoretically, "peace without victory" was 
within the realm of reason, but practically it was not. 
Civilization must advance further than it has at present, 
before such a peace is possible. The magnitude of the 
war was such that its disastrous consequences touched 
the remote parts of the earth and disturbed every 
human activity, thus bringing to bear upon the peace 
many diverse and alien influences. Those who would 
have had the congress do this or that particular thing 
were not present, or, if so, were not conversant with its 
inner workings. 

The accomplishments to which favorable attention 
may be called are: 

(i) The forming of an organization for the preventing 
of war. 

(2) The sincere effort to give racial entities self-deter- 

mination. 

(3) The declaration of a policy of trusteeship in regard 

to mandates. 

425 



426 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

These parts of the treaty mark a distinct advance in 
international morals, and if they fail of their purpose it 
will be because of the refusal of the United States to 
accept the treaty in good faith and to give it her power- 
ful support — a support which is essential to success. 
Our people have not passed upon the treaty per se, for 
as yet the question has been almost wholly obscured by 
the ever-recurrent controversy between the executive 
and the United States Senate. Those who believe in our 
government and its purposes look confidently forward to 
its taking, in due time, its place in the Society of Nations, 
and assuming, without fear, all the responsibilities which 
its commanding position in world affairs entails. One 
cannot have power without corresponding responsibility. 

Probably the greatest misfortune of the Conference 
was that it assembled too late and took too long with 
preliminaries. This, however, was not the fault of the 
United States. Had it convened immediately after the 
armistice, and had it dealt promptly with Germany, the 
long period of uncertainty, disorder, and suffering might 
in large part have been avoided. Then, too, no country 
was willing that its army should be used to police the 
world, except France, and what France could properly 
do was limited in more ways than one. Soon after the 
armistice the American and British troops began to be 
demobilized, and the orders of the Conference were known 
to be based merely upon its moral influence, and this 
influence rapidly declined as the armistice receded into 
the past. As a result, help from the Conference was de- 
spaired of and self-help was substituted. In consequence, 
numberless little wars broke out, and increased the misery 
of people whose sufferings were already all but intoler- 
able. 



THE VERSAILLES PEACE 427 

Economic and Financial Clauses 

The economic and financial terms of the peace should 
have been made as soon after the armistice as possible. 
Delay was the cause of much of the friction at the Con- 
ference and since. The failure to do this, combined with 
the crushing debts and disturbed industrial conditions 
with which all the belhgerents are burdened, is largely 
responsible for the present chaotic international situa- 
tion, and, in consequence, there is general distrust, lack 
of credit, and a disorganized and impossible rate of 
exchange. 

While the United States is the principal creditor and 
not indebted to any nation, it is probable that our inter- 
est in adjusting and placing world finance on a sound 
basis is greater than that of any other Power. Being 
the largest producer, it is obviously to our advantage to 
bring back a normal healthy economic condition every- 
where. One cannot have bankrupt neighbors and con- 
tinue to prosper for long. 

After the armistice there was a decided disinclination 
to grapple with these questions. In order to temporize, 
both France and Great Britain had recourse to the cry 
of making Germany pay the entire cost of the war, and 
there were some financiers of international reputation in 
both countries who gave credence to the statement that 
this could be done. It was a mad and wholly unwar- 
ranted assumption, but the people accepted it as an 
easy way out of one of their many difficulties. 

In an address to Congress, February 11, 1918, Presi- 
dent Wilson said: **There shall be no annexations, no 
contributions, no punitive damages." Because of this 
there was at Paris an avoidance of the use of the word 



428 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

"indemnity," and the word "reparation" was substi- 
tuted. But by no stretch of the imagination could 
"reparation" cover the vast cost of the war in all its 
ramifications, and the attempt to shift one of its most 
oppressive burdens by advocating a plan so palpably 
impossible was a subterfuge unworthy of responsible 
statesmen. 

From a purely selfish standpoint it would have been 
to our advantage if, after the armistice, we had called a 
conference of the Allies and had prepared a plan, the 
leading feature of which should have been a general ad- 
justment of international indebtedness. Under such a 
process our foreign loans, instead of being $10,000,000,000 
would probably now have been $5,000,000,000 — all good 
and interest-bearing. This, in itself, would have reduced 
our taxes $250,000,000 a year, and with the stimulus 
which a sound financial situation abroad would have given 
our trade a different story could to-day be told. As it is, 
we are owed a nominal sum of $10,000,000,000, the value 
of which is exceedingly doubtful, and upon it no interest 
has yet been paid. Sooner or later some adjustment 
must be brought about; it should have been effected 
immediately the war was over. Our people would then 
have recognized that our foreign loans were not made as 
investments, but in order to defeat the Central Empires. 
Even now they should understand that these debts can- 
not be collected except by process of war, unless, indeed, 
the debtors choose otherwise. Such conditions make for 
bad foreign relations, and we shall awaken to this when 
we begin to press for interest payments. 

But the failure of the Allied and Associated Powers to 
readjust their own finances did not end there; they car- 
ried this policy through the entire Conference. It would 



THE VERSAILLES PEACE 429 

have been the part of wisdom to have named immediately 
a fixed sum for Germany to pay as reparation. This 
sum should have been the maximum she could pay, but 
not an impossible sum. Then the bankers of the world 
might, under proper conditions, have underwritten it, 
and France, Belgium, and Great Britain would have 
obtained the needed stimulus which would more rapidly 
have brought their economic conditions back to normal. 
A part of this sum might have come to the United States, 
as we, in turn, cancelled a portion of the obligations 
those countries owed us. 

It is well that the economic and financial clauses of 
the treaty are more or less temporary and not perma- 
nent, as are the clauses covering boundaries and racial 
determination. 

Boundaries and Self-Determination 

In the matter of boundaries the Paris Conference was 
confronted with almost its most difficult problem. There 
was no good way out, and any decision was certain to 
displease, and in many instances to do injustice. 

It was easier to give nationafity to races bulking large 
in numbers than it was to make an equitable adjustment 
of territory between two or more contiguous states, 
where it was difficult to decide whether the racial status 
or the natural boundaries should determine. Italy, in 
demanding a natural or strategic frontier to the north, 
has included two hundred odd thousand Tyrolese, who 
will not be reconciled to the change except through cen- 
turies of kindly treatment and good government. 

An even more uncertain determination of justice, 
reached after the United States had practically with- 
drawn from the Conference, was the shifting of boun- 



430 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

daries between Bulgaria, Roumania, and Jiigo-SIavia, 
the result of which has left much dissatisfaction. It is 
doubtful whether any adjustment could have been made 
in this region which would not have left seeds of another 
war. Those who were present to advocate their claims 
succeeded in expanding their boundaries to an astonish- 
ing degree, but almost wholly at the expense of their 
defeated neighbors. It requires but little prescience to 
see that it will take a strong and vigilant League of 
Nations to hold these turbulent Balkan States in leash. 

But in spite of unfortunate mistakes in details, it 
remains true that for the first time in history Europe 
enjoys a natural political map or, at least, a fair approxi- 
mation to it, a map drawn in accordance with the un- 
forced aspirations and the spontaneous affiliations of the 
peoples themselves. The map of Europe drawn by the 
Congress of Vienna and changed by later congresses, 
knew no such principle. Peoples were handed from sov- 
ereignty to sovereignty like chattels, the determining fac- 
tors being the ambitions, the power, and the cunning of 
sovereigns and their foreign ministers. As they sowed 
so, indeed, did they reap, for most of the wars of the 
nineteenth century after 1815 had their roots in efforts 
on the part of oppressed groups and peoples to throw off 
alien rule and join congenial political units. Therefore, 
it was not unnatural that the Paris Peace Conference 
should have been carried away by the popular demand 
for self-determination. It was a slogan which stirred 
into action the dormant dreams of many ancient peoples. 

When the great empires east of the Rhine began to 
totter, fulfilment of the cherished hopes of centuries 
sprang at once to the fore in the hearts of oppressed 
races. Some communities did not vvait for Paris to act. 



THE VERSAILLES PEACE 431 

but, with a courage born of strong desire, severed the 
political ties which had bound them for centuries and 
established governments for themselves in which their 
several racial entities dominated. It was the gladdest 
and yet, in some ways, the maddest movement in his- 
tory. In the endeavor to be free everything else was 
overlooked. No tribal entity was too small to have 
ambitions for self-determination. Social and economic 
considerations were unreckoned with, and the only 
• thought for the moment was to reach back to the cen- 
turies when they were nomads and were masters of their 
own fortunes and desires. The sufferings and hardships 
of the war seemed to fall from them in this hour of joy, 
and nothing appeared to matter if once again they might 
escape from the domination of their overlords. 

During the winter and spring of 191 8-1 919 Paris was 
the Mecca for the oppressed not alone of Europe but of 
the earth. Pilgrims came in countless numbers to lay 
their hopes and grievances at the feet of those in the 
seats of the mighty. Many were in native costumes, 
some charming and some otherwise, but all picturesque 
and lending an air of interest to the great modern 
Babylon. 

There was much that was pathetic in it all. Delega- 
tions would appear overnight, and then, after many 
weary weeks of waiting, would disappear and would be 
replaced by others. On the other hand, some coming 
from the ends of the world lingered through the greater 
part of the life of the conference. Nearly all had hear- 
ings, but these were of necessity of a perfunctory nature, 
and were given less to obtain real information than to be 
courteous to some sponsor among the Powers. Argu- 
ments would at times be made in the native language, 



432 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

which had to be first translated into French and then 
into English. When boundaries were described at great 
length it is doubtful whether any of those upon whom 
the final decision rested would have known if the speaker, 
sensing the irony of it all, had taken them a thousand 
miles afield, and had followed a line in no way pertinent 
to that which he was supposed to prove. 

Much of the time of the Conference was wasted in this 
grotesque effort not to offend. Of the visiting chiefs 
and potentates from far-off lands, none made a more • 
profound impression than the Emir Feisal, son of the 
king of the Hedjaz. He spoke Arabic only, but he had 
an able friend and interpreter in Colonel Lawrance, who 
himself was one of the unique characters of the war. 
The Arabian prince, in his native dress, was a striking 
figure. He looked not unlike the accepted pictures of 
the Christ, but there the resemblance ended, for Feisal 
had proved himself a dangerous foe on many fields of 
battle, and at Paris asserted himself in a way in which 
no signs of humility were apparent. He came less like 
a suppliant than any of the others, for he bore himself 
with a kingly air and was imperious in his demands. 
This attitude finally brought about his undoing and 
landed him in exile. 

While many failed to realize their aspirations, yet 
enough succeeded to change the map of Europe as it has 
never been changed within the memory of living man. 
And now that the theory of self-determination has been 
so largely put into practice, the question is, what will 
the outcome be? Some are already eager to expand 
beyond the limits of safety, and others are evincing an 
unreasonably selfish policy toward their neighbors. There 
is one thing that seems essential, and that is some under- 



THE VERSAILLES PEACE 433 

standing regarding customs, postal service, and the 
monetary unit. Without such an understanding, it is 
difficult to see how these small states can live in comfort 
and happiness. Many of them are landlocked, and 
some that touch the sea have no ports adequate to move 
their commerce. Few, if any, are self-supporting, and a 
free interchange of commodities is necessary in order to 
maintain abnormal economic life. If a common mone- 
tary unit is adopted and there is no barrier to trade, it 
will probably not be long before some sort of federation 
will here and there come about. Then, and not until 
then, will those small states assume a position of impor- 
tance and wield an influence commensurate with their 
aspirations. 

Limitation of Armaments 

The Conference "shunted" the question of the limita- 
tion of armaments, and there was no mention of it except 
in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
Germany and other enemy states were drastically dis- 
armed, but there was a careful avoidance of the subject 
as it related to the Allied and Associated Powers. 

There was and is no more crying need than of some 
general understanding regarding the limitation of arma- 
ment, for unless and until it comes there can be no 
security for continued peace, and the Conference could 
not have done the world greater service than to have 
reached a satisfactory solution of this troublesome ques- 
tion. The excuse given then was that the League was 
the proper medium through which it could best be done, 
but the truth, perhaps, was that most of the European 
states at the Conference were unwilling to take it up at 
that time. It is doubtful, too, whether any agreement 



434 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

could have been reached, for neither France nor Italy 
were then in a mood to disarm on land, and Great Britain 
was even less willing to limit her fleet upon the seas. 

During the war one heard on every side the cry that 
something must be done, but the representatives of the 
great Powers foregathered at Paris sat for the better 
part of a year, and went away leaving things as they 
were, relying upon what might be accomplished through 
the instrumentality of the League. There has been more 
than enough discussion, but it has brought no result and 
scarcely a plan worthy of consideration. However, the 
time is near when this question must have its hearing, 
for the people of all debt-laden countries are demanding 
relief, and no relief can be had until account is taken of 
the expenditures for war. One of the needs of the time 
is for a voice with an authority so great that it may 
reach all lands and awaken into action the dormant 
desires of the masses. 

There is no voice to-day which carries so far and 
which is freighted with so much power as that of the 
President of the United States. No matter what diff'er- 
ences of opinion may exist here regarding our taking 
part in world affairs, there is but little difi'erence regard- 
ing the desirability of a reduction of armaments. A con- 
ference of the principal Powers should be called to dis- 
cuss and provide ways and means to bring about limita- 
tion of armaments among themselves, and later to use 
their influence through the League of Nations to make 
it world-wide. It is to be hoped that President Harding 
may do this great and needful thing. Should he succeed 
in bringing this about he would place himself among the 
benefactors of mankind and mark the beginning of a new 
era. Statesmen could no longer sit in seclusion, hidden 



THE VERSAILLES PEACE 435 

behind doors, and formulate policies the enforcement of 
which would necessitate military and naval strength. A 
grandiose foreign policy has been one of the fruitful 
causes of war. Such a policy and militarism are of one 
warp and woof, and when the one goes the other will 
likely follow. 

In days gone by the jingo and the imperialist appealed 
successfully to the imagination, and the pomp and pan- 
oply of war stirred the emotions, but that day has passed, 
let us hope, forever. We understand now what such 
policies entail, and never again shall we submit to condi- 
tions which bring in their train so frightful a trail of 
suffering and death. 

Publicity 

From the American view -point and that of the smaller 
nations — for the outlook and interests of both were much 
the same — one of the mistakes at Paris was the lack of 
publicity. If the American purposes could have been 
known, a moral backing and stimulus would have been 
given our representatives which was almost wholly lack- 
ing. This sustaining force might have come from the 
entire world, and would have had a double effect inas- 
much as it would have weakened the opposition and 
strengthened us. 

We had taken the position of overthrowing the old 
order and bringing a new and different diplomacy into 
play. "Open covenants, openly arrived at," was one of 
the popular slogans of the day, and it was clearly to our 
advantage, as well as our obligation, to carry it through. 
The failure to do this left us in the attitude of reformers 
working in the dark. Darkness is conducive to secret 
covenants secretly arrived at, and what we needed for 



436 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

success was light — all the light which could properly be 
thrown about the subjects proposed and discussed. 

It may be entirely proper to have conferences in 
groups of two or more in which no one but those vitally 
interested may appear, but when the meetings begin to 
be official and take on an aspect of final decision, then 
the public should be given the text of the entire discus- 
sion. In this way, and in this way alone, may the pub- 
lic of every country know and fairly assess the motives 
of each participant and bring to bear, if need be, the 
power of public opinion. 

The League of Nations 

The outstanding feature of the Paris congress which 
differentiated it from other congresses was the creation 
of the League of Nations. This noble conception was 
the product of no single brain, but was the consumma- 
tion of the thoughts and aspirations of the forward- 
looking men of the past and the present. It was the 
great dream of the centuries which had at last come 
true. 

While the idea was not President Wilson's, yet the 
power to make it a real and living thing was his. History 
will give him the credit of using this power to the utmost 
to create an instrument to make wars less probable. 

In fairness to those who opposed the Covenant, as it 
was made in Paris, let it be said that some were frankly 
against any such adventure on the part of our govern- 
ment; others believed our interests were not sufficiently 
safeguarded; and there was yet another group maintain- 
ing that there was even a more vital issue involved — that 
of the right of the Senate to exercise its constitutional 
functions. It is to be regretted that this last group did 



THE VERSAILLES PEACE 437 

not choose another occasion to battle with the executive 
for what they declared to be their rights. 

It has been said before, but it cannot be told too 
often, that another such war will overturn what is left of 
civilization. We have built up a structure the continua- 
tion of which is dependent upon co-operation. Its ma- 
chinery is so delicate that when jarred it all but falls to 
pieces. We have before us the example of Russia. The 
sun shines there as it has always shone, the rains fall now 
as in the past, the soil is there to yield as abundantly as 
in former years; and yet the jar which came with the 
revolution loosened the machinery of that great co-opera- 
tive society, and cold, hunger, and death stalk the land. 

Should another such war come, this same thing that 
has happened to the Russians may happen to us all, but 
the disorganization will be more complete and the dis- 
aster more terrible. We are told that such things can- 
not occur in free and prosperous America. But we were 
told that the Great War was unthinkable. "Civilization 
was too advanced"; "the bankers would not permit it"; 
**at any rate, the United States had no entangling alli- 
ances." But it did come, and we were helpless to pre- 
vent its spread. The bankers were as impotent as others, 
for they were caught in the machinery of war, and car- 
ried along by its irresistible momentum. Though un- 
entangled by any alliance, the call of right drew us in, 
as it would again. 

And now, two and a half years after the signing of the 
armistice, the United States has as yet failed to do the 
necessary thing to make successful the only instrument 
which has been devised to save us from the destruction 
another world war would bring. It is a melancholy re- 
flection upon our right to exist. 



438 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

The Freedom of the Seas 

It is doubtful whether there is anything discernible 
upon the horizon of international affairs which would 
sooner quicken a local war into a world war than the 
unsettled question now known as the freedom of the 
seas. It is especially provocative of danger to such 
maritime Powers as the United States. 

There has been no agreement upon this subject since 
the Declaration of Paris in 1856, when privateering was 
abohshed and the rights of neutrals were defined. The 
Declaration of London of 1909 was never ratified by all 
the interested Powers; therefore, when the Great War 
began, it was necessary to hark back to the Declaration 
of Paris of 1856, and conditions since then had made 
that instrument wholly inadequate for modern usage. 

The traditional policy of the United States has been 
for the protection of neutrals and a more liberal attitude 
toward the freedom of trade upon the seas. The policy 
of Great Britain has been the reverse, and at times there 
has been sharp disagreement between the two nations 
upon this question. It was never brought before the 
Peace Conference, however, and in consequence the world 
is practically without laws governing blockade, capture 
at sea, contraband, and the use of mines and sub- 
marines, for the Germans wiped the slate clean in their 
violent attempt to destroy both enemy and neutral 
commerce. 

It is quite clear why Great Britain should regard her 
situation as different from that of other Powers, since in 
order to live she must keep open her sea communications. 
Again, she is dependent upon her navy to protect her 
colonies and dominions, and to keep them in touch with 



THE VERSAILLES PEACE 439 

the mother country. But it is not so clear why she 
resists the grouping of all the Powers into a pact to keep 
the seas free in war as well as in peace. Such a pact 
might prevent her from using her fleet to starve an enemy 
into submission, or to wield its force to drive an enemy's 
commerce from the seas, but it would in turn be a pro- 
tection that would more than compensate her for any 
loss in these directions. She would not only gain in the 
security of her food-supply, but her merchant marine 
might sail the seas in time of war unmolested. 

England's conservatism, which has been a bulwark of 
strength in many a crisis, may some time be the cause of 
her undoing. The world moves quickly now, both in 
thought and invention, and many of us who wish this 
great people well hope to see them look upon this ques- 
tion from a broader point of view. 

There could be made a code of sea laws which would 
remove many of the causes leading to war, and which 
would materially lessen its horrors. It is fear of the 
destruction of one's commerce at sea in time of war 
which has given an impetus to naval armaments. Re- 
move this fear and one of the vexatious questions of our 
time would be solved. 

Sufficient homage has not yet been paid to the intrepid 
men who, unafraid, sailed the restricted seas during the 
war and refused to be terrorized by a relentless foe. 
For the future protection of men like them, and for the 
safeguarding of women and children who of necessity 
must traverse a danger zone in time of war, a new and 
more humane code of sea laws must be made and guar- 
anteed by the governments of the world. It is to be 
hoped that some time soon Great Britain and the United 
States may together lead the way in this direction, in 



440 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

order that one of the shadows still hanging over us may 
be lifted and that we may at last have the freedom of 
the seas. 

Mandates 

The question of mandates is one in which the American 
people should have much concern. It is not alone a new 
departure in international ethics, but it is one in which 
we have an economic interest. Until now, backward 
countries have generally been controlled or exploited by 
some Power for selfish purposes, and the good which has 
come from such control or exploitation has been merely 
incident thereto. These backward communities have 
been a constant source of friction between the more civ- 
ilized states, friction which has often resulted in war. 

Until the Paris Conference there had been no attempt 
to reach a general understanding or fixed policy between 
the more powerful nations regarding the control or bet- 
terment of such states or territories. The system hith- 
erto practised was admittedly so bad that when the 
Conference came to the disposition of the late German 
colonies there was a general agreement that a more 
enlightened policy should be inaugurated. In further- 
ance of this desire, Article 22 was incorporated in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, and subsequently 
there was a commission appointed to sit in London dur- 
ing the summer of 19 19 for the purpose of preparing the 
terms of the mandates. 

Upon this commission were Lord Milner, who had as 
his adviser Lord Robert Cecil; M. Simon, French minis- 
ter for the colonies; Viscount Chinda, for Japan; Gugli- 
elmo Marconi, for Italy; and Edward M. House, with 
the late George Louis Beer as adviser. 



THE VERSAILLES PEACE 441 

Following the wishes of the Allied and Associated 
Powers, as expressed in Article 22, we divided the man- 
dates into three classes: Form A was to be used for 
"communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire 
where their existence as independent states could be pro- 
visionally recognized subject to the rendering of admin- 
istrative advice and assistance by the Mandatory until 
such time as they were able to stand alone. The wishes 
of these communities must be a principal consideration 
in the selection of a Mandatory." 

The essential features of Mandate A, proposed as a 
basis for discussion, were that it provided for a cessation 
of the mandate as soon as practicable; the administration 
of the government as far as possible by the native ele- 
ments; that no military, naval, or air forces should be 
raised or maintained, nor any fortifications be erected or 
naval bases be established further than a local gendar- 
merie for the preservation of internal order. The com- 
plete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all 
forms of worship were assumed, and no discrimination of 
any kind should be made between citizens on the ground 
of race or religion. 

A provision of far-reaching importance was included, 
which would compel the Mandatory Power to grant to 
all citizens of states members of the League of Nations 
the same rights as those enjoyed in the territory by its 
own nationals in respect to entry into and residence 
within the territory, and in respect to the acquisition of 
property and the exercise of a profession or trade. 

Further, the Mandatory Power should not attempt to 
obtain special privileges for its own citizens, and should 
undertake to insure to all citizens of states members of 
the League freedom of transit and occupation and com- 



442 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

plete economic, commercial, and industrial equality. 
And again, that concessions for the development of the 
natural resources of the territory should be granted 
without discrimination between citizens of states mem- 
bers of the League. 

The London commission never finished its labors for 
the reason that the Turkish treaty had not been pre- 
pared or signed, and it was the fragments of the Turkish 
Empire as well as the German colonies which were to 
come under the mandates. 

Mandate B was prepared for those communities not 
so far advanced in government and civilization as those 
which were to come under Mandate A, but the provi- 
sions were very much the same, except that it gave 
greater protection to the natives, who would presumably 
be more ignorant than those coming under Mandate A. 
Particular care was given to the safeguarding of their 
lands, and they were to be protected against usury, 
against traffic in liquor, drugs, and slaves. Another im- 
portant provision was that in case of disputes between 
the members of the League of Nations relating to the 
application or interpretation of the mandate which 
could not be settled by negotiations, the dispute must 
be submitted to the permanent Court of International 
Justice which was to be established. 

Mandate C was framed for those countries in South- 
west Africa and the Pacific Islands "which owing to the 
sparseness of their populations, or their small size, or 
their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their 
contiguity to the Mandatory can be best administered 
under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of 
its territory." 

Here, again, even greater care was used to protect the 



THE VERSAILLES PEACE 443 

natives than was given to those in A and B, because of 
their ignorance and helplessness. Therefore, taking it 
altogether, the acceptance by the members of the League 
of Nations of this new principle in the question of con- 
trol of backward countries is a long step forward. A 
Mandatory Power now accepts a trusteeship not for the 
benefit of itself but for the benefit of the natives, and 
incidentally it must permit other countries to share in 
the development of the state over which it exercises the 
mandate. 

The fact that hereafter each Power holding such a 
mandate will be under close observation must have a 
tendency to promote the best administration possible. 
The report which must be given each year to the council 
of the League will in itself stimulate rivalry, and the 
Power giving the best account of its stewardship will be 
the one to hold the highest place in the esteem of the 
world. 

Although the council, during its November meeting at 
Geneva, withheld some of the terms of the different 
grades of mandates, yet it is reasonable to expect that 
the essence of what the London commission prepared 
will form the basis of the agreement made at Geneva. 

One of the arguments used by those Americans who 
favor the acceptance of a mandate by the United States 
is that it will give us an opportunity to set the pace in 
giving to some community, strugghng to advance, an 
administration of law and order which will serve as a 
model for other Mandatory Powers, and which will result 
in adding to the sum of human progress. 

The world at large gave prompt and generous praise 
to our diplomatic, mihtarj^ and naval efforts. But we 



444 WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS 

were not content to let their righteous judgments go 
unchallenged; in public and in private we have told of 
our shortcomings in terms so convincing that others 
have come to see us as we seem to see ourselves. The 
object of this book is to tell something of the American 
purposes at the Conference, and let our people form a 
more deliberate opinion as to **What Really Happened 
at Paris." 



APPENDIX 

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF QUESTIONS ASKED AND ANSWERS GIVEN 
AFTER THE LECTURES IN THE ACADEMY OF MUSIC, PHILADELPHIA 



Ill 

THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY 

December 30, 1920 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY CHARLES HOMER HASKINS, CHIEF OF THE 
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPE, OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COM- 
MISSION 

Question: What part do the iron-mines play in the Alsace-Lorraine 
question? 

Answer: A very considerable part. The frontier line was drawn 
in 1 87 1 by the German geologists, with the understanding that they 
had included all the iron-mines which could be worked profitably, 
but after the application of the new processes to the phosphoric ore 
the portion west of the French boundary became more valuable than 
the part east of the border. Thenceforth the German policy was to 
get the rest of the iron district. They have now lost it all. Some 
kind of an adjustment by which France shall agree to furnish iron 
ore to Germany in return for a supply of coal Is one of those neces- 
sary economic bargains which ought to be worked out by inter- 
national agreement as soon as the countries can get together. 

Question : In your opinion, was the question of the German frontier 
wisely and j airly settled by the Conference? 

Answer: Yes, for reasons I have given in the lecture. 

Question: It has been said by some that the President freely con- 
sulted his experts and by others that he ignored them. From your ex- 
perience, which is true? (Laughter.) 

Answer: From my experience the first statement is more nearly 
true. So far as I could see, the President was anxious to have the 
exact facts before him in every situation. Doubtless, there were a 
number of occasions when he could not consult with experts at a par- 
ticular moment, but, in general, the President sought such advice, 
although he naturally had to use his own judgment whether that 
advice was to be adopted in any particular case. 

Question: Before the war were the Lorraine iron-mines owned by 
private German owners ? And has the title changed to French public or 
private ownership now? 

Answer: Before the war they were owned by private owners, 
principally German. In Alsace-Lorraine the French reserve the 

447 



448 APPENDIX 

right to liquidate enterprises owned in Germany; they have an 
"alien property custodian" also. (Laughter.) 

Question: How do you justify the giving of the Saar mines to France 
under that one oj the "Fourteen Points" which says "no indemnities" ? 

Answer: The Saar mines are not an indemnity such as the Ger- 
mans secured from France in 1871; they constitute reparation and 
restoration for property destroyed by the Germans in France. 

Question: Is it not true that in five years' time the French mines 
will again be producing, and France ivill then have both her own and 
Germany's coal? 

Answer: The French mines will be producing again in five years, 
but it is not so clear that they will be producing at their pre-war 
productivity, for those mines were flooded and dynamited in a way 
that makes it very difficult to get them into good working condition 
again. Of course, the French will get coal from their mines before 
the fifteen-year period is up; but, on the other hand, it must be re- 
membered that the French were deprived of the coal of these mines 
during the five years of the war. Any surplus above the losses in 
coal is credited to Germany on her further account in the way of 
compensation for the destruction of other property. For all this, 
the coal-mines were an easily available asset. 

Question: Is any part of the German public debt noiv a liability 
of the Lorraine and Saar districts? 

Answer: No part of the German public debt is a liability of Lor- 
raine, nor for fifteen years in the Saar. If any part of the Saar or 
the whole of it votes to return to Germany, it goes back with all the 
rights and liabilities thereto appertaining. 

Question: You spoke of Mr. Keynes. He infers in his book, "The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace," that Clemenceau and Lloyd George 
bamboozled the President — in your opinion, is this true? 

Answer: Mr. Keynes says that Mr. Lloyd George "found it 
harder to debamboozle the old Presbyterian than it had been to bam- 
boozle him." If Mr. Keynes knew as much about Scotch Presby- 
terians as we do in Pennsylvania, he would have chosen some one 
else as an example of bamboozling; and if he knew more about men 
in general, he would know that such a formula is much too simple 



APPENDIX 449 

for any personality. The President has in his make-up much of the 
stiffness and firmness of the Scotch Calvinist, but also something 
of the canniness. Mr. Keynes also calls President Wilson "slow 
and unresourceful," and that is certainly ur'cic. At Paris Presi- 
dent Wilson showed himself to be quick and intelligent in grasping 
and assimilating facts, and quick to use them in debate. I think 
I have seen more of him than Mr. Keynes, both in Paris and earlier. 
Mr. Keynes's book, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," 
is in its latter part an able and, in some respects, a sound piece of 
economic analysis; but economic analysis is not what most people 
like to read, and in order to get the book read, he wrote some pre- 
liminary matter which purported to describe the setting and the 
personalities of the Peace Conference. On this he could nf>i speak 
as an authority from his own observation; and the result was a highly 
imaginative and, in some respects, a distorted picture of men and 
motives. 

Question: Do you Jeel that the United States really lost out at the 
Peace Conference? 

Answer: No. The United States, in a territorial or in an eco- 
nomic sense, had practically nothing to gain or lose at the Peace 
Conference. She was the great disinterested Power at Paris. If 
the United States had lost out at all, it would have been through 
failure to reahze her programme, as laid down in the Fourteen Points 
and other principles submitted by President Wilson. It seems to 
me that the most fundamental points, the major portion of the Amer- 
ican programme, were realized; but of course there were some com- 
promises and adjustments. On the whole I do not think it can be 
said that the United States lost out at the Peace Conference. 



IV 
POLAND 

December 17, 1920 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY ROBERT H. LORD, CHIEF OF THE POLISH 
DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION 

Question: Personally do you believe that the settlement of the Polish 
question was the fairest to Poland that could have been reached? 

Answer: I am going to speak very frankly and say no. Personally 
I feel that the Danzig problem was a very grave one and of the most 



450 APPENDIX 

vital interest to Poland. The new arrangement about Danzig has 
now been reduced to the form of a definite treaty, which was signed 
just the other day, and it is a treaty that whittles away some of the 
rights which the Peace Treaty seemed to have assured to Poland. 
It leaves the control of the port of Danzig in the hands of a mixed 
commission, made up of two Poles, two Danzigers, and one neutral; 
so that Poland will not have secure and effective control over her 
one and only port. How badly she needs secure control was shown 
last summer when I was in Danzig. At that moment Poland was 
fighting for her life against the Bolsheviks. The only means by which 
war supplies from the outside world could come in to her was through 
Danzig; but owing to the hostility of the Danzig Germans, and I 
might add of the British High Commissioner, the port of Danzig 
was closed to Polish munitions in the very heat of the struggle. If 
matters had not been settled by General Weygand's splendid victory 
near Warsaw, that situation at Danzig might have cost Poland her 
very existence. Furthermore, the feehng shown by the Danzigers 
at present is just as bad as can be imagined. The Poles in the city 
are mobbed not infrequently. In short, I think the new arrange- 
ment is working very badly. 

Question: You said that taking territory from Germany is very 
serious business. What do you mean by that? 

Answer: There is a popular impression in Germany, although 
it is not exactly an accurate one, that Prussia has never definitely 
lost any territory that she has once possessed; that whenever any- 
thing has been taken away from her, there has always been a come- 
back, and she has invariably regained whatever territory she had 
lost and taken some more into the bargain. One of the most mod- 
erate among present-day German politicians. Professor Delbriick 
of the University of Berlin, declared some years ago that, "all Ger- 
many would have to be hewn in pieces before we should allow Posen 
to be taken away from us." Among all the provinces in the east, 
Posen is the most overwhelmingly and indisputably Polish in all 
respects, the one province that Germany would most surely have to 
give up if she were going to renounce anything. The trouble is that 
the Germans cannot bear the thought of renouncing anything that 
once belonged to them ; I fear it will be a very long time before they 
come to regard their new frontiers as definitive, and that means a 
permanent danger to the peace of Europe. That is why I said it 
was "serious business" to take territory away from Germany. 



APPENDIX 451 

Question: How valuable were Mr. PaderewskVs services to Poland? 

Answer: Mr. Paderewski accomplished a wonderful service at 
the start by ending a serious internal crisis, a dispute between Polish 
parties as to the control of the government. He founded the first 
government of the new state that was accepted by every one at home 
and recognized by all the powers. He had so many tasks on 
his hands, particularly in regard to foreign pohcy and the great de- 
cisions pending at Paris, that I fear he did not find time to devote 
himself sufiiciently to the internal organization of the new state; 
and some unfortunate conditions developed at home which he would 
doubtless have desired to avoid had he been able. But he held the 
country together successfully during the first and most trying year 
of its new existence. He is an orator of the first rank. He has many 
times spoken most effectively before the Paris Conference and at 
the League of Nations meeting at Geneva, and in his speeches be- 
fore the Polish Diet he was often able to sweep that assembly off 
its feet by his eloquence. Mr. Paderewski is so obviously a thor- 
oughly high-minded and disinterested patriot that he commands 
confidence. He was able to win even the warm friendship of Mr. 
Lloyd George, who was not on very friendly terms with the other 
Poles; and through the confidence of the British prime minister and 
President Wilson and M. Clemenceau I think he gained a great many 
things for Poland that a statesman who was less trusted could never 
have secured. In general, Mr. Paderewski's services have been of in- 
estimable value to his country, and in his handling of negotiations with 
the other powers I think he did what no other Pole could have done. 

Question: To what extent does Bolshevism prevail in Poland at 
the present time? 

Answer: It does not prevail at all. It scarcely exists. There is 
practically no Bolshevism among the Catholic population, which 
is overwhelmingly in the majority. The Poles are rather ardent 
Catholics, and that in itself is a strong safeguard against Bolshevism. 

Question: Will the Danzig corridor become a second Alsace-Lor- 
raine as Jar as Germany is concerned? 

Answer: The Germans in Germany doubtless think so, but I 
do not beheve this comparison would be fair. For, as it was finally 
marked out, the Polish corridor to the Baltic contains a majority 
of Poles and not of Germans. It is not a case of the majority of the 
population being held under a foreign rule against their will, as was 
the case in Alsace-Lorraine. 



452 APPENDIX 

Question : What can you say oj the frequent statement that the pres- 
ent aims of the Polish Government are imperialistic? 

Answer: I should say that the statement In the main is based 
on inaccurate knowledge of the ethnographic situation. As heard 
to-day, this charge is usually made with regard to the claims of the 
PoHsh Government to certain territories on the east. In that quar- 
ter the Poles have claimed a good deal of territory which, according 
to the statistics of the old Russian Government, does not have a 
PoKsh majority. But these statistics of the old Russian Govern- 
ment, like those of the Turks, were in large part simply fabricated 
for poHtical reasons. Take, for example, the case of the district of 
Vilna, which is so much in dispute to-day. The Russian census of 
1897 affirms that the Poles made up only 20 per cent of the popula- 
tion there. In 1909 the Russian estimates admitted that the Poles 
were 43 per cent of the population. In 1916 the Germans, who were 
then occupying this region, took a census and found that 80 per 
cent of the population were Pohsh. Last winter the Poles themselves 
took a census which agrees pretty well with the German one. This 
case may illustrate how unreliable the Russian figures often are. Un- 
fortunately the Russian statistics, particularly those of 1897, are al- 
most the only data with which the rest of the world has hitherto 
been famihar; almost all the current ethnographic maps of eastern 
Europe are based solely upon them, and therefore the rest of the 
world gets a very false idea of the ethnographic character of much 
of the territory which the Poles are laying claim to. 



V 

THE END OF AN EMPIRE : REMNANTS OF 
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

January 14, 192 1 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY CHARLES SEYMOUR, CHIEF OF AUSTRO- 
HUNGARIAN DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION 

Question: Do you think that President Wilson promised Premier 
Bratiano oj Rumania to send United States troops to protect the new 
frontiers? 

Answer: The evidence against it is overwhelming. The steno- 
graphic notes taken during the session indicate that nothing said 
by President Wilson could be construed into a promise to send United 



APPENDIX 453 

States troops abroad to protect frontiers. The allegation is based 
upon the report of the interpreter Mantoux and a book by a journal- 
ist, Doctor E. W. Dillon, called "The Inside Story of the Peace Con- 
ference." M. Mantoux, though a brilhant and cultivated interpreter 
whose work enormously facihtated the progress of the Conference, 
did not take stenographic notes and his interpretations sometimes 
failed to give the exact meaning of the original. Doctor Dillon's evi- 
dence is subject to suspicion, since his book is based upon gossip 
and replete with errors of fact. The stenographic report, on the 
other hand, is worthy of trust. I have heard the President on more 
than one occasion explain to Clemenceau and Lloyd George that if 
troops were necessary to protect any troubled area, they must not 
look to the United States for assistance, for pubhc opinion in this 
country would not permit the use of American forces. 

Question: What is the history oj the clause forbidding the union 
of Germany and Austria? Who opposed this union and why? 

Answer: From the beginning of the Peace Conference the French 
were inalterably opposed to the granting of any new territory to 
Germany. They refused to consider the possibihty of joining the 
German portions of Bohemia to Germany, and were emphatic in 
their denunciation of the plan to join Austria (that is, German Aus- 
tria) to Germany. They made their feehng so plain that there was 
not, I beheve, any serious discussion of yielding to the demand of 
the Austrians for annexation, although many if not all of the Amer- 
ican Delegation approved such annexation. The prohibition was in- 
direct and secured by the insertion of a clause in the German Treaty 
to the effect that Germany recognized the absolute independence 
of Austria. It is not difficult to understand the French point of view 
which was based on the behef that Germany, weakened by the loss 
of Alsace and Polish territory might become dangerous if compen- 
sated by the annexation of German Austria. 

Question: Do the Austrians want to be united with Germany? Do 
you think it will be a good thing to have the union? 

Answer: At the close of the war probably the majority of the 
German Austrians would have preferred independence. This was 
particularly true of the moneyed classes, who feared lest they should 
be caught in the financial burdens that reparations would impose 
upon Germany. The Socialists, on the other hand, advocated union, 
beheving that Sociahsm would triumph in Germany and they wished 
to share that triumph. As the months passed, and the German Aus- 



454 APPENDIX 

trians realized how narrow would be their boundaries, and that there 
was no chance of a Danubian Federation, the movement for annexa- 
tion gathered strength. At the present moment, doubtless the vast 
majority favor union, believing that in it lies Austria's sole chance 
of escape from economic disaster. Personally I have always ad- 
vocated union if a Danubian Confederation did not enter the circle 
of practical possibilities. It would assist the economic renaissance 
of German Austria and thus favor the chance of political tranquillity. 
I do not believe that the addition of six and a half million German 
Austrians would render Germany redoubtable. On the contrary, 
I believe that they would tend to counterbalance the Prussian in- 
fluence in the German state. Personally they are the most attrac- 
tive of Teutons, and hold an enviable record in the history of civiliza- 
tion. With the exception of certain aristocratic types they represent 
liberal ideas and peaceful industry. 

Question: How do you reconcile the landlocking of Austria and 
Hungary with President Wilson s pronouncement that small nations 
should have free access to the sea ? 

Answer: My impression is that the President merely stated that 
each nation should be guaranteed conditions insuring the possibihty 
of economic existence. On the other hand, he also stipulated in the 
Fourteen Points that there should be a readjustment of Itahan fron- 
tiers on the Hues of nationality, and he also constantly emphasized the 
principle of self-determination. In the case of Austro-Hungarian 
boundaries as elsewhere a conflict of principles was inevitable. Aus- 
tria could not touch the sea without encroaching on Itahan and Jugo- 
slav territory; Hungary is shut off from the sea by a broad band 
of Jugo-SIav territory. It would have been intolerable that Austria 
and Hungary, in order to touch the sea, should retain sovereignty 
over many thousand Italians and Jugo-SIavs. But the isolation of 
Austria and Hungary from the sea, although unfortunate, can be 
remedied by stipulations permitting them freedom of transit. 

Question: Did not strategy and economic considerations have more 
weight in decisions than religion, nationality, and selj-determination? 

Answer: It is difficult to strike a balance, but I should say that 
the answer is in the negative. Except in the case of the Itahan fron- 
tier strategy did not count very seriously. There it is true many 
German Austrians and Jugo-SIavs were granted to Italy, in order 
to offer to Italy an easily defensible frontier. Economic considera- 
tions, of course, played a role of enormous importance. No frontier 



APPENDIX 455 

which produced or perpetuated intolerable economic conditions 
could be regarded as permanent. The economic welfare of the in- 
habitants must always be taken into account. For this reason, as 
I have tried to show, Czechoslovakia and Rumania include a large 
alien population. But after all the basis of the frontiers was always 
nationahty and the free desires of the populations concerned. It 
was from the principle of self-determination that the territorial com- 
missions started to study frontier problems, and the burden of proof 
was always on the delegate who wished to depart from national Hnes. 
Rehgion, of course, did not count except as it forms an element in 
nationality. 

Question: What justification did President Wilson have for expect- 
ing the Allies to abrogate the secret treaties for the sole reason that they 
had been made previous to our entering the war? 

Answer: He may not have been justified in expecting complete 
abrogation, if he did expect it, but he was surely justified in expect- 
ing that they would abrogate those portions of such treaties which 
conflicted with the Fourteen Points and Wilson's later speeches. 
For the Allies had agreed in the autumn of 191 8 to accept the Four- . 
teen Points as the basis of the peace, and it was fair to assume that 
such public acceptance imphed an abrogation of any previous con- 
flicting agreements. It might have been wiser to demand the abro- 
gation of the secret treaties at the time we entered the war, but such 
a demand would have been ungenerous and probably mistaken states- 
manship; we had not yet begun to fight, and it would have been 
difficult to formulate at that time our terms of peace. The question 
of the abrogation of the secret treaties was confused by reason of 
the fact that the armistice with Austria was concluded without the 
clear understanding on all sides that the peace with Austria should 
be based upon the Fourteen Points. As a matter of fact, the two 
secret treaties that concerned the Hapsburg territories were vir- 
tually abrogated, for neither Rumania nor Italy received the boun- 
daries they had been promised, although the latter Power did not 
come off badly. 

Question: How did the Council of Ten become the Council oj Four? 

Answer: There has been much gossip and many mjrths with re- 
gard to this interesting development. It has been alleged that it 
was the work of reactionary interests at Paris desiring to isolate 
President Wilson and weaken his resolution. A study of the facts 
shows that it was a perfectly natural development. President Wil- 



456 APPENDIX 

son left Paris in February, sailing for the United States with the 
draft Covenant of the League of Nations, and intrusting practical 
control of negotiations from the American point of view to Colonel 
House. The latter did not like the organization of the Council of 
Ten. He felt that it was too large to accomplish work effectively 
and that too many onlookers and assistants attended its sessions. 
In the autumn of 191 8, when he represented the United States on 
the Armistice Commission, he had found it possible to accompHsh 
a tremendous amount of work by meeting informally with Clemen- 
ceau and Lloyd George, for in such small meetings there were no 
speeches and work could proceed rapidly. At Paris during the early 
weeks of the conference, matters lagged. With Colonel House dis- 
liking the methods of the Council of Ten, Lloyd George was unwill- 
ing to go in to the meetings. Clemenceau was confined to his house 
by the wound inflicted by a would-be assassin. It resulted natu- 
rally that the informal conferences of the three should be revived. 
Decisions began to be arrived at quickly. When President Wilson 
returned to Paris in March, he realized that the small informal com- 
mittee could work more effectively than the larger council, and he 
followed Colonel House's example. Orlando, as representative of 
Italy, was naturally invited to meet with the other three, and thus 
the Council of Four was formed. I do not think that the halo of 
secrecy which surrounded the work of the Four was necessary or 
that Colonel House approved of it. It might have been possible to 
secure the benefits of the small committee, and at the same time 
give greater publicity to the matters under discussion and the de- 
cisions reached. 

Question: Can you suggest any more effective way in which Presi- 
dent Wilson might have gathered expert information on boundaries and 
ethnology? 

Answer: I think that the principles of the system which he used 
were sound: he had organized a staff of men each one of whom was 
responsible for information on a particular area or topic. Colonel 
House had seen to it that these men began their investigations in 
time, that is in 191 7. Of course, I am hardly fitted to pass on the 
qualifications of the experts chosen. A great deal of material was 
gathered, and on the whole was so organized that the questions of 
the President could be answered quickly and comprehensively. He 
asked a great many questions and on most points at issue was sur- 
prisingly well informed. I doubt if he would have gained by troub- 
ling himself with more detailed knowledge than he possessed. In 



APPENDIX 457 

contradistinction to Lloyd George and Clemenceau the President 
made constant use of his experts, and with few exceptions his de- 
cisions were based on the facts they furnished. 

Question: Do you believe that Austria should be ruled by the Allied 
Reparation Commission, as suggested? 

Answer: As I have said, I beheve complete union with Germany 
to be the best solution to the problem. If that is not permitted, 
and it seems unlikely, it is possible that some form of economic union 
with Germany might help to meet the crisis. If that is forbidden it 
seems clear that the Allies must take some steps toward aiding Aus- 
tria if they do not wish to see the reign of anarchy along the Danube. 
I think that the responsibility of government should always rest 
upon the Austrians themselves. I do not think that pohtical con- 
trol should be assumed by any Allied Commission. The Austrians 
must be made to feel that the problem is their problem, and that 
they must work in order to meet it. But it is necessary that the 
prospect of a livelihood should be offered them, and such a prospect 
can come only through union with Germany, through a Danubian 
Federation, or through assistance from the Allies. It may well be 
that the Reparation Commission is the proper body to take control 
of such assistance, possibly even administering the finances of the 
Austrian state. 

VI 
FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM 

January 7, 192 1 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY DOUGLAS WILSON JOHNSON, CHIEF OF THE 
DIVISION OF BOUNDARY GEOGRAPHY, AMERICAN PEACE COM- 
MISSION 

Question: In describing the Italian boundary did I understand 
you to say that the line finally marked out left Italy a very good boundary 
as it ran up beyond Trieste? 

Answer: The line recommended by the American experts and 
oflFered to Italy, the so-called "American line," was, in the critical 
region of the Pear Tree Pass, carefully drawn in such manner as to 
place under Italian control the whole of the Birnbaum Plateau com- 
manding the pass from the north, and other important highlands 
commanding the pass from the south. This assured to Italy such 
effective control of the approaches to the pass that any invasion of 
Italy through this historic gateway was rendered practically impos- 



458 APPENDIX 

sible. So far as an invasion from the Fiume region is concerned, the 
frontier, by following the high mountain backbone of the Istrian 
Peninsula, dominated the Fiume basin, and offered Italy ample pro- 
tection against any possible enemy efforts to enter Italy in that region. 
Thus points of peculiar tactical strength were assured to Italy in 
order that she might feel safe from any threat from the east. Taking 
into account the remarkably strong frontier granted to Italy on the 
north, one can justly say that the whole frontier offered to Italy 
was strategically and tactically exceedingly strong. (Applause.) 

Question: Why was the American view about Fiume so rigid when 
it seemed more generous about Shantung or the Germans of Bohemia? 

Answer: I am not sure that I should agree with the assumption 
that the American view regarding Fiume was more rigid than re- 
garding the other cases mentioned. There was a fundamental differ- 
ence between the Fiume problem and the Shantung problem, or the 
problem of the Germans of Bohemia. It must not be forgotten that 
the Shantung agreement was based on a Japanese promise to evacuate 
Shantung after receiving certain economic privileges similar to those 
which other nations had enjoyed in China. The Italians made no 
such offer respecting Fiume. At no time was there any suggestion 
that if this territory were given to the Italians by the treaty, they 
would later turn it over to Jugo-SIavia. On the contrary, the ar- 
rangements suggested looked definitely toward the future annexa- 
tion of additional areas to Italy. As for the Germans of Bohemia, 
the Conference decided to adhere to the historic frontier, although 
the experts had recommended the elimination from Czechoslovakia 
of certain German areas, and the inclusion of others which belonged 
within the natural hmits of the new Czechoslovak state. Bohemia 
constitutes one of the most striking geographical units in all Eu- 
rope, the geographical frontier following in general the crest of moun- 
tain ranges surrounding the central basin. Unfortunately, the Ger- 
mans extend in large numbers across the mountain crest and down 
the inner slopes of the barrier to the margin of the central plain. The 
economic and other relations of the Germans within the basin are 
largely bound up with the Czechoslovaks in the basin. I can see 
no resemblance between the grounds upon which the Bohemian case 
was decided and the arguments advanced by Italy in support of 
her claim to a frontier which was geographically, economically, and 
historically unsound. 

Question: Is it true that the Italians aimed to make an Italian lake 
oj the Adriatic? 



APPENDIX 459 

Answer: That question asks me to assign motives; and this I 
must decline to do. It was not our province to inquire into motives, 
but to study the problem on its merits just as it came to us. I can 
say, however, that the inevitable effect of assigning to Italy the ter- 
ritories on the eastern Adriatic coast claimed by her, whatever the 
intention or aim, would have been to turn the Adriatic into an Ital- 
ian lake. 

Question: What was the extent of the President's personal knowl- 
edge of the Adriatic problem? 

Answer: In answer to that question I will say that the President 
kept in constant touch with the experts on the Adriatic problem, 
not only through the memoranda furnished by the experts but in 
other ways. I can assure you that there was sent to him a volumi- 
nous quantity of material, and I want to say that when we had per- 
sonal discussions with him upon the question it immediately be- 
came apparent that he had studied these memoranda most carefully. 
It is only fair to say that of the details and intricacies of this most 
difficult problem the President possessed a most astonishing com- 
rnand. (Applause.) I have shown you something of the ramifica- 
tions of this problem. They were endless and exceedingly compli- 
cated. In order to make it easier for the President to grasp them, 
I set up in his study relief models of the eastern Adriatic coast, models 
made on a large scale which showed in proper position and propor- 
tion every river, mountain, valley, town, and railroad. Thus the 
President had the actual form of the region before him in miniature. 
On the models were marked off the strategic, ethnological, and other 
frontiers, and the President used these models in conferences with 
his experts and with the representatives of other governments. 
Whenever we, in our capacity as speciaHsts, thought we had found 
something that the President ought to know about, and believed 
we could not get it across effectively in any other manner, we could 
ask for a personal conference with him. He was, of course, a very 
busy man, because, unlike the experts who usually had only one 
problem to consider, he had to do not only with all the territorial 
problems, but in addition with all the problems bearing on the League 
of Nations, the economic problems, and many 'other aspects of the 
peace. Despite this fact I wish to state that while I repeatedly asked 
for personal conferences with the President on this and certain other 
problems, he never failed to respond immediately with an appoint- 
ment. He had a private wire, and on occasion he would call us at 
the Crillon to make appointments on his own initiative, or to secure 
papers, maps, or other documents that he needed in his studies. I 



46o APPENDIX 

will not forget that in one instance he called me on the telephone 
late at night in my bedroom, asking for some papers which I had 
promised to supply him, and which had not reached him with suf- 
ficient promptness. You can judge from this that he kept closely 
in touch with the problems he was called upon to consider. 

Question: Will the principle oj self-determination, in your judg- 
ment, make J or peace in this region any more than it would in Poland? 

Answer: I am not an expert on the Polish question, so that I 
^;wouId not like to pass on that comparison. Briefly considering the 
question in relation to the Adriatic problem, I do not think that the 
determination of the frontier line on the basis of self-determination 
alone would make for peace. I am of the opinion, and I think that 
was the opinion of all the American delegation, that it was wise to 
violate the principle of self-determination and the principle of na- 
tionahty in establishing Italy's boundary-lines, in order to get good 
geographic and good economic frontiers, and frontiers showing 
reasonable consideration for Italy's strategic security. To have 
given her a frontier along the base of the mountains, along the racial 
line, would have been to breed trouble, and to create economic dif- 
ficulties which would not have proved favorable to the maintenance 
of peace. I think that a frontier on the natural geographic and eco- 
nomic divide would have much more of a peace-preserving char- 
acter than would one following the racial boundary. 

Question: What impression did Orlando and the Italian delegation 
make upon you? 

Answer: I must say that they made a most delightful impression. 
Both Orlando and Sonnino impressed me as very delightful men to 
meet and with whom to discuss questions. In the discussions they 
were always most amicable. There were problems that were acute, 
and which touched deeply upon Itahan sensibilities; yet in tatking 
with Orlando I had at all times a great appreciation of his genial, 
kindly, and sympathetic manner. Of course, at the same time, he 
maintained a very rigid and unbending attitude, as regarded the 
demands of his government. If you ask my impression as to his 
wisdom as a statesman, I will have to say that I beheve it would 
have been possible for him, with a broader view of the destiny of 
Italy, to take a great moral leadership in Mediterranean affairs, to 
make friends, economically and in every other way, with the Jugo- 
slavs. The occasion ofl'ered an opportunity for a fine, strong states- 
manship which, it seems to me, was an opportunity that was lost. 
Sonnino speaks excellent Enghsh; he is perfectly charming, and I 



APPENDIX 461 

never saw him in any discussion with the other members of the Su- 
preme Council, or with the President, but that I felt sorry, when 
he got the worst of an argument, because he took it so genially. I 
felt that he ought to have had the best of it, just because of the way 
he went at it. 

Question: Is Fiume a necessary economic outlet Jor Hungary and 
Jugo-Slavia and if so, could not Italy be relied upon to deal fairly with 
these nations? 

Answer: In answer to the iirst question, "Is Fiume economically 
necessary?" I say, yes. I think that geographic and physical con- 
ditions make it absolutely essential for the economic development 
of the Jugo-SIav people. I have tried to point out the peculiar phys- 
ical condition which makes it so. I do not believe that there is any 
place on the whole Mediterranean coast where one Httle location is 
as important as this. If I had the same condition, in a region ad- 
jacent to the United States, I should regret to see the United States 
have control of its only practicable outlet, no matter how good the 
American people are; and I have a very high opinion of the idealism 
of the American people. Looking at this problem from the economic 
view-point: if I come to you and ask you to put some milhons of 
dollars into the development of Fiume, and you, as Jugo-SIavs, are 
the people primarily interested, you will say to me: "Wfiy, yes, I 
think it is necessary for our people and our country, and we would 
Hke to invest our money and support it. But what can we do, if 
there is any possibility of Fiume's some day being put under another 
sovereignty?" You cannot expect one people to tax themselves and 
put their money into the development of a port, if that port is going 
to be under the control of a foreign nation, however high-minded 
and good that foreign nation may be. It is not good business policy. 

VII 
CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 

December 23, 1920 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY ISAIAH BOWMAN, CHIEF TERRITORIAL AD- 
VISER OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION 

Question: What was really the atmosphere surrounding the rela- 
tions oj the Big Three and also their relations to General Foch ? 

Answer: As far as the relations of the Big Three are concerned — ■ 
at least in the meetings with which I had to do — they were extremely 
cordial. Between Americans and the French and between British 



462 APPENDIX 

and Americans there was displayed only the very finest spirit in all 
the commission meetings. Perhaps I may answer the question best 
by relating several circumstances of a somewhat more concrete na- 
ture. Any one arriving at the Peace Conference unaware of the past 
history of the leaders could not have been in the atmosphere of the 
place very long before finding out that there were some interesting 
undercurrents at work. One of these undercurrents that perhaps 
I may speak of frankly is that some of the Alhed leaders had as much 
to say of other Allied leaders as they had of quite ordinary people. 
I might refer to one incident which got on the record but it got on 
the record in a very interesting way, and it did not happen in the 
way in which it is recorded. There was before the Conference the 
question of getting Haller's army to Poland. A British representa- 
tive asked me if I would put the question of transport to General 
Weygand, the French Chief-of-Staff, who, when I saw him, assured 
me that by three o'clock in the afternoon, when the Supreme War 
Council met, he would have his answer ready. General Foch, usually 
a man of few words, yet who could become very loquacious when 
he wanted to tire out the opposition, spoke at such length and with 
such obvious circumlocution that Lloyd George quite lost patience. 
You must remember that Foch is said not to understand a word of 
English, but perhaps he found this rather a convenience than a hand- 
icap. I suppose that he does know a few words like "damn," for 
instance, but he does not know many; he is said not to understand 
a whole sentence. Finally Lloyd George, impatient over the delay, 
said: "If Foch means this, I understand him; if Foch means that, 
I understand him, but if he means neither, then upon my honor / 
don't know what he means!" It would have been natural for the 
Marshal to leave the room and resign as Generalissimo of the Allied 
armies. On the contrary he did not leave the room; he didn't know 
what the fuss was all about. Lloyd George was not taken to task. 
Then the official interpreter, M. Mantoux, an unclassified but real 
diplomat of sorts, translated as follows: "The British Premier begs 
to observe that if the Marshal means this he can understand him; 
if he means that he can understand him; if he means neither the 
Premier is at a loss to know just what the Marshal means." 

Perhaps you will permit me to mention one other occasion. 

It was the practice of the Peace Conference to have the leading 
generals and admirals and some of their staff's meet with the Supreme 
War Council, when they had to do with matters in the Peace Treaty 
bearing on military and naval matters. After that portion of the 
business was transacted the President of the Council, M. Clemenceau, 



APPENDIX 463 

would say: "Now that the business of the Supreme War Council 
has ended, the military men and naval experts will please retire." 
When they had retired only a civil organization was left, the one 
dealing with the Peace Treaty. On this particular occasion there 
was discussed the western boundary of Poland. Foch refused to 
leave the room. Presently Clemenceau repeated the suggestion, 
there being no other military man or naval man in the room but 
Foch, Again Foch refused to leave — he simply disregarded the sug- 
gestion, as if not hearing it. Finally Clemenceau, having in mind 
that Foch did not understand Enghsh, rose from his chair, went over 
to President Wilson, and said, "I don't know what to do; he won't 
leave," and then, perplexed, sat down. Presently he again rose and 
went over to President Wilson and Premier Lloyd George, saying 
that as an agreement had been made that the generals were to be 
there only if there was something in dispute which required their 
presence, and as Foch did not appear to pay any attention he was 
at a loss to know what next to do without offending him. Finally 
Balfour, who always could be depended upon in such emergencies, 
remarked: "I suggest we have tea." Tea was served but still Foch 
stayed on. At last Clemenceau spoke to Foch. I don't know what 
it was but it was effective and Marshal Foch got up, abruptly, and 
left the room. 

Question: Can you express an opinion oj the future in store Jor the 
Greeks in recalling King Constantine? 

Answer: I have just heard an opinion that is rather illuminating. 
It came from a man of great intelligence, accustomed to observing 
events in foreign countries. He told me that the only reason why 
Venizelos was cast out and Constantine recalled was because he 
thought the Greek people were in about the same state of mind as 
the American people at the recent election in this country. Venizelos 
had gone ahead and done a lot of things which redounded to the 
credit of Greece, but the people were tired of fighting. There is a 
peasant class which has been used to the idea of a king and a court, 
and of having the country run in the old manner. And, of course, 
you know that during the war Venizelos created a host of enemies 
by the efficient way in which he ran the country ! What Constantine 
will do or how he will be treated by the Allies is a matter not of record 
but of prophecy. 

Question: You say that the American standpoint on Bulgarian 
territory was unsuccessful and that our recommendation to give Danzig 



464 APPENDIX 

to the Poles was also lost. Why did the Americans have to make those 
concessions ij they were in the right? 

Answer: The Americans did not make any concessions. They 
entered upon the records not only protests but also the specific state- 
ment that the Bulgarian settlement invites war. I ask you to con- 
sider the helplessness of the American delegation at that time in 
holding out against the Allied solution of the Bulgarian question. 
We had not ratified the German Treaty, yet there we were at Paris 
telling the other Allies how to make peace with Bulgaria. The Amer- 
icans were discredited by the Senate delay. I think that the answer 
that Clemenceau made on one occasion will illuminate that ques- 
tion. Mr. Polk commissioned me to secure the opinion of Premier 
Clemenceau on the Fiume question which was then leading up to 
one of its most critical phases. It was late in 1919. We had not 
ratified the Treaty of Versailles, the Conference was nearing its end. 
The apparently vacillating policy of our colleagues, toward the 
Italians, was embarrassing. We wanted to find out where they stood 
on the matter of signing the memorandum of December 9. I ap- 
pealed to Tardieu, who reported his chief's answer to be: "The Amer- 
icans are charming, but they are far away. When they have gone 
the Italians remain and as our neighbors!" 

Question: Was there not a time when it looked as iJ the Peace Con- 
ference might break up because oj the extreme policy of one of the Allies? 

Answer: Yes, there were a number of occasions when the Peace 
Conference might have broken up. Almost anything might have 
happened with so many nations represented, so many personalities 
and so many experts — perhaps half a thousand in all ! Owing to 
the fact that President Wilson has been charged on the one hand 
with outrageous concessions to the Allies and on the other hand 
that he had always been soft with the Germans, particularly with 
Bulgaria, let us see just how soft he was ! On a certain day three 
of us were asked to call at the President's house, and on the follow- 
ing morning at eleven o'clock we arrived. President Wilson wel- 
comed us in a very cordial manner. I cannot understand how people 
get the idea that he is cold. He does not make a fuss over you, but 
when you leave him you feel that you have met a very courteous 
gentleman. You have the feeling that he is frank and altogether 
sincere. He remarked: "Gentlemen, I am in trouble and I have 
sent for you to help me out. The matter is this: the French want 
the whole Left Bank of the Rhine. I told M. Clemenceau that I 
could not consent to such a solution of the problem. He became 



APPENDIX 465 

very much excited and then demanded ownership of the Saar Basin. 
I told him I could not agree to that either because it would mean 
giving 300,000 Germans to France." Whereupon President Wilson 
further said: "I do not know whether I shall see M. Clemenceau 
again. I do not know whether he will return to the meeting this 
afternoon. In fact, I do not know whether the Peace Conference 
will continue. M. Clemenceau called me a pro-German and ab- 
ruptly left the room. I want you to assist me in working out a solu- 
tion true to the principles we are standing for and to do justice to 
France, and I can only hope that France will ultimately accept a 
reasonable solution. I want to be fair to M. Clemenceau and to 
France, but I cannot consent to the outright transference to France 
of 300,000 Germans." A solution was finally found — the one that 
stands in the Treaty to-day. 

VIII 

THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM AND THE DISRUPTION 
OF TURKEY 

January 28, 192 1 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY WILLIAM LINN WESTERMANN, CHIEF 
OF THE NEAR-EASTERN DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN PEACE 
COMMISSION 

Question: Apparently you believe that the United States should 
have accepted a mandate for Armenia and sent her soldiers there. Yet, 
you say we would now be in trouble had we done so. Do you still ad- 
vocate such a course? 

Answer: It is impossible now for the United States to do for Ar- 
menia what it could have done at the time of the Peace Conference. 
Had we then sent 10,000 or 20,000 troops with 500 American officers, 
and we could have gotten them in, we could have restored the Ar- 
menian refugees and maintained order in Turkish Armenia without 
great difficulty. The Near- East Refief was at that time, as since, 
feeding both Turks and Armenians, men, women, and children, and 
the Turks were very appreciative of that fact. We had a moral stand- 
ing in the Near East such as nobody else had, which would have 
carried us far. The population of Turkish Armenia, Turk and Kurd, 
would have welcomed us, and there would have been no trouble with 
Russia. Now the time is past for a successful political activity on 
our part. 



466 APPENDIX 

Question: You seem to support the Zionist cause. Is not Palestine 
Arab in population, and is not Palestinian Zionism contrary to the 
idea oj self-determination? 

Answer: In Palestine there are six Arabs to every Jew, and the 
special privilege granted to the Jews there is contrary to the policy 
of self-determination. The justification for it Hes, in my mind, in 
the fact that the Jewish problem cannot be regarded as a local prob- 
lem. It is a world problem and the problem of a very powerful people 
— powerful far beyond their numbers. It must be treated as a world 
problem. It offers to the Jewish people an opportunity to carry 
out their idealistic aspirations, necessary for the Jews of the world, 
and bound to be helpful, rather than harmful, in the tangled situa- 
tion in the Near East. 

Question: What do you think will be the outcome oJ the proposed 
Near-East conference in London the end of next month, and in what 
way do you think the treaty of Sevres will be revised? 

Answer: The French papers insist that it will not be "revised," 
but that it will be "modified" — a fine diplomatic distinction. The 
French would give anything if they could get out of that muddle 
which they got into by putting Smyrna even under Greek adminis- 
trative control and attempting, in the Tripartite Agreement, to en- 
force their Sykes-Picot claim in central AnatoHa. No real solution 
of this entire Near-East problem will ever be found until all the ap- 
plications of the Secret Treaties are thrown out. The French papers 
are now urging that the French drop their Cilician adventure and 
give up that Anatohan territory which they got out of the Tripartite 
Agreement. In December they suffered a defeat in the territory 
which is under their mandate. In order to make peace with the Turk- 
ish Nationalists they will be willing to modify the arrangement by 
which the Greeks control the Smyrna district. The Greeks will ob- 
ject to this; but they ought to be glad if they should lose Smyrna. 
It is costing the Greeks 1,500,000 drachmas a day, which they can 
ill afford, and they are not getting anywhere with it. 

Question: Can you tell us approximately the cost to France of its 
occupation? Is it succeeding? 

Answer: I judge that means the occupation of Syria. General 
Gouraud, who has been in command there, made a statement, in 
December last, before the combined French Senatorial Committees 
on Foreign Affairs and Finance in answer to a similar question. He 
said that it had cost one billion francs last year. I doubt that the 



APPENDIX 467 

French mandate in Syria will eventually succeed. The difficulty 
is that they can only send in French Colonial troops. These are 
Mohammedan; and that is dangerous, and they know it is danger- 
ous. Yet the Government seems utterly incapable of the thought 
of giving it up. I am very much afraid of the outcome of the Syrian 
mandate, from the French point of view. 

Question: Why do you make the distinction between Syria and 
Palestine? 

Answer: There is no real geographic distinction between Syria 
and Palestine, and the imphed criticism is a correct one. Syria in- 
cludes Palestine, and has a geographical and an ethnological unity. 
There is an historical distinction, because of the occupation of Pales- 
tine by the Jews in the past and the present Zionist movement. 
This was accentuated at the Peace Conference because of the British 
desire to have a buffer state on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. 
As Syria was to be given to France, historical Jewish Palestine be- 
came the natural unit for this political purpose. 

Question: In your opinion is the Zionist state a wise policy and 
safe for the peace oj the Near East? 

Answer : The Balfour declaration speaks only of a Jewish Home- 
land — not of a Zionist state. The Zionist movement and the inde- 
pendent state of Armenia were the two which promised the greatest 
good in the Near-Eastern situation. The Zionists have made great 
irrigation plans for the development of Palestine. Their influence 
and example will be of advantage to all the Near East. 

Question: What will be the effect oj Bolshevist control in Russian 
Armenia? Are the Armenians Bolshevists? 

Answer: No, absolutely not! The Armenian people, as well as 
the Turkish people, though they differ from each other, have nothing 
in common with the Russian temperament, and especially not witfi 
tlie Russian Bolshevists. The Armenians are extremely individual- 
istic, and therefore non-Bolshevist. 

Question: Is there any connection between the return of King Con^ 
stantine and the proposed revision of the Treaty of Sevres? How do you 
explain that Venizelos was summoned to Paris to discuss the Sevres 
treaty? 

Answer: They could not keep Venizelos away. You cannot keep 
that man away, where Greek interests are concerned. 

Yes, there is a connection between the return of Constantino and 



468 APPENDIX 

the proposed revision of the Treaty of Sevres. Greek political leader- 
ship has changed. France and Great Britain can now say that they 
granted Smyrna to Greece because of their confidence in Venizelos. 
They will probably assert that what they granted to Venizelos they 
are not bound to maintain for a leader whom they stigmatize as a 
pro-German brother-in-law of the ex-Kaiser. 

Question: What is back of the project provided Jor in the Turkish 
treaty Jor a possible independent state oj Kurdistan, which appears on 
your map? 

Answer: In the Turkish treaty there is a territory south of 
Turkish Armenia still included in Turkey, which is set off as the dis- 
trict of Kurdistan. There is a provision in the treaty that after a 
year, if the Kurds desire to form an independent state and so ex- 
press themselves, the Council of the League of Nations and the Al- 
lied Powers will consider the matter. Undoubtedly the provision 
is connected with the British defensive pohcy for India. The mih- 
tarj'^ hne of defense runs across Persia and up to the Armenian moun- 
tains. An independent Kurdistan would give them a much better 
defensive Hne and strengthen the British control over Mesopotamia. 
I judge that is the essential reason. 

Question: What is your personal opinion oJ the merits of Presi- 
dent Wilson s recent 7iote, referring the Armenian problem back to the 
League of Nations on the ground that it has become part and parcel oJ 
the Russian problem? 

Answer: President Wilson is quite right. The history of the 
Russian advance over Trans-Caucasia in the nineteenth century 
and the geographic position of Armenia marks it as a legitimate 
sphere of Russian influence. Turkish Armenia hes in the pathway 
of Slavic Russian expansion. Soviet Russia now controls Russian 
Armenia. I hold no brief for Bolshevism; but we might as well be 
honest and face facts. Bolshevist Russia has done that thing which 
we have refused to do — gone in and protected the Armenians. It 
seems obvious to me that the Armenian question must be looked 
at primarily in connection with the Russian problem. 

Question: Did the Turks fire first upon the Greek troops at Smyrna 
or did the Greeks start the massacre without provocation? How many 
hundred thousand Greeks and Armenians were butchered by the Turks? 

Answer: The massacre at Smyrna was seen by hundreds of Eu- 
ropeans and Americans stationed upon the Alhed and American 
ships in the harbor of Smyrna, but nobody could tell who fired the 



APPENDIX 469 

first shot. An Allied Commission sent out to inquire and report 
upon the entire situation could not settle the question as to who 
began the firing. 

There is no doubt about the terrible massacres of Armenians by 
the Turks and Kurds. There were also massacres and deportations 
of Greeks in Asia Minor. That, however, does not affect the situa- 
tion. We are not asking whether the Greeks have a right to our 
sympathy because of the sufferings they endured. The question is 
whether they can successfully rule over a greater number of Turks 
in the Smyrna district. The Smyrna massacre makes the answer 
extremely doubtful. There are about 6,000,000 Turks in Anatolia, 
who will exert continual pressure to regain control of Smyrna, and 
about 5,000,000 Bulgarians, who will press down upon the thin Greek 
coastal area of Thrace. It is not political wisdom to subject the 
Greek kingdom to the dangers of this combined pressure, in view 
of the fact that the Smyrna massacres have aroused bitter anger 
among the Turks against the Allied pro-Greek poHcy. 

Question: You intimate that it was a mistake that the United States 
did not declare war on Turkey. Why? What advantage would have 
been gained? 

Answer: We should not have lost anything by declaring war, 
and would have been in a stronger position on the whole Near-East- 
ern question at the Peace Conference. When Turkish questions 
came up we continually met this assertion: "After all, you are not 
interested in this, because you were not at war with Turkey." Above 
all, had we been at war with Turkey, we could have sent troops into 
Armenia immediately after the Armistice and could have done a 
great deal to help the situation there, because the Turks would gladly 
have accepted us at that time, either temporarily or in a mandatory 
capacity. 

IX 

THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND NATIVES IN 
TRANSFERRED TERRITORIES 

February 4, 192 1 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY MANLEY O. HUDSON, LEGAL ADVISER TO 
AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION 

Question: Have you any comments to make upon the Shantung 
settlement? 

Answer: The disposition of Germany's interests outside of Eu- 
rope has, of course, greatly changed the situation in the Far East. 



470 APPENDIX 

The enforced surrender to China of the German concessions at Tsin 
Tsin and at Hankow was altogether in line with the AIHed effort to 
restore control to the peoples concerned. But the transfer of Ger- 
man interests in Shantung to another foreign Power has been widely 
condemned as a departure from the general principles of nationality 
and self-determination. To the Chinese it was a flat contradiction 
of the principles which the Allies were professing to apply to Europe; 
to the Japanese it was but a continuance of the pohcy which so 
many states had been following in the Far East for a score of years. 
If this part of the settlement is not to be defended, it can be ex- 
plained and understood. The seizure of Tsingtao had been eff"ected 
by Japan in 1914, and at the time of the Peace Conference Japanese 
troops were occupying the Shantung peninsula. Perhaps the basic 
parts of President Wilson's programme had not been popularized in 
the Far East as in the West. At any rate, after the failure of their 
attempt to get a provision on racial equality embodied in the Cov- 
enant of the League, Japan's representatives seem to have attached 
more importance to their desire that the Treaty should not call upon 
Japan to withdraw from Shantung, but should recognize her succes- 
sion to Germany's position. Both France and Great Britain had 
agreed, at a time when their conduct of the war needed naval co- 
operation, to support Japan's claim at the Peace Conference. As 
the time approached for submitting the conditions of peace to the 
Germans, it was becoming more difficult to withhold satisfaction to 
Japan's demands, and when the dissolution of the Conference was 
threatened by the disaffection of the Belgians and the actual with- 
drawal of the Italians, the Japanese insistence succeeded. A prom- 
ise was given to President Wilson and Mr, Balfour that Shantung 
would be completely restored to China within a reasonable time, and 
the well-known 'agreement between Japan and China in 1915 had 
stipulated for conditional restoration. With the recent election of 
China to a place on the Council of the League of Nations, her gov- 
ernment is certainly in a better position to insist on the redemption 
of that promise. Indeed, it would seem to be another situation like 
the enforcement of the minority treaties and the supervision over 
the mandates — where if the League did not exist it would have to 
be created. 

Question: Will the refusal of the United States to ratify the minori- 
ties treaties which you have enumerated with Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, 
Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Greece mean the failure of this part of 
the work of the Peace Conference? 



APPENDIX 471 

Answer : I think it will not mean the failure of that part of the 
work. I think it will go on if the League of Nations lives, whether 
the United States ratifies these treaties or not. It seems to me that 
this is a part of the American responsibility which we have not fully 
appreciated in this country. It was an American President who 
introduced it, and it was the hope of America that brought about 
the nationalistic revolt in southeastern Europe. I think, therefore, 
that we have a very distinct obhgation to the minorities in relation 
to race and religion in each of these countries, whose political future 
we have attempted to fashion. The Peace Conference itself did not 
have the decision as to Austria-Hungary, which was taken long 
before. We dealt with their future by prosecuting the war as we 
prosecuted it during 191 7 and 191 8, and we battled for the support 
of the dissatisfied nationalities in old Austria-Hungary, giving them 
help to achieve their freedom. It seems to me that we have a dis- 
tinct responsibihty, therefore, to see that the provisions of these 
minorities treaties are not permitted altogether to go by the board. 

What is the United States going to do? I do not doubt at all 
that some future American Secretary of State will have to appeal to 
the governments that are signatories and that have ratified those 
treaties, as John Hay appealed to the signatories in another treaty 
with Poland when he sought to protect the Jews in 1902. 

Question : Do you consider adequate the provisions for enforcement 
0/ the minority treaties by the Council and Court of the League of Na- 
tions? Why shouldn't an aggrieved minority be permitted to prosecute 
its appeal directly? Why was it not made possible for any member oj 
the League to file a complaint? 

Answer: It seems to me that this question is based upon a very 
sound criticism of the scope of these treaties. I have felt all along 
that it ought to have been made possible for any member of the 
League of Nations and not simply a state represented on the Coun- 
cil to espouse the cause of the Jews in Poland on terms like those 
employed on behalf of Jugo-SIavia. The American delegation stood 
out for enabling any member of the League of Nations to make that 
appeal, but it was necessary to yield many things, and that was one 
that was yielded. 

Question: Why were mandates superimposed on people. Jot in- 
stance on Syria? 

Answer: The first part of the question attacks the whole man- 
date system. I suppose the person who asked it would not suggest 



472 APPENDIX 

that the natives of Southwest Africa should be permitted to govern 
themselves. I think one might as well have suggested that the 
American Indians should have been given the government of our 
continent. A great deal is to be said for that, but with the compe- 
tition in economic spheres of all sorts I think it is quite impossible 
for the outside world to keep its finger out of the German South- 
western part of Africa. It is a very rich country and the foreigners 
who go there are bound to get into trouble with the natives. For 
territories of that kind I think the mandate system was inevitable. 
I do not intend to defend the expansion of a system of this sort to 
countries like Syria, except that the protection of the people de- 
mands some scheme of this sort to prevent their exploitation by 
foreigners. 

Question: The Declaration oj Independence declares governments 
derive "their just powers Jrom the consent of the governed." Does this 
statement differ Jrom President Wilson s principle of "self-determina- 
tion"? J 

Answer: We think President Wilson's principle is looking in the 
same direction. I am sure we should have as many opinions as we 
have people here. Self-determination is not a cure-all for map- 
making. It seems to me to be merely a method. One must decide 
that he is going somewhere before he needs decide how he is going 
to travek It seems to me that self-determination does not tell you 
where you are going, although it may help along the way. The 
United States decided for Austria-Hungary in the early part of 191 8 
as to where they were going, and self-determination was the coach 
in which they travelled. Personally I find it exceedingly difficult to 
get any help from such statements as that of the Declaration of our 
Independence. 

Question: Under what class of mandate was Smyrna given over to 
^ Greece? 

Answer: Not under any mandate. I am not at all sure that her 

.. .. case does not constitute a departure from the text of Article twenty- 

^ two (xxii) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Does that 

y^ Article go so far as to apply to what was formerly all of the Turkish 

.^ territory? I think this construction of the terms used in that article 

' is not unsound. Then why is not the mandate apphed in the case of 

V Greece? I do not know, but I should be inchned to believe that it 

was more due to Mr. Venizelos's silver tongue than to anything else. 

Question: What is the present status oJ any mandate for Armenia? 



APPENDIX 473 

Answer: A number of Powers were asked to take the mandate 
for Armenia and they all refused. The United States was asked 
and the United States refused. Persons who called themselves the 
representatives of the Armenian Government were permitted to sign 
the treaty of peace with Turkey. I will leave it to my learned col- 
league whether that constitutes making it an independent state. 

Question: Will you tell us something oj the action and reaction of 
personalities on this subject of protection of minorities? What was 
Clemenceaus attitude, Jor example? 

Answer: As to M. Clemenceau's attitude, I was never able to 
discover that he had any. M. Clemenceau, in my observations of 
him, was capable of having decided attitudes; he was also capable of 
as decided neutrahty. On the subject of minorities he "sat," and 
that was all, but if any one is interested in the reaction of personali- 
ties I think it ought to be said that it was President Wilson's interest 
and it was his desire to protect the Jews of Europe, as the American 
Jews here demand that they should be protected, which made the 
whole thing possible. It was an American proposition first that 
something be done for the protection of the minorities, and that 
proposal had the strong support of certain persons in the British 
delegation, and it had the very strong support of a few people in the 
Italian delegation, who had spent a great deal of time in the Balkans. 
But in the main it was the kind of thing which might have been per- 
mitted to go by the board in the Conference hke many other mat- 
ters that came before the Paris Conference. There were many ques- 
tions which were permitted to fall over to one side. I think that 
this was not permitted to do so owing to the insistence of the Ameri- 
can Jews of whom I was speaking, and the insistence of President 
Wilson himself. But, in that connection another personahty is to 
be mentioned — Lord Robert Cecil. His father sat in the Congress 
of Berlin, and it was he who had been responsible for the promise 
exacted from Montenegro, Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, requir- 
ing all those states to protect religious minorities. Lord Robert 
Cecil took for that reason, as for many others, a hve interest in that 
part of the Conference and did much to forward the work. He 
would have gone so far as to have allowed an appeal to the League 
of Nations by any committee of Jews or by any individual Jew or 
any individual member of any minority. 

Question: How about Ireland? 

Answer: It seems to me that Ireland is a place where we have 



474 APPENDIX 

needed for many years the kind of religious toleration which was 
aimed at by the Paris Conference in these minorities treaties. If I 
know anything of the conditions in Ireland my opinion is that they 
have been more than a Httle due to the struggle between the religious 
groups, and I wonder whether the extension of the principle of reli- 
gious toleration which we have attempted to envisage in those trea- 
ties should not be remedial; I wonder whether that principle would 
not contribute something to peace within the island for Ireland 
itself. As soon as we talk about the self-government of nationalities 
trouble arises from the opposition of those who would like to see 
Ireland united and independent. I know of no place where the 
practical lines of the doctrine of self-determination or the doctrine 
of nationahties are more obvious than on the island of Ireland itself. 

Question: Was it actually proposed to the Italians and French that 
they give guarantees for the German minorities in the Trentino and 
Alsace-Lorraine respectively, and did they refuse to give them? 

Answer: As to Alsace-Lorraine, no such proposal was made. 
The Alsace-Lorraine question came to the Peace Conference a ques- 
tion settled by the arbitrament of arms. No proposal was made, 
and I doubt whether one would say that any provision hke those 
which I have described for protecting rehgious and racial minorities 
would be necessary; as to the hnguistic minorities, I doubt whether 
any special provision was necessary in Alsace-Lorraine. Instead of 
the Germans enforcing their demands, and in spite of the German 
rule, I understand that most of the French population have con- 
tinued to speak French. As to the Trentino, the suggestion was 
made to the Italian delegation that guarantees of this sort ought to 
be given for the 400,000 Germans who are transferred to Italy. 
The Italian delegation felt that it was entirely inconsistent with its 
position as a principal power to have any such suggestion made. 

Question: Does not the maintenance oj their own schools by the 
various nationals produce in the new European states poor standards 
of liberal education — will not such separate schools become the centre oj 
secession agitation ? 

Answer: In this country the suggestion that we have separate 
schools has always been met, I think, by the criticism that they 
would mean inferior standards in those schools. Surely that could 
not be true among the Germans who are transferred to Poland; 
the Germans surely would maintain as efficient schools as the Poles. 
Among the Jews in Poland one may very well say that their schools 
would probably be less efficient. 



APPENDIX 475 



X 

THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER 

January 21, 1921 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY JAMES BROWN SCOTT, LEGAL ADVISER TO 
AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION 

Question: In your opinion, what amount oj actual sincerity was 
there back oj the demand Jor the Kaiser's delivery? 

Answer: Mr. Lloyd George evidently was in earnest, for in 
December, 1919, just before the opening of the Conference, he went 
before the country, in England, I understand, with the cry of "Hang 
the Kaiser and make Germany pay for the war." Mr. Clemenceau 
appeared to have been in earnest inasmuch as France had suffered 
extremely. Beyond these two Powers, there was, I think, httle de- 
sire to see the Kaiser tried. Italy was more lukewarm, as far as I 
could judge, but was unwilling to disassociate itself from its Allies. 
Japan positively refused to be a party to it and filed a dissenting 
opinion repudiating any law or custom by which a sovereign could 
be tried or should be tried. The United States stood hke a rock 
against the trial of the Kaiser for a criminal offense. As to the reso- 
lution of compromise, in regard to which I made a statement, an 
agreement was had to request the extradition of the Kaiser, to place 
him before a so-called pohtical court to be tried for an offense against 
morality and to be punished according to the principles of high polit- 
ical policy. That was quite late in the Conference and by that time, 
I think, they had taken the measure of Holland and had ascertained 
that no amount of persuasion would force that devoted httle coun- 
try to violate the principles of international law concerning hos- 
tihty or its own traditions, and that if force were used Holland 
would stand against any amount of force that the Alhed Govern- 
ments might care to bring against it. Now, ladies and gentlemen, 
at the end it was simply an attempt to get out of an embarrassing 
situation by, may I use a Washington phrase, "passing the buck" 
from the Allies and Associated countries over to Holland, where 
the "buck" appears to be at present. 

Question: Did Japan's stand with the United States mean that 
she disapproved of the Kaiser's trial on the same grounds as those of 
the Americans? 

Answer: The American opinion was more elaborately reasoned. 



476 APPENDIX 

The Japanese dissenting opinion was very brief but extremely to 
the point, saying that "it did not believe that there was any criminal 
law or statute or custom by which the Kaiser could be tried for the 
commission of a criminal offense, and that Japan was averse on prin- 
ciple to the trial of the Heads of States." 

Question: Did not Mr. Lansing propose an indictment oj the 
Kaiser? Why was not this adopted? 

Answer: I think the answer I shall give you is correct, because 
I have the text here of Mr. Lansing's proposal, and if it be your plea- 
sure, to lay it before this meeting, I wish to read it. It has not been 
pubhshed. 

RESOLUTION SUGGESTED BY MR. LANSING AT THE MEETING 
OF THE COMMISSION OF RESPONSIBILITIES, MARCH 12, 19191 

It is recommended that the Conference of the Allied and Associated Govern- 
ments issue at the time of the signature of a Treaty of Peace with an enemy Power, 
and annex the same to such Treaty, the following declaration: 

Declaration by the Representatives of (name of countries) in Conference As- 
sembled. 

The moral right to wage war only exists when there is an imperative neces- 
sity to employ force in the protection of national life, in the maintenance of na- 
tional right or in the defense of liberty and humanity. 

War inspired by any other motive is wanton, needless and violate of inter- 
national morality and justice. It cannot be justified. 

Judged by this standard the war which was begun in 1914 was unrighteous 
and indefensible. It was a war of aggression. The masters of the Central Powers, 
inflamed by the passion to possess the territory and sovereignty of others, en- 
tered upon a war of conquest, a war which in magnitude, in waste of life and 
property, in merciless cruelties and in intolerable woes, surpasses all wars of 
modern times. The evidence of this moral crime against mankind is convinc- 
ing and conclusive. 

Restrained by reverence for law which is inseparable from that high sense of 
justice which is essential to social order, the nations which have suflfered so griev- 
ously may be unable to mete out through judicial channels retribution to the 
guilty. But the authors of this atrocious war ought not to pass unscathed into 
history. They should be summoned before the bar of universal public opinion 
to listen to the verdict which mankind passes upon the perpetrators of this great- 
est crime against the world. 

Therefore, in the name of those who sacrificed their lives that liberty might 
live, in the name of the helpless who endured unspeakable atrocities, in the name 
of those whose ruined and plundered lands bear witness to the wickedness of the 
accused, in the name of humanity, of righteousness and of civilization, an out- 
raged world denounces as infamous and demands the judgment of the ages against 
William of Hohenzollern, once German Emperor and King of Prussia, etc., etc. 

1 Minutes of the meetings of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Au- 
thors of the War, p. 37. 



APPENDIX 477 

MR. LANSING'S SUGGESTION OF APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSION 
OF INQUIRY AS TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE KAISER. AT 
THE MEETING OF THE COMMISSION OF RESPONSIBILITIES, 
MARCH 12, 19191 

In view of the official and personal Influence which the ex-Kaiser possessed 
and exercised upon the course and conduct of the war, and in view of the im- 
munity from suit and prosecution which a Monarch and Chief of State enjoys 
according to the municipal law of every civilized country and also according to 
the Common Law of Nations, and lest because of this immunity from judicial 
process the ex-Kaiser escape the condemnation which his misdeeds require, the 
third Sub-Commission recommends that, instead of attempting to hale the ex- 
Kaiser before a Court of Justice for which there is no precedent in the accepted 
Law of Nations, an International Commission of Inquiry be instituted to investi- 
gate and to report upon the extent of the responsibility of the ex-Kaiser from the 
political, legal and moral point of view for the acts of the German authorities, 
civil and military, in violation of the laws and customs of war committed during 
the course of the war from the ist day of August, 1914, to the nth day of No- 
vember, 191 8. 

The International Commission of Inquiry to be instituted for this purpose 
should be composed of . . . Representatives of the United States, the British 
Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and one Representative of each of the other 
countries at war with Germany. It should be appointed during the sessions of 
the Conference; the archives of the German Government should be placed at 
its disposal, and the report of the Commission based upon a careful examination 
of the evidence at its disposal should be presented by the members of the Com- 
mission to their respective Governments on the nth day of November, 1919, 
and immediately made public by each of them, in order that the public opinion 
of the world thus enlightened and instructed may anticipate the verdict of his- 
tory and render the judgment of posterity. 

MR. LANSING'S SUBSEQUENT SUGGESTION FOR A COMMISSION 
OF INQUIRY. AT THE MEETING OF THE COMMISSION OF RE- 
SPONSIBILITIES, MARCH 13, 19192 

The Commission on Responsibilities recommends that — 

1. A Commission of Inquiry be established to consider generally the relative 
culpability of the authors of the war and also the question of their culpability 
as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed during its course. 

2. The Commission of Inquiry consist of two members of the five following 
Powers: United States, British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan; and one mem- 
ber each, of the five following Powers: Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Roumania, 
and Serbia. 

3. The enemy be required to place their archives at the disposal of the Com- 
mission which shall forthwith enter upon its duties and report jointly and sepa- 
rately to their respective Governments on the eleventh day of November, nine- 

1 Minutes of the meetings of the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors 
of the War, pp. 37-38. 

2 Minutes of the meetings of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Au- 
thors of the War, pp. 57-58. 



478 APPENDIX 

teen hundred and nineteen (November ii, 1919), or as soon thereafter as prac- 
ticable. 

That was submitted by Mr. Lansing. He was Chairman of the 
Commission of ResponsibiHty, and this was read at a full meeting 
of that Commission. It was received with a certain amount of good- 
will, but when it was understood that it was to stand alone and was 
not to be accompanied with a spectacular trial — the trial of the Kaiser 
for a criminal offense for violating the laws and customs of war and 
the laws of humanity — the members of the Commission lost all in- 
terest in it and would have none of it. A trial they wanted, and were 
satisfied with nothing less than a trial, and the members would not 
be satisfied until their Chiefs-of-Staff suggested that they withdraw 
from their position. I think, if I may say so, two other propositions 
were presented to the Commission from the American members, 
which provided for the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry, 
to be appointed by the Conference, to meet and to examine the evi- 
dence, and to reach a judgment, and then to present this as a report 
to the world at large through the public press in order that the opinion 
expressed in the report should be examined or tested by public opin- 
ion. But as that did not involve a trial of the Kaiser, it shared the 
fate of the Resolution already referred to. 

Question: Did President Wilson ever express himself as to any 
form of punishment Jor the Kaiser? 

Answer: It is my understanding that President Wilson regarded 
the trial of the Kaiser for a criminal offense as entirely out of place 
and as unjustifiable, and that he refused to be a party to it. Be- 
cause of his refusal the Supreme Council rejected the majority re- 
port of the Commission of Responsibility, and as a compromise 
agreed upon an article according to which the Kaiser, if the Allies 
could get their claws upon him, should be arraigned for an offense 
against international morahty. President Wilson thought, as I be- 
lieve, that this was the most that could be permitted, and that it 
would not be a legal but a political offense and that the punishment 
should not be a criminal but a pohtical punishment. 

Question: I J the Kaiser should by any chance leave Holland in the 
course of succeeding years, are the Allies bound by the Treaty to try him 
then? 

Answer: I would say to that, that the AHies are not bound by 
the Treaty to try him now or at any time. They reserved to them- 
selves the right to try him if they could get their hands upon him. 



APPENDIX 479 

and if when he seemed to be nearing the goal they then wish to try 
him, it is a right which they reserve, but it is not a duty which they 
have imposed upon themselves. 

Question: Why did Lloyd George object to the inclusion of President 
Wilson's express denial that the Kaiser's offense was criminal? 

Answer: Well, of course, I am not here this evening as the of- 
ficial mouthpiece of Mr. Lloyd George. Our views would differ some- 
what in this matter. I should imagine, however, that inasmuch as 
Mr. Lloyd George had denounced the Kaiser as a criminal and had 
made some pointed remarks upon the hustings about the Kaiser's 
liability that he could not at Paris deny the validity of his own state- 
ments. The South African delegates were bitterly opposed to a 
criminal trial. It is well known that General Botha stood like a rock. 
He knew, as commander-in-chief of the Boer forces, what defeat was 
and, I understand, he did not intend to be a party to the signing of 
a document to try the Kaiser. It is supposed that this rather led 
Mr. Uoyd George to put up with less than he had hoped to get; it 
was feared that there would be a protest on the part of the South 
African delegates. 

Question: Do you regard it as inexpedieiit that the head of a State 
should ever be tried by an international court Jor moral crimes against 
other nations? 

Answer: That question asks my personal opinion, and I am not 
willing to give it. I think, however, it is best for nations themselves 
to take care of their chief executives. We do so by apt provision in 
the Constitution of the United States, and we always adjust our ' 
own mistakes with our own punishment. It would be exceedingly 
disagreeable, and Mr. Lansing said so in the Commission, if our own 
Chief Executive were tried by an international court; because the 
United States could not submit that any sovereignty other than the 
sovereignty of the United States should try its own chief executive. 
If, however, nations should agree that in certain cases in the future, 
if offenses be committed in the future, the chief of the State should 
be tried, then, of course, they have agreed to it. Personally, I think 
that would be unfortunate, and I hope it will never be attempted. 

Question: Did Jeeling run high within the Commission because of 
the disagreement over the question oj the trials, and what was the "per- 
sonal'* situation? 

Answer: I see Mrs. Scott smile at the question, "Did feeling 



48o APPENDIX 

run high?" Feeling ran about as high as feeling can run. It ran 
especially high in the British membership, and it ran especially high 
in the French members. It ran so high that relations were some- 
what suspended, but I imagine they are over that feeling because 
last summer when I had the pleasure of being in Europe and meeting 
some of those gentlemen whose feeling was a little high at that time, 
they seemed to be glad to see me and had apparently forgotten all 
about it. When I ventured to suggest "the Kaiser" they laughed 
and said: "Oh, well, you know that is all past." 

Question: What practical effects oj the Two Hague Conferences 
were manifest during the World War? 

Answer: The Hague Conferences or bodies called no meeting 
periodically; they were not self-starters. They have to be sum- 
moned, the programme prepared in advance before the members 
meet and deliberate. The Powers at war were unwilling to have 
conferences at such time or before any time until victory had been 
determined one way or the other. The machinery was there before 
the war and in some periods of the war perhaps it might have been 
appHed, but there was no request on the part of the Powers to make 
use of this machinery. It was just exactly as if you had your auto- 
mobile out in front of your house ready to start and there was no 
starter. 

Question: Could the International Court, recently held at The 
Hague, function, in part or in whole, as a League of Nations? 

Answer: The Court was framed as it has been outlined and 
drafted by the Committee at The Hague last Summer, and depends 
for its constitution upon the concurrent and independent separate 
action of the Assembly of the League of Nations and of the Council 
of the League of Nations, and therefore it presupposes the existence 
of the League of Nations. But if the League of Nations should not 
succeed, it would still be possible to use that method. Why? Be- 
cause, in the Assembly of the League of Nations, every State is rep- 
resented upon an equahty; in the Council of the League of Nations 
the large Powers have a preponderance. Therefore, if the League 
of Nations were not to continue to function, it would be very easy 
for the Powers, if they so desire, to have their diplomatic agent 
credited to The Hague with the functions, in so far as the Court is 
concerned, of the Assembly of the League of Nations; they might 
organize an Executive Committee of the diplomatic agents, to be 
composed, if they so chose, in the same fashion as the Council, with 



APPENDIX 481 

the functions of the Council, as far as the Court is concerned. The 
project in that way could be put into execution without change, — 
"without the crossing of a t or the dotting of an i." 



XI 
REPARATIONS 

February 25, 1921 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY THOMAS W. LAMONT, ECONOMIC ADVISER 
TO AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION 

Question: Is there any way of figuring accurately Germany's capac- 
ity to pay? 

Answer: There is no absolutely accurate way of determining 
Germany's capacity to pay. You have to take a great many differ- 
ent factors into consideration; you have to take the material wealth 
that she has, described to us by her own finance minister in such 
glowing language prior to the war, and you have to recognize what 
diminution has come to that as a result of the war; you have to 
figure on the earning capacity of her average citizen, and very for- 
tunately her own statisticians — and they are not excelled in the 
world — gave us very good figures as to her pre-war capacity; you 
have to take the question of exports and imports, of course, and 
there is no doubt as to that. And after all is said and done, if you 
have figured on a certain amount each year and have been consider- 
ing the figures of something like $500,000,000 a year to be paid to 
Belgium, you will have to take into consideration all these intangible 
moral considerations that I was attempting to describe a little while 
ago; you have also to remember that Germans are an industrious 
people, accustomed to work. 

Question: Is there any political party or group in Germany which 
Javors as prompt a payment as possible oj the indemnities? 

Answer: I don't know whether there is any pohtical party of 
that kind or not. I am not sufficiently informed as to the internal 
political situation in Germany. I can only say that the German 
financiers who came to Paris — not to Paris itself, but to Versailles — 
the German financial men were all in one accord with the idea that 
the sooner Germany knew what she had to pay the sooner she would 
adapt herself to the situation and the sooner they would be hkely 
to pay it. I have no doubt that even to-night they are figuring on 



482 APPENDIX 

what kind of proposition they should make to Great Britain and 
France on the subject as it has been presented during the past week, 
and there is a great, growing number in Germany that wants the 
thing settled and settled promptly. 

Question: Did the Allies plan to destroy or to maintain Germany's 
economic lije? 

Answer: While, of course, the Allies made no plans to destroy 
Germany's economic Hfe, there were enough men in France who had 
ample justification for wanting to wipe Germany off the map; there 
were enough men there who wanted to see Germany destroyed. 
They knew somebody had to pay for the terrible damage that had 
been caused, and they wanted Germany to pay for it instead of 
themselves. That was not unnatural. But in the course of the 
Peace Conference, in the clauses finally drawn very carefully, word- 
ing was admitted indicating the care and foresight with which the 
Alhes were looking on this question of Germany's maintenance of 
industrial life. I have quoted one or two things on this point. One 
is: "The Reparation Commission is instructed to give due consid- 
eration to such domestic requirements of Germany as it deems essen- 
tial for the maintenance of Germany's economic life." I think that 
answers the question. 

Question: What has Germany paid up to the present time? 

Answer: The exact amount I do not know. What the Repara- 
tion Commission has figured I do not know. Germany's merchant 
fleet has been turned over, its fishing fleet and machinery have been 
turned over; of the initial payment that was to be made, approxi- 
mating $5,000,000,000, therefore, I presume $2,000,000,000 or $3,- 
000,000,000 would be a fair figure; nobody knows but the Reparation 
Commission, but a very substantial sum has been paid in. 

Question : Has more live stock been demanded from Germany than 
she took Jrom her opponents? 

Answer: Not so much, according to the figures furnished to us 
by the experts. Everybody has figured that if the Belgians had 
demanded from Germany as much as she had taken from them, 
and demanded the prompt return of it, it would probably interfere 
so much with Germany's agricultural hfe that she would be crippled 
w agriculturafly. As to the reparations demand on the return of cat- 
^ tie, I regard that demand as reasonable or even moderate. 

Question: Was any attempt made to estimate the damage done in 



APPENDIX 483 

France by Allied as distinguished from German military operations? 
Did the Germans contend that they should pay for only the damage they 
caused? 

Answer: In answering the last question: first, no, I don't think 
so. When the Germans considered our proposals in May, 1919, they 
did, as I remember it, set up some contention that there ought to be 
a careful discrimination made, as to whether it was an Allied shell 
or a German shell that destroyed a certain pig-sty; however, they 
never made much of a contention about it. Speaking by and large, 
there has been no attempt to discriminate on that point in the 
actually devastated districts. Germany swooped through Belgium 
like a cloud of locusts, and did the real damage, while a very frac- 
tional part of the damage might be caused by the retreating Belgian 
army blowing up a few bridges. Perhaps ungenerously we have not 
given quite enough credit to Germany for that. 

Question : Will not the greater thrift, industry, efficiency, selj-denial, 
required for the payment of indemnities, mean a greater, stronger Ger- 
many when the burden passes? 

Answer: I should think so. I should decidedly think so. That 
is a thing that the Allies had to fix; that is a thing that they had to 
contemplate. We discussed that a good many times, and certain of 
the delegates, especially the French, feared that they might push 
the thing so that they would build up a gigantic machine over there 
in Germany, a Frankenstein that would ultimately overwhelm them, 
because of their increased efficiency, but they were willing to take 
the chance. 

Question: What is your opinion oj requiring Germany to pay 
12^2 per cent in exports? 

Answer: I think it is 12 rather than 12^ per cent; however, the 
diflference is trifling. I will answer that in this way: When I first 
saw that scheme proposed, that is, saw the schedule of payments as 
set forth, placing an extra tax of 12 per cent on all of Germany's 
exports, I did not think well of it. I wish, however, to say that it 
was an attempt to get some benefits from Germany's future increased 
prosperity, and so they wanted to gauge it — just as at Paris we tried 
to work on a basis of a maximum or a minimum; if Germany should 
become tremendously prosperous, France wanted to receive more 
damage than if she remained in the doldrums. I did not think very 
well of that tax, however, because it seemed to me it would require 
German exporters to put an additional 12 per cent to cover that 



484 ^ APPENDIX 

tax, which would mean higher prices to the importers throughout 
the world, including the Americans, which would create a sentiment 
and have some effect against the Alhes, throughout the markets of 
the world. One of the French ministers cabled to me an explanation 
referring to the term "exports," claiming that that term was a mis- 
nomer. They were trying to find another basis for figuring repara- 
tion. All they cared for was the total of Germany's exports as a 
basis, and figuring on an additional 12 per cent. There was no rea- 
son why the German exporter should jack up his prices if German 
exports were $10,000,000 in a given year, and then an additional 
tax of 12 per cent were laid on. On the whole, it did not strike me 
as a very feasible thing to do. 

Question: Has Great Britain ever asked that her own debt to the 
United States Government be cancelled? 

Answer: Not to my knowledge. Mr. Austen Chamberlain, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, was reported the other day in the 
papers as saying that they had sounded out the United States Trea- 
sury on the question of certain cancellation of war debts. Of course 
I have no connection with the United States Treasury and do not 
know what conversations took place there in that department of 
this government. However, at Paris there was very frequently a 
suggestion, perfectly philosophical and practical and not in an en- 
treating tone, that the world would be better off" if some of these 
complicated international balances were cleared up; and some of the 
British delegates would inquire whether it would be wise for them 
to write off" all the sums owing to Great Britain from these lesser 
AIKes, amounting to $4,000,000,000. At that time we always felt 
that that was a question beyond our competence; that we could not 
discuss any question of cancellation of war debts or of refunding 
debts or anything of that kind; that would have to be left over until 
a later day for the people of America, through their Congress, to 
determine in their wisdom. On the general question I may say, 
, with the utmost emphasis, that Great Britain never once proposed 
that we should do anything that she would not precede us in doing 
in the way of debt cancellation. 

Question: How did the question of providing food in return for 
German ships bear upon the work oj the Conference? 

Answer: Well, that was quite a moot question at one time, the 
question of providing food in return for German ships. Along in 
the early part of the Conference that was very much discussed and 
very heatedly. You will remember that before the armistice the 



APPENDIX 485 

Allies put in one specific promise, stating that they would try to see 
that Germany was kept from starving; they did not promise to ship 
in so many tons of food, but the plan was for Germany to sign the 
armistice, and then an effort would be made to keep the infants and 
the children and the people of Germany from starving. I was on 
the Civihan Armistice Commission. We wanted to undertake to ' ) 
carry out that implied purpose in good faith. It was a very compli- 
cated situation, because Germany had to have food, but she had to 
pay for that food, and the only thing she could pay for it immedi- 
ately with was gold. She had quite a lot of gold in the Reichsbank. / 
However, the French did not want her to pay out that gold. They / 
did not beheve that she was starving. They wanted her to hold 
on to that gold and turn it over to the Alhes for reparation in due / 
course of time. One solution was that Germany should turn over 
a certain amount of ships in return for food. Some of us, I think 
Mr. George McFadden of your city and myself, went on a very 
interesting mission, first to Spa and then to Brussels, trying to have -/ 
the Germans turn over their ships in payment for food, but the first 
negotiations on the subject came to naught. 

As a matter of fact, because of this contention on the part of some 
of the Allies that German gold should not be turned over, that led 
to a very dramatic scene when we came back from Spa and reported < 
that we had been unable to carry out this plan because one or two 
of the Allies objected to the gold going out. M. Clemenceau, Lloyd 
George, and Colonel House asked me to go into the next room and 
work out some formula — some statement. So we went into another 
room; they locked us in and we worked out a formula by which a 
certain amount of gold was to be sent with the ships. It was handed 
around and Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Colonel House signed it, < 
and it was done. 

XIII 
THE LABOR CLAUSES OF THE TREATY 

February 11, 1921 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY SAMUEL GOMPERS, CHAIRMAN OF THE COM- 
MISSION ON INTERNATIONAL LABOR LEGISLATION 

Question: Could the Labor Charter he inimical to the interests oj 
the United States or the working people of the United States? 

Answer: No. One of the particular features upon which, with 
my associates, I insisted was that no conference or recommendation 



486 APPENDIX 

or convention should recommend to any country or state any con- 
dition of labor lower than the standard which already existed in 
that country. It was the protocol to Article XIX of the report 
which the Labor Legislation Commission presented to the Peace 
Conference. Without that protecting provision the American dele- 
gation to the Peace Conference would have refused to sign it, and 
would have submitted a minority report. The labor provision of 
the Treaty is an absolute protection to the conditions of labor in all 
form and against any attempt to enforce or propose lower standards. 

Question: Is legislation controlling woman and child labor eco- 
nomically possible in Central Europe under present conditions? 

Answer: Until the conditions of Central Europe shall become a 
bit more normal than they are now, it is doubtful whether all the 
provisions of the Labor Charter can be enforced. As soon as prac- 
ticable I think that they will be enforced. There are forty-one na- 
tions in the League, forty-one nations who are a part of Interna- 
tional Labor. There are five nations which are not a part of the 
League and of the Labor Organization or the Labor Office: Russia, 
Turkey, Mexico, Germany, and the United States. We are in 
splendid company. 

Question: How would international agreements on labor standards 
affect employers' interests? 

Answer: They would help to standardize minimum conditions. 
We know that in many countries the labor of human beings is now 
regarded as a commodity; that the human beings performing that 
labor are regarded as so much machinery; that the human side has 
been totally ignored. When the workers in those backward coun- 
tries shall have been raised to a higher standard of economic and 
social and human life, they will take their part in the world's affairs, 
and the establishment of a minimum of standards amongst the low- 
est paid and poorest conditioned workers of the world will help more 
thoroughly to stabilize standards of life and encourage industry and 
commerce in every country. 

Question: Would the Labor Charter act in the direction of inhibit- 
ing or restricting Bolshevism in Europe? 

Answer: Everything that tends toward constructive organization 
is an obstacle to absolute radicalism of all sorts. Every effort made 
by the constructive labor movement of the United States makes 
for the perpetuity of the American Republic. Every attempt sue- 



APPENDIX 487 

cessfully made to weaken or in part to destroy this conservative 
constructive force in our American life makes for Bolshevism. 

Question: Does the word "merely" in the declaration "Labor is 
not a commodity" depreciate the value of the declaration? 

Answer: It does not. I am free to say that when there was pub- 
lished in the newspapers the report that the word "merely" had 
been prefixed to the declaration that the labor of human beings is 
not an article of commerce, I was much perplexed. The newspapers 
did not publish the whole preamble nor the entire declaration, but 
only that the word "merely" had been added as a prefix, and that, 
more than anything else, prompted me to request that a message be 
sent to the President at Paris, and the reply which the President 
returned and the comparison with the text that we have in the 
United States convinced me that the use of the word "merely" had 
no effect other than to strengthen the declaration. For instance, if 
I were to say, "A man is entitled to his rights as a citizen," and then 
added this declaration, "A man is not merely entitled to his rights 
as a citizen, but they must be guaranteed to him," that does not 
weaken the first declaration, but strengthens it. 

Question: What was the attitude of the Japanese and Chinese com- 
missioners concerning the labor provisions — particularly that calling Jor 
a Jorty-eight-hour week and a weekly day of rest? 

Answer: The Japanese commissioners abstained from voting. 
They declared they had no instructions from their government either 
one way or the other. I don't think the Chinese were represented 
in our commission. 

Question: What is a "proper standard oj living"? Is it the same 
Jor any one who works hard as Jor one who loajs? 

Answer: Individually, I should think that the questioner might 
answer for himself. Speaking as for the people, I should say that 
a proper standard of living should conform to the American concept 
of comfort, to the time and civihzation in which we live; that changes 
with every day, with every year, with every decade, and the stand- 
ard of hfe as among America's workers to-day compared to the 
standard of life of ten years ago, will show quite a transformation. 
There are contributions to our comfort and convenience, to the 
standards of life, which are now of every-day use and which were 
practically unknown in the homes of the working people in our coun- 
try a decade or two ago. It is a condition of constant transition. 



f 



488 APPENDIX 

and I hope that the standards will continue to increase and improve, 
and that America shall go onward and forward as the leader in the 
civilization of the world. 

Question: What was the attitude of Mr. Lloyd George and M. 
Clemenceau toward the labor provisions? 

Answer: Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau were ardent sup- 
y>. porters not only of the Treaty but of the League of Nations and of 
the Labor Charter. 

Question: Is it likely that the provisions of the Labor Charter will 
be applied in the countries under mandatories? 

Answer: We have every hope and behef that they will at the 
earhest possible practical opportunity. 

Question: 0/ what practical use is " Labor* s Bill oj Rights" to 
American labor? 

Answer: It is the enunciation of purposes and principles. One 
might just as well ask: "What is the Declaration of Independence 
worth to the people of the United States?" It has done much to 
inspire the American people, and it has done more — it has helped to 
spread the Gospel of Freedom and Justice throughout the world. It 
may be questioned whether the provision in the Labor Treaty will 
have any practical result upon the people of the United States 
directly. As I have already indicated, its greatest value is to help 
the people of those most backward countries that they may take 
their stand in their own battles, and voice the hopes and ideals for 
self-achievement in their own lives and in their own country. You 
cannot improve the standards of life among a people in any other 
country but what it will react advantageously upon the people of our 
own country. 

Question: Why was not the United States represented by delegates 
at the first International Labor Conference held in Washington in Octo- 
ber, 1919? 

Answer: For the very good reason that we had not ratified the 
Treaty, the League of Nations, nor the Labor Treaty. We were no 
party to it and not entitled to delegates. We were in this anom- 
alous position: The government of the United States invited other 
governments to send delegates to Washington to attend the Inter- 
national Labor Conference in October, 1919, and here we were hosts 
of guests and yet had not the right to say a word or participate in 



APPENDIX 489 

the conference. I was invited to participate in the conference, I 
suppose, as the executive officer of the labor movement of our coun- 
try and as President of the International Labor Commission, and 
I was given the right to speak but not the right to vote. I at- 
tended one of the meetings of that conference at Washington, and 
upon one of those subjects under discussion I availed myself of my 
right to speak, and did speak, and at the conclusion of my address, 
the question was put to a vote and thoughtlessly I raised my hand. 
Then it suddenly occurred to me that I was trespassing far beyond 
my rights in that meeting. The indignity of it all was too appalling 
for me to remain or attend another conference. 

The reason that we were not represented there was because we 
had no right to be represented, because we did not ratify the Treaty, 
and may I say this: I am deeply impressed by the keen attention 
which you have given to my address, as well as to the answers which 
I have tried to give to the questions propounded. I think there is a 
great service to be performed by the organization which is conducting 
these lectures. There ought to be a better understanding among 
the people of the United States of what the provisions of the Treaty 
of Versailles mean. I decline to accept as final the declaration that 
the votes cast last November formed a declaration on the Treaty of 
Peace. (Prolonged applause.) Men have said that the United 
States is so far away from the other countries. Is she? One hun- 
dred and fifty years ago we were far away from Europe. We now 
travel to Europe from the United States in six days. That, one 
hundred and fifty years ago, took over seven weeks. We have seen 
that the United States transferred 2,000,000 of our American boys, 
with all the accoutrements and necessities of war, across the seas 
within a year. We know that we can communicate with the other 
lands and with the remotest -parts of the world in a few minutes by 
cable and wireless. All our industry, all our commerce, all our 
social, political, and industrial fives are now so intermingled with 
the world that we can no longer regard ourselves as absolutely apart 
from the struggles, the progress, and the travail of the world. In- 
stead of the world's affairs being decided without our people, the 
Government of the United States being unrepresented, we ought to 
have a vote and a voice and influence, and would have, if the people 
had but the sense and determination to say that the Treaty shall be 
ratified by the Senate of the United States. 



490 APPENDIX 

XV 
THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE GREAT WAR 

March 4, 1921 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY ADMIRAL HENRY T. MAYO, COMMANDER-IN- 
CHIEF OF THE ATLANTIC FLEET 

Question: Why were the British at first doubtful regarding the North 
Sea Mine Barrage project? 

Answer: The particular objection was at first advanced in the 
Grand Fleet. The commander-in-chief did not like the idea of put- 
ting a mine barrage across the North Sea on account of interference 
with shipping. He thought it might be quite as dangerous to the 
friend as to the foe. In the Admiralty they were a little doubtful 
of success because it was a new invention. I think they were some- 
what doubtful of our ability to produce the mines in sufficient num- 
ber. Undoubtedly, having never heard of mine operations by the 
United States, I think they were rather doubtful of our ability to 
lay these mines successfully. 

Question: Was there any reason for not rushing naval vessels to 
Europe as soon as the United States entered the war? 

Answer: To answer that question, I think it is necessary to refer 
to the condition that existed before the war began. The whole de- 
sire of the Administration and, no doubt, the country, was to avoid 
being drawn into the war. Naturally, there was a reluctance on the 
part of the Administration to take any steps which would indicate 
fear on their part that they were going to be drawn into the war. 
Some of us in the Navy were rather disappointed that the conditions 
were as they then existed, but we were restricted. We would have 
been glad to have had an opportunity to have gone into it sooner. 
They did a lot of things that we did not know anything about. 
However, preparations were not made, except such as could be 
made in the Navy Department by the various Bureaus without 
attracting attention. A good many things were done in Washing- 
ton of which the Department of the Navy was not cognizant, for all 
of which we are very thankful. After the war began it was the 
belief of the Navy Department that the United States fleet was the 
only reserve force which could be depended upon to face the Ger- 
mans with in case of disaster to the British Grand Fleet, which might 



APPENDIX 491 

take place at any time, although, of course, it was highly improbable. 
For this reason, up to the time when we went into the war, and 
for some time afterward, the desire was to keep our fleet intact until 
it could be determined just what the course of events would be. 
The German submarines were being most successfully operated. I 
think April was the big month, in 191 8, of the submarine operation. 
There was a natural fear abroad, which extended to the United 
States, that they were going to be even more successful, and there 
was a fear that after a while supplies of material would fail. There 
was a feehng that they did not want a single ship over there which 
would be dependent upon their resources. That was another factor 
in preventing us from rushing ships over there. When I visited 
Europe in 191 7 I found, especially over in France, that there was 
very great fear that we would rush men over there without accom- 
panying them with supplies to maintain them. One French official 
said to me: "You must maintain your own men; you must not send 
them over faster than you can send suppHes." There was one ex- 
ception, and that exception was General Foch, who said: "What we 
want is men, men, men"; but he was different. 

Question: How did the British trace the German submarines Jrom 
the German ports? 

Answer: By excellent radio work and by the excellent men 
assigned to do that work. The German submarines had the habit 
of reporting at leasts once a day, often twice, and they supposed 
that it was impossible for anybody to decipher their code. But the 
British were very successful in deciphering their code; no matter 
how many times they changed it, it would only be a few days before 
they had it. So expert were the British radio operators they would 
even recognize the operators on the German submarines, and deter- 
mine what submarine they were attached to. I heard one of those 
fellows talking, and he said, when he touched the radio: "That is 
U-151," or "That is U-boat No. 63." After a time their direction 
finders became so acute that they would determine the direction 
from which the signals were sent, and got cross-bearings with which 
to fix the position of the German submarine absolutely. 

Question: Was the disappearance of the "Cyclops'* ever cleared up? 
Answer: No, not to my knowledge. Nothing has been heard of 
the Cyclops. 

Question: Is it true that President Wilson originated the convoy 
system? 



492 APPENDIX 

Answer: Possibly. The convoy system had been advocated by 
many, and had been opposed by a great many, especially in England. 
The United States Navy Department was not impressed with the 
idea at first, seeing the many difficulties. It was realized by them 
that going in convoy, the convoy would have to go at the slowest 
speed of the slowest ship, and it was a disadvantage to those who 
had faster boats. They also thought that it was very difficult to 
get the number of officers to do the extra work, but these ideas 
nearly all disappeared when the convoy system was tried. Admiral 
Sims was very insistent on it in his recommendation; so we tried it 
and it was finally adopted within a month after the first convoy 
started. However, I don't know that President Wilson ordered it. 

Question: What effect is the airplane going to have on the battleship? 

Answer: If an airplane has a big enough bomb and drops it on 
a battleship it is going to make it very interesting for the battleship; 
but I don't believe that we have got to the point where a bomb 
dropped from an airplane will destroy a battleship or damage her 
very much, because the bombs will not go through her decks and 
will not disturb the turret. There is not one built that can go 
through a turret of a ship. One must drop these bombs from a 
place where they cannot be fired at from the battleship. General 
Mitchell, Chief of the Army Aviation Forces, says his planes can 
drop bombs on battleships without any trouble at all. Possibly 
they can, but I think it would be a very difficult thing. In spite of 
the fact that he says that an airplane is a very hard thing to hit, I 
think he would find it very diff'erent if they ran up against a barrage 
which has an accepted method of deahng with an airplane attack, 
or if they were disturbed by airplanes on the other side. It is a very 
difficult matter to drop a bomb from an airplane at a great height 
that will strike an object even as large as a super-dreadnaught. 
There are some computations that I heard of a short time ago which 
were to the effect that a plane at a height of 6,000 feet would have 
one-half a second of time in which the operator must decide in his 
mind whether or not he is at the proper point where he must release 
the bomb in order to make a hit. I do not think that there is any 
disposition to attempt to underestimate the dangers from an aviation 
force; on the contrary, their possibilities are reahzed, and I think it 
is the purpose in Congress and elsewhere to give it every possible 
chance to develop, and do everything necessary to be done to get 
what is possible out of aircraft of all kinds. But I am one of the 
conservative old cranks who think the battleships are not dead yet. 



APPENDIX 493 

Question: How Jar do you believe it wise for the United States to 
go in a policy oj disarmament? 

Answer: If there could be a condition of the Iamb and the lion 
lying down together so that we do without armies entirely, we would 
arrive at an ideal condition. If nations could be as safe without 
any armament as you are in the streets of Philadelphia without a 
gun, I feel then that it might be, and that it would be a desirable 
condition. But it is impossible. Nations, like individuals, are self- 
ish. They don't trust each other. And until the day comes when 
they do trust each other completely, armament must continue. 
This idea of disarmament is not new; it has been considered for over 
one hundred years. At the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, the subject 
was brought up and strenuous efforts were made to arrive at an 
agreement on disarmament, or for limitations of arms. However, 
no conclusion could be reached. No nation wants to give up any- 
thing. All through the nineteenth century there were frequent 
international conferences which succeeded in accomplishing a great 
deal in ameliorating war troubles and in arriving at international 
agreements to prohibit the weapons of war, but never any agreement 
as to the limitations of armament. In 1899, at the instance of the 
Emperor of Russia, the first Hague Conference was called, with the 
express idea of arriving at some international agreement for limita- 
tion of armament or for the limitation of budgets to be expended 
for armament. I have recently gone pretty carefully over the 
reports of the proceedings of that conference, and the discussions 
were very illuminating. They show that nobody wanted to give up 
anything that they had. They were perfectly wiHing to let the 
other fellow cut down, but they wanted to hold everything they had 
which would give them an advantage. They arrived finally at the 
conclusion "That the various nations should seriously consider the 
subject of International limitations of armament, to be brought up 
at some future time." In 1907, at the second Hague Conference, 
this subject was brought up again by the representatives of Great 
Britain, seconded by the United States and France; the only result 
was the adoption again of a resolution, saying, "that in view of the 
material increase in military forces in the various nations, and es- 
pecially in the expenditures for military purposes," they again recom- 
mended that the government seriously consider this subject. I don't 
think there has ever been any limitation of armament by agreement, 
except in one case: You remember that history tells us that there 
was a limitation of the army of Prussia in 1807, at the treaty with 
Napoleon, when Prussia was to limit her army to 42,000 men. 



494 APPENDIX 

Nevertheless, in 1813 Prussia uncovered a trained army which was 
established in spite of the previous agreement. Men had been put in 
under short enlistment service under which they were trained by the 
thousands. In 1902 there was an agreement limiting the naval arma- 
ment between Chili and the Argentine. This lasted for five years. 
At the expiration of that period it was not renewed, and they pro- 
ceeded to spend as much money as they could to get hold of and to 
continue naval armament. In 1913 the subject of a naval holiday 
between Great Britain and Germany was broached in Parliament by 
Winston Churchill, and, as shown by his speeches in Parliament, he 
was perfectly willing to have a naval hoHday, providing England 
could retain all the advantages she had; it was never taken up of- 
ficially. It is a grand idea, if it were possible for nations to get to- 
gether and agree that none of them would carry a gun. It would be 
a splendid thing to do, but they won't agree. If they said that there 
should be a Hmitation of armament, when they get together to act 
on the details of it, they strike so many snags that there is no con- 
clusion arrived at. 

Question: What part did the French 7iavy perjorm in the war? 

Answer: The French, in conjunction with the Italian forces, had 
practically charge of the German and Austrian operations in the 
Mediterranean. On the Atlantic and on the North Sea, of course, 
the British predominated. The French also took part in the con- 
voy operations with their cruisers, and in the patrol of the Atlantic 
on their own coast, and of course engaged there in mine-sweeping 
operations. I think the French did everything they could have 
been expected to do and they are entitled to the very greatest com- 
mendation. They worked their cruisers until they were ready to 
fall apart. They ran very little to torpedo boats, and it was for 
that reason that they made their first call on us to help them out 
in that line. Incidentally, I would hke to tell you something in 
regard to that. Admiral Grasset called for small craft and asked 
that they be rushed. In answering this request our Secretary of the 
Navy was conservative; he would not definitely say what we could 
send and when. He did promise, however, that we would do the 
best we could. In the fall of 19 18 I met Admiral Grasset, and in 
talking to him about naval issues at a lunch one day I said to him: 
"Admiral, do you remember your request and what you told us in 
regard to rushing small craft over when the war first began, and we 
sent them? Tell me how you think it turned out." The Admiral 
said: "You did far more than we had any idea was possible." 



APPENDIX 495 



XVI 
THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT 

December lo, 1920 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY GENERAL TASKER HOWARD BLISS, REP- 
RESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SUPREME WAR 
COUNCIL AND COMMISSIONER PLENIPOTENTIARY 

Question : General, did you say that each nation will maintain its 
navy? Do you mean that the United States should maintain what it 
has and stop building? 

Answer: No, what I mean is this. If an international Confer- 
ence should be held and the American representatives should be 
asked to make a proposition, I think that it would not be wise for 
them to propose something at the outset that would almost cer- 
tainly be rejected. I, therefore, should think it better for them to 
pass over, or defer to the last, any proposition relating to fortifica- 
tions and navies, because those elements in international armaments 
are not the most dangerous menace to international peace. Hereto- 
fore, nations have not been able to accomplish anything in the way 
of a limitation of armaments because some one of them has always 
proposed, and insisted upon, at the very beginning, something that 
the others will not accept. I think that in this matter the nations 
must proceed step by step, and the first thing to do is to find out 
something that is practicable that they will all agree to. They have 
all maintained that the system of the "Nation in Arms," which 
was inaugurated by Germany, has been the cause of all the excessive 
armaments; and that the last war was fought in order to destroy 
that system. Because, they held, that until it was destroyed in Ger- 
many it could not be destroyed elsewhere. If they are now agreed 
upon anything it is to do something in the way of limiting the ex- 
cessive land armaments. This, therefore, is the first step that it 
seems to me ought to be proposed. If, as a result of that, the con- 
stant threat of world war can be minimized, then, it is possible, the 
nations will of their own accord take measures to reduce their ex- 
penses in maintaining the other elements of national armaments. 
I do not think that for an indefinite time to come we need concern 
ourselves with the question of land fortifications. That is purely 
a domestic question. Land fortifications will not hurt any one un- 
less some one runs up against them. The fear that now exists, in 
some countries, of invasion by the army of some other country is 



496 APPENDIX 

due to the existence of great military establishments on land. It 
is this which largely causes some of the nations to maintain great 
navies. They are afraid that an enemy's navy may convoy trans- 
ports carrying a great army to attack them. If this latter fear can 
be removed or minimized the question of the navies will take care 
of itself. Nations will not long maintain navies of excessive strength 
if they are once relieved of the fear of attack by great foreign armies. 
To sum it all up, there are three things which constitute the elements 
of national armaments: 

I St. Land fortifications. 

2nd. Navies. 

3rd. The land military establishments resulting from the doc- 
trine of the "Nation in Arms." 

The first two of these are the cheapest and constitute the least 
menace to international peace. These questions, therefore, in an 
international Conference to discuss the limitation of armaments 
could well be discussed last, or left to take care of themselves. But 
if we cannot come to some reasonable agreement in respect to the 
overweening land military establishments, there is little hope of 
accomplishing anything. 

Question: In your opinion do you consider the submarine was an 
effective means of warfare during the late World War? 

Answer: In the last war, I should say, the effect of the submarine 
was like that of a two-edged sword, — cutting both ways. It was 
very effective from the point of view of the Central Powers in that 
it destroyed milhons of tons of shipping that could otherwise, have 
been used in the transportation of troops, food-supplies and military 
supplies of all kinds for the Allies. Its effect was against the Central 
Powers in that its ruthless use stimulated the passions of the Allies 
for a more bitter and prolonged war and, ultimately, by creating at 
least one more active enemy in causing the United States to declare 
war. In every war new agencies of destruction are introduced. Some 
of these agencies prove at once so effective that they are immediately 
adopted by both sides in the war. Some of them prove to be ineffec- 
tive, adding merely to the bitterness of the struggle, but really ac- 
compHshing nothing in deciding the war. Some of them prove to 
be not very effective while, at the same time, experts in such things 
are satisfied that by further improvement they may become very 
effective in the next war. These latter agencies are, therefore, likely 
to be legalized and developed and their use become habitual in suc- 
ceeding wars. Even those who think that the submarine was not 



APPENDIX 497 

very effective in the last war know that it developed possibilities 
of effectiveness, after further improvement, in future wars and that, 
therefore, the submarine has come to stay. In the same way, air- 
planes and tanks developed an increasing effectiveness which has 
caused them to be recognized as necessary parts of national arma- 
ments for the future. Limiting your question to the submarine, I 
have no doubt that this weapon will be an enormously powerful 
agency of defense for use by the United States in protecting our coast 
and harbors against attack. 

Question: With new developments, coming out oj this war, such 
as the submarine and airplane, will their use make it more difficult or 
less difficult, if we were not prepared in the United States to defend our^ 
selves against an aggressive nation which is better prepared? 

Answer: If your question means this: Can the United States 
safely neglect preparation in time of peace and, in case of sudden 
attack by a powerful, aggressive and prepared enemy, find some 
safe agency of defense developed by the recent war? I think that 
the question should be answered in the negative. So long as war is 
possible or probable, safety in defense will consist in being equally 
well prepared with the possible aggressor. At the same time, I think 
that the last war developed certain agencies for defense that may 
enable an unprepared nation to more quickly prepare itself to meet 
an emergency, but these agencies are, for the most part, those that 
will be developed in a great industrial nation. All of the chemical 
agencies that are used in modern war can be prepared relatively 
quickly in establishments that are engaged in peaceful productions. 
If such establishments exist in great numbers in one country and 
not in another, they give the former a great relative advantage over 
the latter. In the same way a nation which, in time of peace^ should 
develop the use of airplanes for commercial purposes would find it- 
self on the approach of war already provided with a very powerful 
agency for defense. One of the great advantages of Germany in 
the recent war was the fact that so many of her peaceful estabhsh- 
ments could be rapidly diverted to the production of material for 
war. From this point of view, your question would be answered in 
the affirmative, provided the United States developed in time of 
peace the industries which could rapidly supply in large numbers 
such things as submarines, airplanes, tanks, and chemical products 
for our defense. Even in that case our safety would have to depend 
upon our relative isolation, which might give us time to divert these 
industries to the manufacture of material for war. But if war is to 



498 APPENDIX 

come, the only real assurance of defense is to be prepared for it in 
advance. 

Question: How Jar or hf what means do you think we must clear 
the ground of Bolshevism, before we can go on to a realization oj peace? 

Answer: If Bolshevism were to be limited to a governmental 
theory and were to be confined to Russia, I think we could clear the 
ground right away. Bolshevism is a theory which is propagated in 
two ways: first, by written and spoken propaganda and, second, 
by force of arms. When it is propagated in the first way, it can be 
kept out of a country only by fighting it with a similar propaganda, 
— by convincing the people that it is not a good thing and that some- 
thing else is better. It is when Bolshevism is propagated in the second 
way that it becomes a menace to international peace. If the Bolshe- 
viks of Russia attack another country in order to spread its doctrines, 
or for any other purpose, that other country must be prepared to 
resist it by force. And I recognize this as one of the unfortunate 
things that may delay a general limitation of armaments. But there 
is no use of talking about stopping by force of arms what you might 
call a peaceful propaganda of Bolshevism as it comes out of Russia. 
Armies cannot keep the theory of Bolshevism from penetrating the 
United States or England or France or from any other country to 
which the adherents of that theory want to carry it. At one time 
during the Peace Conference there was some talk of estabhshing a 
military sanitary cordon from the Baltic to the Black Sea to stop 
the progress of Bolshevism. Of course, every one knew that that 
would not stop the progress of the idea of Bolshevism although it 
might stop the progress of Bolsheviks. When this idea of Bolshevism 
penetrates any country and the result of this penetration is to bring 
on internal disorder, perhaps even revolution, the government of 
that country may have to fight it by force. In the course of my dis- 
cussion I have recognized this possibifity as one of the things that 
will require each country to maintain a mihtary force for the preser- 
vation of order within its own boundaries. No government can be 
expected to contemplate the possibifity of its own destruction. It 
must have power to maintain itself, but that is a very diff'erent thing 
from having the excessive armament necessary for international 
aggression and war. So far as the general question is concerned, 
our main hope fies in the destruction of Bolshevism from its own 
internal forces tending to disrupt it. 

Question: Do you not think, General, that treaty arrangements be- 
tween great powers will be more efficacious in maintaining peace than 



APPENDIX 499 

disarmament? That is, an alliance such as existed before 1914? 7/ 
England had united with France and Russia at the outset, would not 
that have been more efficacious than disarmament? 

Answer: If all of the great Powers entered Into an alliance for 
the purpose of maintaining peace, it would doubtless be effective 
so long as the alliance continued, but who can possibly maintain 
that, as long as such an alliance existed, it would be necessary to 
support the present excessive military estabhshments ? As a matter 
of fact such an alliance has never existed, and there is no reason in 
history for believing that it can exist. These great armaments ex- 
isted because of certain national policies which caused the great 
Powers to be afraid of each other. If these pohcies can be modified, 
armaments would undoubtedly be reduced, because no nation will 
bear the burden longer than it thinks absolutely necessary. So long 
as nations have mutually antagonistic policies they cannot be united 
in a common alhance, but they almost certainly will be united in two 
groups of alliances and that is the thing which I have pointed out 
as the primary cause of the last war. The nations whose pohcies 
were, for the time at least, the more sympathetic with each other 
united together. And that brought them into two groups whose 
policies were more or less antagonistic to each other. But assume 
that such an alliance as your question presupposes were in existence. 
It is perfectly evident that as those nations differ in wealth and in 
population some of them — if they are all armed to the extent of 
their abihty — will have bigger armies and navies than the others. 
When any important question comes up which they must settle 
among themselves, how can there be any possibility of peaceful dis- 
cussion of it so long as they are armed to the teeth? We all know 
very well that in the recent history of Europe the time came more 
than once when, in the so-called peaceful discussion of some ques- 
tion of common interest and affecting the common peace, Germany 
placed her sword in the balance and weighed down the scales of jus- 
tice in her favor. Or, take a more famiHar illustration and suppose 
that I and a half dozen other gentlemen here were to assemble about 
this table to discuss some very important questions affecting all of 
us. All of us know that in a fair discussion each one must be pre- 
pared to give and take, but suppose that as we sit down at the 
table you see the handle of a pistol sticking out of my hip-pocket 
and I see the handle of a butcher knife sticking out of yours, is it 
not evident that the first question that will be asked will be: "What 
are we going to do with these arms? will you lay your knife down if 
I put my pistol down?" If either of us says "No," is it not evident 



500 APPENDIX 

that there is an end to our discussion? Is it not evident that in an 
alliance of the great Powers the first question will be: "How can we 
limit our armaments to such a point that we will have no special 
fear of each other?" It may be that we will still have our scraps 
but no one of us would endure that situation very long so long as 
any one of us had the power to lay his pistol on the table and say: 
"Gentlemen, there is my final argument." Suppose that Germany 
and the Central Powers were in such an alhance just before the be- 
ginning of the recent war. What would prevent them from saying, 
if they so desired: "This alliance will not agree to our doing certain 
things that we want to do; we are armed to the teeth; we beheve 
that we are stronger than the rest of the alhance and can whip it, 
and we intend to do so." That is exactly what they did do and they, 
or any other nations, will continue to do the same thing as long as 
they feel that they are able to enforce their will. 

Question: General Bliss, was any effort made at any of the different 
peace conferences at Paris to recognize the reduction of national arma- 
ment to the lowest point consistent with national safety? 

Answer: It was recognized in Article VIII, second chapter of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations. Again it was recognized 
in the Preamble to the mihtary terms of peace with Germany. 

Question: If one Nation should refuse to disarm, how could you 
compel it? 

Answer: It has not been suggested that the United States should 
absolutely disarm, but should only hmit its armament within reason- 
able hmits. In answer to your question I should say that this ques- 
tion of limitation of armaments is of serious concern to the great 
Powers alone, which are small in number. The hope of getting the 
consent of these to some reasonable hmitation hes in their utter ex- 
haustion from the last war and the universal dread of a similar one 
in the future. If any one of these great Powers should positively 
refuse to consider the question of any hmitation of its armament, 
it would be equivalent to a declaration that it proposes to carry out 
its national pohcies by force of arms, if necessary. There would 
at least be one good result from an international Conference on this 
subject, even if it did nothing more than to elicit such a declaration 
from one of the great Powers, and that is this: we would then know 
which one is to be the next Germany, and we would the more cheer- 
fully pay our taxes to be ready to destroy it. In short, I see no hope 
except from a common agreement among the five great powers. I 



APPENDIX 501 

have no specific proposition to advance as to any particular scheme 
for a limitation of armaments. The main thing that I want to im- 
press upon you is the necessity of promptly holding an international 
Conference on this subject, composed of the most far-seeing states- 
men. There is no doubt that such statesmen want to do something 
and our main hope is in getting them together while that spirit is 
strong in them. 

Question: Is not the practical result of your proposition likely to 
lead to the control of the world by England and America through their 
navies? 

Answer: If the United States and Great Britain wanted to enter 
into a formal alliance for the control of the world, they doubtless 
could accomphsh a great deal in that direction. Ultimately, it would 
be the ruin of both of them. If they have the slightest intention of 
doing what your question implies, you can be sure that they will 
not put any limitation on their armaments. It is for you, as an 
American, to say what our attitude on that question shall be. If 
in the last resort it is our wicked purpose to control the world, there 
would be at least some financial advantage in doing it with navies 
alone rather than with the superadded cost of armies. But, speak- 
ing seriously, I do not think that there is any danger of navies alone, 
to whomsoever they may belong, dominating the world. No navy 
alone has conquered any territory. It has to be supported by mili- 
tary forces to do this. The Enghsh Navy by itself has not interfered 
with the lawful trade of any other country. Nor has the American 
Navy done so; nor will it do so. And, if there is any one lesson to 
be learned from the recent world war, it is this: the world as a whole 
will not endure its domination by any one Power or combination of 
them. The world will fight to prevent it and destroy that combina- 
tion just as certainly as we destroyed the combination of the Central 
Powers whose object, also, was world-domination. As I have al- 
ready said so often, in one form of words or another, if the 
great Powers still intend to pursue the phantom of world-domina- 
tion, there is no hope of limiting the armaments that they think 
necessary for that purpose. The world will then have to continue 
the system which has already brought it to the verge of ruin and 
we can do nothing more than pray God that our civilization will 
continue to stand the strain. 

Question: General, do you think such a preposition would be re- 
ceived cordially by Europe? 



502 



APPENDIX 



Answer: I do not know how the national leaders, who are in- 
fluenced by their secret knowledge of their national policies, would 
receive it, but I am sure that the vast mass of the peoples would 
receive it cordially. 

Question: In your opinion, don*t you think the time will be hast- 
ened toward disarmament if the United States should get into this agree- 
ment with the nations? 

Answer: I am not quite sure what you mean by "getting into 
this agreement with the nations." If you mean getting into an agree- 
ment with the nations in respect to a hmitation of their armaments, 
of course I beHeve that the solution of the problem will be hastened. 
None of the great Powers will agree to do anything unless they all 
agree to do it. If the United States does not enter into an agreement 
with the other Powers on this subject, there will be no limitation of 
armaments. On the other hand, if the United States makes such 
a proposition and demands its fair consideration, I believe that all 
will accede to it as far as it is possible. In fact, I believe the solu- 
tion is largely in the hands of the United States. We will hasten 
it by making the first step toward the agreement. The United States 
should take advantage of its influence, which is enormous at this 
moment, to demand that the nations sit down and talk the matter 
over. We, and the other great Powers, have been spending since 
the armistice more money on our military establishments than ever 
before in time of peace. What are we and they doing this for? We 
are doing it because we still profess to be afraid of each other. If 
this fear is not, in its entirety, well-founded neither we nor they want 
to spend so much money for this purpose; if we find that it is well- 
founded, we want to go ahead with our preparations and spend even 
more money. If we can have a fair Conference on this subject we 
and they may find out that it is not necessary to spend so much for 
such a purpose, and we may rest assured that as soon as the common 
people should believe that it is not necessary the money will not be 
forthcoming for this purpose. I believe that it will be possible for 
wise statesmen of the United States to make some proposition which, 
when known and understood by the common peoples of the great 
Powers, will result in its acceptance and in a material relief from 
present burdens as well as a materially increased assurance of future 
peace. The United States can materially hasten this movement. 

Question: In view of Germany's constant effort to evade the pro- 
visions of the treaty in furnishing coal and rolling-stock, etc., how can 
you rely on her professions and on her promises? 



APPENDIX 503 

Answer: In answering that question I shall state, first of all, that 
I am not prepared to accept the extreme view that there Is a constant 
effort on the part of Germany to avoid the provisions of the treaty, 
— at least In so far as those provisions concern the subject that we 
are talking about to-night. The despatches in the daily press, com- 
ing from all kinds of sources, are enough to show that, even outside 
of Germany, there Is no unanimity of belief that all of these pro- "tC 
visions can^be complied with at the time contemplated by the treaty. 
Nevertheless, in regard to the provisions that at this moment con- 
cern us, I am satisfied, from Inquiries of all those who are in a posi- / 
tion to know, that the provisions relating to disarmament have been 
carried out as rapidly as could reasonably be expected and, of course, 
that is the thing of the greatest Importance. No one supposes that 
Germany or any other beaten enemy will cheerfully and gladly com-> 
ply with onerous conditions of peace. The main thing is to be as- 
sured that she cannot fight in order to avoid comphance with the , 
treaty, and her Inability to fight depends entirely upon the success 
of her disarmament. The recent official report made by the French 
Prime Minister to the Chamber of Deputies shows that this dis- ^ 
armament has been very satisfactorily completed. When you think 
of the amount of armament that the Germans surrendered at the 
time of the armistice, the still greater amount that was abandoned 
by them in the disorganization of their army immediately following 
the armistice, and the vast amounts now officially reported to have 
been surrendered for destruction in compliance with the terms of 
the treaty, and when you think that all German arms-factories are 
under observation of inter-allied military commissions, it is impos- 
sible to beheve that there Is the material necessary to equip a Ger- 
man army for an international war. The French Prime Minister 
has reported that the disarmament has proceeded in a satisfactory "^ 
manner and as rapidly as could be expected. Much of that material 
was scattered aff over Germany and It has been a long process, nat- 
urally, to get possession of it In order to destroy It. Large inter- 
alhed military commissions are and have been travelling all over j 
Germany, and it is impossible that anything really worth speaking^ 
of has escaped their attention. Of course, I am not now speaking 
of Germany's failure to comply with any provision relating to repara- 
tion or anything of that sort. I am speaking only of her ability to 
evade compliance with "her professions and her promises" by force 
of arms, and I think this ability has become a negligible quantity. 
Of course, Germany Is not doing anything in the way of comphance 
with the treaty because she Hkes It; I don't know of any defeated 



504 APPENDIX 

nation that has ever done so. I am amazed that they have made 
the progress which they have in accomplishing the reahzation of 
the mihtary conditions that we imposed on her. It would take a 
long time merely to read to you what those conditions are. I do 
not think that the average audience has a reahzation of what it is 
that Germany is required to do; and I think that in realizing the 
particular conditions which make it impossible for her to engage, 
with any hope of success, in an international war she has done very 
well thus far. If the Allies are determined to impose their will upon 
Germany in respect to the other provisions of the treaty — those 
relating to reparations, etc., — they have the full power necessary 
to do so. As I have already pointed out to you, while there now 
may be millions of trained soldiers in Germany she will have no arms 
to put in their hands; while the Allies, also with millions of trained 
soldiers, have a great abundance of all the material necessary for 
war. 

XVII 
THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 

March ii, 1921 

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY DAVID HUNTER MILLER, LEGAL ADVISER TO 
AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION 

Question: Was Clemenceau in Javor of the League of Nations or 
not? 

Answer: I would say that Clemenceau was in favor of the League, 
but without much confidence in it. He beheved in the balance of 
power; but I cannot conceive of a balance of power unless there be 
power on each side, and one does not like to think of the existence 
of a balance of power at the present time. 

Question: Do you think that the League of Nations has a real 
existence without the United States as a part? 

Answer: Well, we are writing notes to it about Yap I Whether 
the League could finally succeed if the United States continued to 
stay out, I think nobody could answer with certitude. My personal 
opinion is in the affirmative; I think it is going to last, for the reason 
that the League of Nations at the present time holds a place in the 
scheme of things in the world in regard to which this may certainly 
be said : that place must be held either by the League of Nations or 



APPENDIX 



505 



by something else for which we have no precedent whatever, and 
no basis for believing in its possibility. 

Question: What do you say to the criticism that the League of 
Nations is political rather than legal? 

Answer: Well, I take it that that question relates to the Inter- 
national Court. The Court is a part of the League. I do not see 
how in any international structure a court can fill the whole place. 
I think the court fills a great place in the world, but there are many 
disputes and questions between countries which are political, and 
for the adjustment of which there must be some political machinery; 
so I shall answer the question in the language of Senator Root, who, 
in speaking of the "political" side of the League, said: * "It would 
be a sad thing if this opportunity for the establishment of such a 
safeguard against future wars should be lost." 

Question: Would the present occupation of Germany be necessary 
ij the United States had signed the Peace Treaty? 

Answer: In my opinion, No. I do not think that the Treaty of 
Peace has ever really been tried. It was drafted with the theory 
that the United States would ratify it, and, if they had, I think the 
situation in Europe and the situation here would be very different. 

Question: Is the League, in your opinion, stronger or weaker to-day 
than when it first met last Jail? 

Answer: The meeting of the Assembly last fall did not end until 
about the middle of December. I do not think that the period 
which has elapsed has made very much difference. The next phase 
of the League, it seems to me, will come along two lines — its discus- 
sions with the United States of the questions regarding Mesopotamia 
and Yap, and the situation developed at the second meeting of the 
Assembly next September. 

Question: Is it true that the French did not want Article X in the 
Treaty? 

Answer: I have tried to describe what France did want in the 
Covenant. In the discussions of the League of Nations Commis- 
sion, the French certainly never at all opposed Article X, but rather 
favored it, and the final clause of Article X, as it now reads, was 
proposed and adopted on account of the views of the French and 
with their approbation. 

^Letter of Senator Root of March 29, 19 19. 



5o6 APPENDIX 

Question: How much influence had General Smuts in the formation 
oj ideas for drafting the League of Nations? 

Answer: Undoubtedly he had considerable influence, but it is 
extremely difficult to weigh that influence. You have the general 
idea of a League of Nations which goes back through a great many 
minds, and it is almost impossible to say just where any particular 
idea originated and in whose mind. 

Question: Is it true that President Wilson stood in the way of sign- 
ing the Peace Treaty with Germany by Christmas, 1918? 

Answer: I might answer that question No, but it is fair to go a 
httle farther — whether or not a peace treaty could have been brought 
about with Germany by Christmas, 191 8, is very doubtful. Colonel 
House wanted to try it and the President did not put any stone in 
his way at all; but one great drawback was that Mr. Lloyd George 
would not stay in Paris because the elections in Great Britain were 
going on; there are different views as to whether it could have been 
done or not if Mr. Lloyd George had stayed, but it certainly could 
not have been done without him. 

Question: What part will the League of Nations play in settling 
the present trouble over Germany's refusal to agree to the indemnity? 

Answer: None, I think; it is a question of reparations, and lies 
between the Alhed and Associated Powers and Germany. 

Question: Is there any way by which the United States can now 
join the League of Nations without the Senate's ratifying both Covenant 
and Treaty with Germany? Can the United States adhere to the Cov- 
enant separately and be admitted to the League? 

Answer: If the other states would consent to a separate ad- 
herence it would be possible; I think the French would, perhaps, 
object, as they have been feeling very strongly in regard to the 
integrity of the Treaty. 

Question: Was there any objection in the discussions as to the 
multiple votes of the British Empire in the Assembly? 

Answer: None at all. Every one at Paris recognized that the 
giving of votes to the British Dominions was a diminution of the 
influence of London, and there was not the slightest objection on the 
part of anybody. 

Question: Is, in your opinion, the Covenant of the League chiefly 
English, French, or American in origin? 



APPENDIX 507 

Answer: Certainly not French, because while the French did 
make general proposals of principles, they did not make detailed 
proposals or drafts such as both the Americans and the British did. 
Referring to the text, I should say that perhaps in volume and, I 
think, perhaps in importance as well, the larger part of it was Ameri- 
can in its origin; but any answer to such a question is difficult and y^ 
unsatisfactory, for even before the Conference many men in various 
countries had been working along very similar lines, and had reached 
more or less similar results. 

Question: Will you explain the difference between the first and the 
final draft oj the Monroe Doctrine section, and what the French objec- 
tion to it was? 

Answer: There was not any first or final draft of the Monroe 
Doctrine Article because it was maintained substantially as at first 
proposed; the objections of the French, which always seemed to me 
rather obscure, appeared to be based upon a fear that the Article 
meant a policy of isolation on the part of the United States. 

Question: Do you believe that President Wilson Jailed in Paris? 

Answer: How could I beheve that such a man failed? A man 
who showed to the world the moral grandeur of America, and who 
went out of office broken in health, but with a place in history, as 
I believe, that few have equalled and none surpassed. 



INDEX 



Abdul Hamid, i8o 

Adatci, Mr., 211 

Adige River, watershed of, 113, 114 

Adrianople, 174 

Adriatic Sea, Slavonic population of 
east coast of, 122 ; three keys to naval 
domination of, 126; military value of 
eastern coast of, 129, 130; three mili- 
tary bridge-heads of, 130-133; report 
of American specialists on Italy's 
claims in, 132; settlement of Italian 
claims in, 137, 139; Italian and Ser- 
bian struggle for control in, 158 

Africa, data concerning, collected by 
the United States, 4; British occupa- 
tion in, 153; opposition to German 
control in, 224; mandates for, 226, 
227 

Ahad, the, Arab secret society, 180, 181 

Aharonian, Avetis, 188 

Albania, 130, 131, 169, 171; claims of, 
to national independence, 18, 19; 
control over, desired by Italy, 127, 
129; mandate for, offered to Italy, 
137; Greek claims in, 173, 191, 194; 
economic and political conditions in, 
174; independence of, recognized, 
175; terms of Treaty of London re- 
garding, 175 

Allenby, General, 185, 197, 198 

Allenstein, District of, 78, 81 

Alliances of nations, 374 ff. 

Alsace - Lorraine, self - determination, 
German plea for retention of, 40, 46; 
return of, to France, 45-48; Ger- 
man propaganda in, 47; religious 
freedom guarantee not required of, 
212 

American Army engineers, estimate by, 
of war damages, 275, 309 

American Commission to Negotiate 
Peace, 294 

American delegates at Peace Confer- 
ence, on frontiers committee, 96, 97; 
attitude of, regarding Bulgaria, 164, 



166, 170 jf.; errors pointed out by, to 
commission on responsibility for the 
war, 248; memorandum of, to Com- 
mission on Responsibilities, 250; 
fixed sum as amount of Germany's 
indebtedness urged by, 263; attitude 
of, toward costs of war and repara- 
tions, 270; suggestion of, as to 
amount Germany could pay, 276; 
a moderating influence, 285; share of, 
in framing of Treaty, 293 _^.; on eco- 
nomic commission, 307; large amount 
of information gathered by, 308; on 
labor commission, 319, 321, 323; 
Labor's Bill of Rights proposed by, 
329, 331-333 
American Federation of Labor, in- 
dorsement of League of Nations by, 

330 
American Geographical Society, i 
American labor, standards of, 323, 334; 

influences of, in Treaty, 327 
Anatolia, 189, 203; importance of 

Smyrna to, 192; Ottoman rule in, 193 
Andersonville prison, 249 
Antilles, sinking of, 357 
Anti-submarine craft, United States, 

354 

Arab revival, the, 180 

Arabs, freed from Turkish domination, 
176; secret societies of, 180, 181; 
plans for liberation of, 181; con- 
federation of, in Syrian desert, 183; 
revolt of, from Turkey, 184, 185; 
delegation of, at Peace Conference, 
188; camel corps of, in Palestine, 185, 
197; desire of, for independence, 197; 
mandatory control of, 200 

Arbitration, compulsory, 420 

Armaments, problem of limitation of, 
before the Peace Conference, 370 ff. ; 
the accumulation of, 377; limitation 
of German, 386-390; a concrete ex- 
pression of national policies, 390; 
conference of Powers, first step to- 



509 



510 



INDEX 



ward reduction of, 391 ff.; three com- 
ponent parts of, 392; equality in 
limited, impossible, 393; proposals 
concerning reduction of, 394; desir- 
ability of reduction of, 433-435 

Armenia, the frontiers question of, 22; 
failure to liberate, 178; refusal of 
United States to accept mandate for, 
178-180, 187, 188; Soviet Republic 
of, 178, 202, 203; Russian advance 
into, 182; Russian sovereignty over 
four vilayets of, 182; delegations 
from, at Peace Conference, 188, 202; 
starvation in, 190, 191; betrayed by 
civilized world, 195, 203; efforts of, 
for independence, 202; boundaries of, 
fixed by President Wilson, 203; guar- 
antee to aliens in, 212; no mandate 
taken for, 227 

Armistice, the, negotiations concern- 
ing, 8^.; Colonel House's description 
of situation during, 12; economic 
administration during, 336 ff. 

Asia Minor, islands off coast of, re- 
united with Greece, 176; spheres of 
influence promised Italy in, 185; 
Greek claim in, 191, 192, 194; Ital- 
ian claim in, 191, 192; the peasantry 
of, 192, 193; American attitude to- 
ward, 193, 194; Greek troops in, 194- 
197 

Atlantic Fleet, gun's crews supplied 
merchant vessels by, 349; size of, in 
191 7i 349; movements of, 349; de- 
stroyers and patrol vessels of, 351- 
353; training of men by, 352; battle- 
ships sent to British grand fleet, 
354, 357; the troop convoys, 355- 
357; work of the destroyers, 357, 358; 
mine force of, 359-361; mine-laying 
by, 360; overseas transportation ser- 
vice of, 361; aviation service, 361; 
the railway batteries, 363; the sub- 
marines, 366; the subchasers, 367; 
the marine corps of, 367, 368 

Australia, German possessions seized 
by, 224; mandate held by, 226 

Austria-Hungary, armistice conditions 
imposed upon, 8, 9; food and succor 
promised to, 9; dangers coincident 
with disintegration of, 87; revolution 



in, 88-90; secret treaties concerning 
frontiers of, 91; boundary disputes 
in, 92; the drafting of new bound- 
aries in, 95 ff.; factors considered in 
fixing boundaries in, 98, 99; request 
of, concerning Brenner frontier, 102; 
possible dangers from division of 
empire into states, 1 07 _^. ; strategic 
designs of, against Italy, 112; sur- 
render of, to Italy, 120; strategic ad- 
vantages of, on Italian frontier, 124; 
ship tonnage of, in the Straits, 152; 
uncertainty in, as to political future, 
207; assassination of heir to throne 
of, 233; responsibility of, for world 
war, 233, 236; declaration of war 
against Serbia by, 235, 236 

Austria, lesser, boundary settlement of, 
106; economic conditions in, 108; 
advantages of union of, with Ger- 
many, 108; injustice in reparations 
imposed on, 109; lack of seaports a 
danger to, no; protection of minor- 
ities in, 215, 218, 222; customs pro- 
vision concerning, 316 

Austrian Tyrol, boundary settlement 
in, loi, 102 

Aviation service. United States Navy, 
361, 362 

Azerbaijan Tartars, at Peace Confer- 
ence, 189 

Balfour, Rt. Hon. Arthur James, 11, 
25, 93, 159, 280; French plan for 
defense of Rhine opposed by, 52; 
declaration of, concerning Palestine, 
185, 200 

Balkan War, the first, 157, 169, 174; 
cause of the second, 170 

Balkans, the, I55#.; Italian desire for 
control in, 129; expansion in, planned 
by Italy, 130-132; map forgeries in, 
142; industrial development in, 155, 
156; boundary settlements of, 158 
ff.\ intermigration of dissatisfied 
peoples in, 222, 223 

Baltimore, the, 360 

Banat of Temesvar, the, division of, 
105, 106 

Barnes, Mr., 27 



INDEX 



511 



Baruch, Bernard M., 260, 307; "The 
Making of the Reparation and 
Economic Clauses of the Treaty " 
by, 270 

Battleships, United States, in Atlantic 
Fleet, 349; sent to join British grand 
fleet, 354, 357; at Bantry Bay and 
Halifax, 357 

Beer, George L., 7, 440 

Belgium, settlement of boundary ques- 
tion of, 43, 44; mandate held by, 
227; violation of neutrality of, 235, 
236; priority on German reparation 
for, 279-281; German prior lien 
bonds for, 281, 282; economic dele- 
gates from, 307; on Council of 
League of Nations, 417 

Benes, Dr. Edward, 94, 159, 215 

Berlin, Treaty of, 209, 220 

Berthelot, M., 211 

Bethmann-Hollweg, von, 253 

Bill of Rights. See Labor's Bill of 
Rights 

Bismarck, trial of Napoleon III, pro- 
posed by, 247 

Bitlis, 178, 182, 203 

Black Book, the, 6 

Black Sea, ship tonnage in, 152 

Bliss, Dr. Tasker Howard, 197, 198; 
on the Problem of Disarmament, 
370 #. 

Blockade, of enemy areas during armi- 
stice, 340; relaxation of, on import of 
food, 343, 344; the ruthless, of 
modern war, 379, 380 

Bohemia, 97; boundaries of, 103; 
attempt to impose Czech language 
on German, 207 

Bolshevist propaganda in Europe, 341 

Bonds, German, for Belgian obliga- 
tions, 281, 282; given as pledge of 
good faith, 283, 284 

Bonsai, Colonel, 409 

Borden, Sir Robert, 411 

Bosporus, the, 150, 153, 154 

Boundaries, data gathered concerning 
revised, 5, 6; difficulty of fixing, 21- 
23, 98, 99, 205, 206; the principles of 
nationality in settlement of, 68, 106, 
107; territorial commissions formed 
to determine, 95 ff. ; American point 



of view in settlement of, 97; deter- 
mined by territorial commissions, 
159, 160; economic barriers created 
by new, 315; and the League of 
Nations, 411; and self-determina- 
tion, 429 ff. 

Bourgeois, Leon, 27, 410, 414 

Bowman, Dr. Isaiah, 7; on Constanti- 
nople and the Balkans, 140 jf.; 
"The New World" by, 140 n, 

Bratiano, Mr., 94, 212-214 

Brazil, economic delegates from, 307; 
chosen for Council of League of Na- 
tions, 417 

Brenner Pass, the, Italy's claim to 
frontier on, 102, 113-115, 117 

Brest-Litovsk, treaty of, 41 

Briand, M., 58, 286 

Browne, Ralph C, submersible gun in- 
vented by, 359 

Browning, Rear-Admiral, 350, 351 

Bulgaria, armistice conditions imposed 
upon, 9; foreign trade of, 152; cut 
off from the ^gean, 154; small 
peasant proprietors of, 156; fixing 
the boundaries of, isSff., 430; cere- 
mony of signing of treaty by, 163; 
America's position regarding, 164, 
166, 170 ff.; territory lost by, 166, 
168, 170-173; influence of, in Mace- 
donia, 168-170; secret treaty with 
Serbia, 169; gains of, in Thrace, 169; 
American protest against territorial 
losses of, 171; outrages of, upon 
Serbians, 172; effect on, of terri- 
torial losses, 172, 173; ethnic purity 
of, 173; Kavala, ceded to, 173; 
the frontier at Adrianople and Kirk- 
Kilisse, 174; not represented at 
Peace Conference, 191; religious 
freedom in, 209; protection of mi- 
norities in, 215, 218, 222; intermi- 
gration treaty of, with Greece, 223; 
responsibility of, for world war, 233 

Bulgarians, Slavic element in, 156 

Billow, Prince von, 204, 253 

Busch, Moritz, his "Bismarck" quoted, 
247 

Cadorna, 115 

Cambon, Jules, 71, 95, 160 



512 



INDEX 



Cameroons, the, mandate for, 226 

Caperton, Admiral, 353 

Caporetto, disaster, the, 116, 119 

Carr, Mr., 211 

Cassin, the, 358 

Castoldi, Colonel, 211 

Caucasus, the, British activities in, 151 

Cecil, Lord Robert, 27, 440; on League 
of Nations Commission, 403-405, 
408, 415; draft of Covenant made 
by, 403; characteristics of, 403 

Central Alps, the, 116 

Central Rhine Commission, the, 48 

Chauncey, the, 358 

Chiesa, M., 259 > 

China, chosen for Council of League, 
418 

Chinda, Viscount, 440 

Cilicia, 183, 189, 202, 203 

Civilization, modern war a menace to, 
376, 381, 384, 437 

Clemenceau, Premier, 10, 11, 55, 171, 
259. 273, 274, 277, 281, 413; presid- 
ing officer at Peace Conference, 18, 
25, 93; on the Council of Four, 31, 
32, 35, 100; shooting of, 159; re- 
quest of, that American delegation 
postpone departure, 165; fixed sum 
as amount of German indebtedness, 
opposed by, 262, 264-268; the power 
of, 265, 266; attitude of, at Confer- 
ence, 298 

Coal situation during the armistice, 
340 

Colonial expansion before the war, 223 

Commercial clauses of the Treaty, 303 

Commercial interests of nations and 
modern war, 378 

Commercial treaties, European, 313 

Commission of the Straits, 202 

Commission on Reparations, 27, 28, 
259 Jf.; proposal for permanent, 277 

Commission on Responsibility of the 
Authors of the War, 232 ff.; errors 
of, 248; American memorandum to, 
250 

Commission on the League of Nations, 
27, 407-409, 421 

Commissions, established by Council 
of Ten, 25 ff.; the sessions of, 28, 



29, 95-97; reports of, the basis of 
treaties, 29, 30, 34, 99 

Committee on New States and the 
Protection of Minorities, 211 

Communication service, United States 
naval, 364 

Congress of Oppressed Austro-Hun- 
garian Nationalities, 119 

Conscription in Germany, abolition 
of, 388_ 

Constantinople, 143-155; a prize of 
war, 144; economic and political 
importance of , 144-146; under Allied 
control, 144, 150-155; German con- 
trol in, 145; foreign trade of, 145, 
146; the Turk in, 146-150; centre 
of Mohammedan world, 147-149; 
base of British and French activi- 
ties, 151; maintenance of the Sultan 
at, 177, 201, 202 

Convoys for American transports, 355- 

357 

Coolidge, Professor A. C, 211 

Corfu, the Pact of, 157 

Cornwall, Lieutenant-Colonel, 159 

Costs, war, 385; controversy over, 260- 
262; and damage to civilian popu- 
lation, 268-270 

Council of Ambassadors, the, 82 

Council of Five, the, 32, 33 

Council of Four, the, 306, 407; Peace 
Conference in control of, 31-33, 100; 
the sessions of, 33, loi; secret ses- 
sions of, 33, 34; terms of treaties not 
determined by, 33-35; treaty with 
Germany decided upon by, 35; per- 
sonalities of members of, 35, 36; 
friendliness of discussion by, 65; or- 
ganization of, 161; part taken by, in 
making of Treaty, 291 ff.; functions 
and methods of, 296 

Council of Ten, the, 17 ^.,407; meeting- 
place of, 18; character of business of, 
18; weakness of, 20-26, 30, 31; ad- 
ministrative duties imposed upon, 
21; two kinds of problems confront- 
ing, 21 ; the frontiers question before, 
21-23; not qualified to investigate 
facts, 23, 25; special commissions es- 
tablished by, 25 ff.; superseded by 
Council of Four, 31 ; becomes a Coun- 



V 



INDEX 



513 



cil of Five, 32, 33; number of sessions 
held by, 33; inability of, to settle 
Austrian boundary disputes, 92 

Council of the League of Nations, 
choice of four smaller Powers to sit 
on, 417; provision made for increase 
in, 418; eligibility of British do- 
minions to, 422 

Covington, sinking of, 357 

Credits extended to liberated nations, 

339; 340 

Crespi, Signor, 259 

Crillon Hotel, 27, 159 

Crimes, war, fixing responsibility for, 
232 #. 

Croatia, Fiume reserved to, by treaty, 
121, 127 

Croats, the, 157 

Cross-channel transport force, the, 368 

Crowe, Sir Eyre, 96 

Cunliffe, Lord, 259, 275, 276 

Curzon, Lord, 85 

Czechlers, protection to, in minority 
treaty, 219 

Czecho-Slovakia, independence of, rec- 
ognized, 88-90, 94; work of Edward 
Benes for, 94; railway connection be- 
tween Rumania and, 97, 98; the 
northern frontier of, 100; settlement 
of boundaries of, 103, 105; different 
nationalities in, 105, 107; economic- 
ally independent, 109, no; seaports 
given to, no; protection to aliens in, 
211, 212, 215, 218, 219; customs pro- 
vision concerning, 316 

Czechs, desertion of, from Hapsburg 
armies, 88 

Dalmatia, 143; Italian claims in, 124, 
127-129, 131, 132, 138 

Danzig, annexation of, to Poland pro- 
posed, 78; made a free city, under 
the League, 79, 160-162; mobbing 
of Poles in, 82; treaty with Poland, 
82 

Davis, Norman, 260, 280, 307 

Day, Dr. Clive, 7; on the Atmosphere 
and Organization of the Peace Con- 
ference, i5Jf. 

Declaration of Paris of 1856, 438 

Dedeagatch, 173 



Denmark, settlement of boundary be- 
tween Germany and, 42, 43 

Destroyers, United States, 351-353; 
the work of, 357, 358 

Deutschland, the, voyages of, 364 

Diaz, General, 9 

Dinaric Alps, the, 133 

Diplomacy, and justice, 154; and secret 
agreements, 186 

Djemal Pasha, cruelty of, 184 

Dmowski, 27, 94, 158 

Dobrudja, Bulgarians in, 173 

Dodecanese, the, reunited with Greece, 
176; sovereignty over, promised 
Italy, 181 

Drummond, Sir Eric, 421 

Dulles, Allen W., 211 

Dulles, John Foster, 277; arguments of, 
against inclusion of war costs in rep- 
arations, 270 

East Africa, German control in, 224, 
225; mandates for, 226, 227 

East Prussia, 77, 78 

Economic barriers, removal of, 312 ^.; 
conditions, during the armistice, 336 
ff.; priorities, proposals for world 
system of, 310-312; systems, Eu- 
ropean, 316 

Economic clauses of the Treaty, 291 
ff., 427-429; President Wilson's part 
in framing of, 292, 296; influence of 
American principles on, 293 ff.; 
criticism of, 294 ff., 304-306 

Economic commission, the delegates 
on, 306 ff.; the Supreme Economic 
Council, 308; priorities proposal of, 
310-312 

Economic Conference, at Paris, 309 

Economic Council, Supreme, 308 

Egypt, plan for Turkish advance into, 
184 

England. See Great Britain 

Erzerum, 178, 182, 203 

Esperey, Franchet d', 150 

Eupen, Germans in, 212 

Europe, base maps constructed for, 5, 
162; economic solidarity of, 299; 
economic systems in, 316; tariff sys- 
tem of, 313; commercial system of, 
313; natural political map of, 430 



514 



INDEX 



Executive, chief, exempt from trial by 
international tribunal, 238, 247 

Famine at close of war, 336 

Farmers, price pledges given to, 338, 343 

Faroki, 184 

Feisal, Emir, 184, 185, 188, 190, 197, 
200, 201, 432 

Fettah, the, Arab secret society, 180 

Financial questions, work of the com- 
mission on, 27, 28 

Fiume, 112 _^.; Italian claim to, 120^., 
127 ff.; reserved to Croatia by treaty, 
121, 127; Italians and Jugo-Slavs in, 
121, 122; only practicable port for 
Jugo-Slavia, 127, 128, 134; "Tardieu 
project" for free state of, 131, 133; 
Italian plans concerning, 131 ; advan- 
tageous situation of, 133; majority 
of population Jugo-Slav, 135; free 
expression of public opinion in, 
stifled, 136; annexation of, to Italy 
proclaimed by Italian National Coun- 
cil, 136; reasons for rejection of 
Italy's demands for, 134-137; Ameri- 
can attitude toward, 137; effect on, 
of Rapallo Treaty, 139 

Foch, Marshal, 10, 58, 386, 413; at- 
titude of, toward an armistice, 12, 
13; before the Council of Ten, 20; 
attitude toward fortification of 
Rhine, 52, 54 

Food, hoarding of, 337; supplied to 
Europe by the United States, 338 
ff.; prices of, 343 

Ford, Henry, Eagle boats constructed 

by, 354 

Fourteen Points, President Wilson's, 
90, 142, 171, 204, 224, 230, 297; the 
basis of, 2 ; accepted as basis of peace 
with Germany, 13, 14, 120, 186, 187, 
399; and the Saar settlement, 63; and 
the Polish question, 72; and Italian 
boundaries, 120, 123; clause on re- 
moval of economic barriers, 312 

France, close relations of, with other 
countries, 2, 3; desire of, for military 
guarantee on Left Bank of Rhine, 
49-53; offer of Great Britain and 
United States to aid if attacked by 
Germany without provocation, 54, 



55; claims of, on the Saar, 56-58; 
attitude of, toward Poland, 69, 70; 
attitude of, concerning Czecho- 
slovakia, 97; union of Austria with 
Germany opposed by, 108; attitude 
of, toward Italy's Adriatic claims, 
132; spheres of interest for, defined 
by Sykes-Picot Treaty, 182-184; 
the Tripartite Agreement, 183; at- 
titude of, toward Syria, 189, 190; 
opposition of, to Syrian commission, 
198; Syrian mandate given to, 200; 
attempt of, to occupy Cilicia, 203; 
mandate for Syria and Lebanon held 
by, 227; declaration of war aganist, 
by Germany, 235, 236; trial of 
kaiser desired by, 246; control of the 
Ukraine desired by, 151; ship ton- 
nage of, in the Straits, 152; attitude 
of, toward fixing German indemnity, 
262 jf.; opposition of, to fixed sum as 
German indebtedness, 263; conten- 
tion of, for inclusion of war costs in 
reparations, 269; estimate of amount 
Germany should pay, 277; coal sup- 
plied to, by Germany, 282, 283; de- 
livery of horses and cattle to, 283; 
indemnity paid Germany by, 288; 
supremacy in Europe desired for, 
299; suicidal economic policy of pro- 
posals of, 299-302; political situa- 
tion in, 300; economic conditions in, 
301 ; attitude toward war costs and 
military pensions, 303; delegates 
from, on economic commission, 307; 
the Paris economic conference, 309; 
economic priorities proposed by, 
310; tariff system of, 313; conference 
of naval representatives from, 350, 
351; need of alliance in case of an- 
other war, 376, 377; proposals of, for 
international military force, 410, 414; 
attitude of, toward League of Na- 
tions, 412; Monroe Doctrine article 
opposed by, 416; demand of, that 
Germany pay entire war cost, 427 
Frazier, Mr., 409 
Freedom of the seas, 438-440 
French attitude at Peace Conference, 

298/. 
Fromageot, M., 30 



INDEX 



515 



Gallcia, Eastern, decision concerning, 

83 

Ganem, Chukri, 189, 190 

Gases, use of, in war, 381 

Geneva, chosen as seat of League of 
Nations, 417 

Geographical Journal, London, 149 

Geological Survey, United States, 308 

Georgians, delegation of, at Peace Con- 
ference, 189 

German bonds given as pledge of good 
faith, 283, 284 

German language, value of, to Ger- 
mans, 207, 208 

Germany, close relations of, with other 
countries, 2, 3; peace negotiations re- 
quested by, 9, 10; uncertainty as to 
attitude of, toward armistice terms, 
II, 12; armistice terms concerning, 
13, 14; supremacy of Prussia in, 38; 
problems of western frontiers of, 37 
ff., 41 ff.; moderation of conditions 
imposed upon, 41 ; denunciation by, 
of Saar settlement, 61 ; two considera- 
tions in settlement of boundaries of, 
65; Poland's chief enemy, 77; dis- 
satisfaction of, with Polish settle- 
ment, 80; territory and population 
ceded to Poland by, 81 ; trade of, with 
Constantinople, 145; ship tonnage of, 
in the Straits, 152; fixing the eastern 
boundary of, 160; failure of, to en- 
list sympathy of eastern Europe, 204; 
guarantees In treaty with, 211; Af- 
rican possessions of, 224, 225; re- 
sponsibility of, for world war, 233- 
236, 288; declaration of war against 
France and Russia, 235, 236; neu- 
trality violation by, 235, 236; trial of 
subjects of, guilty of war crimes, 248 
ff.; refusal of, to surrender persons 
guilty of war crimes, 255 ; offer of, to 
try guilty subjects, 255, 256; details 
of charges against subjects presented 
to, 256; controversy as to capacity 
of, to pay war costs, 260-262; ques- 
tion of fixing reparation payment of, 
262 jf.; fixed sum as reparation urged 
by United States, 263, 429; amount 
of reparation to be paid by, 275- 



'277, 286, 302; capacity of, to pay, 
275-277, 287; clauses of peace treaty 
regarding reparations by, 278; rec- 
ognition by, of obligation to Bel- 
gium, 281; prior Hen bonds of, for 
Belgian debts, 281, 282; surrender 
of merchant marine of, 282 ; delivery 
by, of coal to France and Italy, 282, 
283; delivery of horses and cattle by, 
283; bonds given as pledge of good 
faith, 283, 284; ability of, to pay large 
amounts, 287; commercial clauses in 
Treaty concerning, 303; tariff system 
of. 313; commercial relations with, 
315 n.; labor section of treaty with, 
325; agreement with, regarding food 
supplies, 345; the feeding of, 346; 
unrestricted submarine campaign of, 
350. 355; merchant ships of, in 
United States ports, 355; submarines 
sent by, to American coast, 364-366; 
pledge of, to limit armaments, 372, 
390; preliminary treaty of peace 
with, 386; limitation of armaments 
of, 386 ff. ; abolition of conscription 
in, 388; size of army allowed for, 388; 
accumulation of munitions prohib- 
ited, 388; reduction of navy of, 389; 
plan of, for league of nations, 399; 
not admitted to League of Nations, 
418; belief that entire cost of war 
could be paid by, 427 

Germans, in territory taken from Ger- 
many, protection of, 211 

Giornale d' Italia, quoted, 131, 133 

Gleaves, Rear-Admiral, 353 

Gompers, Samuel, 27; on the Labor 
Clauses of the Treaty, 319^.; tele- 
gram sent President Wilson by, 330; 
Wilson's reply to, 331-333 

Gourand, General, proclamation of, 
200 

Grasset, Rear-Admlral, 350 

Great Britain, close relations of, with 
other countries, 2, 3; ofTer of, to aid 
France, 54, 55; attitude toward 
French claims on the Saar, 58, 60; 
attitude of, toward Poland, 70; atti- 
tude of, concerning Czecho-Slovakia, 
97; spheres of interest for, defined by 
Sykes-PIcot Treaty, 182-184; nego- 



5i6 



INDEX 



tiations with Arabs, 184; interest of, 
in Suez Canal and Egypt, 184; man- 
dates over Mesopotamia and Pales- 
tine given to, 200, 227; reply of, 
concerning Roumanian Jews, 221; 
mandates for German East Africa 
and island of Nauru held by, 226; 
entrance of, into World War, 236; 
trial of kaiser desired by, 246; 
argument of, for inclusion of war 
costs in reparations, 268-270; atti- 
tude of, toward Italy's Adriatic 
claims, 132; control of the Baltic and 
of the Caucasus desired by, 151; 
primacy of shipping of, in region of 
the Straits, 152; advantages to, of 
control of the Straits, 153; military 
control in Africa, 153; motives not 
disinterested, 153, 154, 163; attitude 
of, toward fixing German indemnity, 
263 ff. ; estimate by, of amount Ger- 
many should pay, 277; delegates 
from, on economic commission, 306; 
representation of Dominions of, in 
League, 334, 403, 408, 422 ; conference 
of naval representatives from, 350, 
351 ; draft of League of Nations sub- 
mitted by, 403; demand of, that Ger- 
many pay entire war cost, 427; atti- 
tude of, toward freedom of the seas, 

438, 439 

Greece, services of, to be paid for, 143; 
annexation of Thrace by, 154; land 
tenure in, 156; influence of, in 
Macedonia, 168; Macedonia divided 
between Serbia and, 170; American 
attitude toward claims of, 173, 192, 
194; treaty of, with Italy, 176; islands 
off Asia Minor reunited with, 176; 
Bulgarian Thrace promised to, 186; 
delegations from, at Peace Confer- 
ence, 188; claims of, presented, 191; 
control of Smyrna given to, 193-196; 
massacre of Turks by, 195; religious 
freedom guaranteed Ionian Islands 
by, 209; protection to aliens in, 212, 
215, 218, 219; special protection to 
Jews in, 218, 219; intermigration 
treaty with Bulgaria, 223; chosen 
for Council of League, 418 

Greek islands, reunited with Greece, 



176; Italy promised sovereignty 

over, 181 
Greek territorial commission, 191, 192, 

194 
Grey, Lord, influence of, 401 

Hampton Roads, naval conference at, 

350. 351 

Haskins, Dr. Charles Homer, 7, 48, 
59, 159; on the New Boundaries of 
Germany, 37 ff. 

Hay, Secretary John, protest of, to 
Roumania, 220, 221; on religious 
toleration 229 

Headlam-Morley, Mr., 48, 59, 159, 
161, 162, 211 

Hedjaz, the, king of, 147, 177; inde- 
pendence of, recognized, 177; en- 
trance of, into war, 184; revolt of, 
from Turkey, 185; population homo- 
geneous, 212 

Herreros, the, German treatment of, 
224 

Hindenburg, 253 

Hofer, Andreas, 102 

Holland, refusal of, to surrender the 
kaiser, 240-245; suggestion of, re- 
garding international jurisdiction, 
244 

Hoover, Herbert, before the Council 
of Ten, 20; member of Supreme Eco- 
nomic Council, 308; on the Economic 
Administration during the Armistice, 
336 #. 

Hornbeck, Capt. S. K., 7 

House, Colonel Edward M., 95, 144, 
159, 210, 270; The Inquiry organ- 
ized by, I ff.; representative of the 
United States in armistice negotia- 
tions, ^ ff., 10; description of the 
armistice situation by, 12; plan for 
Belgian priority suggested by, 280; 
work of, on League of Nations com- 
mission, 404-409, 415, 421; on the 
Versailles Peace in Retrospect, 425 
ff. ; member of mandates commission, 
440 

Hudson, Manley O., 21 1 ; on Protection 
of Minorities and Natives in Trans- 
ferred Territories, 204 ff. 



INDEX 



517 



Hudson, Supreme Court decision con- 
cerning, 249 

Hughes, Premier, 412; argument of, 
for inclusion of war costs in repara- 
tions, 268-270 

Hungary, lesser, principle of nation- 
ality in boundary settlement, 106; 
economic conditions in, 109; lack of 
seaports a danger to, no; protection 
of minorities in, 215, 218; customs 
provision concerning, 316 

Hurst, Mr., draft of League of Nations 
Covenant by, 405 

Hussein Ibn AH, Cherif of Mecca, 177; 
British negotiations with, 184 

Hymans, M., 280, 408 

India, protest from Moslems of, 201 
Inquiry, The, organization and work of, 
I ff., 28; report of, 2; valuable data 
gathered by, 5, 308; maps prepared 
by 5, 162; the personnel of, 6-8; 
three types of problems dealt with 
by, 8; representatives for boundaries 
commission from, 96; Constanti- 
nople memorandum of, 144 
International jurisdiction, 244, 257 
International Justice, Permanent Court 

of, 221 
International Labor Conference, 322 
International Labor Legislation Com- 
mission, 320 Jf. 
International military force, French 

proposal of, 410, 414 
Ionian Islands, religious freedom in, 

209 
Istria, Italy's desire to annex, 131 
Italy, 3; problems concerning bound- 
aries of, 21, 22; attitude of, toward 
Poland, 71; treaties fixing frontiers 
of, 91 ; attitude of, toward Austrian 
boundary settlements, 98; acquisi- 
tions promised to, in Treaty of 
London, 98, 113, 117; annexation of 
Brenner frontier by, 102; territorial 
claims discussed by supreme council 
only, 102; aliens in, 107; defenseless 
frontiers of, before the war, 112; 
Austria's designs against, 112; rea- 
sons of, for entering war, 113; 



territory claimed by, on north, 113- 
115, 117; strategic importance of 
northern frontier of, 115, 116; deci- 
sion concerning northern frontier of, 
117, 118; territory claimed by, on 
the east, 118, 120, 121; settlement of 
eastern boundary question, 118, _^.; 
agreement of, with Jugo-Slavia, 
119, 120; Fourteen Points accepted 
by, 120; Austrian surrender to, 120; 
Fiume claimed by, 120 ff., 127; in- 
creased territorial demands of, 120, 
121, 124, 12^ ff.; principle of nation- 
ality applied to claims of, 121 ; self-de- 
termination applied to claims of, 122 ; 
geographic and economic grounds for 
claims of, 122, 123; strategic argu- 
ments justifying eastern claims of, 
124-126, 129, 130; new frontiers of, 
in alien territory, 126; supremacy in 
Adriatic assured to, 126, 175; Adri- 
atic claims of, 129-132, 157; desire 
of, to obtain control in Balkans, 129- 
132; report of American specialists 
on Adriatic claims of, 132; decision 
against Fiume claim of, 134-137; 
territory ofifered to, in settlement of 
Adriatic problem, 137; terms of 
treaty with Jugo-Slavia, 138; Ameri- 
can attitude toward claims of, 139; 
price for entering war, fixed in ad- 
vance, 143, 181; forces driven back 
by theSenussi, 148, 149; ship tonnage 
of, in the Straits, 152; Croats and 
Slovenes allies of, 157; struggle for 
control in Adriatic, 158; driven from 
Valona, 175; treaty of, with Greece, 
176; terms of London Pact concern- 
ing, 181; spheres of influence in Asia 
Minor promised to, 185, 191; opposi- 
tion of, to Greek claims, 192, 194; 
guarantees of religious freedom not 
required of, 212; delegates from, on 
economic commission, 307 

Jacob Jones, the, 358 

Japan, admitted to Peace Conference, 
17, 24, 28; opposed to trial of kaiser, 
241; German islands seized by, 224; 
mandate held by, 226; proposals of, 
for racial equality, 411, 414, 415 



5i8 



INDEX 



Japanese delegates at Peace Confer- 
ence, 71, 94, 408, 411 

Jefferson, Professor Mark, 7 

Jews, Palestine a homeland for, 176, 
177, 182, 185, 219; question of pro- 
tecting, 210; classified as aliens in 
Roumania, 216, 220; special protec- 
tion to, in Poland, Roumania, and 
Greece, 218, 219 

Johnson, Major Douglas Wilson, 7, 59, 
159; on Fiume and the Adriatic 
Problem, 112 ff. 

Jugo-Slavia, representatives from, at 
Peace Conference, 95; claim of, to 
Klagenfurt basin, 100; nationalities 
in, 107; importance to, of territory 
claimed by Italy, 128; recognition of 
independence of, 132; value of Fiume 
to, 134; terms of treaty with Italy, 
138; land tenure in, 156; lack of 
political unity in, 157; gains on 
eastern frontier of, 158; Bulgarian 
territory claimed by, 166; racial ele- 
ments in, 166; America's protest 
against territorial gains of, 171; 
protection to aliens in, 212, 218, 219; 
opposition of, to protection of mi- 
norities, 213-215; intermigration not 
favored by, 223; fixing boundaries of, 
430 

Jugo-Slavs, desire of, for independence 
and union with Serbia, 89, 90; right 
of self-rule recognized by America, 
118; agreement of, with Italians, 119, 
120; in Fiume, 121; opposition of, to 
Italian rule, 122; elements of, 156, 

157 
Justice, international, and the League 
of Nations, 155 

Kaiser. See William II 

Kammerrer, M., 211 

Kautsky, Karl, his "Guilt of William 

Hohenzollern " quoted, 234, 235 
Kavala, 173 
Kehl, the port of, 48 
Keynes, J. M., 259; misrepresentations 

of, 65 n. 
Kionga, mandate for, 227 
Kirk-Kilisse, 174 



Kitchener, Lord, 267 
Klagenfurt basin, the, lOO 
Klotz, M., 259, 280 
Koo, Wellington, 408 
Kramarz, M., 213, 408 
Kurds, the, 188 

Labor, amendment to Treaty con- 
cerning, 323, 324; standards of Amer- 
ican, 323, 327, 334 

Labor clauses of the Treaty, 319 ff., 

325 ff- 

Labor Conference, International, con- 
troversy over composition of, 322; 
method of procedure of, 325; mis- 
conceptions regarding, 325 

Labor Legislation Commission, 27, 320; 
the Socialists on, 320, 322; sessions 
of, 321; two parts of, 322 

Labor's Bill of Rights, 321, 323, 326; 
the preamble to, 327; full text of, 
328; the American draft of, 329, 331- 
333; amendment of, 330 

Lagosta islands, 138 

Lamont, Thomas William, 307; on 
Reparations, 259^. 

Languages, attempts to extend use of, 
207, 208; provision concerning, in 
minority treaties, 216, 217 , 

Lansing, Secretary, 25, 406 

Larnaude, Professor, 410, 423 

Lawrence, Colonel T. E., 184, 185, 
432 

League of Nations, government of the 
Saar population under, 60-65; Dan- 
zig a free city under, 79; need of, for 
southeastern Europe, 1 1 1 ; mandate 
system under, 155, 22$ ff.; minority 
treaties under guarantee of, 221, 222, 
230; report of, on international penal 
law, 257; treaty obligations left to 
discretion of, 303; and equality of 
trade, 314; labor section of treaty 
concerning, 325; resolution concern- 
ing, adopted at Peace Conference, 
398; votes to British Dominions un- 
der, 334, 403, 408, 422; Geneva 
chosen as seat of, 417; choice of four 
smaller Powers to sit on Council of, 
417; countries invited to join, 418; 



INDEX 



519 



outstanding feature of Paris con- 
gress, 436; opposers of, 436 

League of Nations Commission, mem- 
bers of, 27, 407-409; meetings of, 
407, 409; translation of speeches and 
documents, 409; matters of interna- 
tional concern before, 421; delega- 
tion of women heard by, 421 

League of Nations Covenant, 335; the 
commission which formulated, 27, 
407-409, 421; labor clause in, 319; 
indorsement of, by American Feder- 
ation of Labor, 330; Treaty not de- 
layed by writing of, 399; commission 
appointed to prepare agreement of, 
400; President Wilson's drafts of, 
402, 403; adoption of draft of, 402- 
410; the Hurst-Miller draft, 405; 
clause regarding religious equality 
dropped from, 406, 411; provision 
regarding the Council, 410; pro- 
vision of, for advisory military com- 
mission, 410; Article X of, 410, 411; 
and boundary changes, 411; Article 
XXII of, 411, 440; public discussion 
of, 412; French attitude toward, 412; 
additions and changes suggested, 
414^.; recognition of Monroe Doc- 
trine in, 415-417; the withdrawal 
clause, 418; amendments proposed 
by United States, 418-420; and do- 
mestic questions, 419, 420; Mr. 
Taft's amendment to Article XV, 
420; no provision for compulsory 
arbitration, 420; clearing-house of 
international action, 421; French 
translation of, 423; critics of, 423; 
accepted by nearly every country, 
424 

Lebanese, starving of, 184 

Lebanon, mandate for, 227 

Left Bank of Rhine, demilitarization 
oi, 54, 55; inter-Allied occupation of, 
54, 55 

Leipzig, trial at, of Germans accused of 
war crimes, 253-256 

Lens coal-fields, 282 

Leviathan, the, 356 

Lichnowsky, Prince, 401; quoted, on 
the Polish question, 67 



Linguistic minorities, protection of, 
216-218 

Lippmann, Walter, secretary of The 
Inquiry, i 

Lissa island, 126, 137, 138 

Lithuania, Vilna claimed by, 85 

Little Entente, the, 98 

Lloyd George, Rt. Hon. David, 10, 11, 
13, 60, 70, 93, 154, 237, 240, 273, 
274, 277, 281, 282, 286, 301, 403; 
member of Council of Four, 31, 32, 
36, 100; defense of Rhine opposed 
by, 52; attitude of, in Polish settle- 
ment, 78-80; proposal of, concerning 
Danzig, 79; opposition of, to Polish 
annexation of Danzig, 160-162; op- 
posed to fixing sum of German in- 
debtedness, 262, 264-268; the power 
of, 265-267; argument of, for inclu- 
sion of pensions in reparations, 271; 
estimate as to what Germany could 
pay, 275 

Lodge, Senator, League Covenant 
reservations of, 424 

London, the Conference of, 209; repara- 
tions proposals at, 301, 303 

London, secret treaty of, 91, 98, 102, 
113, 117, 118, 121, 127, 132, 137, 138, 
143, 171, 175, 181, 185, 191; con- 
sidered obsolete by American gov- 
ernment, 118; contents of, made 
public, 119 

Lord, Dr. Robert Howard, 7; on the 
reconstruction of Poland, 67 ff. 

Loucheur, M., 259, 276 

Lowell, James Russell, 246 

Ludendorff, General von, 253; "War 
Memories of, " 41 

Lunt, Dr. W. E., 7 

Lusitania, sinking of, 348 

Lussin islands, 137 

Luxemburg, settlement of question of 
customs frontier of, 44, 45; violation 
of neutrality of, 235, 236 

McCormick, Vance, 260, 275, 307 
Macedonia, population of, 168; Serbian 
and Greek influence in, 168; Rou- 
manian influence in, 169; end of 
Bulgarization of, 168-170; divided 
between Serbia and Greece, 170; Bui- 



520 



INDEX 



garians in, 173; political autonomy 
in, proposed by Italy, 219 

Mack, Judge Julian W., 210 

Malmedy, Germans in, 212 

Mandates, system of, proposed by 
General Smuts, 225; three types of, 
225, 226; selection of states as man- 
datories, 226; the formulation of, 227; 
Japanese and French reservations, 
227; permanent committee for super- 
vision of, 227; value of system of, 
228-230; article on, in League Cove- 
nant, 411; commission to prepare 
terms of, 440; provisions protecting 
natives under Mandatory Power, 
441-443; three classes of, 441-443 

Mantoux, Captain Paul, 65 n.; letter 
of, quoted, 12 

Maps, prepared by The Inquiry, 5, 
162; use of perverted, 142 

Marconi, Guglielmo, 440 

Marienwerder, District of, 78, 79, 81 

Marine corps. United States, part taken 
by, in war, 367, 368 

Maritsa River, the, 172 

Marshall, Louis, 210 

Martino, Mr. de, 211 

Masaryk, President, 94 

Maximilian, Prince, of Baden, peace 
negotiations requested by, 9, 10 

Mayo, Rear-Admiral Henry Thomas, 
on the Atlantic Fleet in the Great 
War, 348 /. 

Merchant vessels, surrender of German, 
282; training of gun's crews for 
United States, 349, 351; taking over 
and repair of German, by United 
States navy, 355 

Mesopotamia, the Arabs of, 176; Brit- 
ish control in, 183; promise to assist 
establishment of native government 
in, 197, 198; mandate over, given to 
Great Britain, 200, 226, 227 

Mezes, Dr. Sidney Edward, 7 ; on Prep- 
arations for Peace, i ff. 

Miller, David Hunter, i, 7, 59, 211; 
on the Making of the League, 398 
ff. ; draft of League of Nations Cove- 
nant by, 405 
Milner, Lord, 11, 440 



Mine barrage in North Sea, 354, 359- 
361 

Mine-laying force. United States, 353, 
359-361 

Minnesota, the, 365 

Minorities, guarantees to religious, 209, 
210; first proposal for protecting, 
made by President Wilson, 210; 
committee on protection of, 211; 
opposition to guarantees to, 213-215; 
President Wilson's speech in regard 
to, 214; signing of treaties guaran- 
teeing protection of, 215; provisions 
of treaties protecting, 215 ^. 

Minority treaties, provisions of, 215 
ff.; criticism of, 217; under guaran- 
tee of League of Nations, 221, 222; 
method of enforcement of, 222 

Mittel Europa, data concerning, col- 
lected by The Inquiry, 5; discussion 
of tentative boundaries for, 6 

Mobilization and preparedness, 373 

Mohammedanism, Constantinople the 
focus of, 147; the confraternities of, 
147-149; change in aspects of, 148 

Monroe Doctrine, recognition of, in 
League Covenant, 406, 415-417 

Montagu, E. S., 201, 259 

Montenegro, religious freedom in, 209 

Moravia, the boundaries of, 103 

Mori, M., 259 

Most-favored-nation clauses of Euro- 
pean treaties, 313 

Mt. Athos, special protection to monks 
of, 219 

Mount Vernon, the, 357 

Mussulmans, the, 209; special protec- 
tion to, in minority treaties, 219 

Mustapha Kemal Pasha, 178, 196, 203 

Napoleon Bonaparte, 114, 115, 239, 246 

Napoleon III, 247 

Nation in arms, doctrine of the, 373 

#., 377/. 
Nationalism, impetus given to, by 

Allied success, 207 
Nationality, principle of, and boundary 

settlements, 106, 107; provision in 

minority treaties concerning, 216 
Nations, Alliances of, 374 ff. 
Naval Bureau of Ordnance, 359, 363 



INDEX 



521 



Navy, United States, increase in, 348, 
352; conference with British and 
French Admirals, 350, 351 ; organiza- 
tion of patrol force by, 350, 351, 353; 
destroyers sent to British waters, 
351-353; command of forces of, in 
European waters, 352; demand for 
trained men in, 352; anti-submarine 
craft built by, 354; battleships of, 
sent to join British Grand fleet, 354, 
357; taking over and repair of Ger- 
man merchant ships by, 355; the 
troop convoy system, 355-357; work 
of the destroyers, 357, 358; mine 
force of, 359-361 ; mine-laying by, 
360; overseas transportation by, 361 ; 
development of the aviation service, 
361, 362; the railway batteries, 363; 
transatlantic communication for 
army secured by, 364; vessels de- 
stroyed by German submarines, 365; 
operations of submarines of, 366; 
the sub-chasers, 367; part taken in 
war by marines, 367, 368; numerous 
activities of, 368, 369; hospital facili- 
ties of, 368; the cross-channel trans- 
port force, 368 

Near East, secret treaties concerning, 
181-186, 190, 200, 203; delegations 
from, at Peace Conference, 188 

Neuilly, Treaty of, 163, 166, 172 

New States and Protection of Minori- 
ties, Committee on, 211 

New Zealand, mandate held by, 226 

North Sea, mine barrage in, 354, 359- 
361 

Norway, coast mined by, 359 

Nubar Pasha, 188 

Odessa, withdrawal of French from, 151 

Olympia, the, 369 

Olympic, the, 356 

Orlando, Premier, 10, 11, 24, 94, 191, 
194, 262; in the Council of Four, 31, 
32, 35, 100; on League of Nations 
Commission, 407 

Osmanli, the, 176; see also Turks 

Ossoinack, speech of, 135 

Ottoman foreign debt, the, 146 

Overseas Transportation Service, Na- 
val, 361 



Pachitch, Serbian delegate, 94 
Pacific Fleet, South Atlantic patrolled 

by, 353 

Pact of Rome, the, 119, I20 

Paderewski, 94, 14c, 213 

Palestine, a homeland for the Jews, 
176, 177, 182, 185, 219; campaigns 
in, 185; opposition to separation of, 
190; mandate for, 200, 226, 227 

Panyeko, 151 

Paris Economic Conference, 309 

Patrol vessels. United States, 350, 351, 
353 

Peace Conference, the, personnel of, 
10, 11; atmosphere and organization 
of, 15 #•; public demand for the 
spectacular at, 15, 16, 19; Japan ad- 
mitted to, 17, 24, 28; the Council of 
Ten, 17 ff.\ character of business of, 
18, 19; meeting-place of, 18; diffi- 
culty of settling frontiers questions 
at, 21-23; special commissions estab- 
lished at, 25 ff.; direction of, assumed 
by Council of Four, 31-33, 100, 296; 
the Council of Five, 32, 33; number 
of sessions held by different councils 
at, 33; compared with similar bodies 
in the past, 36; settlement of ques- 
tions of new frontiers of Germany 
by, 37 ff., 42 ff.; settlement of fron- 
tiers questions of Poland by, 6j ff.; 
determination by, of frontiers in 
Austria-Hungary, 91 ff.; the mem- 
bers of, at the hearings, 93, 94; the 
American representatives on frontiers 
committee, 96, 97; decision of, re- 
garding Italian boundaries, 117; 
idealistic principles brought to, 141; 
confusion at, concerning objects of 
war, 141; recitals of claims of minor 
nationalities at, 158, 159, 431; the 
first two months of, 159; the Amer- 
ican delegation at, 165 ff.; Near East 
delegations at, 188; withdrawal of 
United States from, 198; protection 
of minorities and natives in trans- 
ferred territories, 205, 208, 210^.; 
responsibilities of, 208; Commission 
on Responsibilities created by, 232 
ff.; reparations most difficult question 
before, 259^, ; qualities of, 296; state 



522 



INDEX 



of mind at, 297; French attitude at, 
298 #.; interests of Allied Powers at, 
305; economic delegates at, 306^.; 
idealism and determination at, 335; 
character of the problems before, 370; 
resolution of, concerning League of 
Nations, 398; accomplishments of, 
425; delay in convening and in deal- 
ing with Germany, 426; failure of, to 
adjust international finances, 428; 
avoidance by, of armaments reduc- 
tion question, 433; lack of publicity 
at, 435; League of Nations outstand- 
ing feature of, 436 

Peace without victory, 425 

Pelagosa islands, 137 

Pensions, inclusion of, in reparations, 
271, 272 

Pershing, General, 253 

Persian Gulf, ship tonnage in, 152 

Pessoa, President, of Brazil, 408 

Pichon, M., 25, 70; palace of, on the 
Quai d'Orsay, 18, 19, 23, 93 

Plenary Assembly, of the Peace Con- 
ference, 17 

Pola, 126 

Poland, 39; settlement of boundary 
questions of, 67 ff. ; attitude of Allies 
toward, 69 ff.\ French attitude to- 
ward, 70; England's attitude to- 
ward, 70; American attitude toward, 
71; Italian attitude toward, 71; an 
independent state, 71; fixing the 
frontiers of, 71 #.,83-85; Germans 
in, 73; national feeling in, 74; prov- 
inces proposed for cession to, 75 > 7^; 
free access to the sea promised to, 77; 
Germany, chief enemy of, 77; terri- 
tory and population ceded by Ger- 
many to, 81 ; treaty with Danzig, 82; 
Austrian, 82; Russian, 83-85; the 
eastern boundaries of, 83-85; claim 
of, to Vilna, 85; size and population 
of new state of, 86; representatives 
of, at the Peace Conference, 94; 
Ruthenians under control of, 107; 
Danzig not given to, 160-163; pro- 
tection of minorities in, 210, 218, 222; 
guarantee of protection to Germans 
in, 211; opposition of, to guarantees 
to minorities, 213-215; special pro- 



tection to Jews in, 218, 219; cus- 
toms provision concerning, 316 

Polish territorial commission, report of, 
160 

Polk, Frank L., 165, 166, 215, 330, 

333 
Portugal, mandate held by, 227 
Posen, 74, 75 
Powers, World, conference of, proposed, 

for consideration of armaments 

limitation, 391 ff. 
Preparedness, 373, 377; a guarantee 

against war, 383 
President Lincoln, sinking of, 357 
Pressburg, Czecho-Slovak claim to, no 
Priorities, economic, 310-312 
Prussia, military supremacy of, 38; 

division of, not desired by the Allies, 

39; strategic importance of West, 74, 

75; East, 77, 78 
Publicity, lack of, at Paris Conference, 

435 

Racial minorities, protection of, 215 #, 

Radio stations. United States control 
of, 364 

Raggi, Marquis Salvago, 96 

Railway batteries, United States naval, 
363 

Rapallo, Treaty of, 138, 172 

Rappard, Professor, 415 

Red Book, the, 6 

Red Cross article in League Covenant, 
421 

Red Sea, ship tonnage in, 152 

Reis, M., 410 

Religious, equality, clause regarding, 
dropped from League Covenant, 406, 
411; minorities, guarantees to, 209, 
210, 216; toleration, basis of inter- 
national action, 229 

Reparations, work of the commission 
on, 27, 28; members of commission 
on, 259; sub-commissions, 260; ac- 
tual war costs excluded from, 260, 
268-270, 428; Germany's capacity to 
pay, 260-262, 275-277, 287; fixed 
sum as, urged by United States, 263, 
429; limited to material damage, 
271; inclusion of pensions in, 271; 



INDEX 



523 



total amount to be paid, 275-277, 
286, 302; surrender of German mer- 
chant marine, 282; delivery by Ger- 
many of coal, cattle, and other items, 
282,283; permanent commission on, 
277, 284^.; clauses of peace treaty 
dealing with, 278; German bonds for 
Belgium, 281; bonds as pledge of 
Germany's good faith, 283, 284; dele- 
gates to permanent commission, 284, 
285; United States not represented 
on permanent commission, 285, 289; 
new proposals of, at London con- 
ference, 301, 303; impossibility of 
fixing maximum sum, 301 

"Report of the Commission of Re- 
sponsibilities of the Conference of 
Paris," 234 n., 235 n. 

Responsibility of the Authors of the 
War, Commission on, 232 f. 

Revolution, separation of states from 
old empires through, 336, 337 

Rhine, the. Left Bank of, extent and 
character of the region, 49; defense 
of, desired by France, 49-53 ; demili- 
tarization and inter-Allied occupa- 
tion of, 54, 55 

Riga, Treaty of, 85 

Root, Senator, member of Interna- 
tional Court Committee, 421 

Roumania, treaties fixing frontiers of, 
91; the new boundaries of, 95, 105, 
430; railway connection between 
Czecho-Slovakia and, 97, 98; claim 
of, to the Banat of Temesvar, 105, 
106; aliens in, 107; increase in com- 
merce of, 154; land tenure in, 156; 
influence of, in Macedonia, 169; 
Bulgaria's foreign trade menaced by, 
172; religious freedom in, 209, 210; 
Jews classified as aliens in, 216, 220; 
minority races protected in, 212, 218, 
219; opposition of, to guarantees to 
minorities, 213-215; special protec- 
tion to Jews in, 218, 219; Secretary 
Hay's protest to, 220 

Rupprecht of Bavaria, Ex-Crown 
Prince, 253 

Russia, data concerning, collected by 
the United States, 4; secret agree- 



ment with, concerning Left Bank of 
Rhine, 49, 52, 58; and Polish eastern 
boundaries, 83-85; services of, to be 
paid for, 143; economic change in 
Ukrainian district of, 144; ship ton- 
nage of, in the Straits, 152; Arme- 
nian Soviet Republic in Transcau- 
casia, 178, 202, 203; terms of 
Sazonof-Paleologue treaty concern- 
ing, 181; advance into Turkish Ar- 
menia, 182; sovereignty over Ar- 
menian vilayets promised to, 182; 
overthrow of, 186; Bolshevism in, 
189; Constantinople promised to, 
201 ; representation on Commission 
of Straits provided for, 202 ; declara- 
tion of war against, 235, 236 
Ruthenians, political autonomy given 
to, 219 

Saar Valley, the, description of, 56; 
French claims in, 56-58; coal-mines 
of, 56, 259, 283; government of, un- 
der League of Nations, 60-65; criti- 
cism of settlement concerning, 62, 63; 
extent of, and form of government 
in, 64 

Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement, 
the, 185, 191, 194 

Saloniki, 169; foreign trade of, 146; 
capture of, by Greeks, 157; Greek 
claim to, 173 

Samoan Islands, German, mandate for, 
226 

San Diego, the, 365 

San Remo, conference at, 200, 227 

Sassens, island of, 175 

Saxons, special protection to, in minor- 
ity treaty, 219 

Sazonof-Paleologue Agreement, the, 
181, 187, 201, 203 

Schleswig, division of, between Ger- 
many and Denmark, 42, 43; the 
Germans in, 212 

Scotland, fuel-oil pipe-line across, 368 

Scott, Dr. James Brown, 7, 402, 406; 
on the Trial of the Kaiser, 231 ff. 

Seas, freedom of the, 438-440 

Secret treaties, 91, 181-186, 190, 200, 
203 



524 



INDEX 



Self-determination, President Wilson 
quoted on, 68; limitations of, 205; 
and fixing of boundaries, 429-433 

Senussi, the, Mohammedan society, 
148, 149 

Serajevo, the assassinations at, 233 

Serbia, delegates from, at Peace Con- 
ference, 94; claim of, to the Banat of 
Temesvar, 106; deprived of access to 
the sea, 129, 157, 158, 169; struggle 
of, for control in Adriatic, 158; ter- 
ritory ceded to, 166, 168, 170; in- 
fluence of, in Macedonia, 168, 170; 
secret treaty of, with Bulgaria, 169; 
Bulgarian outrages in, 172; religious 
freedom in, 209; opposition of, to 
guarantees to minorities, 213; Au- 
strian ultimatum to, 234; war 
against, declared by Austria, 235, 236 

Serbs, the, 156, 157 

Sevres, Treaty of, 144, 150, 172, 176 ff., 
190, 195, 196, 202, 203 

Sexten valley, the, 118, 137 

Seymour, Dr. Charles, 7, 159; on the 
End of an Empire, 87 ff. 

Shaw, the, 358 

Shipping, in region of the Straits, 152; 
tension upon, during armistice, 339 

Shotwell, Dr. James T., 7 

Silesia, 103; Upper, 74, 75, 80-82 

Simon, M., 440 

Sims, Rear-Admiral W. S., 352 

Siwa, the Senussi driven out of, 149 

Slavs, two groups of, 156 ff. 

Slovenes, the, 156, 157 

Smuts, General Jan, 27, 402-404, 408; 
proposal of mandate system made 
by, 225; argument of, for inclusion 
of pensions in reparation bill, 271 

Smyrna, foreign trade of, 146; impor- 
tance of, to Anatolia, 192; control of, 
given to Greece, 193, 194, 196; occu- 
pation of, by Greek troops, 194; 
massacre of Turks in, 195, 196; pro- 
visional arrangement concerning, 
196 

Socialists on labor legislation commis- 
sion, 320, 322 

Sofia, 166, 170 

Solf, 269, 270 

Sonnino, Baron, 11, 24, 94, 131 



South African Union, the, 224, 226 

South America, detailed data concern- 
ing, collected by United States, 3, 4 

Southwest Africa, German control in, 
224; mandate for, 226 

Sovereigns, immunity of, 238, 247 

Spain, chosen for Council of League of 
Nations, 417 

Spalato, port of, claimed by Italy, 127 

Stambouliski, 163 

States' rights, protection of, in labor 
clauses of treaty, 326 

Stowell, Lord, quoted, 231 

Straits of Constantinople, zone of, 144; 
shipping in region of, 152; advantages 
to Great Britain of control of, 153; 
commission of, established, 202 

Strasburg, the port of, 48 

Strauss, Rear-Admiral, 353, 361 

Strikes, shipping and port, 339 

Strumitsa, 166, 168, 170 

Subchasers, United States, 367 

Submarine warfare, German, 350, 355, 
364-366 

Submarines, movements of German, 
kept track, of, 356; destruction to 
German, by mine barrage, 360 ; Ger- 
man, on American coast, 364-366; 
operations of United States, 366 

Suez Canal, British interest in, 182, 184 

Sultan, the, maintenance of, in Con- 
stantinople, 201, 202 

Sumner, Lord, 259, 268 

Supreme Court, United States, deci- 
sion of, in Hudson case, 249 

Supreme Economic Council, the, 308, 

341 
Supreme Inter-allied War Council, the, 

\7 
Switzerland, 206; refusal to recognize 
neutrality of, in League Covenant, 

415 

Sydorenko, 151 

Sykes-Picot Treaty, the, 182-184, 189, 
198, 203 

Syria, British occupation of, 153; 
French occupation of, 153, 200; the 
Arabs of, 176; Arab confederation 
established in, 183; Turkish cruelties 
in, 184; French mandate over, 189, 
190, 226, 227; promise to assist estab- 



INDEX 



525 



lishment of native government in, 
197, 198; American commission sent 
into, 198; proclaimed independent 
state, 200 
Szoegeny, Count, 234 

Taft, William H., amendment to Ar- 
ticle XV of Covenant by, 420 

Tardieu, Andre, 26, 33, 48, 53, 59, 96, 
165; project of, for free state of 
Fiume, 131, 133 

Tariff Commission, United States, 309 

Tariff system, European, 313 

Tariffs and equality of trade, 314 

Tarvis basin, the, 137 

Tashkilat Milli, the, 178, 196 

Tatsumi, M., 259 

Taussig, commanding Destroyer Divi- 
sion, 351 

Temperley, H. W. V., "The History of 
the Peace Conference" by, 61, 278 

Territorial and Economic Section of 
the American Commission to Nego- 
tiate Peace, 2, 6 

Territorial commissions, establishment 
of, 28; reports of, 29, 34, 99, 100; 
the Polish, 71 ff., 160; to draft new 
boundaries in Austria - Hungary, 
95 ff-', the American representatives 
on, 96, 97; new boundaries deter- 
mined by, 159, 160; the Greek, 191, 
192, 194 

Teschen, the dispute over, 69, 92 ; divi- 
sion of, 82, 83 

Thrace, Greek annexation of, 154; 
Bulgarian gains in, 169; Greek claim 
to, 173, 186, 191, 194; Bulgarian 
population of, 173 

Ticonderoga, the, 365 

Times, London, list of accused Germans 
in, 253 

Togoland, mandate for, 226 

Tower, Sir Reginald, 162, 163 

Trade conditions, equality of, 312-315; 
economic barriers created by trea- 
ties, 315 

Transcaucasian Russia, British occu- 
pation of, 151, 153; Armenian Soviet 
Republic in, 178, 202, 203 

Transferred territories, protection of 
peoples in, 223 ff. 



Transport, overseas, of United States 
troops, 355, 361; cross-channel, 368 

Transylvania, 105, 207 

Treaties, secret, 91, 1 81-186, 190, 200, 
203 

Trebizond, 182, 203 

Trentino, the, 116; Italy's claim to, 
102, 113-115; distribution of races 
in, 114; Germans in, 212 

Tripartite Agreement, the, 183, 190, 
200, 203 

Trumbitch, Mr., 94, 213 

Turkey, foreign debt of, 146; Constan- 
tinople focus of trade and political 
life of, 146; limitation of armaments 
in, 150; ship tonnage of, in the 
Straits, 152; results of treaty with, 
176 ff.; Turkizing policy in, 180; 
international compacts disposing of 
territory of, 181 ; revolt of Arab offi- 
cers in army of, 181; advance of, 
into Egypt planned, 184; revolt of 
Hedjaz from, 185; provisions of 
Fourteen Points concerning, 187; 
not represented at Peace Conference, 
191; Cilicia and central Anatolia 
left with, 203; protection of minori- 
ties in, 215, 218; protection to Chris- 
tians in, 219; intermigration arrange- 
ment with Greece, 223; responsibility 
of, for world war, 233 

Turks, the, position of, at Constanti- 
nople, 146-150; under control of 
Sultan, 176; revolt of Young Turk 
party, 180, 196; of Asia Minor, 192, 
193; treatment of Anatolians by 
Young, 193; massacre of, by Greeks, 
195. 196 

Tyrell, Sir William, 159 

Tyrol, Austrian, Italy's claim to, 102, 
113 

Tyrolese, annexed by Italy, 429 

Z7-53, the, 364, 365 

Z7-151, the, 365 

Ukraine, the, French activities in, 151 

United States, lack of information con- 
cerning other countries, 1-3; in- 
fluence of, at Peace Conference, 41; 
French plan for defense of Rhine 



526 



INDEX 



opposed by, 52; offer of, to aid 
France, 54, 55; secret treaties op- 
posed by, 91; the representatives 
from, on frontiers commission, 96, 
97; refusal of, to recognize Treaty of 
London, 118; refusal of, to accept 
Armenian mandate, 178-180, 187, 
188, 443; expected to replace Russia 
in settlement of Turkish problems, 
187; attitude of, toward Greek 
claims, 192; withdrawal of, from 
Peace Conference, 198; representa- 
tion on Commission of Straits pro- 
vided for, 202; interest of, in Rou- 
manian conditions, 220; opposed to 
trial of kaiser, 241, 245; no delegate 
from, on Reparations committee, 
285, 289; no pledge as to war debt 
given by, 289; food supplied to Allies 
by, 338; solution by, of economic 
problems during armistice, 342 ff.; 
insistence by, on removal of food 
blockade, 343; refusal of, to furnish 
supplies to enemy on credit, 344; 
assistance given Europe by, during 
the armistice, 346; assistance of, in 
event of another European war, 376, 
377; amendments to League Cove- 
nant favored by, 418-420; refusal of, 
to accept and support Treaty of 
Versailles, 426; interest of, in adjust- 
ing world finance, 427; foreign loan 
of, 428; failure of, to join League of 
Nations, 437; attitude of, toward 
freedom of the seas, 438; argument 
for acceptance of mandate by, 443 
Upper Silesia, 74, 75; mineral wealth 
of, 80; plebiscite in, 80-82 

Valona, 126, 130, 174, 175 

Van, 178, 182, 203 

Vandervelde, 27 

Venizelos, Eleutherios, II, 27, 159, 188, 
213, 418; quoted. III; promise ob- 
tained by, 186; Greek claims pre- 
sented by, 191, 192, 194; Smyrna 
claim of, 194; Greek troops sent to 
Smyrna by, 194, 195; downfall of, 
196, 197; protection of minorities ap- 
proved by, 215; intermigration in 
the Balkans suggested by, 222, 223; 



Article XV of League Covenant by, 
408 

Versailles Conference, the, 10^.; per- 
sonnel of, 10, II 

Versailles, treaty of, founded on re- 
ports of Commissions, 29, 34, 99; 
provision regarding trial of the 
kaiser, 232, 237^.; the preamble of, 
236, 237; draft of Article 227 pre- 
pared by President Wilson, 237; 
provisions concerning trial of Ger- 
man subjects, 251, 252; clauses deal- 
ing with reparation and finance, 278; 
clause concerning German bonds, 
281; the economic provisions of, 291 
ff., 427-429; President Wilson's part 
in making, 292 ff.; American prin- 
ciples and economic clauses of, 293; 
reparations clauses of, 302; com- 
mercial clauses of, 303; a hard and 
exacting document, 304; criticism of 
economic clauses of, 304-306; in- 
terests of Powers determining terms 
of, 305; the labor clauses of, 319 ff., 
325 ff.; labor amendments to, 323, 
324; preamble to military peace 
terms of, 372 ; not delayed by League 
of Nations, 399; accomplishments of, 

425 

Vesnitch, M., 94, 408 

Vienna, Congress of, 430 

Vilna, the dispute concerning, 85; 
population of, 85 n. 

Vlachs, special protection to, in minor- 
ity treaty, 219 

von Bethmann-Hollweg, 253 

von Biilow, General, 204, 253 

von Capelle, Admiral, 253 

von der Goltz, General, 181 

von Falkenhayn, General, 253 

von Kluck, General, 253 

von Lersner, Baron, 254, 255 

von Ludendorff, General, 253; "War 
Memories" of, 41 

von Mackensen, Field-Marshal, 253 

von Sanders, General Liman, 145, 253 

von Tirpitz, Admiral, 253 

von Wiesner, Herr, 233 

War, breaches of the laws and customs 
of, 247 ff. 



INDEX 



War, modern, characteristics of, 373 
#•1 381 Jf.; national alliances in, 374- 
377; alliances of commercial interests, 
378; a menace to civilization, 376, 
377. 381, 384, 437; accumulation of 
armaments for, 377; the extreme 
blockade, 379, 380; suddenness of, 
380; the non-combatants, 380; facts 
concerning, 381-383; ruthless de- 
struction of life in, 38 1 ; preparedness 
a guarantee against, 383 

War, World, confusion concerning 
objects of, 141 ; change in objects of, 
143; a crusade for liberation of op- 
pressed peoples, 205; rivalries en- 
gendered by, 224; commission to fix 
responsibility for crimes of, 232 ff.; 
causes of, 233-236; Germany's neu- 
trality violation, 235, 236; cost of, 
260-262, 268-270, 288, 385, 427; 
amount of actual material damage 
and pensions, 275; responsibility for, 
288; no American pledge as to Allied 
debt, 289; national alliances preced- 
ing, 375; summary of, 383; number 
killed and wounded in, 384, 385; 
diplomatic telegrams preceding, 401 

Warsaw, renounced by Russia, 83, 84 

Waugh, Mr., 64 

Weizmann, Dr. Chaim, 188 

West Prussia, 74; strategic importance 
of, 75 

Westermann, Dr. William Linn, 7; 
on the Armenian Problem and the 
Disruption of Turkey, 1^6 ff. 

William II, Emperor, provision in 
Versailles treaty concerning trial of, 
232, 237 ff.\ flight of, into Holland, 
239; Holland's refusal to surrender, 
240-245; punishment in present con- 
dition of, 246 

Wilson, Admiral, 353 

Wilson, President, 93, 143, 188; reply 
of, to Germany's request for peace 
negotiations, 9, 10; trip to America 
and return to France, 31; in the 
Council of Four, 31, 32, 36, 100; 
attitude toward French claims on 
the Saar, 58, 60; on self-determina- 



527 



tion, 6»; on the Polish question, 69; 
value of services of, at Peace Con- 
ference, 36, 165; reply of, to Austria's 
request for an armistice, 90; opposi- 
tion of, to secret treaties, 91, 186; 
territorial commissions approved by, 
in Austrian boundaries settlement, 
95; keen interest of, in boundary 
settlements, loi; decision of, con- 
cerning Brenner frontier, 102; view 
of, concerning Italian frontiers, 118; 
Italian supremacy in Adriatic ap- 
proved by, 126; terms of Adriatic 
settlement ameliorated by, 139; sug- 
gestion of, concerning Constanti- 
nople, 144; agreement with Lloyd 
George on the Danzig question, 161, 
162; not responsible for refusal to 
accept Armenian mandate, 179; ap- 
proval by, of Palestine agreement, 
186; American commission sent into 
Syria by, 198; Armenian boundaries 
fixed by, 203 ; new meaning given to 
war by, 204; insistence of, on impar- 
tial justice, 208 ; protection to minori- 
ties advocated by, 210, 215; speech 
of, on rights of minorities, 214; draft 
of Article 227 prepared by, 237; 
opposed to trial of kaiser, 237; 
Premier Hughes's attack on, 269; 
on inclusion of war costs in repara- 
tions, 270; inclusion of pensions 
approved by, 272; generous attitude 
of, at Peace Conference, 272-274; 
on reciprocal tariff for Germany, 274; 
no pledge as to war debt made by, 
289; share of, in framing economic 
clauses of the treaty, 292, 296; Gom- 
pers's telegram to, 330; reply of, to 
Gompers, 331-333; equality of trade 
conditions proposed by, 312, 314; 
on removal of economic barriers, 
312; phrase "association of nations" 
used by, 399; drafts of League of 
Nations prepared by, 402, 403; ac- 
ceptance by, of Hurst-Miller draft 
of Covenant, 405; D. H. Miller's 
criticism of Covenant draft of, 406; 
success of first visit to Paris, 413, 
414; support of Monroe Doctrine 



528 



INDEX 



article by, 416, 417; addrej^s of, con- Young Turks, revolt of, 180, 196; treat- 

cerning reparations, 427; influence of, ment of Anatolians by, 193 

in making League Covenant, 436 

Wirz, Henry, trial of, 249 Zara, Italian claim to, 121, 127, 128, 

Women, delegation of, heard by League ^31; given to Italy, 138 

of Nations Commission, 421 Zholger, Jugo-Slav representative, 95 

Wurtemberg, Duke of, 253 ^T''^'' '^^^ff''''' «f'. ^^ Peace Con- 

ference, 188; opposition to move- 
ment of, for separation of Palestine, 

Yap, island of, 226, 227 190 

Young, Dr. Allyn Abbott, 7; on the Zone of the Straits, 144; sec o/so Straits 
Economic Settlement, 291 ff. of Constantinople 



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